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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Royalist and Parliamentarian War Effort in Shropshire  
During the First and Second English Civil Wars, 
1642-1648 
 
Jonathan Worton 
 
 
Addressing the military organisation of both Royalists and Parliamentarians, the 
subject of this thesis is an examination of war effort during the mid-seventeenth 
century English Civil Wars by taking the example of Shropshire. The county was 
contested during the First Civil War of 1642-6 and also saw armed conflict on a 
smaller scale during the Second Civil War of 1648. This detailed study provides a 
comprehensive bipartisan analysis of military endeavour, in terms of organisation 
and of the engagements fought. 
 Drawing on numerous primary sources, it explores: leadership and 
administration; recruitment and the armed forces; military finance; supply and 
logistics; and the nature and conduct of the fighting. 
 The extent of military activity in Shropshire is explained for the first time, 
informing the history of the conflict there while reflecting on the nature of warfare 
across Civil War England. It shows how local Royalist and Parliamentarian activists 
and 'outsider' leaders provided direction, while the populace widely was involved 
in the administrative and material tasks of war effort. The war in Shropshire was 
mainly fought between the opposing county-based forces, but with considerable 
external military support. Similarly, fiscal and military assets were obtained locally 
and from much further afield. Attritional war in Shropshire from 1643 to 1646 
involved the occupying Royalists engaging Parliamentarian inroads, in fighting the 
garrison warfare characteristic of the period. Although the outcome of both wars in 
Shropshire was determined by wider national events, in 1646 and again in 1648 the 
defeat of the county Royalists was due largely to their local Parliamentarian 
adversaries. Broadening this study to 1648 has provided insight into 
Parliamentarian county administration during the short interwar period.  
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EXPLANATORY NOTES AND CONVENTIONS 
 
 
 
Dates are given according to the Old Style (Julian) Calendar, in use across the British 
Isles at the time of the Civil Wars. However, the New Year is taken to begin on 1 
January, not 25 March.  
 Spellings in contemporary manuscript and printed sources have been 
modernised to aid readability along with some minimal intervention in 
 viii 
punctuation. However, spelling of the titles of contemporary publications has been 
retained.   
 Contemporary monetary values have been quoted throughout. Thus 12 pennies 
(12d) = one shilling (1s); 20 shillings = one pound sterling (£1); £1 = 240d. To put 
these amounts into some local pre-Civil War context in terms of personal income, in 
1640/1 the day rate paid by the corporation of Shrewsbury, Shropshire's county 
town, to skilled workmen such as carpenters and ordinary masons was 8d including 
food and drink or 14d without, meanwhile the respective rates for day labourers 
were 4d and 8d. At the opposite end of the social scale, among the county gentry 
proposed as suitably wealthy candidates for the shrievalty of Shropshire in 1632 
were the future leading Royalists Thomas Wolrych of Dudmaston and John Weld of 
Willey, whose respective annual incomes were then estimated as £1,200 and £3,000.1 
 Finally, while acknowledging the vigorous scholarly debate since the turn of the 
twentieth century concerned with whether or not the warfare widespread across the 
archipelago of the British Isles from 1639 into the early 1650s were British civil wars, 
or, indeed, were wars fought between three kingdoms (or four nations, if Wales is 
considered as a separate land), because it is concerned with the conflict as if affected 
an English shire this thesis has kept the traditional convention of classifying the 
period as the English Civil Wars. 
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Summary of main events in Shropshire during the  
First and Second English Civil Wars, 1642-8 
                                                         
1 M. Reed, 'Early Seventeenth-Century Wage Assessments for the Borough of Shrewsbury', 
TSAS, LV (1954-6), pp. 140-1; HHL, Ellesmere Mss, 7114. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The object of this study is to evaluate in detail war effort at a county level during the 
English Civil Wars. At the time the phrase 'war effort' would have been unknown, 
although its meaning and effects would have been understood only too well. For 
historians it is a useful catch-all expression to encompass wartime activity. War 
effort may be defined more exactly as the sum of the coordinated actions by which 
military operations are conducted and sustained in furtherance of the political and 
military object of war. Given this definition, war effort provides the broad context in 
which to consider the home front as well as the front line, and vital activities such as 
leadership and administration, the organisation of armed forces, logistics and 
finance. Other factors - less distinct, perhaps, than overtly military concerns - such 
as economics, allegiance, and political and religious motivations may, moreover, be 
addressed in the wider ambit of war effort.  
 Turning for a definition to On War, the seminal and still outstanding examination 
of armed conflict, we find that Clausewitz does not conceptualise war effort. But his 
explanation of 'the art of war in its widest sense', as including 'all activities that exist 
for the sake of war, such as the creation of fighting forces, their raising, armament, 
equipment and training' comes close to the meaning of war effort. Furthermore 
Clausewitz acknowledged the vital importance of the 'preparations' of 'the fighting 
forces', in 'such matters as artillery, fortification [...] elementary tactics, as well as all 
the organisation and administration'. These and other actions concerned with 
operational effectiveness and sustaining armed forces are addressed by this thesis 
within the context of war effort.1  
 From the early nineteenth-century perspective of On War, the all-embracing 
nature of war effort was unrecognised as a concept. The term is still most often used 
in the context of the mass-mobilisation of national resources during the twentieth-
century World Wars. However, the English Civil Wars were fought at a time when 
war effort was increasingly being organised in a recognisably modern form. This 
was the result of a combination of military developments, and political, economic 
and social factors, that many historians have seen as having brought about a  
                                                        
1 C. von Clausewitz, On War, (eds.) M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, 1989), pp. 127, 131-2. 
 2 
'Military Revolution' in Western Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. 
 This can be viewed as a period of sustained evolution and of innovation in 
military (including naval) affairs. The development and widespread adoption of 
gunpowder weapons brought about radical changes in battlefield tactics, and in 
fortification and siegecraft. Armies, in general, became bigger, and fought larger 
and more sustained campaigns. The training and equipment of the soldiers became 
more standardised, and their leadership more professionalised. Kingdoms and 
states kept more permanent military establishments, and the growth of bureaucratic 
administration enabled governments more effectively to levy the taxes and other 
impositions necessary to sustain armed forces. The effects of military activity on 
state and society as a whole became more widespread, especially the increasingly 
unprecedented fiscal and economic burdens imposed during the actual time of 
war.2 
 The historiography of the 'Military Revolution' debate has tended to focus on 
contemporary Continental warfare and society, with the English and wider 'British' 
Civil Wars often seen as a backwater of military innovation. It is not the purpose of 
this thesis to speculate to what extent the 'Military Revolution' shaped warfare in 
the British Isles, but war effort - Clausewitz's 'art of war in its widest sense' - was 
developing there along modern lines: the armies were trained and equipped and 
fought in standardised ways, adapting Continental practice; there was widespread 
professionalised military leadership; the fighting was sustained; taxation and other 
systematic fiscal and economic levies were introduced, along with the                                                         
2 A European 'Military Revolution' during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was first 
proposed by M. Roberts in 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660', an influential lecture given 
at Queen's University, Belfast, in January 1955. The paper was reprinted as an essay on pp. 
195-225 of Roberts's Essays in Swedish History (Minneapolis, 1967). Roberts's  'Military 
Revolution' theory provoked widespread debate that continues to the present and has 
generated its own historiography.  This has been a wide-ranging discourse, looking at many 
countries, questioning and modifying the actual time span of this 'revolutionary' period, and 
examining warfare and military technology as well as other aspects. G. Parker in turn 
influentially reappraised and questioned Roberts's thesis in "The Military Revolution", 1560-
1660 - a Myth?', The Journal of Modern History, 48 (1976), pp. 195-214, and, in The Military 
Revolution, Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1990), proposed 
a lengthier era of military innovation. For a useful overview of the historiography of the 
'Military Revolution' debate, see 'The Military Revolution in History and Historiography', 
pp. 1-8 of C.J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military 
Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, Colorado, 1995). 
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administrative bodies required for their implementation; industries were put to 
wartime production; and, moreover, the effects of war on society as a whole were 
profound and far-reaching. 
 It is the social impact of war effort upon daily life and economic activity that has 
attracted most attention from historians of the Civil Wars. Both Tennant and 
Wroughton, for example, took English regional perspectives to view the impact of 
war on society and on individuals. Their approach to war effort was to see taxation, 
recruitment and requisitioning as the cause of much disruption, hardship and 
damage. Pennington and also Bennett have viewed civilian experience at national 
level in much the same way. Bennett's The Civil Wars Experienced drew on 
widespread anecdotal evidence to illustrate the repercussions of the conflict for the 
common people of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland.3  
 This thesis does not underrate the economic and social dislocation caused by the 
Civil Wars. Indeed, it often portrays the pervading effects of war effort on the 
livelihood of the people of Shropshire, in terms of the demands made upon them, 
and in their interaction with the soldiery. However, this thesis is a military rather 
than a social history of the period. It is concerned in particular with the mobilisation 
of resources for war. Accordingly, it explains the war effort in terms of its military 
purpose and necessity.  In the event, the First Civil War became a lengthy war of 
attrition because both sides were able to sustain war effort by systematically 
organising the populace and economic resources. 
 It is argued here that the military history of the Civil Wars goes to the heart of the 
conflict. In particular, an insight into the underlying war effort surely provides the 
vital connection between the causes and eventual outcome of events. However, in 
2003 Hutton made the assertion that historians of the English Civil Wars had 
become overwhelmingly preoccupied with the 'causes and meaning of the war', 
sensing a decline in academic interest in the military history.4 Does this still hold 
true? In studying war effort in Civil War Lancashire, in 2010 Gratton identified a 
shift away from military topics, that 'nowadays considerable attention is being paid                                                         
3 P. Tennant, Edgehill and Beyond: the People's War in the South Midlands, 1642-45 (Stroud, 
1992); J. Wroughton, An Unhappy Civil War. The Experiences of Ordinary People in 
Gloucestershire, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1642-1646 (Bath, 1999); D. Pennington, 'The War and 
the People', in Reactions to the English Civil War, 1632-1649, (ed.) J. Morrill (London, 1982), pp. 
115-35; M. Bennett, The Civil Wars Experienced: Britain and Ireland, 1638-1661 (New York, 
2000).  
4 R. Hutton, The Royalist War Effort 1642-1646 (2nd edn., London, 2003), p. xviii. 
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to philosophy, religious and political issues and social and gender issues'.5 In terms 
of research published in journals this remains a trend at the time of writing this 
thesis in 2014. The bibliographical listings by the Cromwell Association of articles 
published in 2009-14 concerned with the long period of the Civil Wars and 
background seventeenth-century British history reveal that of a total of 670 articles, 
military (including naval) history was the subject of just 35, of which only 20 
(including four archaeological reports) addressed the Civil Wars - just three per cent 
of the total.6 Furthermore, of 156 higher-level theses on seventeenth-century British 
(including Irish) history in progress within UK universities at the time of writing, 
only nine, a modest six per cent, were military-focussed studies of the Civil War 
era.7 However, over the last decade have been published a number of substantial 
military histories by academic historians of the period, including narrative and 
analytical studies of the national scene by Wanklyn and Jones, Donagan and most 
recently Gaunt (Donagan being more concerned with military culture), a fresh 
appraisal of Civil War battles and generalship in a brace of books by Wanklyn, and 
a study by Hopper of military code and conduct, in terms of allegiance and 
defection.8  
 At the time of writing, then, the field of Civil War studies presents a mixed 
picture of endeavour, in which a comparative examination of war effort may 
provide a profitable route to a revealing and comprehensive new study. This thesis 
is therefore concerned with what Hutton termed the 'collection of tasks' comprising 
war effort during the English Civil Wars, by taking the county of Shropshire as a 
case study.9 It contributes to the well-populated genre of Civil War county studies, 
an approach to the history of the period of great longevity that has remained 
                                                        
5 J.M. Gratton, The Parliamentarian and Royalist War Effort in Lancashire 1642-1651 
(Manchester, 2010), p. xxvii. 
6 P. Gaunt, 'Bibliography of Journals', in Cromwelliana; The Journal of the Cromwell Association, 
Series III: 1 (2012), pp. 111-38; 2 (2013), pp. 114-20; 3 (2014), pp. 97-106. 
7 'Theses in progress (UK)', listed in History Online, the website of the Institute of Historical 
Research, www.history.ac.uk/history-online. 
8 M. Wanklyn and F. Jones, A Military History of the English Civil War (Harlow, 2005); B. 
Donagan, War In England 1642-1649 (Oxford, 2008); P. Gaunt, The English Civil War: A 
Military History (London, 2014); M. Wanklyn, Decisive Battles of the English Civil War 
(Barnsley, 2006); M. Wanklyn, The Warrior Generals: Winning the British Civil Wars, 1642-1652 
(London, 2010); A. Hopper, Turncoats & Renegadoes, Changing Sides During the English Civil 
Wars (Oxford, 2012). 
9 Hutton, War Effort, p. 94. 
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vigorous and has never wholly fallen from favour. Accordingly, at this point some 
justification may be necessary for yet another county history.  
 Having been reinvigorated during the 1960s and early 1970s, by the end of the 
latter decade, as one noted historian has observed, the county history was tending 
to be viewed in academic circles as a somewhat hackneyed field of Civil War 
studies.10 This echoed the reservations expressed 20 years before by Burne and 
Young, professional soldiers become military historians, that county and regional 
histories provided an 'unsatisfactory treatment' of the Wars, 'from a military point 
of view'. 'The treatment by counties', they declared, 'has led to an exaggeration of 
the view that the war was nothing more than a disconnected series of petty local 
struggles'.11 
 Having at once questioned the ongoing viability to Civil War research of the 
county model, the answer must be that because a comprehensive approach to the 
period is desirable, the county history, by often taking a long view of the conflict 
and pursuing various lines of investigation, has been and remains a highly 
productive field of research. The methodologies Stoyle used in his thought-
provoking work on Devon, for example, if applied to other counties should further 
our understanding of popular allegiance during the Civil Wars.12 Furthermore, the 
shire was the largest sub-unit of seventeenth-century government and during the 
conflict the organisational cornerstone upon which both sides footed their war 
effort. While acknowledging Burne and Young's concern to view the First Civil War 
as a national struggle, in practice - and in the example of Shropshire in particular - it 
was also very much an attritional conflict contested at county level. 
 This thesis considers Shropshire as a theatre of operations during the First Civil 
War of 1642-6 and the Second Civil War of 1648. The modern and historic shire (in 
the seventeenth century and later also known concurrently as Salop) is the most 
westerly of the counties of the English Midlands. Seventeenth-century Shropshire 
was bordered by Cheshire to the north, Staffordshire to the east, Worcestershire to 
the south-east and Herefordshire to the south. To the west Shropshire adjoined four 
Welsh counties: Radnorshire to the south-west, then, northwards, Montgomeryshire                                                         
10 Ibid., xvi. 
11 A.H. Burne and P. Young, The Great Civil War: A Military History of the First Civil War 1642-
1646 (London, 1959, reprinted Moreton-in-Marsh, 1998), pp. xi-xii. 
12 M. Stoyle, Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon During the English Civil War 
(Exeter, 1994).  
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and Denbighshire, and an enclave of Flintshire bordered northerly Shropshire (Map 
1, p. ix). Shropshire lay in the northerly central sector of the Welsh Marches, the belt 
of English shires bordering the Principality. The topography of Shropshire varies 
between northerly lowlands and southerly uplands. The River Severn divides the 
county and its course marks approximately the transition between the north 
Shropshire plain and the hill and dale country of south Shropshire. 
 In 1926 introducing his The Great Civil War in Shropshire, 1642-1649, Farrow wrote 
that ‘Shropshire epitomised in a peculiar way the struggle of the whole English 
nation. Within the borders of this one county – better perhaps than anywhere else – 
can be seen the Great Civil War in miniature’.13 Identifying Shropshire as a singular 
microcosm of the English Civil Wars is of course contentious. Many shires were 
divided in allegiance and witnessed widespread and often heavy fighting. Farrow 
was, however, right to suggest that the eventful course of the conflict in Shropshire 
merited scrutiny. But the choice of Shropshire as the setting, and indeed as an 
exemplar, for the examination of war effort in mid-seventeenth-century England 
requires further explanation.   
 Shropshire became the focus of the conflict between King and Parliament on 19 
September 1642, when Charles I, having marched with a small army from the East 
Midlands, arrived there at Wellington, a small market town, and next day entered 
Shrewsbury, the county town.14 The King went unopposed as a result of the efforts 
of his active supporters in Shropshire over the previous seven or so weeks. Their 
party, with relative unanimity among the gentry and a degree of popular support, 
had, as Morrill put it, engineered a ‘solidly Royalist front’ that overawed local 
Parliamentarian dissent. Shropshire's Royalism within a region that by the end of 
1642 mostly stood by the King remains upheld among historians, a tenet of Civil 
War historiography that this thesis, concerned with allegiance only in passing, 
leaves unchallenged.15 Charles I left Shropshire a Royalist county in mid-October 
1642, meanwhile leading the enlarged field army that fought the first pitched battle 
of the English Civil Wars at Edgehill in Warwickshire on 23 October. The King's                                                         
13 W.J. Farrow, The Great Civil War in Shropshire, 1642-49 (Shrewsbury, 1926), preface. 
14 Sir Edward Walker, Iter Carolinum (1660), p. 3. 
15 J. Morrill, Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedy of Civil War, 1630-
1648 (Harlow, 1994), p. 66. For Shropshire defined as a Royalist county, see also for example: 
Hutton, War Effort, pp. 24-5, 37; A. Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War (London, 
1989), p. 298; Stoyle, Loyalty and Locality, pp. 242-3.  
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sojourn in Shropshire had been a vital breathing space, allowing an effective army 
to take on Parliament to be gathered and financed. Apart from noting the 
importance of the Parliamentarians' surprise capture of Shrewsbury early on 22 
February 1645 - a damaging loss to the Royalists of an important supply base and 
for almost two and a half years their regional headquarters - it is with the end of 
King Charles's stay in autumn 1642 that Shropshire usually disappears from the 
pages of popular histories of the Civil Wars.16  
 No major set-piece battles were fought there. However, Shropshire lay amid a 
widely fought-over region, encompassing parts of the Principality and the English 
shires of the Marches and the western Midlands. From January 1643 Royalist forces 
from Shropshire intermittently engaged the Cheshire Parliamentarians, but 
Shropshire's war began in earnest that September when the Parliamentarians 
planted their first military foothold in hitherto Royalist territory by occupying and 
fortifying Wem, a small northerly market town. While the military situation in the 
county thereafter often reflected the ebb and flow of the wider war, there developed 
in Shropshire a prolonged and often intense local war of attrition. Since the major 
field armies did not campaign there the war in Shropshire had a distinctly insular 
nature, characterised - simplifying in the broadest terms a struggle lasting almost 
two and three-quarter years - by Royalist defence and counter-attack against 
intermittent Parliamentarian advances across the county on a generally southerly 
front (Maps 2-5, pp. x-xiii). Along with the progressive military collapse of King 
Charles's cause across England, the First Civil War ended in Shropshire when 
Ludlow Castle, the last Royalist outpost in the county, was formally surrendered on 
1 June 1646. The military operations in Shropshire in summer 1648 during the 
Second English Civil War were on a far smaller scale, when attempted Royalist 
uprisings were suppressed by the Parliamentarian regime. 
 The longevity of the armed confrontation there alone makes Shropshire a suitable 
paradigm for the study of war effort in the English Civil Wars. There is, moreover, 
further interest in the situation of both sides. The Royalists, with at least an 
ostensible hold over most of the county for much of the First Civil War, drew 
heavily on local resources. Meanwhile, the Parliamentarians as an invading force 
were reliant on external financial and military support even after having established                                                         
16 For example, C. Hibbert, Cavaliers & Roundheads: The English at War, 1642-1649 (London, 
1993). 
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a foothold in Shropshire. These differing approaches provide fertile ground for an 
enquiry into war effort. In itself Shropshire as a theatre of operations is sufficiently 
complete for consideration as a separate subject, while reflecting themes common to 
the wider fighting in England. Shropshire also had a significant bearing on the war 
in Wales and its borderland and in the English Midlands. 
 Given the suitability of Shropshire as the setting for a bipartisan military study of 
the English Civil Wars, further justification is required for the examination of war 
effort in the context of the historiography of the period. The contribution of this 
present work is to address three branches of scholarship: the local history of the 
county of Shropshire; county and regional histories of the Civil Wars as a genre; and 
the wider field of the military history of England at this time. Accordingly, previous 
historical literature of relevance to this thesis and within these categories will now 
be reviewed. 
Previous studies of Civil War Shropshire 
Farrow's Great Civil War in Shropshire, the product of his university MA thesis, was 
the first of two books to date that have attempted to encapsulate the countywide 
conflict. Shropshire had lacked a narrative history of the Civil War period, and 
Farrow's work was important in for the first time placing events there within a 
chronological context. Setting out, as he put it in the preface, to correct 'some current 
misinterpretations', and to reveal a 'very considerable quantity of new material', 
Farrow succeeded in a book of moderate (149-page) length to establish the course of 
the county war, and by reference to contemporary sources identified and generally 
accurately dated most of the engagements (although his dating of the regionally 
significant campaign and battle for Montgomery Castle in September 1644 was 
inaccurate). Farrow's was more than a military narrative, however, commenting also 
on partisanship and neutralism in devoting a chapter to 'social aspects of the 
struggle'. Nor was the importance of religion as a motivating factor overlooked. 
Farrow's identification of a 'vigorous Puritan element' in well-established pockets in 
parts of pre-Civil War Shropshire has recently been upheld by Coulton's work on 
religious non-conformity at Shrewsbury. He was also no doubt correct in 
identifying a depth of active Royalism among Shropshire's clergy.17 Farrow's Great 
Civil War remains a useful and mostly reliable account of the period, supplemented                                                         
17 Farrow, Civil War, pp. 26-7; B. Coulton, Regime and Religion, Shrewsbury 1400-1700 
(Almeley, 2010), chapter four, 'Puritans and Laudians', pp. 69-90. 
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in 2000 by Bracher and Emmett's attractively produced and illustrated Shropshire in 
the Civil War, which continued the story to the Restoration.18 Including several maps 
charting the course of the county war and a gazetteer, this is an adequate 
introduction to the subject for a general readership. However, being a short text 
Shropshire in the Civil War is limited in content, while some of its analysis lacks 
scholarship. It is also unreferenced, but an impressive list of more than 130 titles of 
suggested further reading shows the considerable depth of the authors' research. 
Recently a third book has considered the long period of the Civil Wars in Shropshire 
through the experience of one town. As a military historian Barratt has taken the 
example of Ludlow, a Royalist garrison town throughout the First Civil War, as the 
setting for a narrative of military events in south Shropshire and the Marches.19 
Although the author drew on third-party transcripts of original documents, Cavalier 
Stronghold would have benefitted from a closer scrutiny of the extant local records 
for Ludlow. 
 These books form part of a sizeable corpus exploring narrower aspects of 
Shropshire's Civil War, for since the nineteenth century the conflict has received 
considerable scholarly attention. The clergymen Owen and Blakeway, and Bellett, as 
antiquarian authors of local histories of Shrewsbury (1825) and Bridgnorth (1856) 
respectively, acknowledged the importance of these towns as key Civil War 
strongholds. Owen and Blakeway exercised commendable academic rigour in their 
History of Shrewsbury, although Bellett placed undue reliance on folklore.20 The first 
attempt to consider the war across the county was published in 1867.21 While the 
author freely acknowledged her limitations as a military historian - ‘it may lead 
someone better qualified for the task to collect materials for a history of the Civil 
War as it affected Shropshire generally' - Frances Stackhouse Acton's study of the 
Garrisons of Shropshire drew on primary sources to stress the number and local 
importance of strongholds. However, it should now be read with caution because of 
the author's factual errors and wayward dating of events. 
 The founding in 1877 of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History 
Society enabled learned articles by local historians to be published in the Society’s                                                         
18 T. Bracher and R. Emmett, Shropshire in the Civil War (Shrewsbury, 2000). 
19 J. Barratt, Cavalier Stronghold: Ludlow in the English Civil Wars, 1642-1660 (Almeley, 2013). 
20 J.B. Blakeway and H. Owen, A History of Shrewsbury, 2 vols. (London, 1825); G. Bellett, The 
Antiquities of Bridgnorth (Bridgnorth, 1856). 
21 F.S. Acton, The Garrisons of Shropshire During the Civil War, 1642-1648 (Shrewsbury, 1867).  
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annual journal, the Transactions. Eminent among them was William Phillips, whose 
researches published during the last decade of the nineteenth century in the 
Transactions and also Shropshire Notes and Queries (a monthly compilation of 
miscellanea relating to Shropshire's natural and human history) often featured Civil 
War material.22 Like other published Victorian local historians, Phillips's 
achievement was in bringing historical documents to the fore. His transcriptions of 
seventeenth-century texts were published accompanied by a commentary and 
detailed explanatory footnotes. Phillips's most important work was the transcription 
of the papers of the leading Shropshire Royalist Sir Francis Ottley, published in the 
Transactions from 1894 to 1896.23 
 Alfred and John Audens' approach to the study of the Civil Wars in Shropshire 
was more descriptive, and during the early twentieth century the Transactions often 
featured their work. In 1908 Alfred Auden’s view of the war in south Shropshire 
was the first published local study to combine several sources in a narrative 
account.24 A similarly factual work was John Auden's paper on Royalist activity 
between 1646 and 1660.25 On the other hand, his articles in 1912, one based around 
Prince Rupert's correspondence, the other a biographical listing of Royalist officers, 
both reflected Phillips’s earlier formulaic approach.26 The Parliamentarian 
leadership and a Royalist regimental history were the subjects of John Auden's three 
subsequent papers.27 In the early 1940s Beaumont followed in similar style, with 
                                                        
22 For example: ‘Shrewsbury Expenditure in the Civil War, Transcribed by W. Phillips’, 
Shropshire Notes and Queries, VI (1897), pp. 69-70, 80-4, 90-3; 'Shrewsbury During the Civil 
War of Charles I. Extracts from the Borough Records’, TSANHS, 2nd Series, X (1898), pp. 
157-72. 
23 W. Phillips (ed.), ‘The Ottley Papers Relating to the Civil War’, TSANHS, 2nd Series: VI 
(1894), pp. 27-78; VII (1895), pp. 241-360; VIII (1896), pp. 199-312. 
24 A.M. Auden, ‘Clun and its Neighbourhood in the First Civil War’, TSANHS, 3rd Series, 
VIII (1908), pp. 287-336. 
25 J.E. Auden, 'Shropshire and the Royalist Conspiracies between the end of the First Civil 
War and the Restoration, 1648-1660', TSANHS, 3rd Series, X (1910), pp. 87-168. 
26 J.E. Auden, ‘Four Letters from Shropshire to Prince Rupert’, and 'The War Services of 
some Shropshire Officers in the King’s Army’, both in TSANHS, 4th Series, II, (1912), 
respectively pp. 1-21, 215-92.  
27 J.E. Auden: ‘Lieutenant Colonel William Reinking in Shropshire', TSAS, XLVII (1933-4), 
pp. 33-47; ’My case with the Committee of Salop’, TSAS, XLVIII (1934-5), pp. 49-60; ‘The 
Anglo-Irish Troops in Shropshire’, TSAS, L (1939-40), pp. 49-64. 
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articles on Lord Capel, the Royalist regional commander in 1643, and on the 
outbreak of hostilities in Shropshire in 1642.28 
 Since the Second World War the number of local studies concerned with the Civil 
Wars has declined. Hopkins’s article in the Transactions for 1957-60 considered the 
economic impact of the war on landed estates in north Shropshire, while Gilbert’s 
1993 study of clubman activity examined more fully the events pictured by Alfred 
Auden in 1908.29 Elsewhere, Wanklyn did important work by identifying many of 
the activists on both sides in Shropshire, and his thesis on gentry allegiance to some 
extent also considered military affairs.30   
 The Civil War history of Shropshire has therefore been studied to a considerable 
extent. However, our understanding of the period in many important aspects 
remains fragmentary. War effort has been touched on in passing, and more 
particularly in articles such as John Auden's 'Officers in the King’s Army’, but on 
the whole the nature of military endeavour and organisation in the county remains 
obscure. Moreover, Shropshire taken as a whole lacks a thorough military study of 
the Civil War period. 
County and regional studies 
This thesis joins a long established and prolific area of the scholarship of the English 
Civil Wars, the county history.31 Many English and Welsh counties now have one or 
more published histories of the period. The genre has its roots in Victorian curiosity 
about the Civil Wars. This was stimulated by antiquarian-led interest in the past 
alongside the growth of county historical societies, and the publication of period 
histories such as Warburton's 1849 best-selling three-volume homage to Prince 
Rupert and Royalism.32 An early and very good example of a Civil War county 
history, with a much wider geographical ambit that included Shropshire, was the                                                         
28 H. Beaumont: ‘Arthur, Lord Capel, The King’s Lieutenant General for Shropshire, 1643’, 
TSAS, L (1939-40), pp. 65-94; ‘Events in Shropshire at the Commencement of the Civil War’, 
TSAS, LI (1941-3), pp. 11-42. 
29 E. Hopkins, ‘The Bridgewater Estates in North Shropshire during the Civil War’, TSAS, 
LVII (1961-4), pp. 307-12; C.D. Gilbert, ‘Clubmen in Southwest Shropshire, 1644-45’, 
Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Historical Society, LXVIII (1993), pp. 93-8. 
30 M. Wanklyn, 'Landed Society & Allegiance in Cheshire and Shropshire in the First Civil 
War' (Manchester, unpublished PhD thesis, 1976). 
31 For a discussion of county histories within a broader examination of Civil War 
historiography, see R.C. Richardson, The Debate on the English Revolution (3rd edn., 
Manchester, 1998), pp. 162-83. 
32 E. Warburton, Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers, 3 vols. (London, 1849). 
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Webbs' two-volume study of Herefordshire published in 1879.33 Of an epic 800-
page-length, referenced to contemporary sources - a good number of which (some 
now lost) were incorporated within the narrative - and with a sound grasp of the 
sequence of events, the Webbs' work demonstrates well the kind of approach, in-
depth research and scholarship that often made later Victorian and Edwardian Civil 
War county histories very thorough and inquisitive works indeed. Kingston's two 
books, on Civil War Hertfordshire (1894) and a broader regional study of East 
Anglia (1897), followed a path similar to the Webbs. Meanwhile county historians 
benefitted from the chronology of national Civil War events authoritatively 
established by Gardiner (1886-91), and by Firth's thorough examination of military 
organisation (1902).34 The early years of the twentieth century saw a fresh crop of 
county studies, including Willis Bund's study of Worcestershire (1905), while in 
1910, with the encouragement of Sir Charles Firth, then a professor of modern 
history at Oxford, appeared a cluster of full-length Civil-War histories of Dorset, 
Sussex and Lancashire.35   
 These and the other pioneering county histories over the previous 40 years had 
set out with the straightforwardly laudable objective of explaining local Civil War 
events within a coherent narrative. Broxap's view of Lancashire was a wholly 
military one, but most other county historians, such as Thomas-Stanford on Sussex, 
took a broader perspective of the county before the Wars and its rehabilitation 
thereafter. The approach to military affairs was necessarily narrative more than 
analytical, establishing when, where and how engagements took place, rather than 
considering the organisation that allowed their occurrence in the first place, but 
administrative matters were not wholly overlooked; Kingston, for example, 
addressed recruitment and military taxation as 'effects of the war on public life' in 
                                                        
33 J. Webb and J.T. Webb, Memorials of the Civil War between King Charles I and The Parliament 
of England as it affected Herefordshire and The Adjacent Counties, 2 vols. (London, 1879). 
34 A. Kingston: Hertfordshire During The Great Civil War (Hertford, 1884); East Anglia and The 
Great Civil War (London, 1897); S.R. Gardiner, History of The Great Civil War, 1642-1649, 3 
vols. (London, 1886-91; C.H. Firth, Cromwell's Army: A History of the English Soldier during the 
Civil Wars, The Commonwealth and The Protectorate (London, 1902).  
35 J.W. Willis Bund, The Civil War in Worcestershire, 1642-1646; And The Scotch Invasion of 1651 
(Birmingham and London, 1905); A.R. Bayley, The Great Civil War in Dorset (Taunton, 1910); 
C. Thomas-Stanford, Sussex in The Great Civil War and Interregnum, 1642-1649 (London, 1910); 
E. Broxap, The Great Civil War in Lancashire (Manchester, 1910); Richardson, Debate, p. 164, for 
Firth's advancement of the latter three histories.  
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Hertfordshire, and in East Anglia the financing, provisioning and personnel of 
Parliament's military Eastern Association.36  
 Perhaps in reaction to the experience of the First World War, during the interwar 
years there was a discernible trend for county histories to place less emphasis on 
military activity, and to stress those distinct social, religious and economic factors 
that had characterised the local struggle (although in fact these rarely had been 
wholly overlooked by earlier researchers). Books by Coate and Wood, both Oxford 
academics, respectively on Cornwall (1933) and Nottinghamshire (1937), together 
with Farrow's Shropshire emphasised distinct county experiences and local 
reactions to the conflict.37  
 The expansion in county record offices after 1945 allowed researchers access to 
fresh sources of material. This enabled increasing sophistication in county-based 
work that in the 1960s and 1970s allowed further divergence from the narrative 
approach. Everitt's 1966 view of Kent was the first to consider as a model social unit 
the shire as a somewhat insular community, in which, by taking a long view of the 
Civil War period up to the Restoration, the social, political, religious and, to some 
extent, the military aspects of the conflict could be explored in detail.38 Everitt's 
approach prompted a lively academic debate on the nature of provincial responses 
to the conflict that generated several new county studies, including Norfolk (1969), 
Somerset (1973), Cheshire (1974), Sussex (1975) and later Warwickshire (1987), 
which took up and tested the county community thesis. Greater interest in the 
impact of neutralism and attempted avoidance of the war came to the fore.39 A 
feature of these studies, as in the example of Warmington's examination of 
Gloucestershire, was that the years of actual war formed only part of the subject.40 
Although more concerned with local causations and outcomes and in particular the 
activity of the provincial gentry class, by considering both pre-war and wartime                                                         
36 Kingston, Hertfordshire, pp. 162-95, especially pp. 178-86, and East Anglia, appendices, pp. 
373-90. 
37 M. Coate, Cornwall in the Great Civil War and Interregnum, 1642-1660, A Social and Political 
Study (Oxford, 1933); A.C. Wood, Nottinghamshire in the Civil War (Oxford, 1937). 
38 A. Everitt, The Community of Kent And The Great Rebellion (Leicester, 1966). 
39 R.W. Ketton-Cremer, Norfolk in The Civil War: A Portrait of a Society in Conflict (London, 
1969); D. Underdown, Somerset in the Civil War and Interregnum (Newton Abbot, 1973); J. 
Morrill, Cheshire, 1630-1660: County Government and Society during the 'English Revolution' 
(Oxford, 1974); A. Fletcher, A County Community in Peace and War, Sussex 1600-1660 (London, 
1975); A. Hughes, Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620-1660 (Cambridge, 1987). 
40 A.R. Warmington, Civil War, Interregnum and Restoration in Gloucestershire, 1640-1672 
(Woodbridge, 1997). 
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governance these studies did begin to pay fresh attention to how warfare was 
actually organised and sustained. In particular, Hughes's view of Warwickshire 
paid close scrutiny to the problematic development of the Parliamentarian war 
effort there.  
 Current Civil War county studies usually combine socio-political analysis and a 
fairly narrow military narrative in varying measure, of which recent examples from 
Wales and its Marche are John's examination of Pembrokeshire and Knight's similar 
approach to Monmouthshire.41 In reassessing the conflict recent work has revised or 
supplemented earlier interpretations. Civil War Lancashire, for example, is now 
well understood - from Broxap's original ground breaking history, Bull's largely 
military narrative and Gratton's analysis of war effort.42 Closer to Shropshire, 
Atkin's two detailed military histories of Worcestershire have similarly 
supplemented (perhaps supplanted) Willis Bund's original effort.43 On the other 
hand, Ross's more concise and readable recent study of Herefordshire has not 
eclipsed the Webbs' original authoritative work.44 Elsewhere in the Shropshire 
region, Parker's examination of environmental, social, political and religious 
contexts and also military events in Radnorshire is an outstanding example of 
current county histories.45  
 Distinctively, Radnorshire from Civil War to Restoration devoted a short chapter to 
the local Royalist war effort, considering taxation, military organisation and 
recruitment. Such a broader view of military affairs at county level is to be 
welcomed, especially because Royalist activity has left comparatively few traces. 
Indeed, because of the much greater number of surviving records, most detailed 
work on war effort at county level has tended to dwell on the Parliamentarians. 
Warmington, for example, in looking at Gloucestershire, a county heavily fought 
over during the First Civil War, paid most attention to the military problems and 
political infighting that beset the Parliamentarians. Notwithstanding their setbacks, 
Gloucestershire was seen to have witnessed the resilience of 'Parliamentarian                                                         
41 T. John, The Civil War in Pembrokeshire (Almeley, 2008); J. Knight, Civil War and Restoration 
in Monmouthshire (Almeley, 2005).  
42 S. Bull, 'A General Plague of Madness': The Civil War in Lancashire 1640-1660 (Lancaster, 
2009). 
43 M. Atkin: The Civil War in Worcestershire (Stroud, 1995); Worcestershire Under Arms: An 
English County During The Civil Wars (Barnsley, 2004). 
44 D. Ross, Royalist, But ... Herefordshire in the English Civil Wars (Almeley, 2012). 
45 K. Parker, Radnorshire from Civil War to Restoration (Almeley, 2000). 
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administration at its plodding best'. 'The Royalist party', on the other hand, was 
summed up as having 'collapsed in the summer of 1644 after some squabbles over 
authority and a few reverses'.46  
 Gratton's commendable recent approach to war effort in Lancashire has been to 
present a more balanced view of both sides. Like Shropshire, Lancashire was a 
contested county. Gratton's work therefore commands comparison with this thesis, 
being to date the only published history to undertake at an individual county level a 
thorough bilateral investigation of personnel, and of administrative, logistical and 
operational matters. Gratton's War Effort in Lancashire and the present study of 
Shropshire usefully demonstrate how differing, but complementary, approaches 
may be taken to the examination of Civil War war effort. While Gratton's sources 
inclined to a meticulous enumeration of personnel (especially in what he termed the 
'political direction' of the gentry) and of Parliamentarian financing, the present 
thesis is more concerned with the practicalities of logistical arrangements and 
operational matters. Gratton was also able in detail to enumerate the forces raised 
by both sides in Lancashire, and similar fresh military analysis of Shropshire is 
undertaken here. However, due to the terminally weakened condition of the 
Royalists in Lancashire beyond mid-1643 little trace of their activity has survived, 
thus Gratton's work is necessarily slanted to Parliamentarian efforts. This 
underlines the difficulty in attempting balanced bipartisan analysis of war effort 
because the evidence of Royalist activity is usually so sparse. In Shropshire, 
however, the comparatively plentiful evidence for the longevity of the King's cause 
does allow a balanced appraisal of both sides. 
 Civil War studies have also taken the direction of considering regional contexts. 
140 years after publication, the noteworthy regional study also paying considerable 
attention to events in Shropshire remains J.R. Phillips's two-part history of the Civil 
War in Wales and its borderlands, the first volume being a narrative history, the 
second a still useful compendium of significant manuscript and printed primary 
sources.47 Phillips's 1874 landmark work is of course now much dated, and revision 
and reinterpretation of the conflict in the Principality and its March has been 
provided by Gaunt's concise narrative account, Tucker's military history of North                                                         
46 Warmington, Gloucestershire 1640-1672, pp. 52-3, 60. 
47 J.R. Phillips, Memoirs of The Civil War in Wales and the Marches, 1642-1649, 2 vols. (London, 
1874).  
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Wales (including an enumeration of the regional Royalist officer corps), and also by 
Hutton's impressive and wide-ranging study of Royalist war effort across the 
region.48 Hutton's analysis, including much on Shropshire, has great merit, and 
redressed the tendency at the time of its inception for Civil War scholarship to dwell 
on Parliamentarian organisation. This thesis freely acknowledges the inspiration of 
Hutton's Royalist War Effort, which, as an excellent narrative history of the war in 
Wales and its borderlands as much as an analysis of the practicalities of waging 
warfare, necessarily had to skim over the minutiae of Royalist practice that a county 
study of this kind may address in more detail. Shifting the regional focus from 
Wales to the English Midlands, Shropshire featured in Sherwood's competent and 
geographically wide-ranging narrative of Civil Strife, which devoted a chapter to 
war effort as the 'Extra-Military Consequences of the War'.49 Further afield - and in 
geographical terms, and by considering the opposing side, a counterpoint to the 
actions of Hutton's westerly Royalists - the other outstanding scholarly examination 
of war effort at regional level remains Holmes's analysis of the political and military 
organisation of the Parliamentarian Eastern Association.50   
 This appraisal of county and regional studies of the English Civil Wars has 
shown that unless it is the subject, warfare at the organisational level has tended to 
receive only cursory examination. Furthermore, other than Gratton's work on 
Lancashire, to date there has been no other full-length bipartisan commentary on 
war effort at county level. 
The national military context 
A further objective of this thesis is to contribute to the wider corpus of Civil War 
military history. This is a field populated also by the writings of good non-academic 
researchers, and in the number of published works is an enormous and wide-
ranging genre in its own right. Hence only certain representative and more notable 
studies pertaining particularly to war effort can be exampled within the constraints 
of this literature review. General military histories of the period have usually paid 
                                                        
48 P. Gaunt, A Nation Under Siege; The Civil War in Wales 1642-48 (London, 1991); N. Tucker, 
North Wales and Chester in the Civil War (Ashbourne, 2003). 
49 R.E. Sherwood, Civil Strife in the Midlands 1642-1651 (London, 1974), chapter 11, pp. 98-122. 
50 C. Holmes, The Eastern Association in the English Civil War (Cambridge, 1974). 
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attention to organisation to a greater or lesser extent.51 Campaign and battle 
narratives also often give due consideration to the importance of logistics to the 
outcome of events.52 Histories of the armies have also addressed their equipping 
and supply; Gentles's study of the New Model Army, for example, featured 
recruitment, pay and resources, while Barratt's overview of the Royalist army 
looked at logistics.53 Aspects of supply and finance have also been explored 
elsewhere. Roy's examination of the papers of the Royalist Ordnance Office revealed 
much about logistical activity, while pioneering articles by Engberg and Bennett, 
and a book by Wheeler have addressed the financial organisation of both sides.54 
Robinson coupled horse procurement for the Parliamentarian armies to taxation and 
allegiance in a social and philosophical, more than military, discourse on war and 
society.55 However, the scholar who probably has contributed most to elucidate the 
activity of war effort has been Edwards, his research having ranged from arms 
acquisition at county level, to weapons procurement, logistics, finance and civilian 
reaction in the wider 'British' context of the Civil Wars.56 In Dealing in Death: The 
Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, Edwards produced a comprehensive study of 
war effort, addressing activities as diverse as the local acquisition of horses and the 
international trade in arms. Edwards noted that hitherto unrecognised evidence for 
Civil War logistical activity could still be found in the manuscript collections of 
                                                        
51 See for example, I. Gentles, The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms 1638-
1652 (Harlow, 2007), 'Building and fuelling the machinery of war', pp. 94-127; M. Braddick, 
God's Fury, England's Fire A New History of the Civil Wars (London, 2008), pp. 397-404. 
52 For example by G. Foard in Naseby, The Decisive Campaign (2nd edn., Barnsley, 2004), pp. 
58-61, 82-3. 172-5. 
53 I. Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653 (Oxford, 1994); J. 
Barratt, Cavaliers, The Royalist Army at War, 1642-1646 (Stroud, 2000), chapter six, 'Munitions 
and Ordnance', and chapter seven, 'Logistics'. 
54 I. Roy (ed.), The Royalist Ordnance Papers 1642-1646, Parts I and II (Banbury, 1963, 1975); J. 
Engberg, 'Royalist Finances During the English Civil War 1642-1646', The Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, XIV (1966), pp. 73-96; M. Bennett, ‘Contribution and Assessment: 
Financial Exactions in the English Civil War, 1642-1646’, War & Society, 4 (1986), pp. 1-11; J.S. 
Wheeler, The Making of a World Power: War and The Military Revolution in Seventeenth Century 
England (Stroud, 1999). 
55 G. Robinson, Horses, People and Parliament in the English Civil War: Extracting Resources and 
Constructing Allegiance (Farnham, 2012). 
56 P. Edwards, 'Turning Ploughshares into Swords: The Arms and Equipment Industries in 
Staffordshire in the First Civil War, 1642-1646, Midland History, 27 (2002), pp. 52-79; P. 
Edwards, 'Logistics and Supply' in The Civil Wars A Military History of England, Scotland and 
Ireland 1638-1660, (eds.) J. Kenyon and J. Ohlmeyer (Oxford, 1998), pp. 234-71. 
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county record offices.57 This study has made considerable reference to this kind of 
local detail, which can only serve to broaden our wider understanding of the nature 
of war effort in this period. 
Aims, methods and primary sources 
This appraisal of English Civil War historiography has shown the merit of a 
thorough and detailed account of the methods used by Royalists and 
Parliamentarians to wage civil war in Shropshire. This thesis contributes to the 
considerable body of work published on the county war over the last 150 years or 
so, while revising and consolidating those interpretations. It takes a fresh view of 
the subject though the lens of a close examination of war effort. It also contributes to 
the pre-determined genre of Civil War county studies. In these contexts it is hoped 
to shed further light on the relative effectiveness of the organisation of the two 
sides; whether or not, as Hughes asserted in a keynote article on Royalist and 
Parliamentarian leadership, the Parliamentarians were adaptable in creating 'a more 
resilient and broadly based war effort', while organisation in Royalist areas was less 
robust, less sophisticated and 'more rigid'.58 Moreover, by scrutinising 
organisational, logistical and operational matters the present work intends to 
further our understanding of warfare in mid-seventeenth-century England. 
 This study draws almost wholly on written sources because there is very little 
artefactual evidence or, to date, substantial archaeological evidence of the Civil War 
in Shropshire. However, in researching this thesis the author has also made many 
field visits to the buildings or their remains where garrisons were once located, and 
in search of the Civil War battlefields of Shropshire, none of which at the time of 
writing have been located with certainty. The written traces of Civil War military 
activity in Shropshire are fragmentary and scattered, although not unduly scarce. 
While there are collections of correspondence and administrative records upon 
which considerable reliance can be placed, there are very few local family papers 
from the period in the public domain. Accordingly, the quest for primary source 
material has had to range widely in order to acquire the volume of detailed 
information necessary for a comprehensive bipartisan study of war effort. The 
                                                        
57 P. Edwards, Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638–52 (Stroud, 
2001), p. xi. 
58 A. Hughes, 'The King, the Parliament, and the Localities during the English Civil War', 
Journal of British Studies, 24 (1985), pp. 246, 250. 
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following examples demonstrate this approach. 
 Selected manuscripts located in 14 regional and national archives have been 
consulted and transcribed. As should be expected from a county-centred study of 
this kind, the material at Shropshire Archives, the county record office located in 
Shrewsbury, has been examined thoroughly. Notable for their unusual 
completeness, the local administrative records surviving from the 1640s for the three 
main Royalist garrison towns of Shrewsbury, Bridgnorth and Ludlow have proven 
invaluable. Indeed, without the incidental detail discovered in these civic records 
much of the Royalist war effort would remain obscure. In particular, documentary 
evidence in the Shrewsbury corporation collection has allowed considerable light to 
be shed on Royalist military taxation. Evidence of Parliamentarian activity 
nationally is in general fuller and more plentiful, but in the case of Shropshire the 
local evidence of Royalist action has done much to redress the balance and to allow 
a more equitable examination of war effort. This thesis has also made as much use 
as possible of parish records, in which, as Bennett's important earlier comparative 
work on military taxation in the English East Midlands demonstrated, by working 
(as Bennett put it) 'from the bottom up' detailed information on local aspects of war 
effort may be found.59 But while Bennett could draw on up to 21 sets of parish 
constables' accounts across five shires, despite thorough investigation Shropshire 
has so far yielded only one - fortunately most informative - equivalent source from 
the First Civil War, the accounts of the constables of Stockton parish. 
 On the other hand, the correspondence of regional commanders is reasonably 
plentiful and has provided important information, for the Parliamentarian side, 
notably the letter books held at Warwickshire Record Office of the Earl of Denbigh, 
the regional commander for Shropshire for much of the First Civil War. Shropshire 
also came under Prince Rupert's control, and his extensive surviving 
correspondence has supplemented the local sources in order to more fully explain 
the Royalists' war. Portions of the Rupert correspondence have been published since 
the mid-nineteenth century, but wherever possible this study has referenced the 
original manuscripts, held at The British Library, London, the William Salt Library, 
Stafford, and those transcriptions of the Prince's papers, now lost, made by Sir 
Charles Firth held at the Bodleian Library, Oxford. The voluminous Commonwealth 
Exchequer Papers at The National Archives, London, under the general                                                         
59 Bennett, ‘Contribution and Assessment', p. 3. 
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classification SP28 are a vital, if often unpredictable, source of information on 
Parliamentarian and later Commonwealth armies. Accordingly, there are 
widespread references to SP28 papers in this thesis, especially in chapters three 
(concerning finance) and four (concerning logistics). However, the records from 
Shropshire catalogued in SP28 are extremely sparse, and the hoped-for chance 
discoveries of fuller evidence of the activity of the county committee, the leading 
Parliamentarian body for Shropshire, have remained elusive. However, this gap has 
been filled satisfactorily by evidence of the actions of Sir Thomas Myddelton, a close 
ally of the county committee whose forces served in Shropshire, and by evidence of 
the Earl of Denbigh's regional command. 
 Turning to published manuscripts, reference has been made to the edited Reports 
of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and to the calendared State Papers, 
Domestic Series, of the reign of King Charles I. Considerable information about the 
Parliamentarian war effort has been gleaned from the Journals of the Houses of 
Commons and Lords. William Phillips's aforementioned 'Ottley Papers' collectively 
remain an invaluable source for Royalist activity in Shropshire throughout the First 
Civil War.  
 This thesis has drawn heavily on the copious printed ephemera from the Civil 
War period, a remarkable wealth of sources, including the numerous political and 
military declarations and the weekly news journals printed in pamphlet form. 
Produced mostly in Parliamentarian London, these journals - referred to here as 
newsbooks - frequently featured reports (or extracts) from the front line. However, 
these were often unattributed and paraphrased, and editorial was skewed for 
propaganda effect. Accordingly, newsbooks are questionable sources that two 
academic historians in cautionary notes have categorised as 'exceptionally 
dangerous', and as 'dodgy traces of the past'.60 Sometimes newsbooks did print as 
fact fallacious or false reports. In early October 1642 it was expected that Shropshire 
would be the frontline in which the decisive battle would occur between King 
Charles's army based around Shrewsbury and the main Parliamentarian field army, 
then occupying Worcester, commanded by the Earl of Essex. Accordingly, two 
London newsbooks published eagerly anticipated but wholly fictitious accounts of 
imagined Parliamentarian victories in major engagements fought in Shropshire, at 
                                                        
60 Respectively, by Hutton, War Effort, p. 252, and by Wanklyn, Decisive Battles, p. 10. 
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Bridgnorth and Ludlow, three weeks before the Battle of Edgehill.61 However, while 
Civil War-period journalism must be given due circumspection and wherever 
possible evaluated alongside other sources, newsbooks cannot be disregarded out of 
hand. In researching this thesis remarkably few fictitious accounts were 
encountered. Moreover, those reports that obviously had been embellished usually 
had a quite plausible context. Indeed, traces of a number of the military 
engagements that occurred in Shropshire can only be found in the sometimes 
capricious reporting of the newsbooks.  
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis takes the form of five analytical chapters and a conclusion. The subject 
matter is treated thematically, set against the background of the local, regional and 
national events of the First and Second English Civil Wars and the short interwar 
period in England from autumn 1646 into early 1648. Each chapter questions and 
considers the ways in which both sides performed particular tasks of war effort. The 
first four chapters take a comparative and bilateral approach, and for continuity in 
each topic the Royalists are considered first, then the Parliamentarians. 
 Chapter one is concerned with leadership and structures of command and 
administration. Beginning by explaining the pre-war hierarchy of officialdom and 
the nature of county government, it develops to explain how these were shaped to 
the demands of war effort. The rest of the chapter examines the tiers of command of 
both sides at county and regional level. Having thereby introduced the opposing 
leaderships, chapter two considers the armed forces that campaigned in Shropshire, 
including their recruitment. An order of battle of those units engaged in the county 
war is proposed for the first time. The next two chapters examine the material 
resources of war effort. Chapter three provides a detailed evaluation of wartime 
finance, how money, the 'sinew of war', was raised and disbursed. The ad-hoc and 
more systematic measures to garner funds employed by both sides are described 
and evaluated. This chapter also addresses plundering (sanctioned or indiscriminate 
looting) and the taking of 'free quarters' (whereby the cost of billeting soldiers was 
borne by civilians) as practices that indirectly served to subsidise war effort. A 
wide-ranging chapter four scrutinises logistical matters: in turn, how the means to                                                         
61 Exceeding Joyfull Newes From his Excellence the Earle of Essex Declaring the true manner of his 
Excellencies proceedings in his march towards Shrewsbury (1642); True Intelligence and Joyfull 
Newes From Ludlow: Declaring a Battell fought by his Excellency the Earle of Essex, against Prince 
Robert, Prince Maurice, and the rest of the Cavaliers, neere Ludlow, October 1 1642 (1642).  
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arm, equip, feed and mount the soldiers were obtained, and how military supplies 
were shifted to and around the theatre of war. Due attention is given to those facets 
of Shropshire's economy which contributed to the war effort, in terms of resources, 
means of production and - such as it was - transport infrastructure. With the first 
four chapters concerned with the organisation and marshalling of personnel and 
resources, chapter five adopts a narrative rather than a comparative structure to 
explore operational aspects of war effort. Although several larger field engagements 
were fought in Shropshire during the First Civil War, numerous strongholds were 
established across the county and the subjugation of garrisons was the main concern 
of military operations. Accordingly, defensive means of fortification and offensive 
methods of siege-craft are examined in detail here. Furthermore, intelligence 
gathering and medical services are considered, being important operational matters 
of contemporary warfare that until recently have received little scholarly attention. 
Finally, the conclusion pulls together the findings of each chapter and evaluates the 
relative merits, the successes and failures of the war effort of the opposing sides in 
Shropshire as a theatre of operations during the English Civil Wars. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
Leadership and Administration 
 
 
In 1642 the first task of war effort was to create hierarchies of command and control. 
Both sides managed this at county level by grouping their chief supporters into 
similar rival bodies - the Royalist commissions of array and the Parliamentarian 
county committees. These were paramilitary organisations with civil and military 
authority, whose membership acted as civilian officials and/or army officers to 
direct the war effort in their shire. By exercising new martial powers and 
manipulating the traditional structures of county government, while asserting their 
local standing and influence, the commissioners and committeemen fashioned 
wartime administrations of varying effectiveness. Meanwhile, as the First Civil War 
intensified both King and Parliament attempted to direct the wider war effort by 
organising adjacent counties into regional commands, or associations. This was 
intended to facilitate the pooling of warlike resources for effective collaborative 
military action, but in practice concerns for local defence often prevailed over the 
pursuit of regional or wider strategic objectives. On both sides the regional 
commanders were usually peers of the realm, appointed for their social standing 
rather than their military ability.1 
 Chapter one examines the vital organisational structures that underpinned the 
opposing war efforts in Shropshire. However, considered first are the offices and 
mechanisms of local governmental that the belligerents would attempt to harness. 
Pre-war county governance and administration 
                                                        
1 Set against events in the English East Midlands, an appraisal of the commissions of array 
and county committees is provided by M. Bennett in ‘Between Scylla and Charybdis, The 
Creation of Rival Administrations at the beginning of The English Civil War' in The English 
Civil War: The Essential Readings, (ed.) P. Gaunt (Oxford, 2000), pp. 167-83. The commissions 
of array are further explored by Morrill, in Revolt, pp. 59-62, and Hutton, in War Effort, pp. 5-
7, 86-90, while on pp. 49-83 Hutton considered Royalist attempts to establish regional 
commands in Wales and the Marches during 1643. The most thorough studies of a 
Parliamentary county committee and of a regional association remain D.H. Pennington and 
I.A. Roots (eds.), The Committee at Stafford, 1643-1645 (Manchester, 1957), and Holmes's 
Eastern Association. 
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Local government in Shropshire before the Civil War followed the general pattern 
throughout the shires of early Stuart England.2 The will of central government, of 
the king and his executive Privy Council, and also the administration of local affairs 
was exercised by a hierarchical body of mostly part-time and unsalaried officials: 
the lord lieutenant and his deputies; the high sheriff; the justices of peace; the office-
bearers of the corporate towns; the high constables of the county hundreds; and the 
numerous parochial officers - the petty constables, churchwardens, the overseers of 
the poor and the overseers of the highways. When Parliament sat Shropshire sent 12 
MPs to Westminster - two knights of the shire and ten burgess, or borough, MPs, 
two each for the towns of Shrewsbury, Much Wenlock, Bridgnorth, Ludlow and 
Bishop's Castle.  
 The apex of county officialdom was the lord lieutenancy, a sought-after 
appointment exercising great influence and considerable authority. For the ten years 
preceding the Civil War the lord lieutenant of Shropshire was John Egerton, first 
Earl of Bridgewater, a privy councillor and also Lord President of the Council in the 
Marches of Wales. Based in Shropshire at Ludlow Castle, the Council combined the 
duties of a high court of law under the royal prerogative with the regional 
administration of the Principality and the English Marcher counties. By virtue of the 
presidency, by 1640 Bridgewater was not only lord lieutenant of Shropshire, but 
also of Worcestershire, Herefordshire, Monmouthshire and the 12 shires of Wales.3 
Bridgewater's chief responsibility was ensuring the military preparedness of these 
counties. In each shire arrangements for home defence, and especially the 
organisation of the practised militia, or trained bands, were delegated to notable 
gentry appointed as the lord lieutenant's deputies. In early 1642 the eight deputy 
lieutenants for Shropshire were: Sir Richard Lee, MP; Sir Richard Newport; Sir 
Gilbert Cornwall; Henry Bromley; Thomas Screven; Sir Thomas Wolrych; Sir 
Vincent Corbet; and Richard Herbert, the MP for Montgomery in neighbouring                                                         
2 This section draws on: A. Fletcher, Reform in the Provinces, The Government of Stuart England 
(London, 1986); R. Lockyer, The Early Stuarts – A Political History of England, 1603-1642 
(Harlow, 1999); L.M. Hill, 'County Government in Caroline England, 1625-1640' in The 
Origins of the English Civil War, (ed.) C. Russell (London, 1973), pp. 66-90; D.C. Cox, ‘County 
Government, 1603-1714’ in A History of Shropshire Volume III, (ed.) G.C. Baugh (Oxford, 
1979), pp. 90-114; R. Lloyd Kenyon (ed.), Orders of the Shropshire Quarter Sessions, Volume I, 
1638-1708 (Shrewsbury, undated); and H. Langelüddecke "The Pooreste and Sympleste Sorte 
of People"? The Selection of Parish Officers During the Personal Rule of Charles I', Historical 
Research, 80 (2007), pp. 225-60. 
3 ODNB, 27, pp. 996-7; CSPD, 1636-1637, pp. 177, 183; CSPD, 1640, p. 658. 
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Montgomeryshire. All of them became active Royalists. Three deputy lieutenants, 
Screven, Wolrych and Corbet, together with Pelham Corbet, another future Royalist, 
also captained the four companies of Shropshire's Trained Bands, with Cornwall 
captain of the county Troop of Horse.4 
 By the early seventeenth century the office of high sheriff had declined in 
importance as the crown's chief executive in a shire. In particular, the traditional 
powers of the shrievalty in military affairs had largely devolved to the lord 
lieutenancy. But the office regained authority during the 1630s, when the high 
sheriff had to levy and personally account for his shire's annual rate for ship money. 
However, the high sheriff and his under-sheriff deputy were more routinely 
involved in administering law and order, including hosting their county's six most 
important annual judicial and administrative events and social gatherings - the four 
seasonal courts of session and the bi-annual courts of assize.  
 Although virtually no records from them survive, Shropshire's pre-war quarter 
sessions were usually held for up to three days at Shrewsbury.5 The sessions were 
the quarterly main gatherings of the justices of the county magistracy, or 
commission of the peace. In 1642 Shropshire had around 50 justices of peace, 
appointed by the King from among the ranks of the gentry. At quarter sessions the 
JPs addressed legal matters, adjudicating on civil and lesser criminal cases, and also 
administrative affairs, such as local trade regulation and the county rates. The JPs in 
their work were assisted by a grand jury empanelled by the high sheriff, a body of 
15 or more respectable men of middling rank but generally lower social status than 
the magistracy. The grand jury was itself an important and respected institution. As 
well as being trial jurors the grand jurymen were a sort of quasi-supervisory body, 
representing in various issues the informed opinion of the wider county 
community. The sessions were also attended by the high constables of the county 
hundreds, who acted as intermediaries between the JPs and lesser local officials. 
Weighty criminal cases and contentious administrative matters were referred to the 
assize courts presided over by visiting higher court judges sitting with a local grand 
jury. The assizes also gave the Privy Council an indirect opportunity to exercise 
higher policy and to intervene in county affairs. In 1639, for example, the Council                                                         
4 HHL, Ellesmere Mss, 7443, 'A list of the deputy lieutenants and captains in the Principality 
and the Marches of Wales, 1637, revised and amended 1642'. 
5 See Lloyd Kenyon, Sessions, I, pp. 1-2, for fragmentary details of the 1638/9 sessions only. 
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instructed the circuit judges at the assizes to resolve long-standing rating problems 
affecting parts of Shropshire.6 The assizes were held at Bridgnorth in March, at Lent, 
and in high summer at Shrewsbury. Shropshire formed part of the wide-ranging 
Oxford assize circuit encompassing also Oxfordshire, Berkshire, Gloucestershire, 
Monmouthshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire.7  
 With the gentry serving as the chief agents of higher local government, the day-
to-day practice and enforcement of policy depended on the many lesser officials - 
who were typically artisans, yeomen and better-off husbandmen - voluntarily 
serving their elective part-time annual tenure as petty constables and 
churchwardens, or as overseers of the poor and of the highways. Petty constables 
had most responsibilities in their often-conflicting roles as royal officer and also 
village headman. They were charged with upholding law and order in their parish, 
and administrative tasks such as ensuring that the local militiamen of the trained 
bands attended musters and were properly paid and equipped. Petty constables 
assessed and collected most local rates and central taxes. They were expected 
meanwhile to report on their work and any pressing local matters by making 
regular 'presentments' to the justices and high constables. Churchwardens, as lay 
superintendents of the parish church, set and collected rates for its upkeep and, 
together with the overseers of the poor, disbursed relief to the local needy. Finally, 
the overseers of the highways were responsible for their parish's statutory duty to 
maintain public roads in the district.  
 Braddick has pointed out that local government in Caroline England was 
'densely populated with officeholders', and this would have been the case in 
Shropshire.8 Most parishes had two petty constables, but some townships also had 
their own; John Bowland, for example, was in 1638 the petty constable of Woodcote 
and Lynn, a scattered hamlet within Lilleshall parish.9 Constables also enlisted the 
occasional paid help of deputies such as John Marshall of Worfield, who sometime 
in 1640 assisted the parish officers in punishing vagrants.10 Shropshire parishes 
typically had two churchwardens and several overseers. Condover, for example,                                                         
6 Ibid., p. 1; CSPD, 1639, p. 252. 
7 Dating confirmed by, for example, BB/D/1/2/1/50; BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [first part], f. 
123. 
8 Braddick, God's Fury, p. 59. 
9 SA, P161/M1, ff. 8-9, constables' accounts, 1638-40. 
10 P314/M/1, f. 38. 
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into the 1640s had two churchwardens and four sidemen, several overseers of the 
poor and up to seven overseers of the highways. In addition, the parish's lay 
governing body of eight vestrymen audited the churchwardens' annual accounts.11 
The contemporary geographer John Speed identified 170 parishes in Jacobean 
Shropshire.12 Therefore, in 1642 there were probably around 2,000 incumbent 
parochial officials, besides their deputies and other bodies of overseeing lay folk, all 
having some practical experience of local administrative affairs. 
 The officers of Shopshire's largely self-governing corporate towns provided 
another tier of local government. Shrewsbury, Much Wenlock, Bridgnorth, Ludlow 
and Bishop's Castle, which, as borough towns, elected ten of the county's 12 MPs, 
were each administered by an elective body of aldermen headed by one or two 
bailiffs. Shrewsbury differed from 1638 in having a mayor, replacing the two bailiffs 
under a revised royal charter issued that June. The major headed a corporation of 23 
other aldermen, who appointed 48 lesser town officials known as assistants. 
Bishop's Castle, meanwhile, was governed by 15 'headburgesses', from whom one 
was elected bailiff. This assembly appointed the town's standing executive officials, 
some of whom were also headburgesses. They were the two sergeants at mace and 
two constables, whose main duties were law and order, and three clerical officers - 
two chamberlains and the town clerk.13 
 Town officials later found themselves drawn into the war effort. Thomas 
Crowther, for example, as the senior, or high bailiff of Ludlow during 1645 was 
effective in gathering Royalist military taxes. But near Ludlow one night in October 
1645 he was captured by a Parliamentarian patrol. Major Hungerford, the governor 
of Stokesay Castle, the nearest Parliamentary garrison to Ludlow, reckoned that 
Crowther's removal would certainly hamper Royalist tax-collection: 'So you may 
think they [now] get it with much difficulty', he remarked, in a dispatch to 
headquarters at Shrewsbury.14 
 The officials of county governance in seventeenth-century Shropshire acted 
within a framework of administrative districts, the largest being the 15 hundreds 
[Map 1, p. ix]. These included the three main towns of Shrewsbury, Much Wenlock 
                                                        
11 SA, P81/Fiche 115-28. 
12 Speed, Great Britaine, pp. 71-2. 
13 Owen and Blakeway, Shrewsbury, I, p. 406-7, BCHRC, First Minute Book, f. 202v. 
14 LBWB, II, p. 134. 
 25 
and Ludlow, each with their immediate environs, or liberties, counting as a 
hundred. From west to east Shropshire's northerly hundreds were Oswestry, 
Pimhill and then Bradford, the largest hundred, with northerly and southerly 
divisions. In an approximately central belt lay the westerly hundred of Chirbury, 
Ford hundred, the town and liberties of Shrewsbury, Condover hundred, the town 
and liberties of Much Wenlock (the Wenlock Franchise) and the easterly hundred of 
Brimstree. The most westerly of the southerly hundreds was Clun, then Purslow, 
Munslow and Overs, the latter incorporating the town and liberties of Ludlow. 
Finally, Stottesdon hundred lay in the south-east and included the town and 
liberties of Bridgnorth.15 The administrative importance of the hundreds increased 
during the 1630s as the focus of Charles I's policy to systematise local government, 
in such matters as poor relief, alehouse licensing, highway maintenance and 
countering vagrancy. This required the magistracy to superintend monthly 
supervisory meetings of the parochial officers within each hundred. An example of 
these so-called 'petty sessions' in Shropshire was that for Condover hundred held at 
Acton Burnell in October 1632, when the local justices met with the high and petty 
constables, the churchwardens and the overseers.16 The county militia was also 
ordered on the basis of the hundreds. In 1642, of Shropshire's four companies of 
Trained Band infantry, Captain Vincent Corbet's company was recruited from 
Bradford hundred and the town and liberties of Shrewsbury, while Captain Thomas 
Screven's men were more widely drawn from the hundreds of Condover, Clun, 
Purslow, Overs, Munslow and Ludlow. Regulatory inspections of the trained 
bandsmen and their maintainers (those officials or wealthier individuals 
accountable for providing the soldiers' equipment and pay) were also held 
according to hundreds. In November 1634, for example, the county muster master - 
Shropshire's sole full-time stipendiary military officer - reported to the Earl of 
Bridgewater that musters had taken place in seven hundreds and were planned in 
the remaining eight.17 
 Since the 1590s county rates and national taxes had been apportioned in 
Shropshire according to the subdivision of the 15 hundreds into 100 areas of 
                                                        
15 SA, 3365/225, f. 10, a list of Shropshire's hundreds, c. 1642. 
16 CSPD, 1631-1633, p. 421. 
17 HHL, Ellesmere Mss, 7443, 7625. 
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approximately equal wealth known as allotments.18 Their relative size is now 
difficult to characterise, but a town, or a grouping of rural constablewicks, could be 
counted similarly as one allotment. Allotments also overlaid the boundaries of 
parishes such as Myddle, split between the allotment of Myddle and Loppington 
and the liberties of Shrewsbury.19 Chirbury hundred was divided into three 
allotments, the Wenlock Franchise counted as seven.20 Shrewsbury and its liberties 
together comprised six and a half allotments, hence the county town paid one-
fifteenth and a half part of county rates.21 Dividing a rate by 100 and charging all 
allotments equally was normal procedure.22 During the 1630s this applied, for 
example, to the muster-master's annual salary of £50, charged at 10s per allotment, 
and also to purveyance - the customary annual obligation to provide the royal 
household with provisions or cash in kind. Accordingly, in 1639 each allotment paid 
52s towards Shropshire's £260 charge for this 'provision money'.23 From its 
introduction in Shropshire in August 1635 the annual levy for ship money was 
apportioned by allotments, but the unprecedentedly large sums required changes to 
the traditional uniform assessment. The resultant wrangling over variable valuation 
and rating hampered not only the collection of ship money, but in 1640 also the 
levying of coat and conduct money during the Second Bishops' War.24 Nonetheless, 
levies would be imposed according to allotments during the Civil Wars. 
 Petty constables and churchwardens administered the charges upon the 
hundreds and allotments by setting parish rates, known in Shropshire as lewns, 
annually but also on an ad-hoc basis as need arose. In 1639/40, for example, from 
two lewns levied by their constables the parishioners of Kenley contributed to the 
nearest workhouse, or 'house of correction', to purveyance, to the muster-master's 
stipend, and to cover the expense of conscripting three local men as soldiers during 
the Bishops' Wars.25 Land value was the predominant measure of assessment, 
calculated at a variable rate according to a unit of acreage known as yard land. For                                                         
18 Cox, ‘County Government’, p. 102, confirmed by SA, 3365/2559, unfoliated note. 
19 R. Gough, Antiquityes and Memoyres of the Parish of Myddle, (ed.) D. Hey as The History of 
Myddle (Harmondsworth, 1981), p. 29. 
20 CSPD, 1637-1638, pp. 312; CSPD, 1636-1637, p. 20. 
21 SA, 6001/290, f. 115; CSPD, 1635, pp. 516. 
22 Lloyd Kenyon, Sessions, I, p. 1. 
23 HHL, Ellesmere Mss, 7625; SA, BB/D/1/2/1/49. 
24 Lloyd Kenyon, Sessions, I, p. 1; CSPD, 1639, p. 252; CSPD, 1640, pp. 173, 180. 
25 SA, SRO 2310/1. 
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instance, in 1638 the churchwardens of Lydbury North set two lewns for church 
maintenance and two for the parish poor, respectively at the rate of 2s and 18s 'the 
yard land'.26 More than two thirds of one lewn levied during 1634/5 by the 
constables of Worfield - 'after the rate of every yard land, 16 pence' - paid for 
military charges, for the parish trained bandsmen and towards the muster master's 
salary.27 The proceeds from lewns were usually paid to coincide with the quarter 
sessions, like the churchwardens of Donnington who during the 1630s gave their 
'quarter pay' in installments to the high constable to deposit at the sessions.28 
The adaptation of county governance to Civil War 
In organising war effort at county level it was to be expected that the combatants 
would appropriate the machinery of local government, which, as has been seen, was 
in many respects already geared to taxation and procuring military resources. The 
use of familiar administrative structures gave the abnormal demands of wartime a 
legitimate veneer. Moreover, it made good sense to engage local officials familiar 
with implementing financial or material impositions, while higher officials who 
became activists could by exercising their influence add credibility to the cause. 
 In 1642 the powers of the lord lieutenancy eluded both sides in Shropshire. As 
lord president Bridgewater had dutifully and diligently served Charles I. However, 
the difficulties of the later years of the Personal Rule and the consequent censure he 
experienced from the Long Parliament, which entailed the abolition of the Council 
at Ludlow, sapped Bridgewater's support for the monarch. On 5 March 1642 
Parliament finally enacted the national militia ordinance in order to lever military 
authority away from the King, thereby placing under its authority the militia and 
the lieutenancy and instigating a purge of the lords lieutenant across England and 
Wales.29 This included Bridgewater's presidency, and it was reported in the Lords 
on 24 March that he would 'with all convenient speed' relinquish his lieutenancies, 
'for he doth willingly submit unto their lordships' order'.30 Although King Charles 
in summer 1642 and into spring 1643 hopefully appointed Bridgewater the titular 
head of commissions of array in Shropshire and other shires of his former                                                         
26 SA, P177/B/2/1, unfoliated. 
27 SA, P314/M/1/1, ff. 36-7. 
28 SA, P94/B/1/1, unfoliated. 
29 A&O, I, pp. 1-5. 
30 JHL, IV, p. 666. 
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presidency, he played little part and later neutrally sat out the war at his 
Hertfordshire estate.31 By the militia ordinance Parliament replaced Bridgewater as 
lord lieutenant of Shropshire with the county-born Edward, Lord Littleton, Lord 
Keeper of the Great Seal. The politically ambivalent Littleton was an unfortunate 
choice, however, for in May he defected to King Charles's court at York.32  In the 
Commons on 3 June 1642 it was therefore gloomily reported of Shropshire, that 
'there is no lord lieutenant to appoint the execution of the militia [ordinance]'.33 On 5 
September following Parliament formally ejected Littleton from his post, making the 
Earl of Essex, the Lord General of Parliament's field army, the lord lieutenant of 
Shropshire; in the event a titular appointment that had no practical influence on the 
outcome of events there.34 King Charles more credibly revived the office in 1644, 
when on 3 April he made Prince Rupert Lord President of Wales and the Marches 
and thereby the ex officio lord lieutenant of Shropshire.35  
 Following Littleton's appointment as lord lieutenant, on 18 March 1642 
Parliament approved several new deputy lieutenants for Shropshire, of whom two 
at least - Sir William Whitmore, MP for Bridgnorth, and John Weld junior, son of the 
high sheriff - would become Royalists. Accordingly, on 6 September following 
Parliament 'discharged' them both of their deputyship, along with Sir Vincent 
Corbet and Sir Thomas Wolrych. Parliament's replacement deputies appointed the 
same day were Walter Barker of Haughmond, Humphrey Walcot of Walcot, Sir 
Gilbert Cornwall, Thomas Hunt of Shrewsbury and Walter Long (a Wiltshire MP 
with landed interests in Shropshire). They had mixed loyalties, and of the local men 
only Hunt, and Barker to some extent, became active Parliamentarians.36 For the 
purposes of the Parliamentarian war effort in Shropshire the lieutenancy therefore 
became a dead letter. However, the Royalist deputies, including those discharged 
by Parliament, exercised the authority of the office into 1643 at least.37 
 The collection of ship money generated a revival in the powers of the shrievalty 
that continued into the Civil War. During summer 1642, in each shire Charles I                                                         
31 ODNB, 27, p. 997; NRO, Finch-Hatton Mss 133, unfoliated. 
32 ODNB, 34, p. 31. 
33 JHC, II, p. 602. 
34 Ibid., p. 752. 
35 NRO, Finch-Hatton Mss 133, unfoliated. 
36 JHC, II, pp. 485, 755. 
37 For example, a meeting of deputy lieutenants took place at Bridgnorth in January 1643: 
SA, BB/D/1/2/1/53. 
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called upon the high sheriff to coordinate a commission of array, reviving in both of 
these originally medieval institutions military powers lapsed since the Tudor 
creation of the lord lieutenancy. As the incumbent High Sheriff John Weld of Willey 
adroitly headed Shropshire's commission of array, and at the summer assizes held 
on 8 August (at Bridgnorth, within Weld's sphere of local influence, instead of 
Shrewsbury) with the connivance of the circuit judge, Baron Edward Henden, he 
engineered a packed grand jury under the commissioners' sway that proclaimed its 
support for the King.38 On 14 September the Commons ordered Weld's 
impeachment, but he was well beyond their reach and from 21 September the high 
sheriff sat on King Charles's council of war at Shrewsbury and issued warrants to 
summon the militia, to enlist volunteers and to solicit arms donations.39 Weld's 
successors as the King's high sheriff, Henry Bromley in 1642/3, Thomas Edwards in 
1643/4 and, from later 1644 until he surrendered in April 1646, Sir Francis Ottley, 
were active in the Royalist war effort. Henry Bromley, for example, in April 1643 
invoked in south Shropshire the sheriff's traditional power to summon the posse 
comitatus - a general, usually county-wide, call to arms of most physically able men 
aged 16 to 60 - and in November, when superintending tax collection, ordered the 
town bailiffs of Ludlow to pay arrears.40 Shropshire had concurrent opposing high 
sheriffs from December 1643, when Parliament created a rival shrievalty by the 
appointment of Colonel Thomas Mytton who was Parliament's high sheriff into 
1646.41  
 Given their social and political status a number of justices of peace inevitably 
took sides. Of 17 Shropshire JPs gathered at Shrewsbury in January 1642, during the 
First Civil War ten were active as Royalists and five as Parliamentarians.42 For the 
first year of the conflict at least, it was acceptable for magistrates to authorise 
warlike activity. The Royalists Edward Cressett and Edward Acton, MP, for 
example, in May 1643 directed military affairs at Bridgnorth in their capacity as 
local JPs rather than as commissioners of array.43  
                                                        
38 'Ottley Papers' (1894), pp. 33, 37, (1895), pp. 241-4; W. Yonge, Walter Yonge's Diary of 
Proceedings in the House of Commons, 1642-1645, I, (ed.) C. Thompson (Wivenhoe, 1986), p. 5. 
39 JHC, II, p. 766; SA, LB7/2317, LB7/2233, warrants directed to the town of Ludlow. 
40 SA, LB7/2235; SA, LB7/1932. 
41 JHC, III, p. 354; JHL, VIII, p. 41. 
42 SA, LB7/2315. 
43 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
 30 
 There is little extant evidence of the wartime activity of the justices' immediate 
under officers, the high constables. But they seem to have remained the important 
intermediaries between higher authority and lesser officials. In June 1648, for 
instance, Shropshire's governing Parliamentary committee gave orders for Richard 
Holland, a high constable of Stottesdon hundred, to instruct the town bailiffs of 
Bridgnorth to make arrangements for the militia.44 
 The quarter sessions and courts of assize were the assemblies in which JPs, grand 
jurymen, the sheriff and other officials and interested parties had managed county 
affairs. When war came, with King Charles's endorsement attempts were made in 
Royalist areas to ensure that the body politic kept at least an ostensible say in 
taxation and other aspects of war effort, voiced via the continuation in some form of 
sessions and assizes, or by public gatherings of gentry and freeholders. In 
Worcestershire, for example, the grand jury became in effect a county assembly.45 
Meanwhile, the Oxford assize circuit remained operational into summer 1643 at 
least.46 There is vestigial evidence of the survival of the formal courts in Shropshire, 
of the Lent and summer assizes in 1643, and of a grand jury sitting in late summer 
1644.47 But there is more evidence that Royalist policy was disseminated and 
approved by public gatherings. Mass meetings of gentry and freeholders, convened 
by the high sheriff and held at Shrewsbury, are known to have taken place, on 22 
November 1642; upon Prince Rupert's arrival in February 1644; and in 1645, on 7 
January and again on 5 February, the latter gathering held before Prince Maurice.48 
Furthermore, references to Royalist meetings attended jointly by commissioners of 
array and other gentry demonstrate more widespread participation in the direction 
of the Royalist war effort.49 For their part, the Parliamentarians in Shropshire, as 
generally elsewhere during the First Civil War, do not appear to have made any use 
of rival courts or public meetings.50 
 The responsibilities and duties of parochial officers had increased considerably 
during the years of the Personal Rule, and for most their workload intensified                                                         
44 SA, BB/C/8/1/6. 
45 Braddick, God's Fury, p. 285; Morrill, Revolt, pp. 78, 112, 116; Hutton, War Effort, pp. 37, 
135. 
46 BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [first part], f. 123.  
47 'Ottley Papers' (1895), pp. 269-70; SA, 3365/587, f. 11; SA, 3365/588, f. 19.  
48 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/52; WSL, SMS 551/2; HRO, CF61/20, f. 569; BDL, Firth Mss C6, f. 303. 
49 For example, BRL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 19. 
50 Morrill, Revolt, p. 117; Hutton, War Effort, p. 106. 
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during the First Civil War when both sides engaged their services. Higher civil and 
military officers usually sought to act with the authority of warrants when 
demanding material support for the war effort. In early October 1643, for example, 
the Parliamentarians served warrants from their base at Wem, ordering petty 
constables in north Bradford hundred to provide horses, arms and provisions.51 
Royalist soldiers felt justified in enlisting the support of civilian officials who held 
their office in the King's name. A Royalist transport officer posted to Shropshire in 
February 1644 carried Prince Rupert's warrant, to enlist the support of 'all mayors, 
sheriffs, justices of peace, bailiffs, high constables, constables, headboroughs, tithing 
men [the latter two being titles synonymous as petty constables or their deputies], 
post masters, all other of his majesty’s officers [...] but more especially to the 
constables'.52  
Their wartime duties made petty constables especially active. For example, 
during 1644 and 1645 the constables of Stockton performed many assignments for 
the Royalist garrison at Bridgnorth, five miles south of their parish. Among other 
tasks, they assessed and collected military taxes, impressed local conscripts and 
gathered provisions. Later in 1645 the constables also executed warrants served by 
the nearby Parliamentarian garrison across the River Severn at Benthall.53 Petty 
constables were especially had tasked, but other local officials were also drawn into 
the war effort. Before the Civil War the churchwardens of the Shrewsbury parish of 
the Holy Cross had levied funds to maintain the parish's two trained bandsmen, 
and they continued to do so from 1642 to 1644 when their soldiers were in Royalist 
service. After Shrewsbury fell to the Parliamentarians, from 1645 the 
churchwardens in turn assessed and collected Parliamentary military taxes.54 At 
Ludlow, both bailiffs acted as chief assessors of Royalist taxation whilst deputising 
collection to two under-officers, the chamberlains and high constables of the town.55 
Meanwhile at Bridgnorth the 24 aldermen of the town council met periodically 
during the First Civil War. Under the oversight of the military governor and some 
                                                        
51 The warrant was reproduced on pp. 650-1 of the Royalist journal Mercurius Aulicus for the 
week ending 19 Nov. 1643. Although published with propagandist intent, there seems little 
reason to doubt the transcript's accuracy. 
52 SA, LB7/2249. 
53 SA, P270/B/1/1, ff. 55-8. 
54 SA, P250/325-8. 
55 SA, LB7/1932. 
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commissioners of array, the aldermen addressed matters relating to the garrison 
and the town defences.56  
 Some officials found that their freqently onerous duties imposed an intolerable 
burden. The troubles of John Acton, a glover by trade and in 1644 one of the petty 
constables of Ludlow, illustrate the point. For failing to adequately fulfill warrants 
issued by the town's military governor Sir Michael Woodhouse, Acton was 
repeatedly committed to the provost martial's cell, and one market day he was 
arrested and forced out of his shop by Woodhouse's musketeers. On another 
occasion the governor angrily struck Acton and threw a stone at him.57 Constable 
Acton may have been incompetent, obstructive or just plain unfortunate. But local 
officials often adapted to circumstances for their own or their neighbours' sake, and 
in so doing performed satisfactorily for either King or Parliament. This sort of 
pragmatism can be detected in the hinterland of Shrewsbury into 1646, where 
among 27 of the petty constables serving under the Parliamentarian regime, 40 per 
cent had previously acted for the Royalists as parish officers or local tax officials.58 
At Bridgnorth, John Lawrence capably assisted both sides as the Beadle, or general 
factotum to the town council. Having previously executed many warrants for the 
Royalists, Lawrence remained in office into 1647 when he implemented orders from 
the Parliamentarian county committee for the demolition of Bridgnorth Castle, 
formerly a Royalist strong point.59 
 Something remains to be said of the involvement in the First Civil War of the 
Shropshire MPs elected in 1640 to the Long Parliament.60 Four of them opposed 
King Charles. Listed in descending order of their likely importance to the 
Parliamentarian cause, they were: William Pierrepont, a burgess MP for Much 
Wenlock; Sir John Corbet, a knight of the shire; and Richard More and William 
Spurstowe, respectively burgesses for Bishop's Castle and Shrewsbury. Shropshire's 
remaining eight MPs were more or less active as Royalists. Sir Richard Lee of 
Langley and Sir Robert Howard of Clun, respectively the second knight for the shire 
and burgess for Bishop's Castle, were commissioners of array and early active                                                         
56 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
57 SA, LB7/2108, Acton's petition of grievances, dated 20 Jan. 1645. 
58 Individuals named in: SA, 3365/589, ff. 1-3; SA, 3365/1267, ff. 91-148, passim; SA, 
3365/2711, f. 23. 
59 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/57.  
60 D. Brunton and D.H. Pennington, Members of the Long Parliament (London, 1954), pp. 10-13. 
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supporters of King Charles. Consequently, on 6 September 1642 they were both 
'disabled', or formally ejected from the Commons.61 In 1644 Lee and Howard 
attended the Royalist parliament sitting at Oxford from 22 January into April 
together with the six other Shropshire MPs, whose presence there confirmed their 
allegiance beyond any further doubt.62 Accordingly, also on 22 January the 
Westminster Parliament disabled Francis Newport, the second burgess for 
Shrewsbury, for 'being in the King's quarters, and adhering to that party', and in a 
final round of ejections for the same reasons on the following 5 February disabled 
Thomas Littleton, the second burgess for Much Wenlock, Sir Edward Acton and Sir 
Thomas Whitmore, the burgesses for Bridgnorth, along with both burgesses for 
Ludlow, Charles Baldwin and Ralph Goodwyn.63 
Royalist leadership and administration in Shropshire 
The commission of array, 1642-6 
The means by which King Charles I sought to engage widespread military support 
during summer 1642 was by instituting for each county a commission of array, the 
name given to the body itself and also to the impressive charter, written in Latin 
and bearing the royal seal, that brought it into being. Later medieval English kings 
had issued commissions of array to the high sheriffs and leading magnates in the 
shires to raise men for war, but as a military device it had long been superseded by 
the powers of the Tudor lord lieutenancy. However, the commission of array 
remained on the statute book and King Charles had issued them in 1640 at the time 
of the Second Bishops' War, including to the Earl of Bridgewater in mid-September 
instructing him to raise forces within the Presidency of Wales and its Marche.64 King 
Charles constituted the first 28-man commission of array for Shropshire at his court 
at York on 22 June 1642 (see Table 1, pp. 33-4), where the same day his secretary Sir 
Edward Nicholas wrote justifying the commissions generally, as 'issued by his 
majesty for disposing of the militia into the hands of the estated [i.e. landed] sober 
men, in the ancient and approved way'.65 Shropshire's commissioners therefore had 
a deliberately measured military remit, to conduct the trained bands and ensure 
that they were adequately trained and equipped under loyal local officers, and to                                                         
61 JHC, II, p. 755. 
62 J. Rushworth, Historical Collections of Private Passages of State, 8 vols. (1721), V, pp. 573-5. 
63 JHC, III, pp. 374, 389. 
64 HHL, Ellesmere Mss, 7684. 
65 CSPD, 1641-1643, pp. 344-5. 
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tax Recusants in order to provide arms in the anticipated event of a wider call up of 
the untrained militia, the posse comitatus.66 Accordingly, trained bandsmen were 
being mustered in the Shrewsbury area by 2 July.67 The value of the commission of 
array to King Charles was that it enabled him, with some legitimacy, to circumvent 
Parliament's militia ordinance, and, if necessary, bypass the lieutenancy, in order to 
muster military support by the royal prerogative in time-honoured fashion.
 The commission of array in each shire was a cross-section of notable or otherwise 
influential gentry entrusted by Charles to raise support, esquires as well as titled 
gentlemen, under the purported leadership of a leavening of peers of the realm with 
local interests. Hence, under the titular headship of the 12-year old Charles, Prince 
of Wales, the commission for Shropshire was headed by five peers with estates in 
the county but who never or only rarely resided there: Robert, Viscount Kilmorey; 
Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel; William, Lord Craven; Edward Herbert, Lord of 
Cherbury; and the Earl of Bridgewater. Other than Kilmorey, who was active mostly 
in Cheshire, none of these noblemen as figureheads appear to have done much to 
uphold the King's cause in Shropshire in 1642 or later: both Howard and Craven 
voluntarily went into Continental exile; Herbert was infirm and his Royalism was 
lukewarm, and, retired to his fastness at Montgomery Castle, he hoped to distance 
himself from the conflict; while Bridgewater shunned commitment, as has already 
been seen.68  
                                                        
66 'Ottley Papers' (1894), pp. 33-4. 
67 SA, P250/Fiche 325. 
68 ODNB: 40, p. 323; 28, p. 445; 14, p. 65; 26, p. 667. 
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Table 1: Alphabetical listing of Royalist commissioners of array, 1642-6. 
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Sources for Table 1: The only extant full listings of commissions of array for Shropshire are 
for the first, constituted by King Charles at York on 22 June 1642, and for the second 
commission re-constituted at York the following 18 July. Both are listed here from the NRO, 
Finch Hattton Mss 133, unfoliated. Otherwise, Table 1 is a composite of information derived 
from several less uniform sources. References to Shropshire commissioners are scattered 
throughout the  'Ottley Papers', in the volumes of the CPCC and CPCM, and also the CSPD. 
Dugdale Mss 19 and Firth Mss C7, f. 211, both in the BDL, mention Shropshire 
commissioners in 1644. There is evidence of commissioner activity in the manuscript 
collections of Shropshire Archives, for example in: BB/C/1/1/1; LB7/2234 and LB7/2236; 
3365/2711, ff. 22, 25-6, mentioning commissioners at Shrewsbury in spring 1644; and 
especially 5460/8/2/2, a petition from early 1644 subscribed by 20 commissioners. Some 
commissioners in 1642 are named in the Sutherland Papers, D868/2/35, 37-8, 41, at the SRO. 
The Parliamentary Journals, of the Lords, Vol. V, and the Commons, Vol. II, both mention 
Shropshire commissioners of array that Parliament found especially troublesome in autumn 
1642. Much genealogical and topographical information on these individuals came from G. 
Grazebrook and J.P. Rylands (eds.), The Visitation of Shropshire Taken in the Year 1623, 2 vols. 
(London, 1889).   
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 To all intents and purposes, then, in Shropshire it was the local gentry who 
rallied to King Charles and who served as commissioners of array, including the 
trained band captains, and, except for Sir Richard Newport and Sir Gilbert 
Cornwall, the deputy lieutenants holding office in early 1642. Sir Richard Newport 
of High Ercall had the largest landholdings in Shropshire outside the peerage and 
was at first ambivalent in his allegiance, appointed to the first commission of array 
of 22 June, but dropped from the second a month later. So it was a vital moment for 
the Shropshire Royalists when, probably in mid-August, Sir Richard committed his 
support and considerable local influence to the King.69 In the meantime, at York on 
18 July Charles had re-constituted a second commission of array for Shropshire (see 
Table 1) intending to bring more active men to the fore by dropping seven original 
commissioners and appointing 14 newcomers, making a total of 33. Spurred into 
renewed activity, by warrants issued on 26 July the commissioners mustered the 
Trained Bands in the Shrewsbury area on 2 August. The commissioners meanwhile 
gathered at the county town on 28 July, 
where, leading a body of followers armed 
militia-like with improvised weapons, several 
angrily confronted the local Parliamentarian 
MPs on 1 August.70 This belligerent activity 
was headed by the commissioners Sir Paul 
Harris, Edward Cressett, Sir Vincent Corbet, 
Richard Lloyd, High Sheriff John Weld, the 
Mayor of Shrewsbury Richard Gibbons, and 
notably by Francis Ottley of Pitchford, who in 
1646 was still characterised in the London 
press as 'the first man that acted the 
commission of array in Shropshire' (Plate 1).71  
 As has been seen, at the assizes on 8 August 
the commission of array secured a declaration professing lawful obedience to the                                                         
69 W. Phillips (ed.), ‘Sequestration Papers of Sir Richard, First Baron Newport and Francis, 
his son’, TSANHS, 2nd Series, XII (1900), pp. 4-5. 
70 JHL, V, pp. 269-70. 
71 Perfect Occurrences of Both Houses of Parliament and Martiall Affairs, w/e 10 Apr. 1646, 
unpaginated.  
 
Plate 1: 
Sir Francis Ottley (1600/01-1649). 
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King, by 'putting the country [Shropshire] in a posture of arms for the defence of his 
majesty and the peace of the kingdom'. Furthermore, at Much Wenlock on 16 
August the sheriff and 17 other commissioners issued another declaration, 
threatening to confront any opposition as enemies of the King and summoning the 
gentry to back the assizes declaration. From then on, with a firm grip on the 
Shropshire Trained Bands, but it seems without using actual force, by public 
proclamation, by lobbying groups and individuals in correspondence and private 
meetings, and with the backing by a declaration on 24 August of a sizeable and 
voluble Royalist faction among the county clergy, the commission of array 
gradually gained support and a momentum that dissuaded many from supporting 
Parliament.72 This movement expressed a degree of commitment to the King that, as 
Morrill has noted, was more than a show of local unanimity meant to keep the 
peace and avert public disorder.73 More than outwardly, then, the commission of 
array secured Shropshire for King Charles, who, by visits from Shropshire Royalists 
as the court moved into the East Midlands in later August and into September, was 
kept well informed of developments there before he entered the county on 19 
September 1642.  Charles rewarded several commissioners with knighthoods, 
including Francis Ottley who assumed, de facto, a leading role as governor of 
Shrewsbury, an appointment the King confirmed in January 1643.74  
 The commission of array, in cooperation with a succession of regional Royalist 
commanders and their officers, would remain the executive of the Royalist war 
effort in Shropshire throughout the First Civil War, a number of commissioners also 
serving as military officers. The 63 known Shropshire commissioners are listed in 
Table 1. With 36 apparently active during 1642 and 1643 and 37 during 1644, the 
number of effective commissioners during the first two years of the war exceeded 
the commission of 33 re-appointed in July 1642. This was not, however, a monolithic 
bloc of Royalist support, for, excluding the peers and Sir Sampson Eure, an outsider, 
and allowing for the deaths of Francis Charleton and Thomas Screven, of 33 men 
appointed to either or both of the commissions in summer 1642, only 22, two-thirds, 
appear to have remained active into 1644 (although we probably lack evidence for 
others). On the other hand, newcomers who may have been more committed joined                                                         
72 Yonge, Diary, pp. 3-5; 'Ottley Papers' (1894), pp. 34, 35-8, (1895), pp. 244-5. 
73 Morrill, Revolt, p. 66. 
74 'Ottley Papers' (1894), pp. 37-8, 41, 45-6, 56, 59; Owen and Blakeway, Shrewsbury, I, p. 423. 
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the commission from time to time. As the only extant full listings of the commission 
of array for Shropshire are from summer 1642, Table 1 inevitably makes 
assumptions about the involvement of certain individuals. Sir Richard Prince, for 
example, when making settlement with the Parliamentarians claimed that he had 
joined the commission of array only reluctantly, but in fact seems to have been an 
active participant.75 On the other hand, given the fragmentary nature of the 
evidence of their activity some commissioners may remain unidentified, perhaps 
including John Newton of Heightley who reportedly was involved in conscription.76 
Simon Weston, a Shrewsbury draper and the influential Master of the Drapers' 
Company in 1644, is similarly unrecorded as a commissioner, but during 1643 and 
1644 he was a senior Royalist financial official and most likely the county treasurer 
for military taxation.77 
 Whereas the duties of the several Parliamentarian committees for Shropshire are 
made clear in the respective ordinances of Parliament, we lack similar detail on the 
division of responsibilities within the commission of array. However, the list of 
tasks demanded of the commissioners in Shropshire and elsewhere in Prince 
Rupert's regional command embraced all aspects of war effort and were made clear 
when he took over in January 1644. The Prince's commissioners, as they were now 
titled, had to see to the recruitment of new and existing military units; provide the 
soldiers with provisions and clothing; procure artillery, weaponry and ammunition; 
of course raise money; and generally attend to all other 'habiliments [in this sense, 
the activity] of war'.78 This list neatly summarises the greatly expanded role of 
Royalist commissioners from their deliberately restrained remit of summer 1642. 
Meanwhile Prince Rupert had authority to dismiss and appoint commissioners, and 
so several from Shropshire identified in Table 1 were most likely his appointees, 
including Edward Baldwin, Lawrence Benthall, Thomas Ireland and James Lacon.  
 Like the Parliamentarian county committees, the commissions of array were 
concerned with military finance. Chapter three will show that in Shropshire there 
were Royalist sub-commissions for sequestration and for the excise, while 
references from 1644 to (unnamed) 'commissioners for the levying of contributions' 
                                                        
75 CPCC, II, p. 1609. 
76 Ibid., p. 1045. 
77 SA, 1831/1/4/17, f. 61; SA, LB7/2235; SA, P270/B/1/1, f. 55. 
78 BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [second part], f. 75. 
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show that some were responsible for supervising the main Royalist military tax.79 
Furthermore, in June 1644 a regulatory accounting commission for Shropshire was 
appointed headed by Sir Robert Howard and Sir William Whitmore.80 Although 
probably much of their administrative work was done at Shrewsbury, the Royalist 
headquarters, groups of commissioners, perhaps those from the locality, appear to 
have also attended regular organisational meetings in quorum, of several days' 
duration, held at the other main Royalist strongholds of Ludlow and Bridgnorth.81 
A minimum quorum of three commissioners was necessary to authorise warrants; 
for example the order to levy conscripts in the Ludlow area subscribed by Sir Paul 
Harris, Thomas Ireland and High Sheriff Thomas Edwards on 25 April 1644.82  
 Table 1 shows a marked decline in the number of commissioners during 1645 
and into 1646. Because evidence from that time is so sparse, there were probably 
more than the 13 commissioners identified here. However, the commission of array 
suffered a damaging blow on 22 February 1645 when Shrewsbury fell to the 
Parliamentarians, when 12 commissioners, including the stalwarts from 1642 Sir 
John Weld and Sir Richard Lee, were captured there. All were later transferred to 
Nantwich and dispersed further afield to Stafford and Manchester, held as captives 
or given restricted parole.83 Furthermore, a few days before Shrewsbury fell the 
Parliamentarians in a daring, long-distance raid on Sir William Whitmore's house at 
Apley near Bridgnorth appear to have captured several commissioners, including 
Sir Francis Ottley (who either soon escaped or was inadvisably exchanged, because 
by May he was once again active as Royalist high sheriff).84 During the remainder of 
1645 and into 1646 the remaining commissioners were based at Bridgnorth. 
Besieged in Bridgnorth Castle, the last active group of them, Sir Francis Ottley, Sir 
Robert Howard, Sir Vincent Corbet and Sir Edward Acton, Royalist die-hards 
described by their local opponents in the county committee as 'the commissioners of                                                         
79 For example: BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 225; BL, Harley Mss 6802, f. 227; BDL, Firth Mss 
C7, f. 229. 
80 BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [second part], ff. 11-12. 
81 Evidence from 1644 is found in SA, P270/B/1/1, ff. 55-6, and SA, LB/8/3/75, respectively 
for commissioner meetings at Bridgnorth and Ludlow. 
82 SA, LB7/2236.  
83 LBWB, I, pp. 40-3; T. Malbon, ‘Memorials of the Civil War in Cheshire and the Adjacent 
Counties by Thomas Malbon of Nantwich, Gent.’, (ed.) J. Hall, The Record Society for the 
Publication of Original Documents relating to Lancashire and Cheshire, XIX (1889), pp. 166-7. 
84 LBWB, I, p. 43; J. Vicars, The Burning-Bush Not Consumed Or The Fourth and Last Part of the 
Parliamentarie-Chronicle (1646), pp. 115-16.  
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array [...] embittered against the Parliament', surrendered to the Parliamentarians 
on 27 April 1646.85 
Royalist associations and regional commanders 
By mid-August 1642 the commissions of array in Shropshire, Cheshire, North Wales 
and Staffordshire were maintaining contact with each other and developing a spirit 
of informal regional cooperation among the King's supporters that by September 
had resulted in weekly meetings being held at Whitchurch, Shropshire, attended by 
commissioners from Shropshire, Cheshire, Denbighshire and Flintshire.86 Meeting 
on 2 September, including the Shropshire representatives Francis Ottley, John Weld, 
Paul Harris and Sir Richard Lee, MP, they agreed a seven-point declaration in 
support of King Charles to create a regional association army of trained bandsmen 
and volunteers, 'for the necessary defence of our counties and preservation of 
ourselves'.87 This 'confederacy', as it was known in London by 20 September, was a 
platform of support that held King Charles in good stead while he remained in and 
around Shropshire building an army.88 However, with the King gone, active 
cooperation among the region's Royalists lessened into the winter, Staffordshire 
reverting to attempted neutrality in November, while there was a cease-fire in 
Cheshire in December.89  
 In spring 1643 King Charles created provincial military commands headed by 
trusted peers of regional standing. In early April the Principality and its Marche was 
divided between three deputy or lieutenant-generals, holding command under the 
teenage Charles Prince of Wales as titular captain-general: Richard Vaughan, Earl of 
Carberry in command of south-west Wales; Edward Somerset, Lord Herbert, in 
command of south-east Wales and Herefordshire; and Arthur, Lord Capel, given 
charge of Shropshire, Worcestershire, Cheshire and the six counties comprising 
North Wales - Anglesey, Caernarvonshire, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Merionethshire 
and Montgomeryshire.90 Unlike the indigenous leaders Carberry and Herbert, Capel 
was a trusted and committed outsider, a Hertfordshire peer appointed to command                                                         
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a region that lacked an obvious or outstanding native figure to take charge. Capel 
was later handicapped by this distinction: as one of his former officers reminisced 
many years later, Capel came to be seen by the local Royalists as 'a stranger not fit to 
govern them, as one whose lands and interest lies among them'.91 
 Lord Capel's lieutenant-generalship was confirmed on 4 April 1643, when 
already he had held two councils of war at Shrewsbury as his headquarters, after 
arriving in Shropshire at Bridgnorth on 25 March.92 Capel had no military 
experience beyond that acquired in leading his regiment of horse in the war so far, 
but he was accompanied by two experienced professionals, Lieutenant Colonel Sir 
John Mennes, a cavalry officer in the Second Bishops' War and later captain of the 
King's ship Victory until discharged by Parliament in July 1642, and Major Michael 
Woodhouse, a senior regimental officer returned from Ireland.93 Respectively, they 
were Capel's general of ordnance (a logistical role) and sergeant-major-general of 
foot.94 Furthermore, in May Sir Richard Willys arrived from Oxford as Capel's 
major-general of horse.95 Capel also relied on local leaders, Mennes sharing 
responsibility for the defence of Shrewsbury with Sir Thomas Screven, colonel of the 
Trained Bands, and the governor Sir Francis Ottley, while Sir Thomas Wolryche and 
Thomas Fisher governed Bridgnorth and Ludlow respectively.96  
 Energetically Capel set about putting his command on a heightened war footing, 
expecting his subordinates to adopt a collective approach to military operations in 
place of local self-interest. Accordingly, when in April 1643 the Denbighshire 
commissioners failed to supply their county soldiers serving in Shropshire with his 
field army, Capel angrily chided them, that 'in the defence of these parts and offence 
of the rebels here lies your preservation'.97 Responding in July to complaints by the 
Flintshire gentry about Royalist cavalry billeted there, Capel retorted that 'if 
[Royalist controlled] Chester be precious to them they will conclude a necessity of 
quartering of horse near it', and stubbornly kept the horsemen in place.98 However, 
Capel also sought to foster greater unity of purpose across the region by proposing                                                         
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a consultative assembly comprising three representatives from each county under 
his command. The assembly would meet at Shrewsbury, and afterwards a 
commissioner from each shire would remain in a standing council of war. The 
assembly met around 3 July 1643 and it engendered some enthusiasm among its 
delegates, but we lack evidence for it and the council thereafter.99 
 Capel's approach did not sit well with a localist outlook. Discontent engendered 
by his demands may account for a London newsbook in May 1643 reporting that 
Capel had violently argued with Sir Thomas Screven, and that several Shropshire 
Royalists had petitioned the King to replace him with Lord Newport, 'their own 
country man'.100 The report cannot otherwise be substantiated, however, and in July 
Capel favourably contrasted the cooperative 'gentlemen of Shropshire' with the 
apathetic commissioners in Caernarvonshire.101 
 Lord Capel was an active field commander, but he came off worst against his 
chief opponent, Sir William Brereton, the commander-in-chief of Parliamentarian 
forces in Cheshire throughout the First Civil War, who during 1643 kept control of 
much of Cheshire. In abortive attacks, in May and again in August, Capel signally 
failed to capture Brereton's headquarters at Nantwich.102 This left the way open for 
the Parliamentarians to establish themselves in Shropshire at Wem in September 
1643, which Capel did not prevent. The attempts on 17-18 October by Capel's army 
to storm Wem were beaten off. This encouraged Brereton, together with allied 
forces, to launch three weeks later a campaign into north-east Wales that threatened 
Chester. This was a worsening military situation reflected upon by a well-informed 
North-Walian Royalist in mid-November, at the height of the Parliamentarian 
offensive, who saw Capel as a hesitant and 'unfortunate commander' lacking 
support and respect, especially in Shropshire. 103 
 On 21 November, John, Lord Byron, an experienced regimental and brigade 
commander and now ostensibly Capel's field marshal and deputy, left the royal 
headquarters at Oxford to go to his help with 1,300 horse and foot.104 Byron quickly 
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arrived at Shrewsbury on the 28th to find the military situation had shifted in the 
Royalists' favour.105 Two thousand foot soldiers repatriated from the English Army 
in Leinster and landed on the Flintshire coast a week or so earlier had joined with 
Capel's forces and caused the Parliamentarians hastily to retreat from North 
Wales.106 During November and December it appeared likely that Capel's 
replacement would be the Marquis of Ormond, the King's commander-in-chief in 
Ireland, who in September had settled the ceasefire in the concurrent war with the 
Catholic Irish Confederacy that was allowing detachments of the so-called 'English-
Irish' forces to be transferred to the Royalists in England.107 But in the event 
Ormond remained in Ireland, promoted to lord lieutenant, while Byron, whose 
commission confirmed at Oxford on 29 November presupposed that he would 
become Ormond's deputy, based himself at Chester as field-marshal-general (under 
the Prince of Wales) of Shropshire, Worcestershire, Cheshire and the six counties of 
North Wales.108 Capel meanwhile was respectfully recalled to Oxford, arriving there 
on 19 December 1643.109  
 Left, de facto, as regional commander-in-chief and engaged during December 
and into the New Year in a winter campaign in Cheshire, Byron paid little heed to 
affairs in Shropshire. Writing to Prince Rupert in mid-January 1644, he dismissed 
Shrewsbury as a 'disaffected town' and Sir Francis Ottley as an 'old, doting fool'.110 
After Byron's damaging defeat at Nantwich on 25 January 1644 even less was heard 
from him at Shrewsbury, which within days of the battle was unsettled after the 
failure of a plot by Parliamentarian fifth-columnists to overpower the town, and by 
the subsequent arrival of Sir Michael Woodhouse with 300 of his regiment to restore 
martial law.111 From Shrewsbury on 2 February 1644 Sir John Mennes wrote to 
Prince Rupert of being excluded from the meetings of the local Royalists: 'these 
insulting people who now tell us their power and that three of the commissioners of 
array may question the best of us, from which power good Lord deliver me'.112                                                         
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Complaining further of cross-purposes in command, on 9 February Mennes wrote 
hopefully that Prince Rupert would 'put better rules unto us'; for on 6 January 1644, 
instead of the Marquis of Ormond, King Charles had appointed his nephew, in the 
Prince of Wales's stead, as captain-general of Shropshire, Worcestershire, Cheshire, 
Lancashire and North Wales.113 Byron would remain at Chester as field marshal and 
Rupert's deputy. 
 Arriving there from Oxford late on 18 February, the next day Prince Rupert was 
formally welcomed by Shrewsbury's aldermen and made the town his 
headquarters.114 Although his duties often took him elsewhere, especially during 
most of March on the long-distance Newark campaign, until embarking in mid-May 
to the relief of York Prince Rupert spent about eight weeks based in Shropshire, 
when his forces successively confined the Parliamentarians to a small enclave 
around Wem.115 Like Capel before him but with greater military and political 
authority and administrative ability, by reforms and making greater demands 
Prince Rupert set about reinvigorating the Royalist war effort in Shropshire and 
elsewhere under his command. His appointment on 3 April as lord president 
coupled with promotion on 8 May to captain-general of the remainder of Wales and 
of Herefordshire, Monmouthshire and Gloucestershire made the Prince in effect (for 
he remained, on paper, a subordinate of the Prince of Wales) the overlord of the 
Principality and its Marche.116 Rupert also revived Capel's idea of a regional council, 
but although it probably met at Shrewsbury soon after his arrival there, we lack 
evidence of it thereafter.117   
 The local military governors in Shropshire were replaced by Prince Rupert with 
professional soldiers, the senior English regimental officers returned from the army 
in Ireland he favoured, the Prince, according to one of his aides, being 'mightily in 
love with the Irish'.118 Accordingly, before arriving in Shropshire Rupert made Sir 
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Michael Woodhouse governor of Ludlow in place of Richard Herbert.119 Sir Lewis 
Kirke and Sir Abraham Shipman were put in charge of Bridgnorth and Oswestry 
respectively, but it took longer to lever the governorship of Shrewsbury from Sir 
Francis Ottley. Although on 12 March King Charles had acceded to Rupert's 
requests to replace him, Ottley meanwhile journeyed to Oxford seeking the King's 
approbation, and returned to Shrewsbury on 29 March apparently having done so. 
Nonetheless, probably in late April Ottley was replaced by Sir Fulke Hunckes, 
another veteran from Ireland.120 By July, in the wake of recent local successes by the 
enemy Hunckes was quarrelling with the commissioners of array, questioning their 
commitment and condemning them as 'so many caterpillars' for their apparent 
inactivity.121 In early August Prince Rupert made two further senior appointments 
in Shropshire, replacing Hunckes with Colonel Robert Broughton as governor of 
Shrewsbury to placate the local Royalists, and putting Sir Michael Ernle in overall 
command, probably as brevet major-general.122 Again, both officers had previously 
served in Ireland.  
 After being defeated at Marston Moor on 2 July Prince Rupert returned to 
Chester on the 25th, and was based there for a few weeks unsuccessfully attempting 
to rebuild his army. However, on 20 August he left Chester for Bristol as a new 
headquarters, arriving on the 26th.123 In November Prince Rupert was given overall 
command of all Royalist forces as captain-general. Thereafter he would return to 
Shropshire only in March 1645, in support of his younger brother Prince Maurice 
who then was regional commander. 
 Within a month of Prince Rupert's departure, on 18 September the regional 
Royalist field army numbering around 4,500 men led by Lord Byron, once again the 
effective area commander-in-chief, was beaten in battle and routed by a smaller 
Parliamentarian army at Montgomery, just over the Shropshire border in 
Montgomeryshire.124 This major defeat coupled with growing war weariness had a 
profoundly depressing effect on Royalist morale, expressed during October by a 
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marked decline in both popular support for and local cooperation with the 
garrisons in Shropshire.125 Sir Michael Ernle, now governor of Shrewsbury after 
Colonel Broughton was captured at Montgomery, reported to Prince Rupert on 2 
October how in particular, 'the edge of the gentry is very much abated, so that they 
are all at a stand and move but heavily to advance this service'.126   
 The situation encouraged a gathering of gentry, clergy and freeholders on 7 
November to agree a declaration calling on Parliament to engage fully in peace 
negotiations, whilst expressing stolid support for the King and encouraging other 
counties to act likewise.127 The self-professed war-weary Shropshire men had 
followed the example of a declaration by the gentry of Somerset a month earlier, a 
peace initiative that nonetheless aligned them to the King rather than Parliament, 
which had accrued some wider support in the West Country.128 In turn, the 
Worcestershire grand jury on 6 December proposed that an inter-county association 
would carry greater sway with Parliament, especially if expressing more belligerent 
support for the King. Accordingly, meeting at Ludlow around 9-11 January 1645 
representatives from Shropshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire 
agreed to a military association, which as a result of an exchange of proposals with 
Oxford came into effect in mid-February with King Charles's tacit support. This so-
called Marcher Association (a descriptive modern term not used at the time) would 
recruit for its defence 2,000 militiamen (600 from Shropshire) as levies from the 
posse comitatus, which would serve as a general reserve of manpower. As well as 
control over recruitment, the commissioners of the Association would inherit from 
the commissions of array full powers to raise military taxes, much of which would 
be diverted to finance the Association forces.129 Shortly after consenting to the 
Association, on 26 February King Charles issued a regulatory proclamation 
intending to 'ensure a fair carriage' between the Association and the regular 
'soldiers in pay', because to its proponents the Association was a means to keep the                                                         
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military in check and to control the behaviour of the garrisons. This had become an 
especially pressing matter in south Shropshire, where depredations by Royalist 
soldiers had caused civilians to arm themselves and band together in self-defence; 
these were the so-called clubmen reportedly active in the southerly hundreds of 
Clun and Purslow from December 1645 into the New Year.130  
 Understandably the regular officers in Shropshire viewed the Marcher 
Association with undisguised suspicion, as a rival organisation intending to divert 
resources from their own forces and generating confusion to the detriment of the 
war effort, whilst doubting - correctly, as matters turned out - that it could deliver 
the promised manpower.131 This was the situation that Prince Maurice inherited in 
Shropshire when he arrived at Shrewsbury on 4 February 1645 as the new 
lieutenant-general of the region in Prince Rupert's stead, having left Oxford for 
Worcester on 14 January.132 At Worcester in later January Maurice had met with 
commissioners of the Association. Afterwards he wrote to his brother expressing 
suspicion of the 'cunning men among them', and that 'the Association tends much to 
the destruction of military power and discipline'.133 Maurice attended a freeholder 
gathering at Shrewsbury, but he left there on 13 February, marching to the relief of 
Lord Byron's stronghold at Chester with forces including the best part of the 
Shrewsbury garrison and other detachments from Shropshire. This left Shrewsbury 
weakened and it fell relatively easily to the Parliamentarians by surprise attack nine 
days later.134 From then on we know little about Prince Maurice's involvement in 
the war effort in Shropshire, although during March he joined forces with his 
brother Rupert in north Shropshire and relieved Parliamentarian pressure on 
Chester.135 Thereafter Maurice made Worcester his centre of operations until, 
together with Prince Rupert, he lost command and the King's favour in autumn 
1645.136 
 What effect did the Marcher Association movement have on the Royalist war                                                         
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effort in Shropshire? From its formation the Association never fully functioned as a 
regional organisation, although it was revived to some extent at county level, in 
Staffordshire in spring 1645, and in Shropshire that summer.137 Moreover, in 
Shropshire it appears that the county commission of Association did not in fact 
become active in February, so that in August King Charles attempted to re-appoint 
and revive it.138 The Association was an overly ambitious plan that in Shropshire 
was overtaken by events, by the loss of Shrewsbury. Many local leaders were lost to 
the Royalist cause, together with the meeting place of the gentry-led gatherings that 
had driven the Association movement - a further meeting at Shrewsbury planned 
for later February had to be abandoned.139 Furthermore, it remains unclear to what 
extent the commissioners of array embraced the Association. Some, like Sir Francis 
Ottley and Sir Robert Howard, were enthusiastic proponents. However, the 
appointment in August 1645 by King Charles of otherwise previously active 
commissioners of array, such as Sir Vincent Corbet and Sir Thomas Eyton, as 
'additional commissioners' suggests they previously had not fully supported the 
Association, or indeed may have opposed it.140 In reporting the activity in 
Shropshire in January 1645, one of Prince Rupert's aides had warned of the 
Association replacing 'former commissioners', which would cause the commission 
of array to be 'quite spoiled and the effect will be nothing but distraction'.141 
 While Prince Maurice would remain commander-in-chief of Shropshire for much 
of 1645, the effective operational commander was Sir William Vaughan, a veteran 
cavalryman returned from Ireland. According to the Royalist soldier and diarist 
Richard Symonds, sometime in 1644 Vaughan became 'general of Shropshire'.142 
However, Symonds's inexact dating cannot be corroborated, and while Vaughan 
had been based in Shropshire since spring 1644 it is difficult to see him as being in 
command there until after Sir Michael Ernle was captured at Shrewsbury in 
February 1645. No records of Vaughan as an administrator appear to survive. But he 
was certainly an active and often successful field commander of mobile forces,                                                         
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including his own regiment of horse. Vaughan spent most of May to September 
1645 away from Shropshire attached to the King's forces.143 Marching from his 
headquarters at Shrawardine Castle in mid-May 1645 to join the main Royalist field 
army, on the 16th or 17th Vaughan with his regiment routed a body of 
Parliamentary horse at Much Wenlock.144 Returning briefly to Shropshire after the 
battle of Naseby, Vaughan twice heavily defeated the local Parliamentarians, in 
Corvedale on 4 July and at High Ercall the next day. Vaughan led a brigade of horse 
in the Royalist defeat at Rowton Heath outside Chester on 24 September, and in 
October returned to Shropshire with King Charles's commission as General of Horse 
for Wales, Shropshire, Worcestershire, Staffordshire and Herefordshire. Leading 
from Shropshire a task force of detachments numbering around 1,200 men 
intending to disrupt enemy operations around Chester, on 1 November Vaughan 
was defeated near Denbigh (Denbighshire).145 Over winter 1645-6 Vaughan's 
operations increasingly took the form of raids against ostensibly Parliamentarian 
territory, in Shropshire and as far afield as Radnorshire.146 Lacking a permanent 
base and hence regular contribution, Vaughan's mobile forces increasingly lived off 
the land and acquired a reputation for looting. As a result, in December 1645 
Vaughan's horsemen were not allowed to enter Ludlow.147 
 The last Royalist regional commander-in-chief over Shropshire during the First 
Civil War was Jacob, Lord Astley, the King's veteran general of infantry. At Oxford 
on 5 December 1645 Astley was commissioned lieutenant-general of the Marcher 
Association counties of Shropshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire and 
Staffordshire. His orders were to recruit new forces and also to re-establish order 
and governance in the region, where the Royalist war effort was in disarray and 
coming under increasing enemy pressure.148 Acknowledging that his immediate 
task was to restore 'a posture of defence and compose the differences occasioned 
among the governors and those who relate to the garrisons', Astley arrived at 
Worcester on 23 December and made the city his headquarters.149 Over the winter                                                         
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Astley generally restored order across his command, overcoming the 
obstructiveness of several governors including Sir Lewis Kirke at Bridgnorth and Sir 
Michael Woodhouse at Ludlow. Ill-discipline among the soldiers and disputes 
between Kirke and the commissioners had disrupted the garrison at Bridgnorth. 
Informed by Sir Francis Ottley of the unrest there, in reply on 10 January 1646 
Astley confided that 'I can meet with no garrisons free from such distempers', but 
soon after saw to it that Kirke was replaced as governor by Sir Robert Howard.150 
Apart from reorganisation, Astley's main strategic concern was to maintain 
communications with Lord Byron's increasingly beleaguered garrison at Chester. 
But his efforts together with Sir William Vaughan to muster at Bridgnorth by the 
end of January a relief army around 3,000 strong came to nothing. News arrived of 
the defeat and retreat of a Royalist force in north-east Wales that was to have 
provided support and that in any case Byron had entered negotiations to surrender 
- Sir William Brereton's forces occupied Chester on 3 February 1646.151 In early 
March, Astley again gathered near Bridgnorth a small field army of detachments 
from several Midland garrisons including Bridgnorth and Ludlow. Marching for 
Oxford, on 21 March in what was the last battle of the First Civil War Astley's army 
was intercepted, defeated and broken near Stow on the Wold by a Parliamentarian 
army partly commanded by Sir William Brereton. Astley was taken prisoner at 
Stow, although Sir William Vaughan managed to evade capture.152 
Parliamentarian leadership and administration in Shropshire 
Wartime committees, 1642-5 
Because the Long Parliament had conducted much of its own business by 
committee, the Parliamentarian war effort came to be directed by numerous 
national and provincial committees, each acting under the authority of an ordinance 
of Parliament - a statute enacted without royal assent. Many committees were 
primarily concerned with executing fiscal ordinances. Typically, six of the seven 
committees created for Shropshire affairs during 1643 and 1644 were responsible for 
military finance. The seventh and most important Shropshire committee was the                                                         
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controlling county committee. 
 This originated in July 1642, when on the 23rd Parliament instructed the MPs Sir 
John Corbet, William Pierrepont and Richard More to return to Shropshire. Their 
objectives were to solicit for contributions for Parliament's cause and to promote the 
militia ordinance - by opposing the commission of array and securing the county 
magazine and the support of the Trained Bands. Arriving at Shrewsbury on 29 July, 
over the next five days the MPs addressed public gatherings, confronted several 
Royalist commissioners in the near riot in the market square, and inspected a body 
of armed local volunteers led by the alderman Thomas Hunt.153 On 3 August the 
MPs left Shrewsbury to garner support elsewhere but could not prevent the 
commissioners of array from dominating the assizes five days later, or, it seems, 
counter their bellicose declaration from Much Wenlock on the 16th. By the time 
Charles I entered Shrewsbury on 20 September, More, Corbet and Pierrepont had 
returned to London.154 Meanwhile, on 29 August this tripartite Westminster-based 
'Committee of Shropshire' had been augmented by John Blakiston, John Wylde, 
Lawrence Whitaker and William Wheeler, respectively MPs for Newcastle-on-Tyne, 
Worcestershire, Okehampton and Westbury, Wiltshire.155 All became effective 
Westminster committeemen, whose involvement as outsiders in Shropshire affairs 
reflected the situation that two thirds of the shire's MPs supported the King. 
William Spurstowe, Shropshire's fourth Parliamentarian MP, played little part in 
these events and later was appointed to just one Shropshire committee.  
 For their part Spurstowe's Parliamentary colleagues continued actively to 
support the cause in Shropshire. Richard More sat on all Shropshire committees up 
to his death in December 1643, as did William Pierrepont into 1648. A respected 
member of the Long Parliament and an advocate of Parliamentary powers, 'Wise 
William' was one of ten members of the Committee of Safety, formed in July 1642 as 
the directing council of the Parliamentarian cause, and was in turn a prominent 
member of its replacement as a national military executive from February 1644, the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms.156 Thereby Pierrepont was advantageously placed to 
secure resources for Shropshire. Alluding to the MP's supportive background role, 
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in July 1644 Colonel Thomas Mytton wrote from Shropshire to his wife in London, 
to 'present my services unto Mr Pierrepont and desire him that ammunition and 
ordnance may be hastened to me'.157 Sir John Corbet of Stoke and Adderley had 
been a consistent opponent of Charles I's policies before and during the Personal 
Rule.158 Accordingly, Corbet assumed the leadership of the Shropshire 
Parliamentarians, and on 10 April 1643 was appointed, as colonel-general, 
commander of the county forces. However, discord among his compatriots in the 
meantime caused the Commons on 4 July following to instruct Corbet to put aside 
his commission and instead attend to Westminster business.159 Rejected as a military 
leader, nonetheless Corbet was appointed to all Shropshire committees into 1648 
and, like Pierrepont, his London-based contribution to the war effort was in 
securing fiscal and military resources.  
 On 3 August 1642, More, Pierrepont and Corbet in jointly reporting to Parliament 
had acknowledged the support of 'many gentlemen of great quality in this county', 
including several Shrewsbury aldermen.160 The identity of several of these active 
Shropshire Parliamentarians becomes clearer given their situation in the wake of the 
Royalist take-over there. Foremost were the Shrewsbury aldermen Humphrey 
Mackworth of Betton Strange, Thomas Nicolls of Boycott and Thomas Hunt, all of 
whom in mid-October King Charles had charged with high treason.161 But 
Mackworth was in London before Charles entered Shropshire; meanwhile both 
Walter Barker of Haughmond and Robert Charleton of Apley after fund-raising for 
Parliament were believed to have fled with others to Bristol.162 Gathered on 8 
October at Worcester under the protection of the Earl of Essex's Army, 17 leading 
Parliamentarian activists from Shropshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire and 
Gloucestershire signed a declaration of mutual support. Representing Shropshire 
were the MPs Corbet and More, the brothers Thomas and Hercules Kynnersley of 
Stottesdon hundred and, notably, Thomas Mytton of Halston, near Oswestry.163  
 On 24 February 1643, by the ordinance to levy a national weekly tax, or                                                         
157 NLW, Sweeney Hall Mss A1, f. 20. 
158 ODNB, 13, p. 389. 
159 A&O, I, pp. 124-7; JHC, III, pp. 152, 155. 
160 JHL, V, p. 270. 
161 W.G. Clark Maxwell (ed.), 'King Charles I's Proclamation of October 14th 1642', TSANHS, 
4th Series, X (1925-6), pp. xxv-vi. 
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assessment, to finance its forces, Parliament appointed the ten members of the first 
fiscal committee for Shropshire: Corbet, More, Pierrepont, Mackworth, Nicolls, 
Barker and Mytton were joined by Andrew Lloyd of Aston Hall, Lancelot Lee of 
Alveley and Robert Corbet of Stanwardine. All were reappointed when the 
assessment ordinance was re-enacted on 3 August 1643. In the meantime, 
Shropshire committees were created on 27 March and 7 May for two other national 
fiscal ordinances, respectively for the sequestration of enemy assets and to enforce 
subscriptions. Given the membership of these committees listed in Table 2, it seems 
that Mackworth, Myttton, Nicolls, Lloyd, Lee and the three MPs jointly provided 
leadership in Shropshire affairs.  
 They were also the coterie at the heart of the enlarged committee of Shropshire, 
instituted on 10 April 1643 by the ordinance associating the county militarily with 
Staffordshire and Warwickshire. Headed by Sir John Corbet, the county committee 
could act in quorum to raise revenue - three, including Corbet, to accept loans, four 
together to sequestrate assets. Among the 20 county committeemen (identified in 
Table 2) were Thomas Hunt and Richard More's eldest son Samuel, who both 
became active soldiers. On the other hand, Thomas Knight, Robert Talbot, William 
Rowley, John Proud and the Kynnersley brothers were not on any other committee, 
although the Shrewsbury men Proud, a draper, and Rowley, a brewer, as notable 
dissidents had been detained by the Royalists in 1642.164 Proud and Hercules 
Kynnersley were active in the post-First Civil War Parliamentarian county 
administration. While the wartime activity of some committeemen remains 
uncertain, only one of them was certainly ill chosen, the Royalist or side-shifter Sir 
Gilbert Cornwall. However, this remained a committee in exile until it gained a 
foothold in Shropshire by the occupation of Wem in September 1643. 
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Table 2: Alphabetical listing of Parliamentarian committeemen, 1643-4. 
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Key to Table 2: AC = the committee appointed by the national ordinance of 24 February 
1643 for raising the weekly assessment, re-appointed on 3 August following (A&O, I, pp. 85-
100, 223-241); SC = committee appointed by the national ordinance of 27 March 1643 
authorising sequestration (A&O, I, pp 106-17); CC = the standing county committee 
appointed by the ordinance of 10 April 1643 (A&O, I, pp. 124-7); 5&20 = the committee 
appointed by the national ordinance of 7 May 1643 'for taxing such as have not at all 
contributed or lent, or not according to their estates and abilities', known as The Fifth and 
Twentieth Part (A&O, I, pp. 145-55); SCS = the sequestration committee for Shropshire 
appointed under the ordinance of 13 June 1644 (JHL, VI, p. 586-7); IC = the committee 
appointed by the national ordinance of 18 October 1644 for raising a 12-month weekly 
assessment for the Parliamentary forces in Ireland (A&O, I, pp. 531-553). 
 
 
 
 By February 1644 Westminster was considering ways to set the Parliamentarian 
war effort in Shropshire on a firmer financial footing.165 On the following 13 June 
this resulted in an ordinance that endorsed and augmented the financial powers of 
the committee of Shropshire and appointed the 22-member committee for 
sequestrations named in Table 2. Further, the 
ordinance empowered the county committee 
to eject 'scandalous' ministers and 
schoolmasters and to appoint 'able, godly' 
replacements. There was a purge of 
(unnamed) ineffectual committeemen, 
replaced by five newcomers - Robert Clive of 
Stych Hall near Market Drayton, Harcourt 
Leighton of Plaish, Leighton Owen of 
Braggington and Humphrey Edwards of 
Shrewsbury, together with Robert Charlton 
who had been active in 1642. The ordnance 
of June 1644 confirmed the county 
committee's fiscal powers for the remainder 
of the war, although it could not levy duties in Shropshire according to the national 
excise ordinance enacted on 22 July 1643 until the passing of a further enabling 
ordinance on 8 January 1646.166 Additionally, in October 1644 an eleven-man 
Shropshire committee was appointed to execute the national ordinance to finance 
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Plate 2: 
Thomas Myttton (1596/7-1656). 
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Parliamentary forces in Ireland (see Table 2).167  
 By mid-1644 Thomas Mytton, Humphrey Mackworth, Thomas Hunt, Andrew 
Lloyd, Samuel More, Robert Clive and Leighton Owen - who were then, or later 
became, commissioned officers - were, in effect, a committee within a committee, 
operating in the front line from their headquarters at Wem.168 This committee at 
Wem acted semi-autonomously from their colleagues elsewhere, since a Commons 
order on 10 May 1644 had given any five of them power to act in committee.169 
Table 3 shows how by 1645 executive military authority was held by just eight 
committeemen based at Shrewsbury after its capture on 22 February. Five days later 
the Commons gave them authority to appoint a governor for Shrewsbury. 
Accordingly, on 26 March his colleagues there nominated Humphrey Mackworth, 
but for reasons that remain uncertain it was not until 6 June 1646 that Mackworth's 
appointment was finally confirmed.170 The committeemen had, however, prevented 
Colonel Thomas Mytton from becoming Shrewsbury's governor, who was by then 
estranged from his erstwhile colleagues and disliked by them (Plate 2).171  
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Table 3: Sample of documents signed by the committee at Shrewsbury during 1645. 
 
 
 Mytton's absence from the committee's meetings at Shrewsbury during 1645 is 
apparent from Table 3. Since mid-1643 he had been the leading soldier in the 
committee of Shropshire. By autumn 1644, however, the disputation of military 
command (for reasons to be explored more fully here and in chapter two) had 
divided the Shropshire forces between rival headquarters, Mytton's base at 
Oswestry and the committee's stronghold at Wem. In February 1645 the committee 
at Wem had attempted to sideline Mytton during the operation to capture 
Shrewsbury. Furthermore, they encouraged their patron Sir William Brereton in his 
reports to Parliament to downplay Mytton's role.179 The committee had given 
overall command of the Shrewsbury operation to their military expert, the Dutch or 
German mercenary Lieutenant-Colonel Wilhelm (anglice William) Reinking, who as 
a professional soldier challenged Mytton's military leadership.180 Consequently, the 
following May their rivalry spilled into the London press in pamphlet form. 
Reinking's Relation presented Mytton as playing a peripheral role in the capture of  
 Shrewsbury, to which Mytton, styling himself 'the ancientest [i.e. most senior] 
colonel in that county', responded in his Reply by questioning Reinking's fitness to 
command.181 Essentially both pamphlets were vehicles of self-advancement. 
Reinking, with a glowing reference from the committee at Shrewsbury dated 17 
April, had gone to London seeking reward from the Committee of Both 
Kingdoms.182 Mytton was in the capital by the end of March furthering his 
candidacy for the governorship of Shrewsbury, when he may well have engineered 
the blocking of Mackworth's appointment.183 The surviving draft of a public 
petition, calling on Parliament to grant Mytton 'the commanding place in chief of 
the town and county of Salop', shows that he pursued a broader military-politico 
agenda, and on 12 May 1645 Parliament appointed him to succeed his brother-in-                                                        
179 LBWB, I, pp. 51-2. 
180 NLW, Sweeney Hall Mss A1, f. 24. 
181 A More Exact And Particular Relation of the taking of Shrewsbury, than hath hitherto been 
published, With the manner and performance thereof by Lieutenant Collonel William Reinking 
(1645); Colonell Mitton’s Reply to Lieutenant Colonell Reinking's Relation of The taking of 
Shrewsbury (1645).  
182 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 6-13 May 1645, pp. 796-7. 
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law Sir Thomas Myddelton as commander-in-chief for North Wales.184 
 Notwithstanding this infighting, their military achievements won the committee 
of Shropshire plaudits in the London Press. In early July 1645 the Moderate 
Intelligencer praised the  
 
 
 
 
  
In mid-March 1646 the Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer similarly commended 'that 
most exemplary and active committee', for its 'soldier[l]y' and 'politic' acts.185 The 
committeemen, and especially the self-reliant and closely-knit group holding power 
at Shrewsbury in 1645, were not, however, representative of Shropshire's leading 
landed families. Andrew Lloyd, Leighton Owen and Robert Clive were lesser gentry 
with modest estates, while Robert Charleton was a landless lawyer. Shropshire's 
leading Parliamentarians have been characterised as being mostly from the less-
wealthy middling sort of the county gentry.186 This is supported by the example of 
32 of Shropshire's wealthiest men listed in November 1632 as candidates for the 
shrievalty. While 11 of them or their sons became commissioners of array, just three, 
Sir Morton Briggs, Richard More and Thomas Hunt's father Richard, were fathers of 
or were themselves committeemen.187 While the committee of Shropshire lacked 
wealthy landowners, it included men who in 1642 were otherwise influential in 
commerce or politics. Andrew Lloyd was a JP and sufficiently noteworthy to have 
been appointed to King Charles's first commission of array for Shropshire. Thomas 
Mytton, a mid-ranking landowner, was also a JP and an alderman of Shrewsbury. 
Thomas Nicolls was a JP and had been high sheriff in 1640/1.188 Thomas Hunt was a 
wealthy Shrewsbury draper, while the lawyer Humphrey Mackworth was an 
alderman of Shrewsbury and since the early 1630s had been the recorder to the 
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brave proceedings of that honest and valiant committee in Shropshire. It 
were good if there were more of them. They go forth into the field by turn in 
arms: A fighting committee, that's good. They have almost cleared their 
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town corporation, its influential legal expert and 'learned counsel'.189  
The Parliamentary county administration, 1646-8 
Parliament's military victory in 1646 left the English shires controlled by the county 
committees. They supplanted much of the traditional powers of the lieutenancy and 
magistracy for defence and taxation, and were responsible for the financial 
punishment of Royalists. The committee of Shropshire assumed the title of 
committee for safety of the county, but executive power remained in the hands of 
the foremost wartime committeemen. Authority to sequestrate local Royalists and 
other 'delinquents', for example, was distilled from the overblown 22-man 
committee of 1644 to the six-man group sitting at Shrewsbury in February 1646, 
comprising Humphrey Mackworth, Robert Clive, Thomas Nicolls, Andrew Lloyd, 
Robert Charleton and Leighton Owen.190 Colonels Mackworth and Lloyd together 
with Captain Owen oversaw security measures in mid-1647, and just over a year 
later Mackworth, Clive, Nicolls and Owen collectively appointed their colleague 
Andrew Lloyd to the colonelcy of the county militia.191 In spring 1648 collection of 
the monthly assessment was demanded by warrants subscribed by Mackworth, 
Nicolls and Samuel More.192  
 The committeemen also occupied senior military and political posts. In 1646 
Lloyd was made governor of Bridgnorth and More governor of Ludlow, in April 
and June respectively, while in July More was appointed deputy commander of the 
county forces.193 Thomas Nicolls, meanwhile, was the mayor of Shrewsbury in 
1645/6.194 In the so-called 'recruiter' Parliamentary by-elections held in 1645-6 to 
replace Shropshire's ousted Royalist MPs, Thomas Hunt was elected for 
Shrewsbury; Robert Charleton and Robert Clive for Bridgnorth; the prominent 
committeeman (and cousin of Samuel More) John Corbet for Bishop's Castle; while 
Humphrey Mackworth's son Thomas was elected for Ludlow.195 The ever-present 
Mackworth senior emerges now, if not before, as the first amongst equals in the                                                         
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county committee - in effect as Shropshire's county boss, like Sir William Brereton in 
Cheshire and William Purefoy in Warwickshire. Accordingly, Parliament made 
Mackworth commander-in-chief of the county forces in July 1646 and renewed his 
governorship of Shrewsbury in March 1647.196  
 The county committee for safety delegated administration to reliable local 
officials whom it could trust. A small Parliamentarian commission of the peace with 
what would have been very localised powers appears to have been instituted 
during the winter of 1644-5, and a county magistracy much reduced from its pre-
war size to number just 20-28 JPs was in place into 1648, its membership subject to 
intervention by the rival Presbyterian and Independent factions at Westminster.197 It 
was of course politic for the county committee for safety, who were also JPs, to act 
with the sanction of the wider magistracy; hence warrants issued by committeemen 
during the emergency of mid-1648 were subscribed 'with the consent of the justiceof 
peace'.198 But the Parliamentarian regime included a larger number of local officials. 
During 1647 and 1648 Parliament nationally appointed new county commissions for 
taxation and the militia, in adjunct to the county committees. The membership of 
these commissions for Shropshire are listed in Table 4, as follows: a commission of 
55 in June 1647 for the monthly assessment; a commission of 58 in February 1648 for 
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Table 4: Alphabetical listing of officials of the Parliamentarian administration in 
Shropshire, 1646-8. 
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Key to Table 4: CC = First Civil War Shropshire committees; CP = The Several Divisions And 
Persons For Classical Presbyteries In The County of Salop, dated 29 April 1647; AC = commission 
for the monthly assessment, appointed by ordinance of 23 June 1647 (A&O, I, pp. 958-84), re-
enacted on 20 March 1648 (JHL, X, pp. 121-4); IC = commission for 'raising £20,000 a month 
for the relief of Ireland', appointed by ordinance of 16 February 1648 (A&O, I, pp. 1072-1105). 
MC = commission for 'settling the militia [...] within the kingdom', appointed by ordinance 
of 2 December 1648 (A&O, I, pp. 1233-51).  
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the army in Ireland tax (the same commissioners would also oversee the assessment 
re-enacted in March 1648); and the 32 men nominated in December 1648 to 
reappoint the county commission for the militia. Table 4 also lists a fourth 
administrative body, concerned with religious conformity, the appointees to the six 
'classical presbyteries' promulgated in April 1647 to bring Presbyterianism to the 
parishes of Shropshire. Notwithstanding the actual extent of Presbyterian ministry 
in Shropshire being limited, the inclusion of 42 (of a total of 79) presbyters, or elders, 
who as men of local standing were also committeemen or commissioners, allows a 
broader view of the Parliamentarian regime.  
 Table 4 shows how the leading committeemen from the First Civil War were 
appointed to all four bodies. However, other individuals who hitherto seem to have 
been less active in the Parliamentary cause now came to the fore. Sir Humphrey 
Briggs, son of the county committeeman Sir Morton, joined William Pierrepont as 
the recruiter MP and second burgess for Much Wenlock, while the recruiter MPs 
Thomas More for Ludlow - brother of the soldier Samuel - and Humphrey Edwards 
(replacing the Royalist Sir Richard Lee as the second knight for the shire) had 
previously sat only on the 1644 sequestration committee.199 Hercules Kynnerlsey 
and John Proud became important financial officials. By 1646 they were chief 
members of the six-man accounting committee sitting at Shrewsbury as Shropshire's 
agency of the London-based Committee for Taking Accounts of the Whole 
Kingdom.200 In 1647 Kynnerlsey was a leading commissioner for the assessment, 
and in 1648 treasurer of the army tax for Ireland. Meanwhile Proud became the 
county Treasurer at War.201 Another important financial officer was John Browne, a 
presbyter and in 1647/8 the county Solicitor for Sequestrations.202  
 However, putting aside the three MPs, Myddelton, Wallop and Long, who were 
outsiders with landed interests in Shropshire, of the remaining 59 local officials 
identified in Table 4, 34 (58 per cent) were neither First Civil War committeemen, 
nor, it seems, army officers, apart from Colonel Robert Powell, high sheriff in                                                         
199 Brunton and Pennington, Long Parliament, pp. 13, 211, 228, 231, 237. 
200 TNA SP28/242 Part 1, Captain King's accounts, f. 54. 
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1646/7, and Thomas Kettleby, an officer of the Stokesay garrison in 1646. Some may 
otherwise have upheld the Parliamentarian cause, but the political arrivistes whose 
wartime role now appears indiscernible included William Cotton and Thomas 
Baker, high sheriff in 1647/8 and 1648/9 respectively, and Esau Thomas, the town 
clerk of Bishop's Castle elected as its second recruiter MP in 1646.203 The 
appointment of an individual as a commissioner or a presbyter does not, of course, 
prove his active participation. However, given the comparative data in Table 4 it 
seems that governance by the post-First Civil War Parliamentarian regime in 
Shropshire from 1646 to 1648 resided with around 40 officials, while executive 
power was retained by the core membership of the county committee for safety. 
Parliamentarian associations and regional commanders 
The formation of inter-county regional associations was a progressive development 
of the Parliamentarian war effort. Parliament soon recognised the importance of 
collaborative action by its supporters in curbing Royalist activity, and on 4 July 1642 
gave sanction to military intervention by adjacent counties in a neighbouring 
shire.204 Parliament towards the end of August instructed it supporters in Kent, for 
example, to ally themselves with adjoining counties, while on 18 November, in 
furtherance of widespread inter-county collaboration, Parliament ambitiously 
instituted an association of 12 northerly English shires.205 
 Given that Shropshire turned Royalist, Parliamentarian attempts to associate the 
county were intended to secure military intervention there. This encouraged the 
declaration of support between Shropshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire and 
Gloucestershire Parliamentarians agreed at Worcester on 8 October 1642, when 
Parliament's field army was occupying the city and a detachment commanded by 
the Earl of Stamford had secured Hereford. But in the event Essex's main body left 
Worcester on 20 October and by mid-November Parliamentarian troops had 
evacuated Worcestershire.206 Remaining meanwhile at Hereford, Stamford was 
considered by Parliament advantageously placed to be the regional commander, 
and accordingly on 13 December was appointed commander-in-chief of Shropshire, 
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Worcestershire, Herefordshire and Gloucestershire.207 This was of course 
unbeknown to Stamford, who the next day abandoned his isolated outpost at 
Hereford to the local Royalists, withdrawing his forces, via Gloucester, to join 
Parliamentarians in the West Country.208  Shropshire was next attached to a far-
flung Western Association also including Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, Somerset 
and Wiltshire, created by Parliament on 11 February 1643 under the command of 
Sergeant-Major-General Sir William Waller, Stamford's immediate superior.209 Five 
days later, however, the Commons debated a draft ordinance to join Shropshire 
instead with Staffordshire and Warwickshire, associated since 31 December 1642 
under the command of Parliament's lord lieutenant for Warwickshire, Robert 
Greville, Second Baron Brooke.210 Eventually on 10 April 1643 Shropshire joined this 
more geographically cohesive association, under the same ordinance that formally 
constituted the county committee. But this new West Midland Association (a 
descriptively convenient modern term not used at the time) was leaderless since the 
killing on 2 March of the energetic and capable Brooke, shot dead whilst besieging 
Royalist Lichfield.211  
 While Shropshire remained within the West Midland Association, cooperative 
'mutual association' with North Wales was encouraged by the ordinance of 12 June 
1643 making Sir Thomas Myddelton sergeant-major-general and Parliament's 
commander-in-chief of the six shires - albeit a paper command of then entirely 
Royalist territory.212 Sir Thomas was an anglicised Welshman, a wealthy landowner 
and the MP for Denbighshire, whose home estate there at Chirk Castle had been 
seized by the Royalists early in 1643.213 Because of their shared strategic objectives - 
a Parliamentarian recovery in Shropshire could allow Myddelton to springboard 
operations into Wales - Myddelton cooperated with the Shropshire 
Parliamentarians as an active ally until the Self-Denying Ordinance brought his 
generalship to an end in June 1645. This was a generally collaborative relationship 
that benefitted from Myddelton's friendship with his brother-in-law Thomas                                                         
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208 Ross, Royalist, But .., p. 52. 
209 A&O, I, pp. 79-80. 
210 Yonge, Diary, p. 313; A&O, I, pp. 53-5. 
211 Hamper, Sir William Dugdale, p. 48. 
212 JHL, VI, pp. 90-2. 
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Mytton. Their mutual interests in the region also resulted in collaborative military 
operations between Myddelton and Sir William Brereton in command of Cheshire. 
 On 12 June 1643 Parliament also ended the three-month hiatus in the leadership 
of the West Midland Association by making Basil Feilding, Second Earl of Denbigh 
general and commander-in-chief and also the lord lieutenant of his native 
Warwickshire. Worcestershire was also attached to the Association.214 With both 
Worcestershire and Shropshire under Royalist control, however, Denbigh would 
have to secure support from the county committees of Staffordshire and 
Warwickshire. The committee at Stafford was only recently established, but the 
committee based at Coventry was gaining a firm hold on Warwickshire, 
Parliament's most secure county in the central Midlands largely as a result of Lord 
Brooke's actions and leadership there in 1642.215 However, since Brooke's death both 
committees had abandoned formal cooperation and instead had looked inwardly to 
their own defence.216  
 Denbigh's operational command began inauspiciously in late August 1643, when 
after leaving London for the Midlands with some small forces, he was summarily 
recalled because intercepted correspondence from Oxford had raised suspicions 
about his loyalty to the Parliamentarian cause.217 Denbigh was swiftly exonerated, 
but further delayed in October over fresh uncertainty about his fidelity, doubts that 
his background tended to encourage.218 Whereas Lord Brooke had been a 
determinedly radical Parliamentarian, Denbigh was a moderate, an ex-courtier of 
Royalist parentage. Father and son had fought on the opposing sides at Edgehill, 
and the First Earl had died in April 1643 of wounds sustained in Prince Rupert's 
notorious raid on Birmingham. Lady Feilding remained a close companion of 
Queen Henrietta Maria.219 
 Eventually fully absolved by Parliament, the Committee of Both Kingdoms and 
by the Earl of Essex, in mid-November Denbigh finally established his headquarters 
at Coventry. There he became entrenched in a pre-existing quarrel with the 
politically and religiously radically minded associates and appointees of Lord                                                         
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Brooke who dominated the county committee of Warwickshire. As will be seen in 
chapter three, what began as a dispute over military resources deepened when the 
committee rejected Denbigh's authority to take the Warwickshire forces, probably 
the best resourced and well-recruited units in the Association, into Shropshire.220 
From Coventry on 1 December, Denbigh wrote to Westminster of being 'hindered 
from carrying the forces of this county to the relief of our friends [at Wem]'.221 
 Those 'friends' had written increasingly urgently for Denbigh to come to their 
assistance and in November to support Sir Thomas Myddelton and Sir William 
Brereton's advance into Royalist north-east Wales. In their petitioning elsewhere, 
including to the Lord General, the Parliamentarians holding out at Wem became 
increasingly critical of the Earl's apparent inactivity.222 Still short of military 
resources and moreover hamstrung by the committee at Coventry, Denbigh 
returned to London by Christmas to pursue his case against them in Parliament.223 
In the New Year Denbigh remained in London until mid-February. He probably 
returned to Warwickshire around the same time that Prince Rupert arrived in 
Shropshire.224  
 With his relations with the county committee showing little improvement and 
still obstructed by them, Denbigh in spring 1644 built up his own regiments of horse 
and foot and accumulated military supplies for the Association.225 In the meantime 
Shropshire, and in particular the relief of Wem, remained a priority with the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms, but its attempts in early March and again in mid-
April to orchestrate ambitious plans to send Denbigh into Shropshire leading an 
army around 4,000 strong - of units from the West Midland Association and 
detached from adjacent county forces - foundered on both occasions. The main 
reason for this was that units allocated to Denbigh instead remained in their native 
counties or else were unavoidably deployed elsewhere, while in March Prince 
Rupert's bold advance across the Midlands to relieve Newark and his victory there                                                         
220 Ibid., pp. 221-5; JHL, VI, pp. 325-6. Muster rolls show that in January 1644 Colonel 
Barker's Regiment of Foot and Colonel Purefoy's Regiment of Horse, the chief Warwickshire 
regiments, were strong units by First Civil War standards, with all ranks numbering 797 
infantrymen and 428 cavalry and dragoons respectively. WRO, CR2017/C9, ff. 39-40. 
221 BDL, Tanner Mss 62, f. 402. 
222 HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix Part I, pp. 158-61. 
223 JHL, VI, pp. 336, 354. 
224 Assumed from Denbigh's attendance in the House of Lords, recorded in the Journals. 
225 The following summary of Denbigh's operations draws on CSPD, 1644, pp. 34-355, passim. 
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on the 21st threw the Parliamentarians into disarray.  
 Eventually, in early May 1644 the Earl of Denbigh cautiously advanced into 
south Staffordshire with an army of around 2,500 men, with Shropshire as his 
objective. Denbigh's manoeuvres and his subsequent campaigning into July - in 
southerly Staffordshire, Shropshire and then briefly into Cheshire - were mostly 
determined by enemy activity and by the often overambitious instructions of the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms in response; by Prince Rupert's march into Lancashire 
after leaving Shropshire in mid-May; and by a sudden advance by the King from 
Oxford into Worcestershire in early to mid-June, which on the 11th forced Denbigh's 
army to fight a successful defensive engagement at Tipton Green, near Dudley in 
south Staffordshire. Denbigh afterwards resupplied Wem and, while under 
pressure from the Committee of Both Kingdoms to march north to reinforce 
Parliamentarian forces allied against Prince Rupert, seized the opportunity of 
helping Colonel Mytton take Oswestry on 22/23 June. On 4 July his forces also 
threatened Shrewsbury. Capturing Oswestry was an important regional success, but 
while Denbigh's first campaign into Shropshire and Staffordshire had been useful, it 
would also be his last. In mid-July he returned to London, ostensibly to seek greater 
powers over his Association but actually abandoning his command to lick his 
wounds. Eventually, on 20 November 1644, after a series of motions and votes of 
confidence concerned with his conduct, the Commons decided that rather than 
return to command his Association Denbigh would do better as a negotiator of 
terms for peace with King Charles.226 Thereby, to all military intents and purposes, 
the West Midland Association came to an end. 
 What can be said about the Earl of Denbigh's relationship with the committee of 
Shropshire? Clearly, relations became increasingly fractured and disrespectful over 
Denbigh taking so long to intervene in Shropshire. By July 1644 the committee at 
Wem was not only openly demanding that Parliament replace him, but also alleged 
that Denbigh's officers had threatened and abused them.227 In turn, as a peer of the 
realm with a heightened sense of status Denbigh would have found discourtesy 
unpalatable.228 The Earl's relations with the leading committeemen Humphrey 
Mackworth and Thomas Mytton served to divide the committee. Mackworth had                                                         
226 JHC, III, pp. 700-1. 
227 HMC, Sixth Report, Part I, pp. 19-20; CSPD, 1649-1650, p. 444. 
228 Hughes, Warwickshire, p. 227. 
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attached himself to the committee of Warwickshire, and, with their backing, in 
February 1644 presumed to prod Denbigh into action by proposing a plan for the 
relief of Wem.229 Further, on 27 March Mackworth, exasperated, penned an 
insubordinate ultimatum, presenting the 'bleeding condition of Shropshire' and 
demanding 'that your Lordship would plainly declare what you intend to do, 
whether you will go on to their relief or not'; otherwise Mackworth would advise 
his colleagues to evacuate Wem.230 This evidence of Mackworth's disrespect for the 
Earl helps explain the testimony of some Warwickshire Parliamentarians in 1649, 
that in an angry meeting sometime five years earlier Denbigh had insulted 
Mackworth and threatened to kill him, and on another occasion had demanded 
Mackworth's dismissal along with several of his colleagues at Wem.231 On the other 
hand, Denbigh had an amicable relationship with Mytton as a senior colonel of the 
Association, while Mytton welcomed the Earl's patronage. Returning from a stay in 
London in April 1644, in May Mytton attached himself to Denbigh's staff and so 
attended councils of war held at Tamworth (Staffordshire), on 12 May, and at 
Stourbridge (Worcestershire), on 15 June.232 After the action at Tipton Green, on 13 
June Mytton wrote to his wife applauding Denbigh's gallant conduct, and that 'the 
Earl hath engaged me not to leave him and promised to do me right, which I doubt 
not while he is there'.233 Mytton's loyalty was duly rewarded on 23 June at 
Oswestry, when, during a council of war and without consulting the committee at 
Wem, Denbigh appointed him governor.234 It may have been with a sense of 
abandonment, then, that on 16 July Mytton wrote after him that the Earl's departure 
from Shropshire would be 'exceedingly ill taken'.235 However, from London on 27 
October Denbigh wrote to Mytton expressing common cause against vitriol directed 
against them: 'I will not trouble you with [relating] the injuries that are offered to 
you and myself by the committee of Wem'.236 Notwithstanding their animosity, in 
January 1645 the committeemen grudgingly and somewhat sheepishly                                                         
229 WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 46. 
230 Ibid., f. 72. 
231 CSPD, 1649-1650, pp. 444-5. 
232 WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 98a; CSPD, 1644, p. 236. 
233 NLW, Sweeney Hall Mss A1, f. 22. 
234 Two Great Victories: On[e] Obtained by the Earle of Denbigh at Oswestry [...] The Other by 
Colonel Mitton (1644), unpaginated. 
235 WRO, CR2017/C10, f. 16. 
236 NAM, 8812-63, f. 5. 
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acknowledged Denbigh's recent help - perhaps some logistical support - which they 
were surprised to have received.237 
 Once it seemed unlikely that Denbigh would return Sir William Brereton sought 
to extend his influence as de facto regional commander of Shropshire and 
Staffordshire. In October 1644 an officer of the Oswestry garrison informed the Earl 
of Denbigh about an unsuccessful coup attempted there in Colonel Mytton's 
absence, when certain committeemen had encouraged the soldiers 'to elect Sir 
William Brereton general over this county'.238 There the matter seems to have ended, 
leaving Brereton as patron to the committee at Wem. However, in a successful coup 
d'état at Stafford in December 1644, Brereton, with the backing of the Committee of 
Both Kingdoms, purged the county committee of Denbigh's adherents, notably the 
leading Colonels Chadwick and Rugeley.239 Brereton thereby gained effective 
control of the Staffordshire forces, which he deployed in February 1645 to enable the 
committee at Wem to capture Shrewsbury. But once the committee at Shrewsbury 
had strengthened their own forces, during 1645 they gradually shifted the terms of 
their relationship with Brereton, from one of semi-dependence to being instead 
reliable but sometimes questioning allies.240 
Conclusions 
Chapter one has analysed how the war effort in Shropshire was organised and led. 
During the First English Civil both sides adopted similar approaches, by organising 
their leading supporters into politico-military executive bodies, respectively the 
Royalist commission of array and the Parliamentarian county committee, and by 
placing Shropshire within a regional command structure by means of inter-county 
association. Both sides also attempted to channel the gathering of warlike resources 
through the pre-existing structures of county government. This led to their active 
participation in the war effort, voluntarily or otherwise, of numerous individuals 
holding varying degrees of authority and responsibility. This is seen most clearly on 
the Royalist side by their involvement as commissioners of array of MPs, deputy 
lieutenants, JPs, militia officers, senior aldermen and the incumbent high sheriffs.                                                         
237 LBWB, I, p. 33. 
238 WRO, CR2017/C10, f. 38. 
239 CSPD, 1644-1645, pp. 69-70, 80, 84, 91. 
240 In November 1645, for example, the committee tetchily badgered Brereton to repay £100 
he owed them: BL Additional Mss. 11332, f. 111.  
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All told, the means to organise and direct war effort in Shropshire were much the 
same as elsewhere in the shires of England and Wales. This chapter has also shown 
how the Parliamentarian regime holding power in Shropshire during the renewed 
hostilities of 1648 came to be organised.  
 War effort in Shropshire from 1642 to 1646 was directed by in all around 60 
Royalist commissioners and 40 Parliamentarian committeemen drawn from the 
middling and higher ranks of the county gentry. Considering the scale of their task 
this was a modest number of activists, particularly as among them were some 
outsiders and local men whose involvement was peripheral. Furthermore, even 
among the 'activists' the degree and duration of personal commitment varied from 
individual to individual. This resulted in effective authority being devolved to a 
smaller number of highly committed chief men, shown by the Parliamentarian 
example of the eight-man committee at Shrewsbury during 1645 and 1646. Looking 
even more selectively, within both sides was a nucleus of determined leaders who 
remained at the forefront of events from 1642 into 1646, notably the Royalists Sir 
Francis Ottley, Sir Vincent Corbet and Sir Thomas Eyton, and the Parliamentarians 
Humphrey Mackworth, Thomas Hunt and Thomas Mytton. 
 Shropshire was attached to several regional associations, but for both sides these 
were never wholly stable blocs of territory, being often under partial enemy 
occupation or else threatened by hostile incursion from adjacent counties that in 
turn were contested. For these reasons Parliament's West Midland Association in 
particular was unworkable, without the recovery by a substantial army under a 
skilful commander of swathes of territory in Shropshire, Staffordshire and 
Worcestershire. A sufficient army never came together, and although, as explored 
further in chapter three, the Earl of Denbigh laboured without effective powers 
against localism and as a result lacked military resources, he was a pedestrian 
soldier and an uncharismatic leader probably temperamentally unsuited to high 
command. Consequently, he remained unable to overcome the military and political 
difficulties that bedevilled his Association. Shropshire of course fell more easily 
within Royalist boundaries of association, which, apart from contested Cheshire, 
until autumn 1643 generally remained secure. The military high commands of Lord 
Capel and Prince Rupert were far more successful in organising the regional war 
effort than the gentry-led associations of 1642 and 1645, which looked inwardly in 
attempting to secure political cohesion to achieve limited objectives of provincial 
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self-defence and security. However, both generals enjoyed modest achievement 
only for a period of around six months, respectively in 1643 and 1644, before 
military events caused destabilisation - Parliamentarian inroads into Capel's 
territory in autumn 1643, and, indirectly, Prince Rupert's defeat at Marston Moor in 
July 1644. 
 The ultimate purpose of wartime leadership is of course to further the creation, 
support and direction of armed forces. With the dramatis personae of the Civil War in 
Shropshire having been identified, chapter two will turn to military organisation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
The Armed Forces 
War effort of course demanded the mobilisation and organisation of large and 
sustainable numbers of soldiers. Therefore this chapter looks at the recruitment, 
nature and number of the armed forces in Shropshire from 1642 to 1648.  
 The contemporary theoretical size and structure of military units was 
straightforward. Apart from the pre-existing county militias, the trained bands, new 
units were raised by issuing commissions for colonelcies and captaincies, 
respectively for the recruitment of regiments and of troops or companies. The 
cavalry, or horse, were grouped into regiments of 400-500, subdivided into troops of 
around 60 men, while the nominal strength of a regiment of infantry, or foot, was 
1,300 men, in companies of 100 or so. Dragoons, being mounted infantry, were also 
organised into companies and regiments. There were also some semi-independent 
unregimented companies and troops. Artillery, or ordnance, was organised on a 
more ad hoc basis, grouped at army level into artillery trains but at the tactical level 
operating in batteries of two or more cannon or mortars, or even as single pieces. 
Because of ongoing attrition, by combat, sickness and desertion, and the difficulties 
of recruitment, most units were actually well below their theoretical establishment.1  
 In the absence of informative military records (such as muster rolls), many 
Shropshire units remain very shadowy bodies indeed. For example, the Royalist MP 
for Bridgnorth Sir Edward Acton was a colonel by 1645, but of his 'regiment' there is 
evidence of just a diminished troop of ten horsemen at Bridgnorth that October.2 
This example cautions against attributing full regimental status to units that may 
never have been larger than a troop or a company or two. Determining the size of 
the units and formations that campaigned in Shropshire is also problematic, because 
contemporary accounts of military events were often given at second or third hand, 
and for that reason hearsay and misinformation readily passed as fact. In February 
1644, Humphrey Mackworth advised the Earl of Denbigh to use the tendency to 
exaggerate troop numbers to his advantage, for by marching to the relief of Wem                                                         
1 P. Haythornthwaite, The English Civil War, 1642-1651, An Illustrated Military History (Poole, 
1983), pp. 20, 44-5, 50-5; P. Young and W. Embleton, The Cavalier Army (London, 1974), pp. 
24-8.  
2 SA, P270/B/1/1, ff. 57-8; Symonds, Diary, p. 252. 
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with an army of 2,000 men, 'these in reputation', as Mackworth pointed out, 'will be 
[considered] 3,000 at least'.3 Senior officers, who, for reasons of security, special 
pleading or casualness, were vague in their reporting, also obscured the actual 
number of soldiers available. Sir Thomas Myddelton, for example, later declared 
that in early September 1644 he had no more than 650 men, yet at the time his most 
senior cavalry officer had numbered Myddelton's brigade as around 800.4 
Furthermore, determining the size of units and formations is made more difficult by 
contemporary sources often being unclear whether or not their numbering included 
officers as well as rank and file, indeed Myddelton's discrepancy may be an 
example of this. Given that musicians as well as commissioned and non-
commissioned ranks were counted among the proportionately high number of Civil 
War officers, their omission from a written account would mean the size of a force 
being significantly understated.5 
 With these limitations in mind, this chapter examines in turn the various ways of 
recruitment, the variety and character of Royalist units in Shropshire, and the 
expansion and eventual disbandment of the Parliamentary county forces. 
Recruitment 
The rank and file of the armies of the First Civil War consisted of volunteers, 
especially among the cavalry, or conscripts (or impressed men), who increasingly 
came to predominate in the infantry as the war progressed.6  
 While many reluctant conscripts took to soldiering and not all volunteers became 
effective soldiers, most commanders would probably have accepted the maxim 
propounded in a London newsbook in 1644, that, being generally more committed 
and reliable, ‘none but volunteers do the work on both sides’.7 If the 20 men from 
the parish of Myddle who enlisted were representative of the shire, then many 
Shropshire men served ostensibly as volunteers. Richard Gough, whose portrayal of 
the soldiers from Myddle was written within living memory of the Wars, described 
a typical Royalist recruitment drive in the parish during winter 1642-3. Responding                                                         
3 WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 46. 
4 CSPD, 1644-1645, p. 34; NLW, Herbert Mss and Papers, Series II, Vol. IX, E6/1/3. 
5 The problem of establishing troop numbers was acknowledged by Burne and Young, in 
Great Civil War, p. 13, and considered in depth by Foard, in Naseby, pp. 202-3, 206-7. 
6 Haythornthwaite, Civil War, pp. 20-1; C. Carlton, Going to the Wars – The Experience of the 
British Civil Wars (London, 1992), pp. 66-70; B. Donagan, War in England 1642-1649 (Oxford, 
2008), pp. 218-20. 
7 A True and Perfect Journall of the Civill Warres in England, 30 Apr. 1644, p. 12.§ 
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to warrants issued by a local commissioner of array, men from Pimhill hundred 
gathered at a landmark hilltop to listen to a recruiting agent calling for volunteers 
for the King with the enticement of generous pay.8 Voluntarism had different 
shades. Some were motivated on grounds that were more or less ideological, if 
sometimes parochial. Ralph Griffiths, for example, a freeman of Shrewsbury's guild 
of clothiers, when in 1646 applying to become a free burgess of the town professed 
that he had 'ventured his life' as a Parliamentarian soldier, until Shrewsbury 'was 
fully settled under the command of Parliament'.9 Veterans of Continental wars 
returned to soldiering, such as Sergeant William Preece of Newton on the Hill. After 
campaigning in the Low Countries, on his return to Shropshire Preece had joined 
the Trained Bands and later served in the Royalist army.10 With the accepted 
minimum age for liability to military service being 16 years, the reputedly 
adventurous life of a soldier attracted young men whose own living was mundane. 
Consequently, ‘many young boys’ were seen enlisting in the King's army at 
Shrewsbury in 1642.11 Thomas Formeston of Marton was a similarly eager young 
recruit. Unfortunately, he was also most likely the one and the same Thomas 
Formestone buried at St. Michael's Church, Munslow, on 5 July 1645, a 
Parliamentarian trooper and fatal casualty of the cavalry action fought nearby at 
Broncroft the day before.12 The prospect of regular pay and occasional plunder 
attracted volunteers driven by pressing economic reasons such as unemployment 
and indebtedness. In the example of Myddle parish, a group of itinerant quarrymen 
and a local jobbing tailor of no fixed abode left uncertain employment and enlisted 
at Shrewsbury in 1642. Another parishioner, Thomas Ash, an otherwise respectable 
tenant farmer, had fallen into debt and to escape his creditors joined the Royalist 
army.13 If voluntarism often masked economic coercion, then social coercion in a 
hierarchical society also played a part. In September 1642 High Sheriff John Weld 
wrote to the town bailiffs of Ludlow that if they encouraged volunteering, 'his 
majesty will take it as an expression of your affection to his person'.14 Landowners                                                         
8 Gough, Myddle, pp. 71-2, 116. 
9 SA, 3365/2263, unfoliated. 
10 Gough, Myddle, p. 32. 
11 A Continuation of the late proceedings of His Majesty’s Army at Shrewsbury, Bridge North and 
Manchester (1642), p. 6. 
12 Gough, Myddle, p. 71; SA, P200/Fiche 24. 
13 Gough, Myddle, pp. 62, 71, 226-7. 
14 SA, LB7/2233. 
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too could stimulate voluntarism, by exerting local influence over tenants, 
dependants and others. Accordingly, in August 1644 the committee at Wem hoped 
to engage the neutralist Earl of Bridgewater and the side-shifting Sir Arthur 
Mainwaring to foster Parliamentarian recruitment in their north Shropshire 
estates.15  
 Would-be commissioned officers enjoyed greater latitude when volunteering 
their services. The more adventurous sought employment with renowned 
commanders, such as the gentleman seeking a commission from Colonel Thomas 
Mytton in 1645 who earnestly declared, 'Sir, I am resolved to do you service or no 
man'.16 Common soldiers were also attracted to serve a respected or charismatic 
leader, like the committeeman Thomas Hunt who, according to his associate the 
Shropshire-born puritan minister Richard Baxter, was 'entirely beloved and trusted 
by the soldiers for his honesty'.17 In February 1644 Colonel Mytton feared that with 
his arrival in Shropshire Prince Rupert's renown would boost Royalist recruitment, 
'in regard of the reputation of the man, whose name sounds loud in the ears of the 
country people'. Given reinforcements, Mytton hoped to inflict an early defeat on 
the Prince, thereby making him 'so contemptible to the country that he would be 
altogether disabled [...] to raise and levy in these parts'.18  In an often very localised 
war, recruitment was influenced by victories and - as Osborne has cogently 
proposed - by a strong military presence in an area, especially an established 
garrison.19 In later October 1643, when their foothold at Wem remained uncertain, 
the Shropshire Parliamentarians complained that not a single recruit had joined 
them. However, a month later they optimistically reported increased popular 
support, a 'strong body' that might provide 1,000 recruits if they could be armed.20 
In November 1644 the governors of the Parliamentarian garrisons at Moreton 
Corbet and Stoke upon Tern enthusiastically set about recruiting in their localities, 
                                                        
15 NLW, Sweeney Hall Mss A1, f. 21. 
16 NAM, 8812-63, f. 6. 
17 R. Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae: Or Mr. Richard Baxter's Narrative of The Most Memorable 
Passages of His Life and Times (1696), p. 45. 
18 WSL, SMS 557. 
19 S. Osborne, 'The War, The People and the absence of Clubmen in the Midlands, 1642-1646' 
in The English Civil War: The Essential Readings, (ed.) Gaunt, pp. 240-1, 245. 
20 HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix Part I, pp. 160-1. 
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the Royalist defeat at the battle of Montgomery in September having left 'the enemy 
in these parts [...] altogether disheartened'.21 
 The Parliamentarians at first appear to have recruited largely in the London area 
because local recruiting grounds were under enemy control, but by an ordinance 
enacted on 10 August 1643 county committees further afield had been empowered 
to impress recruits.22 However, the committee of Shropshire would have found it 
awkward to do so, not only because their recruiting areas were limited, but also on 
the grounds that they thought of themselves as liberating the shire from Royalist 
military oppression.  
 The Parliamentarian press was quick to condemn Royalist conscription in 
Shropshire. In April 1643 the newsbook Certaine Informations from Severall Parts of the 
Kingdom reported that Lord Capel 'presseth and enforceth men to serve him because 
few or none there offer themselves as volunteers for his service'.23 Capel did not 
introduce conscription to Shropshire - the local authorities were already impressing 
men in early 1643.24 That spring, however, Royalist conscription increased under 
Capel's leadership, when Shropshire was bound to find 600 recruits for the Prince of 
Wales's Lifeguard of Foot. Each allotment was to find ten likely recruits, of whom 
six would be enlisted.25 A year later Royalist conscription intensified in Shropshire 
to provide recruits for Prince Rupert's forces and for King Charles's Oxford-based 
army. During the second week of March 1644 warrants were sent from Oxford to 
the sheriffs of 30 shires instructing them to impress recruits, including 200 men from 
Shropshire.26 Consequently, from Shrewsbury on 26 March Sir John Mennes wrote 
to Prince Rupert that High Sheriff Thomas Edwards's instructions, for the 'seizing of 
pressed men for recruiting his majesty's army', would restrict Rupert's recruitment 
drive.27 Towards the end of May, another order from Oxford demanded the 
unfeasibly large number of a further 800 Shropshire conscripts.28  
 The civic records of the Royalist garrison towns provide evidence of widespread 
impressment at this time. During April 1644 petty constables at Ludlow 'pressed                                                         
21 WRO, CR2017/10, f. 41. 
22 A&O, I, pp. 241-2. 
23 Edition for 10-17 Apr. 1643, pp. 101-2. 
24 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/53, dragoons raised by warrant in the Bridgnorth area, 16 Feb. 1643. 
25 'Ottley Papers' (1895), pp. 313-4, 329, 337. 
26 BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [second part], ff. 29-33. 
27 BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 62. 
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soldiers several times', and on the 25th the bailiffs were ordered to send more 
conscripts for enlistment at Shrewsbury on 2 May.29 Meanwhile the under-officers 
of the county town were also gathering conscripts.30 Warrants to impress in and 
around Bridgnorth were issued monthly from April to August 1644.31 On 4 April 
John Law, a Bridgnorth constable, was given £2 10s in expenses to escort 'soldiers to 
Shrewsbury which were impressed within this town for his majesty's service'. As 
the Royalists' regional recruiting centre Shrewsbury also drew in conscripts from 
further afield, including 100 pressed men from Denbighshire captured en route by 
the Parliamentarians at Montford bridge in May 1644.32 
 In addition to the influx of fresh recruits, troop numbers were sustained by the 
repatriation of prisoners of war in accordance with the laws of war. These 
customary practices regulated conduct in such matters as the surrender of a 
stronghold and the treatment of captives, eventualities that allowed soldiers to 
return to their own side.33 A garrison who had conducted their defence honourably, 
but not in an unduly prolonged or unnecessary way, could be granted favourable 
terms allowing them to fight another day. Thus the Royalists left isolated in 
Shrewsbury Castle after the town fell in February 1645 promptly capitulated and 
were allowed safe conduct to Ludlow.34 It was common practice for captive 
commissioned officers of equivalent status to be exchanged, as in the case of 
Parliamentarian Captain Samuel More in 1644. Captured at Hopton Castle in 
March, by mid-May More was paroled and contemplating the completion of his 
negotiated exchange: 'I am delivered out of the prison of Ludlow', he wrote from 
Upton Cresset Hall, a family home of his Royalist counterpart, 'into the hands of Mr 
Francis Cressett with promise to remain with him till his father Edward Cressett 
shall be set at liberty'.35 Common soldiers, however, were detained in much less 
hospitable circumstances. In April 1644 Colonel Lewis Chadwick, the 
Parliamentarian governor of Stafford, wrote to his Royalist counterpart at 
Shrewsbury, Sir Francis Ottley, complaining of 'the ill usage of our prisoners in not                                                         
29 SA, LB8/1/164, f. 6; SA, LB7/2236. 
30 SA, 3365/588, ff. 38, 42-3. 
31 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/54. 
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having straw, sweet water, [and] without remedy, or necessary food or liberty', 
abuses that Chadwick threatened 'must be answered here of necessity by us'.36 But 
there was also much interchange of rank and file prisoners of war, because few 
buildings other than churches or some castles were large or secure enough to hold 
them in numbers, while feeding and providing for them was expensive and 
problematic. Hence deals were negotiated like that agreed in July 1644 between Sir 
Fulke Hunckes, as governor of Shrewsbury, and Colonel Mytton, as governor of 
Wem, for the exchange between their respective garrisons of 100 Royalist soldiers 
for the same number of Parliamentarians. The switch was conducted with due 
protocol by the dispatch and reception of drummers, acting as the traditional 
emissaries between opposing forces.37 Back in April, in spite of his ire over the ill 
treatment of his men, Colonel Chadwick had remained hopeful of concluding a 
similar interchange of prisoners with Hunckes's predecessor Sir Francis Ottley. 
Chadwick professed his willingness, to 'exchange all fitting courtesies which will be 
both honourable and charitable for both parties'.38   
 Although desertion was rife during the First Civil War the habit tended to 
sustain the armies, for deserters not only joined the enemy but also shifted amongst 
their own side seeking preferential conditions. Captain Hannay, for example, one of 
Sir Thomas Myddelton's officers, found upon his return from Royalist captivity that 
his troop of 40 horsemen had shrunk to just 12, 'the rest being run to other brigades 
which hath better pay'. A fellow officer Captain Simon Farmer calculated that of the 
22 troopers and officers missing from his originally 50-strong troop, just three were 
lost in action - two killed and one captured in the fighting for Oswestry on 2 July 
1644 - while 19 had deserted, 13 of them to the enemy.39 The published articles of 
war regulating the armies condemned desertion as a capital offence, and during the 
First Civil War both sides customarily hanged individuals and small groups of 
deserters as an exemplary disciplinary measure. A particularly notorious case was 
the hanging ordered by Prince Rupert at Whitchurch on 19 March 1645 of 13 
Royalist deserters captured in Parliamentarian service, but this was as much a 
reprisal for the summary execution ordered by the county committee of 13 Irish                                                         
36 WSL, SMS 493. 
37 NLW, Sweeney Hall Mss A1, f. 23. 
38 WSL, SMS 493. 
39 TNA, SP28/41 Part 4, f. 483, Hannay's accounts; TNA, SP28/37 Part 1, f. 89, Farmer's 
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Royalist soldiers taken prisoner when Shrewsbury fell.40 However, endemic side 
changing also came to be accepted as a fact of war and both sides encouraged 
desertion by defection.41 Once characterised as 'the vagabond privates who shifted 
about [...] under temptation of richer spoil or higher pay', recent scholarship has 
attributed wider, sometimes ideological, motives to the likely thousands of side-
changing soldiers.42 The practice is now seen to have had a significant effect on the 
nature of Civil War armies: in Donagan's opinion, large-scale rank and file defection 
was 'a major form of troop attrition and acquisition'.43  
 Side changing permeated the war in and around Shropshire. In October 1645, for 
instance, officers at Montgomery Castle were prepared to accept the return to the 
Parliamentarian fold of three troopers who since deserting had served as 
Royalists.44 At Shrewsbury six months before the committeemen had become wary 
of their ex-Royalist soldiers, and so placed chosen men under Colonel Hunt's direct 
command to garrison Shrewsbury Castle.45 Defeat and disaffection encouraged side 
changing. During August 1644 refugee Royalist horsemen, from the Northern army 
and of Prince Rupert's regiments defeated at Marston Moor and elsewhere since, 
were reported to 'come in daily to the Parliament's garrisons of Oswestry and 
Wem'.46 By far the largest instance of side changing in the region was the defection 
of many of the 1,500 or so Royalist soldiers recently repatriated from Ireland taken 
prisoner after the battle of Nantwich on 25 January 1644. Hundreds reenlisted and 
some were sent to reinforce the Parliamentarians in Shropshire, where for many 
their new allegiance was short-lived. Several had deserted Wem for Shrewsbury 
already by late February, and when the Royalists took Apley Castle on 24 March 
they offered re-employment to the turncoats among the Parliamentarian garrison.47 
The 60 men of Captain Wood's company of the Parliamentarian garrison at 
Longford House were mostly ex-Royalists enlisted at Nantwich, and when the 
                                                        
40 LBWB, I, pp. 141, 227; JHL, VII, pp. 305-6. 
41 Donagan, War in England, p. 278; Hopper, Turncoats & Renegadoes, pp. 85-6. 
42 Quotation from Webb and Webb, Civil War [...] as it affected Herefordshire, II, p. 94. For the 
revisionist view of side changing, see Donagan, War in England, pp. 275-8, and Hopper, 
Turncoats & Renegadoes, especially pp. 78-99. 
43 Donagan, War in England, p. 275. 
44 LBWB, II, p. 135. 
45 LBWB, I, p. 343. 
46 Mercurius Civicus, 8-15 Aug. 1644, p. 612. 
47 HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix Part I, pp 170-1; 'Ottley Papers' (1896), p. 231. 
 76 
garrison surrendered to Prince Rupert in April 1644 almost to a man they re-enlisted 
for the King.48 
 In addition to their regular forces both sides had the occasional support of 
irregular militias. Under the auspices of the Marcher Association, as Royalist high 
sheriff in 1645 Sir Francis Ottley periodically summoned the posse comitatus. On 1 
February, for instance, Ottley issued warrants to mobilise 300 militiamen from 
Munslow hundred. Similarly, the several hundred countrymen gathered near 
Morville in early June who reportedly confronted, fired upon, and were then 
dispersed by a party of Parliamentarian horsemen had probably responded to a 
widespread call to readiness at arms circulated by Ottley towards the end of May.49 
Again in July, Ottley and the sheriffs of Worcestershire and Herefordshire were 
ordered to raise the posse comitatus against the threatened advance of Lord Leven's 
Scottish army.50  
 Also in 1645 both sides endeavoured to benefit from the militancy of the south 
Shropshire clubmen. In late March the county committee intended to send soldiers 
into the area in alliance with the clubmen, who were again hostile to the King's men 
after a punitive raid on the Bishop's Castle district by Royalist forces out of 
Montgomeryshire.51 A month later, however, a clergyman and other local worthies 
were reportedly attempting to enlist clubmen for the Royalist cause.52 The 
combatants also encouraged militia activity elsewhere. In late April 1645, the 
committeemen reported that countrymen in the contested territory between 
Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth had 'promised to rise with us, and we intend to put 
them to it'.53 Parliamentarian efforts to secure local alliances of this sort came to 
fruition in south Shropshire that summer. In early August, men from the hundreds 
of Clun, Purslow and Munslow twice attended armed gatherings near Bishop's 
Castle under the direction of local man Colonel Samuel More, and on the 30th a 
body of townsmen and countrymen joined with upwards of 200 regular 
                                                        
48 CSPD, 1645-1647, p. 298; Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 6 Apr. 1644, p. 921. 
49 'Ottley Papers' (1896), p. 272; Mercurius Veridicus, 7-14 June 1645, p. 72; The Weekly Account, 
4-11 June 1645, unpaginated; HRO, CF61/20, ff. 573-4. 
50 BRL, Harley Mss 6852, f. 276. 
51 H.G. Tibbutt (ed.), The Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke, 1644-45 (London, 1963), p. 490. 
52 LBWB, I, p. 277. 
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Parliamentarian soldiers outside Bishop's Castle to defeat a Royalist force from 
Ludlow.54 
 Before turning from this general review of military organisation to consider in 
detail the particular composition of the opposing forces, it should be explained that 
both sides maintained a corps of artillerymen to operate their garrison, siege and, on 
occasion, field artillery; at the battle fought near Stokesay on 8 June 1645, for 
instance, the Royalists deployed at least two cannon.55 In later 1644 Sir Thomas 
Myddelton's brigade included a unit of at least ten gunners and their matrosses, or 
assistants, while a party of Royalist 'cannoneers' was based at Shrewsbury.56 
Royalist forces in Shropshire 
Local units under local commanders 
During the First Civil War Royalist leadership and manpower was divided between 
the twin priorities of local defence and prosecuting the wider war. Like the 
Staffordshire gentleman who on 9 October 1642 wrote excitedly how he had enlisted 
at Shrewsbury and next day would march with the King's cavalry, many militarily 
active Royalists felt duty-bound to serve in propinquity to Charles I.57 The King's 
army that left Shropshire in October 1642 comprised marching regiments raised to 
campaign beyond their locality. Thereafter, the tendency to gravitate to the Royalist 
centre - to the forces based around Oxford - and to celebrated units was detrimental 
to the King's supporters locked in provincial struggles. In the case of Lancashire, for 
example, from mid-1643 the Royalist cause was left moribund after the departure of 
the most enterprising officers and a number of units.58 Although it did not 
haemorrhage in the way of Lancashire, the Royalist war effort in Shropshire also 
suffered by the diminution of officers and rank and file. Of some 133 Shropshire 
men named in post-Restoration Indigent Officer lists who claimed to have held the 
King's commission, 40% purportedly served in regiments that never or only 
fleetingly campaigned in Shropshire.59 Furthermore, the more or less temporary 
withdrawal of units and the posting of others further afield had a detrimental effect                                                         
54 Heads of Some Notes of The Citie Scout, 19 Aug. 1645, p. 4; The Kingdome's Weekly Intelligencer, 
2-9 Sept. 1645, p. 934; HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix Part I, pp. 95-6. 
55 Perfect Passages of Each Dayes Proceedings in Parliament, 11-18 June 1645, p. 267. 
56 NLW, Chirk Castle Mss 1/Biii, 93, unfoliated; SA, 3365/588, f. 45 
57 SRO, D868/2/43.  
58 Gratton, Lancashire, pp. 258, 260, 267. 
59 IO List, OT List. 
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on the Royalist military situation in Shropshire. During 1645, for example, the 
detachment in February of much of the Shrewsbury garrison to Prince Maurice's 
mobile force, and in May of Shropshire-based units to the main field army, 
contributed respectively to the loss of Shrewsbury and to the local Parliamentarian 
successes during June.60 Captain Edward Lloyd of Llanvorda raised locally a troop 
for Lord Capel's Horse in 1643 and campaigned with the regiment (later Trevor's 
Horse) in Shropshire, the Marches and further afield during 1644. But the regiment 
including Lloyd's Troop was later posted to the West Country, and Lloyd 
eventually surrendered at Truro in Cornwall in March 1646.61   
 In 1642 three locally led Royalist regiments were recruited in Shropshire, and 
they performed provincial and wider strategic roles. Two served as marching 
regiments (although neither was ready to accompany the King when he left 
Shropshire), while the third was raised and operated as a local defence force. 
Probably the first to be raised was Sir Robert Howard's Regiment of Dragoons, who 
local Royalists expected would defend Shropshire alongside the Trained Bands.62 
However, by January 1643 Howard had taken his dragoons to Oxford (although a 
company was still being recruited in south Shropshire in March).63 Two companies 
fought at Prince Rupert's storming of Bristol in July, and after the battle of Newbury 
in September Howard's Dragoons went into garrison at Donnington Castle in 
Berkshire.64 By mid-1644 Howard had returned to Shropshire, perhaps 
accompanied by the remaining dragoons of his regiment.  
 The second regiment was of infantry. On 3 September 1642 King Charles issued a 
colonelcy to Richard Herbert, MP, to raise 1,200 foot. Although Herbert came from 
Montgomeryshire, as an active member of Shropshire's commission of array he 
intended to recruit there. Furthermore, on 17 October Herbert was commissioned to 
raise some horse and was also appointed governor of Bridgnorth, where his recruits 
would muster.65 Herbert's Regiment and Troop joined the Oxford army in mid-
January 1643 where they remained during the spring and summer, the infantry 
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64 Warburton, Prince Rupert, II, pp. 237, 314. 
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participating in the capture of Bristol.66 On 28 September Herbert was appointed 
governor of Ludlow, and his regiment arrived there from Oxford soon afterwards.67 
Herbert's Foot remained in the central Marches into 1644, garrisoning Montgomery 
in February and at the siege of Brampton Bryan Castle in Herefordshire in April, but 
its whereabouts thereafter are rather uncertain.68  
 The third regiment was Sir Vincent Corbet's Dragoons. In late 1642 High Sheriff 
Henry Bromley and certain gentry sought the King's approval of their resolution to 
recruit 'up to a thousand or at least 600 dragoons'. Accordingly, at Oxford on 9 
December the regiment and Corbet's colonelcy was given royal assent, 'for the 
defence of his majesty and that county'.69 Sir Vincent's commission also to raise a 
body of horse was authorised soon after.70 All ten known mounted officers who 
served under Corbet were Shropshire men, including dragoon company captains 
Thomas Pigott, Edward Baldwin, Robert Sandford and (probably) Edward Owen, 
and Captain of Horse John Young.71 Baldwin, for example, obtained recruits in 
south Shropshire including 26 men from Ludlow.72 Under strength and 
inexperienced, Corbet's Dragoons were worsted in early skirmishes with Sir 
William Brereton's forces; the Cheshire Royalist Sir Thomas Aston described them 
at Whitchurch on 17 March 1643 as 'those few dragoons in fear of daily surprise'.73 
Early the following May, Brereton's forces beat Corbet’s 300 dragoons again at their 
base at Market Drayton, and a London newsbook reporting the action claimed that 
the entire regiment had been routed.74 Corbet's Dragoons thereafter appear to have 
served in detachments; for example, 40 men of Captain Baldwin's company were in 
garrison at Ludlow in mid-1643, and in February 1644 a detachment briefly 
occupied Hopton Castle.75 For much of 1644 Corbet was governor of Moreton 
Corbet Castle and probably his dragoons operated from there, while the regiment                                                         
66 Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 14 Jan. 1643, p. 17; ROP, II, pp. 164, 236-9; Warburton, Prince 
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later became synonymous with the garrison at High Ercall, Corbet's base in 1645; on 
1 November a detachment of the 'Arcall Dragoons' were with Sir William Vaughan's 
task force at the battle of Denbigh.76 
 From the onset of hostilities Shropshire's trained militia, the Trained Bands and 
the county Troop of Horse, served Charles I's cause. Colonel Francis Billingsley, 
commanding the foot in mid-1644, acknowledged that: 'The regiment of Trained 
Bands did suppress the militia [ordinance] and kept this county for his majesty'.77 
As has been seen, the four company captains of the Trained Bands in 1642 were 
Royalists and they would have influenced the loyalty of the 600 rank and file, who 
in 1638 had numbered 341 musketeers and 259 pikemen.78 By mid-1643 Thomas 
Screven was colonel of this not wholly reliable regiment of part-time soldiers, who 
reportedly tended to neglect Lord Capel's orders 'in performing their watches or 
other military services'.79 Demoralised that October after their defeat against Wem 
when Screven received an ultimately fatal wound, in February 1644 the Trained 
Bands were found to be in 'great disorder' after his recent death.80 Capel was 
frustrated by the parochial-mindedness of the Trained Bands - because, as Richard 
Herbert observed, they 'refuse to go out of their own country' - but he accepted their 
limitations as 'soldiers of the place', unsuited 'to be built upon for service out of 
their proper county'.81 Accordingly, the Shropshire Trained Bands were most 
usefully deployed in reserve guarding strategic points: a role they performed into 
winter 1642-3 defending Shrewsbury, the Royalist headquarters; in spring 1643 at 
Capel's forward base at Whitchurch; and in May 1644 at Bridgnorth, stationed to 
guard the easterly approaches to Shropshire after the departure of Prince Rupert's 
field army. Evidence of these and other deployments - from the activity of soldiers 
from Ludlow, Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth - shows that the Trained Bands were 
regularly called to arms from summer 1642 until autumn 1644.82 That November, 
however, Colonel Billingsley found that lack of pay and higher administrative                                                         
76 Symonds, Diary, p. 259. 
77 BRL, Harley Mss 6802, f. 227, Billingsley to Lord Digby, 15 June 1644. 
78 HHL, Ellesmere Mss, 7443; TNA, SP16/381, f. 66, 'The Trained Bands of the Several 
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neglect had caused his regiment mostly to disband, and some trained bandsmen to 
join the Parliamentarians.83 Nonetheless, in autumn 1645 there was a Trained Band 
company under Billingsley's command at Bridgnorth.84  
 There is little evidence of the wartime service of the nominally 100-strong County 
Troop, other than the difficulty of calling it to arms in later 1642, and that it was 
commanded by Captain-lieutenant Edward Stanley of Knockin, who was captured 
by the enemy at Shrewsbury in February 1645.85  
 
Units of Horse and Dragoons 
The County Horse Troop (extant in 1642) 
Sir Vincent Corbet's Dragoons (1642) 
Sir Vincent Corbet's Horse (1642) 
Sir Robert Howard's Dragoons (1642) 
Sir Francis Ottley's Dragoons (1642) 
Sir Richard Leveson's Horse (1643?) 
Sir Edward Acton's Horse (1644?) 
Colonel Francis Billingsley's Horse, or Dragoons 
(1644) 
Colonel John Corbet's Horse (1644?) 
Colonel Somerset Fox's Horse (1644) 
Sir Francis Ottley's Horse (1644?) 
Sir Thomas Whitmore's Horse (1644?) 
Units of Foot 
The County Regiment of Trained Band Foot 
(extant in 1642) 
Colonel Richard Herbert's Foot (1642) 
Sir Francis Ottley's Foot (1642) 
Henry Bromley's Foot (1643) 
Sir Vincent Corbet's Foot (1643) 
Sir Richard Leveson's Foot (1643?) 
Colonel John Corbet's Foot (1644?) 
 
 
  
Table 5: Royalist units raised by local commanders (with date). 
 
 Other local Royalist units are known only from a very limited number of sources 
(Table 5). Sir Thomas Whitmore's horsemen, for example, although active in spring 
1644 are otherwise known only from the name of their quartermaster.86 Similarly, 
the purchases they made at local horse fairs seem the only trace of the horse soldiers 
under Francis Billingsley's command at Bridgnorth.87 Furthermore, although Henry 
Bromley, as high sheriff, and Sir Vincent Corbet were both granted commissions to 
raise regiments of foot in 1643, in March and July respectively, it remains unknown 
to what extent these units became operational.88 More definitely, we know that John                                                         
83 BDL, Firth Mss C7, f. 229. 
84 Symonds, Diary, p. 252. 
85 SA, LB7/2234, warrant concerning absence from musters; CPCC, III; LBWB, I, p. 41. 
86 Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 30 Mar. 1644; IO List, p. 151. 
87 SA, BB/C/1-6. 
88 BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [first part], ff. 97, 123.  
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Corbet of Childs Ercall led a unit of horse by spring 1644, was a colonel in the 
garrison at High Ercall in April 1645, and had a company of foot at Bridgnorth that 
October.89 In February 1644, Somerset Fox, of Caynham near Ludlow, was only a 
junior officer in Prince Rupert's Horse, but a year later his own cavalry regiment 
was quartered near Shrewsbury under the deputy command of a relative, Major 
Richard Fox, while four other local officers of the unit are known.90 Sir Richard 
Leveson meanwhile based his own horse and foot as a garrison at Lilleshall Abbey. 
A troop and a company of Leveson's fought at nearby Longford in March 1644, and 
in May 1645 the garrison was 160 strong. Six of seven of Leveson's known officers 
came from Shropshire.91  
 Sir Francis Ottley also became an active commander. He captained a militia 
company by early August 1642 - reported as 'new volunteers by the King's 
commission to him' - and from mid-September raised a further 200 foot.92 These 
were the nucleus of a permanent garrison and town militia regiment at Shrewsbury 
under Ottley's governorship. In 1644 the corporation reported that 'the inhabitants 
of the town were all soldiers, or maintained soldiers under them (if they did not do 
their duty in their own persons)'.93 That January, however, Lord Byron had 
disparagingly characterised Shrewsbury's militiamen as 'a garrison of burghers 
[burgesses]', lacking discipline and of suspect loyalty.94 On paper, Ottley's Foot had 
five companies numbering around 600 townsmen, subdivided into 26 localised 
squadrons or corporalships.95 Six at least of its ten known commissioned officers 
came from Shropshire.96 From late December 1642 a company of dragoons was also 
raised in and around Shrewsbury under Ottley's governorship, and captained 
successively by Ottley and two local men, Roger Owen and John Allen, it was active 
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into 1644.97 By that autumn Ottley was also colonel of a regiment of horse, which 
was then operating from Ludlow. A troop of Ottley's Horse was at Bridgnorth in 
October 1645, and some of the regiment fought at Denbigh that November.98 
 Besides Ottley's regiment at Shrewsbury, local militias were established at the 
other Royalist garrison towns of the First Civil War. A night watch was on duty at 
Bridgnorth from January 1643, and the training of volunteers  - 'for the defence of 
the town and thereabouts' - began that May.99 At Oswestry, 'eighty townsmen in 
arms' were reported to have readily surrendered to the Parliamentarians in June 
1644.100 Armed townsmen guarded Ludlow by keeping watch at night and ward by 
day. One of them, Edward Steple, complained of being forcibly disciplined by 
regular officers of the garrison, he 'being no soldier under their command'.101 
Notwithstanding such friction, in February 1645 Sir Michael Woodhouse intended 
to deploy up to 600 well-equipped militiamen in defence of Ludlow.102 
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Plate 3: Warrant issued in Sir Francis Ottley's name, to muster the town dragoons at 
Shrewsbury sometime in 1643. 
 
 
 Royalist military organisation in Shropshire in 1648 during the Second Civil War 
remains shadowy. Forces were necessarily raised clandestinely and their role was 
short-lived. Nonetheless, in early August the Parliamentarian Humphrey 
Mackworth found 'the whole party of the King's in this county being engaged, 
directly or indirectly, in this business'.103 Lord Byron returned in spring 1648 to 
command the region he had often been responsible for during 1644-6, but later was 
reticent about the extent of the military support in Shropshire provided by 'friends' 
and 'some gentlemen of quality and interest'.104 Byron issued commissions to raise 
forces in Shropshire, including colonelcies to Edward Lloyd - as an experienced 
cavalry officer from the First Civil War - to raise a regiment of horse, and to Sir 
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Francis Ottley to command in chief in the county.105 The officers and men who took 
up arms in Shropshire for King Charles and the Engagement were, however, 
dissipated in the uncoordinated uprisings attempted across the region that summer. 
Seven commissioned officers from Shropshire who joined Sir John Owen's 
insurrection in North Wales were captured when Major-General Mytton's 
Parliamentarians routed Owen's small force at Y Dalar Hir on the north 
Caernarvonshire coast on 5 June 1648.106 In Shropshire a month later, at Dawley 
Castle a covert gathering of would-be Royalist officers was surprised and captured 
by a Parliamentarian detachment from Shrewsbury.107 The abortive 'general 
rendezvous for Shropshire' attempted at Wattlesborough Heath on the night of 1/2 
August attracted 50-100 Royalist horsemen in two troops. Of a third mounted party 
who dispersed from Prees Heath in north Shropshire, 30 or so joined the reportedly 
300-strong body of horsemen with which Byron withdrew into North Wales.108 
Several Shropshire Royalists also appear to have joined Sir Henry Lingen's force 
that Parliamentarians defeated near Llanidloes in Montgomeryshire on 18 August, 
putting an end to Lingen's uprising that had begun in Herefordshire.109 
Outside units and units led by outsider commanders 
A credible Parliamentarian report of the campaign to capture Wem in October 1643 
described how Lord Capel's army comprised units from Shropshire and garrisons 
further afield, including Chester, Dudley and Worcester.110 This reflected the 
situation throughout the First Civil War, that the local Royalist forces were 
reinforced by units from outside Shropshire, posted there for specific operations or 
stationed for longer periods.  
  Lord Capel arrived in Shropshire in March 1643 with just his own depleted 
regiment of 80 horsemen. By mid-summer, however, the regiment had been 
recruited to 400 and participated in actions such as the defeat of Brereton's                                                         
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horsemen at Hanmer (Flintshire) in June. Remaining in Shropshire after his 
departure in December, Capel's Horse declined in numbers and morale, and after 
being defeated at Ellesmere on 12/13 January 1644 was reduced to few more than a 
troop. The regiment was re-formed under the command of Prince Rupert's 
appointee Colonel Marcus Trevor, and in March the troop of local Captain 
Lawrence Benthall was reported in action near Wem. The 400 men of Trevor's Horse 
later fought as part of Prince Rupert's army at Marston Moor.111 In May 1643 Sir 
Richard Willys's Regiment of Horse arrived from Oxford to reinforce Lord Capel 
and was billeted in and around Shrewsbury. Willys's was often brigaded with 
Capel's Horse and so shared in the victory at Hanmer, but was also beaten at 
Ellesmere whereafter it withdrew from the region.112 Colonel Henry Crowe's 
Dragoons were also stationed in Shropshire during 1643. Crowe was based at 
Ludlow by May, and his men were also billeted around Shrewsbury.113 
Detachments from two regiments of Worcestershire Foot also joined Capel in 
Shropshire. Sir Francis Beaumont's Foot were at Ludlow during 1643, while the 80 
'well armed' men and 70 clubmen sent from Worcester in early October fell 
disappointingly short of the expected 400 well-equipped soldiers of Sir William 
Russell's Regiment.114 Meanwhile Sir William Wynne's Denbighshire-raised 
Regiment of Foot also served in Shropshire under Capel.115 Described by their 
opponents as 'their chiefest [foot] in all that part of Wales', Wynne's 700 men fought 
in the Wem campaign.116 
 The Prince of Wales's Lifeguard of Foot was raised in March 1643 as a planned 
1,500-strong marching regiment under the command of Sergeant-Major Michael 
Woodhouse. The Lifeguard was recruited from the counties under Capel's 
command, and included, as has been seen, Shropshire conscripts. On 30 May the 
regiment was blooded in Brereton's attack on Capel's base at Whitchurch - where it 
reportedly fought as a stubborn rear guard - but later joined the Oxford army, and                                                         
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numbering around 700 men fought at Newbury in September.117 Returning to 
Shropshire in early October, the Lifeguard fought in the Wem campaign.118 From 
December 1643 until the close of the First Civil War Woodhouse's regiment was the 
mainstay of his garrison at Ludlow, its long-standing occupation attested by the 
billeting bills of soldiers from several companies.119 There it assumed an 
increasingly local character. Of 11 known commissioned officers, 9 were Shropshire 
men.120 Some of the ten Ludlow townsmen who were Royalist officers of foot 
probably served in the Lifeguard.121  
 Prince Rupert's appointment as regional commander-in-chief in place of Capel 
brought a fresh influx of outsider units and officers to Shropshire. Rupert led 600 or 
more horsemen of his own Regiment and Lifeguard to Shrewsbury in February 
1644, and the Prince's Regiment of Foot arrived from Bristol in March.122 Sir John 
Hurry's Regiment of Horse was also in Shropshire by March, along with Colonel 
Robert Ellice's Foot, a Denbighshire regiment re-embodied for the third time after 
defeats during 1643.123 On 24 March 1644 Ellice led his regiment in the successful 
assault upon the recently established Parliamentarian garrison at Apley Castle.124 Sir 
Lewis Kirke as governor of Bridgnorth recruited new or reinforced his existing 
units. One of Kirke's horsemen purchased a remount at the town's livestock fair in 
July 1644, and at least two of his officers of foot hailed from Shropshire.125 In 
October 1645 a 60-strong troop and a 50-man company under Kirke's command 
were at Bridgnorth.126 The Florentine mercenary Giovanni (anglice John) Devillier 
recruited a regiment of horse in Shropshire in which four local officers are known to 
have served.127 As Symonds noted in 1645, Devillier 'took his troop to Ludlow and 
is now colonel'.128 Devillier was in fact a colonel at Ludlow by September 1644, and                                                         
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in 1645 led the force defeated outside Bishop's Castle on 30 August. Eighty of his 
troopers fought at Denbigh that November.129 
 Units repatriated from the English Army in Ireland made a significant 
contribution to the Royalist war effort in Shropshire. Devillier captained one of the 
four troops of Sir William Vaughan's Horse, a regiment from the army in Leinster 
around 300 strong, which landed in North Wales and arrived in Shropshire during 
February 1644. From autumn 1644 the regiment was stationed in the garrisons at 
Shrawardine, Caus, High Ercall, Lilleshall and Dawley, where Vaughan's troop 
captains were made governors.  As has been seen, Vaughan's Horse often served 
further afield - 'drawn out according to the several designs', as Symonds noted - 
including at Marston Moor and Naseby (where it was 400 strong), but the regiment 
also campaigned in Shropshire and the Marches into 1646, and was regarded by Sir 
William Brereton ‘as good as any horse’ in the Royalist army.130 However, little is 
known of a unit of horse in Shropshire during 1644 under the command of another 
veteran of the Irish war, one Major Sacheverall, who in October 1643 was lieutenant 
of a disbanding troop at Dublin.131  
 Regiments of the Anglo-Irish Foot that arrived in the region from late 1643 also 
campaigned in Shropshire. The 1,200 or more men of the regiments of Colonels 
Robert Broughton and Henry Tillier arrived in Shropshire from Ireland at around 
the same time as Vaughan's Horse. They joined Sir Fulke Hunckes's Regiment, 
survivors of the defeat at Nantwich in January, and detachments from these 
regiments participated in Prince Rupert's relief of Newark in March 1644.132 In 
April, the regiments of Sir Michael Ernle and Colonels Richard Gibson and Henry 
Warren, reformed after the defeat at Nantwich and together numbering around 
1,000 men, appear to have been transferred from Chester to Shropshire.133 In 
September 1644 Broughton's, Tillier's, Warren's, Hunckes's and Ernle's, or 
detachments from them, fought at the battle of Montgomery. By then these 
regiments would have been largely re-recruited, apart from Hunckes's all having                                                         
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served in the campaign for the relief of York and subsequent battle of Marston 
Moor.134 Drawn together as the Shrewsbury Foot, what remained of the Anglo-Irish 
regiments in 1645 fought as a division of the Royalist infantry at the battle of 
Naseby and were lost or captured in the defeat, although in October a company of 
Ernle's Foot remained at Bridgnorth.135  
 Two other Royalist units serving in Shropshire in later 1645 arrived after defeats 
in the West Country during September. Having surrendered at Devizes, a company 
of Sir Charles Lloyd’s Regiment of Foot was in garrison at Bridgnorth by October, 
while Prince Rupert's capitulation of Bristol resulted in around 200 redcoats of the 
Prince's Regiment of Firelocks joining Sir William Vaughan's forces in Shropshire.136 
 The number of Royalist soldiers stationed in Shropshire at a given time cannot be 
determined accurately. In late 1644 Prince Rupert fixed the county establishment at 
1,500 foot and 240 horse (plus officers), divided between the main bases at 
Shrewsbury, Bridgnorth and Ludlow; however, in January 1645, as Sir Michael 
Ernle reported, the number of Royalist soldiers then in Shropshire was somewhat 
higher, including many supernumerary officers.137 Contemporary estimations of the 
size of forces engaged in the larger actions provide an indication of Royalist military 
capability in Shropshire. For example, the previously mentioned Parliamentarian 
dispatch numbered Lord Capel's army in the campaign for Wem in October 1643 as 
3,000 men.138 Two Royalist accounts differed considerably, however, in attributing 
either 800 or 1,400 soldiers to Prince Rupert's force at Market Drayton on 5 March 
1644.139 The Royalist field army defeated near Stokesay on 8 June 1645 numbered 
1,500-2,000 men, comprising detachments from the garrisons of Shropshire, 
Worcestershire, Hereford and Monmouth.140 Finally, newsbook reports suggest that 
by March 1646 there were 700-800 regulars in the three Royalist garrisons remaining                                                         
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in Shropshire, at High Ercall, Bridgnorth and Ludlow, reduced by May to just the 
100 horse and 250 foot blockaded in Ludlow.141 
Parliamentarian forces in Shropshire 
The First Civil War, 1642-6 
During summer 1642 militia bands were formed in support of the execution of 
Parliament's militia ordinance in at least 35 towns across England, including 
Shrewsbury. There, by mid-July, volunteers were meeting outside the town to 
practise arms drill under Thomas Hunt's leadership.142 On 2 August the 
Parliamentarian MPs Corbet, More and Pierrepont viewed at Shrewsbury a muster 
of around 300 of Hunt's 'orderly men', whilst the same day the commissioners of 
array inspected two companies of the Trained Bands at nearby Atcham and 
Montford bridge.143 Hunt - whom local Royalists derided for having assumed 'the 
name of captain to the militia of Shrewsbury' - fled upon the arrival of King Charles 
in Shropshire, and his followers were disarmed and threatened with 
imprisonment.144 Thus the first organised armed body raised in Shropshire in 
support of Parliament was suppressed. It would take eight or so months for new 
units to be established, recruited mostly in and around London. 
 With his Cheshire forces under threat of Royalist attack, in February 1643 Sir 
William Brereton sought military support by lobbying Parliament to hasten Sir John 
Corbet and Sir Thomas Myddelton to raise regiments and advance into Shropshire 
and Denbighshire respectively, where Brereton expected enthusiastic recruits would 
be found.145 By June, Corbet had recruited a cadre of officers who, together with any 
soldiers under them, were transferred to Colonel Thomas Mytton and other 
committeemen when they assumed command on 4 July of what became the 
Shropshire forces.146 Meanwhile, in May 1643 the Earl of Essex had commissioned 
Mytton to raise a regiment each of horse, dragoons and foot, in which at least three 
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of the Shropshire committeemen served as officers - Humphrey Mackworth, 
Andrew Lloyd and Thomas Hunt as captains of troops of horse, and Hunt also as a 
captain of a company of foot.147 Mytton's Regiment of Foot left London in late 
August accompanied by several troops of horse, of Mytton's own regiment and 
others recruited by the Earl of Denbigh.148 In the meantime Sir Thomas Myddelton, 
with a colonel's commission to raise a regiment each of horse, dragoons and foot as 
Parliament's major-general of North Wales, had also recruited in London and the 
Southeast, although the reported 'great forces' he brought to Nantwich around 19 
August 1643 comprised just a regiment of foot and some horse.149 
 Myddelton's, Mytton's, and Brereton's forces together occupied and fortified 
Wem in September, and from 14 to 18 October undertook the campaign for the 
town's defence and relief against Lord Capel's army.150 Royalist assaults on the 17th 
and 18th were repelled by the garrison numbering around 300, mostly half of 
Colonel Mytton's Regiment of Foot, some 170 men, and a scratch militia company of 
townsmen.151 Meanwhile, Myddelton's and the rest of Mytton's Foot remained with 
Brereton's main body shadowing and then pursuing Capel's army between 
Nantwich and Wem. Fought by a coalition of Parliamentarian forces, the Wem 
campaign set a precedent for the vital supportive role that auxiliary units - in this 
instance mostly Brereton's Cheshire forces, but also including Myddelton's men and 
some Staffordshire Horse - would play in sustaining the Shropshire forces. The 
Cheshire Trained Bands in particular played a key role at Wem as a garrison and 
also in building fortifications.152 It was reported that 'whilst the Cheshire soldiers 
continued in Wem (which were about 500 musketeers besides horse) the enemy did 
forbear to make any attempt against the town'.153 Several companies of Cheshire 
Foot remained at Wem into November, where on the 23rd their impending 
withdrawal was reported with trepidation by the Shropshire committeemen.154                                                         
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 The Cheshire units were withdrawn to bolster Brereton's weakened grip on 
Cheshire as a result of the precipitate withdrawal of his forces from the hitherto 
successful advance into north-east Wales made in partnership with Myddelton. The 
campaign had begun on 8 November when the Parliamentarians stormed the bridge 
over the River Dee at Holt, an operation that included 200 of Myddelton's Foot and 
one troop of his Horse.155 In their later retreat from Flintshire the Parliamentarians 
left Hawarden Castle as an isolated outpost. When the castle's 120-strong garrison 
capitulated in early December 1643, a Royalist officer described them as 'being all 
that was left of Sir Thomas Myddelton's Regiment'.156 However, the remainder of 
Myddelton's force was active into February 1644, mounting a raid jointly with a 
detachment from Wem upon Bangor-on-Dee (Flintshire) on the 15th, and holding 
several small outposts astride the Flintshire/Shropshire border.157 These can be 
identified as the garrisoned manor houses of Fens Hall, Hanmer Hall, Emral Hall 
and Bettisfield Hall, which surrendered to Lord Byron during the brief campaign he 
conducted in the area in late March.158 
 Mytton's force at Bangor-on-Dee in mid-February 1644 reportedly numbered 250 
foot and 160 horse, while the detachment he led that beat the Royalists at Ellesmere 
on 12/13 January was probably underestimated by a Royalist officer as 240 
strong.159 These numbers suggest the limited operational capability of 
Parliamentary forces in Shropshire at this time (mostly the Shropshire forces, 
comprising Mytton's three regiments) and are commensurate with Royalist 
intelligence reports in late February 1644.160 These numbered 150 horse and 400 foot 
at Wem, 80 or so dragoons garrisoning Ightfield, and probably somewhat 
underestimated the combined Parliamentarian strength in Shropshire as 700 men, 
when there were also auxiliary companies of Cheshire and Staffordshire foot 
garrisoning Longford House and Tong respectively.161 Furthermore, at this time the 
Parliamentary cavalry in Shropshire were reinforced by five troops of Yorkshire 
Horse led by Sir William Fairfax. They did not provide long-term support, however,                                                         
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for together with Mytton's cavalry the Yorkshiremen were beaten and scattered by 
Prince Rupert at Market Drayton on 5 March.162 That day in London, the Committee 
of Both Kingdoms reported the strength of the garrison at Wem as 400 foot and 200 
horse.163 This concurs with Royalist estimates of the strength of the composite 
Parliamentarian force beaten at the engagement near Longford on 25 March, as 
around 400 foot and nine troops of horse, comprised of Cheshire and Staffordshire 
auxiliaries and units from Wem.164 This deployment was for several months a high 
watermark in the size of force the Parliamentarians could field in Shropshire. The 
Royalists' victory furthered a string of successes under Prince Rupert's leadership 
that by the end of April 1644 left the Parliamentarians blockaded in Wem, their last 
stronghold in the county. 
 Sir Thomas Myddelton meanwhile had returned to London to raise and equip 
1,500 infantry and 300 cavalry.165 This new brigade would include a regiment of foot 
and a troop of horse raised by Myddelton's cousin Sir William Myddelton, and on 
22 March 1644 Sir Thomas agreed to bankroll and equip both units.166 Recorded in 
Myddelton's accounts are payments to officers recruiting companies or troops at 
this time, including £20 each on 1 April to Captains John Weaver and Thomas Judd, 
for their soldiers 'shortly to march from London'.167 On 28 March The Perfect Diurnall 
reported 'there is 500 foot and 300 horse already raised in and about the city for Sir 
Thomas [...] who will presently set forth for Shropshire', and during the next month 
or so Myddelton's brigade gathered at Coventry; Captain Thomas Pope's Company 
of Sir William Myddelton's Foot, for example, departed London around 1 May.168 
Sir Thomas left London for the Midlands on 24 May 1644, and meanwhile three 
troops of his Horse and three companies of Sir William Myddelton's Foot were 
already marching into south Staffordshire with the Earl of Denbigh's army of the 
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West Midland Association.169 Reinforced by another troop and numbering more 
than 200 men, Myddelton's Horse were with Denbigh when Rushall Hall was taken 
on 28 May, but neither Sir Thomas's nor Sir William's regiments of foot contributed 
much to the brief siege, and the Earl bemoaned their laggardly and mutinous 
conduct.170 By 2 June both regiments, each of about 400 men, were with Denbigh at 
Wednesbury (Staffordshire), although the Earl noted that they had been reduced by 
desertion like the rest of his army, which also included his own regiments of horse 
and foot, each around 400 men plus officers.171 
 On 11 June Myddelton led his brigade as part of Denbigh's army at the 
engagement at Tipton Green, where Colonel Mytton also held a subordinate 
command. Myddelton's Horse also participated in the capture of Oswestry on 22-23 
June, Denbigh's first action in Shropshire and a joint operation involving also his 
lifeguard and regiment of horse, and 200 foot and some horse from Wem led by 
Mytton - probably 900 men in all.172 Much reduced by casualties, sickness and 
desertion, the foot regiments of Denbigh and the Myddeltons were then put to 
garrison duty at Oswestry and Wem.173 However, on 29 June Royalists from 
Shrewsbury laid siege to Oswestry, causing Sir Thomas Myddelton to return to 
relieve the town on 2 July leading 1,500-1,700 men. Except for Sir Thomas's Horse 
these were all infantry, comprising three Cheshire regiments and detachments from 
Wem including Denbigh's Foot. These units together with reinforcements hurriedly 
brought up by Denbigh formed the army mustered under his command at Knockin 
Heath, south-east of Oswestry, early on the morning of 4 July 1644. In skirmishing 
lasting until nightfall, the Parliamentarians forced the Severn crossing at Montford 
and reached the westerly defences of Shrewsbury. Denbigh's heterogeneous army 
comprised Myddelton's brigade, the Cheshire Foot and units of the West Midland 
Association - detachments of the Shropshire forces, Denbigh's own two regiments 
and lifeguard, and some Staffordshire Horse and Foot. At 3,500-4,000 men this was, 
albeit briefly, the largest force the Parliamentarians would deploy in Shropshire                                                         
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during the Civil Wars.174 
 The next day Denbigh's army withdrew or dispersed. Myddelton's and Mytton's 
forces went into garrison at Oswestry and Wem, while both commanders sought 
reinforcements. In mid-July, Mytton asked Denbigh's confirmation of the brevet 
colonelcy of Robert Powell, a local gentleman. Powell then went to London to 
recruit cavalry, and by October had returned to Oswestry as a colonel of horse.175 
The Committee of Both Kingdoms in turn pressed Denbigh to confirm the 
commissions of several captains the London-based Shropshire committeemen had 
recruited and sent to their colleagues at Wem.176 On 18 June the Earl had granted a 
captain's commission to Thomas Hunt, enabling him to raise a troop of horse 
independently of Mytton.177 These appointments began the estrangement between 
Thomas Mytton and the other militarily active committeemen, and the resultant 
division of the Shropshire forces between Mytton's Oswestry-based units and those 
of the committee at Wem. Mytton later recollected how during summer 1644 his 
erstwhile colleagues began to make 'themselves colonels and other officers, and so 
[...] engrossed the whole militia into their own regiments'.178 Mytton seems to have 
lobbied for support in London against this usurpation of his overall command. On 
18 August, Captain Samuel More, one of his adherents in the officer corps at Wem, 
wrote cautioning Mytton, 'that I think the Parliament will not take away from the 
committee the power granted them'. Nonetheless, More agreed to help in blocking 
the appointment to a senior captaincy at Wem of Wilhelm Reinking, one of the 
committee's new officers and later Mytton's rival. More concluded that when they 
next met, he would discuss with Mytton 'of such a way that we may make up our 
own garrisons with such men under your command that may not be subject to other 
commanders'.179 
 While his regiment of horse left Shropshire for good with him in July 1644, the 
Earl of Denbigh's Regiment of Foot remained at Wem, where later that month its                                                         
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eight companies numbered just 200 or so rank and file.180 Although in mid-August 
the Committee of Both Kingdoms had instructed the committee at Wem to manage 
the regiment, Denbigh's Foot suffered by the rift between the committeemen and 
the Earl. Consequently, on 24 September a captain wrote to Denbigh from Wem of 
the regiment, 'struggling with the want of all things to serve in a place where we are 
hated for your honour's sake'.181 The proposed amalgamation of the regiment to just 
two companies was averted in November, but in January 1645 the Committee of 
Both Kingdoms proposed its reduction to three. The Committee intervened again 
two months later, pointing out to the committee at Shrewsbury that Denbigh's Foot 
should be reinforced and paid in accordance with their other units.182 
 In mid-July 1644 the Committee of Both Kingdoms had granted Sir Thomas 
Myddelton licence to prosecute a campaign into Wales, provided he continued to 
support the Shropshire forces183 Writing on the 16th, Thomas Mytton informed his 
wife in coded terms that he planned to transfer troops from Wem to Oswestry, 
because 'Brother Myddelton and myself intend, God willing, to take a voyage into 
Wales'.184 Accordingly, on 4 August the brothers-in-law jointly led around 550 
horse, foot and dragoons from Oswestry, together with two Cheshire companies 
from Nantwich, in a successful cross-border raid the next morning upon Prince 
Rupert's Regiment of Horse billeted at Welshpool in Montgomeryshire.185 A month 
later, Myddelton again led his men into Montgomeryshire in the offensive that 
culminated on 18 September in the battle of Montgomery, but by mid-October of the 
brigade of 650-800 there remained just 300 foot and 50 horse. Notwithstanding Sir 
Thomas's understandable special pleading to London for reinforcements - in 
October he asked for 500 Scots infantry from the Earl of Leven's army - his brigade 
appears somewhat to have regained strength into winter 1644-5. In November the 
regiment of foot newly raised in Montgomeryshire under Colonel Sir John Price was 
issued with 340 muskets, and by January 1645 Myddelton could muster at least 235 
horse and dragoons.186                                                          
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 Sir Thomas in the meantime had continued to cooperate with his colleagues in 
Shropshire, especially Mytton at Oswestry. In late October 1644, together they 
mounted an ambitious raid upon the Royalist garrison at Ruthin in Denbighshire, 
while Myddelton's garrisons at Montgomery and the Red Castle (today Powis 
Castle, near Welshpool) opened a new front in western Shropshire; a foray from the 
Red Castle in mid-October seems to have caused the Royalists briefly to abandon 
their new outpost at Lea, near Bishop's Castle.187 But the withdrawal of Myddelton's 
brigade significantly weakened the garrisons of Oswestry and also Wem, from 
where on 23 August 1644 Royalist spies reported there were 500 foot and four 
troops of horse.188 Responding to appeals from the committee at Wem and the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms to send reinforcements to Shropshire, during 
September Sir William Brereton posted four companies of Cheshire Foot to Wem, 
whose advance parties helped on 8 September to capture the important Royalist 
stronghold of Moreton Corbet Castle.189 Not only was Brereton's army a reliable 
source of timely reinforcements, by the secondment or transfer of a number of 
officers it also provided the Shropshire forces with experienced leadership. Captain 
Lord Colvill (or 'Calvin'), for one, jointly led the attack on Moreton Corbet. In 1645 
he held a subordinate command at the capture of Shrewsbury, and from June 
governed the garrison at Broncroft Castle.190 Similarly, during 1645 Francis Spicer 
was first a company captain of Cheshire Foot posted to Shropshire, and later 
became the governor of Lilleshall garrison.191   
 Cavalry and infantry from Cheshire and Staffordshire as auxiliaries under 
Brereton's direction formed more than half of the around 1,200-strong task force 
which captured Shrewsbury on 22 February 1645. In January, the committee at Wem 
had courted Brereton for substantial reinforcements, in part to minimise their 
reliance on Mytton's forces at Oswestry. Whether by accident or design, in the event 
only a few of Mytton's horsemen joined in the Shrewsbury operation.192 On 26                                                         
187 CSPD, 1644-1645, pp. 80-1; The Perfect Occurrences of Parliament And Chief Collections of 
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manner of the Taking of the Towne and Castle of Shrewsbury (1645), p. 3. 
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February Brereton entered the county town with another three companies, 
increasing the number of Cheshire Foot deployed in Shropshire to nearly 600.193 
With 17 companies of Staffordshire and Cheshire infantry still there, towards the 
end of March Brereton also sent three auxiliary regiments of cavalry into 
Shropshire, primarily to assist operations against High Ercall Hall. Among them 
were the nine troops of Lord Fairfax’s Yorkshire Horse deployed in Shropshire 
during April.194 With the Staffordshire Foot becoming mutinous, by the end of April 
1645 the committee at Shrewsbury had released most of their auxiliaries, except for 
one or two companies from Staffordshire and four from Cheshire.195 By then the 
committee had raised several new companies - including one from Warwickshire - 
in furtherance of their expansion of the Shropshire forces under their own 
command, the policy of engrossment of the 'militia' criticised by Mytton (Table 6, 
overleaf).196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regiments of Horse and Dragoons 
Colonel Thomas Mytton's Horse (1643) 
Colonel Thomas Mytton's Dragoons (1643) 
Colonel Richard Powell's Horse (1644) 
Colonel Thomas Hunt's Horse (1644) 
Colonel Andrew Lloyd's Horse (1645) 
Colonel Samuel More's Horse (1645) 
Regiments of Foot 
Colonel Thomas Mytton's Foot (1643) 
Colonel Thomas Hunt's Foot (1645) 
Colonel Andrew Lloyd's Foot (1645) 
Colonel Humphrey Mackworth's Foot (1645) 
Colonel Roger Pope's Foot (1645) 
 
Table 6: Parliamentarian regiments raised by local commanders (with date). 
 
 In October 1644 Thomas Hunt had received a colonelcy from the Earl of Essex to 
raise a regiment of horse in Shropshire, and both Humphrey Mackworth and 
Andrew Lloyd were colonels when Shrewsbury was taken. If not held beforehand,                                                         
193 LBWB, I, pp. 44-5, 52-4. 
194 Tibbutt, Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke, p. 477; LBWB, I, pp. 132-3, 249, 265, 395. 
195 LBWB, I, pp. 291, 303, 324-5. 
196 Ibid., pp. 281-2, 303. 
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both colonelcies may have resulted from discussions by the Committee of Both 
Kingdoms on 18 January 1645 of plans for raising forces in Shropshire, which were 
referred as proposals to the Earl of Essex, still then lord general.197 As colonels the 
Shropshire committeemen raised several regiments and troops. Hunt was colonel 
also of a regiment of foot, in which one George Williams was commissioned a 
company captain on 1 July 1645.198 Lloyd commanded a regiment of horse - 
reported as 300 strong at Stokesay in June - and a regiment of foot, companies from 
which garrisoned Bridgnorth during 1646.199 Mackworth's Foot seems to have been 
a militia regiment recruited in and around the county town; from 2 April 1645 
Captain William King commanded one of its five companies, 'of townsmen in this 
garrison of Shrewsbury'.200 Colonel Samuel More raised some horse, and his 
troopers are recorded serving about Chester in November 1645.201 The county 
committee may also have authorised the raising of independent companies. It was 
the committee at Shrewsbury collectively, rather than a named colonel, who on 1 
March 1645 commissioned Samuel Farrington captain of 'a company of foot soldiers 
in this county of Salop'.202 The Shropshire forces also included at least one 
independent body of horsemen, an amalgamated troop of supernumerary officers 
known as 'reformadoes'. They fought at Stokesay in June 1645, and garrisoned 
Dawley Castle that December.203 
 Elements of Mackworth's, Lloyd's and Hunt's regiments were reported in action 
during 1645 at, for instance, Stokesay in June and during December at the siege of 
Chester.204 However, regimental distinction probably meant little in practice, 
because the Shropshire forces usually operated as individual companies and troops, 
dispersed to garrison duty and brought together only for particular tasks. For 
example, the task force sent from Shrewsbury in mid-June against the Royalist 
outpost at Morville Hall was reported as 13 companies of foot and five troops of 
horse, the infantry led by Colonel Reinking, the cavalry brigaded under the 
command of Colonel Walter Prince (son of the Royalist Sir Richard Prince of                                                         
197 SA, 366/179; CSPD, 1644-1645, p. 259. 
198 SA, 366/1. 
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Shrewsbury).205 Neither officer appears to have had his own regiment, both serving 
instead as field commanders to whom the county committee could delegate 
leadership.   
 As a result of their enlargement and reorganisation by the county committee, the 
Shropshire forces by later spring 1645 could secure their garrisons and also draw 
into the field a brigade-size body numbering 1,000 or so. Around 25 April, 900 horse 
and foot were deployed against a suspected Royalist advance towards Shrewsbury, 
and the Parliamentarian brigade victorious near Stokesay on 8 June reportedly was 
of similar size.206 The Royalists numbered the Parliamentarians beaten at High 
Ercall on 5 July as 500 horse and 600 foot.207  
 One of Colonel Mytton's officers reported of the defeat at High Ercall that only 
the Oswestry Horse had put up a fight, indicating the partisanship that began to 
cloud collaborative operations between Mytton's and the committee's soldiers. The 
London newsbook carrying the officer's letter also reported disputes between the 
'Oswestry forces' and the 'Salop men' engaged in the recent siege of Shrawardine 
Castle: 'these divisions amongst our selves are not good', the editor concluded, 'I 
would all the soldiery in England would [look] to Sir Thomas Fairfax['s] [New 
Model] army for a pattern who being united in affection, we see how they 
conquer'.208 The Shropshire forces stayed divided, however, for in June 1645 Mytton 
succeeded Sir Thomas Myddelton as commander-in-chief for North Wales, and the 
ambiguous status of the Oswestry garrison, as part of the Shropshire forces but also 
under Mytton's independent command, became apparent. As with the Earl of 
Denbigh's Foot, this situation encouraged the county committee's proclivity to 
neglect those units not under its direct control. Consequently, on 22 July the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms sent terse instructions to Shrewsbury, for the 
Oswestry garrison to be strengthened and paid the same as the rest of the 
Shropshire forces. Nonetheless, in February 1646 Mytton reported to London that 
the county committee had instead left his men unpaid for almost six months.209 In 
the interim Mytton had exacerbated the fractious relationship with his erstwhile                                                         
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colleagues by poaching men from the committee's units. In early November 1645, 
two officers offered promotion in the infantry regiment recently raised by Mytton's 
son-in-law Colonel Roger Pope had defected with their companies from 
Shrewsbury to Oswestry. Furthermore, a month later the committee complained to 
Sir William Brereton that many of their men were 'drawn away' by Mytton's 
officers. As well as Pope's Foot, the regiments under Mytton's direct command at 
this time were his own horse and foot - in February 1646 the foot numbered 250 at 
Oswestry - and Colonel Powell's Horse.210 In addition, Mytton could call upon the 
remainder of Myddelton's old command in Montgomeryshire. At the leaguer, or 
besieging encampments, before Chester in early November, clear distinction was 
made between Mytton's 350 horse and 300 foot, and the 500 horse and 350 foot of 
the committee of Shropshire serving as auxiliaries in Brereton's army. This 
deployment marked the impressive overall expansion of the Shropshire forces 
during 1645, and also the end of their reliance on auxiliaries - a role that they in turn 
could now perform for Brereton.211  
 By Christmas 1645 the number of the county committee's soldiers before Chester 
had fallen to 350 foot and 150 horse.212 By early spring 1646 the Shropshire forces 
were concentrated to reduce the county's remaining Royalist garrisons, although in 
March some horse and foot were detached to Sir William Brereton's forces besieging 
Lichfield.213 During April, the besiegers of Bridgnorth Castle reportedly numbered 
700, while later that month 200 Shropshire Foot joined Colonel John Birch's force 
investing Ludlow.214 By June, as the war in England petered out, elements of the 
Shropshire forces had joined Major-General Whalley's army besieging Worcester.215  
Disbandment and the Second Civil War, 1646-8 
As the siege of Ludlow, the last military operation of the First Civil War in 
Shropshire, drew to a negotiated conclusion, in the third week of May 1646 the 
committee at Shrewsbury was preparing to demobilise around half of their forces.                                                         
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Because of the difficulties of maintaining pay and providing for arrears, they 
planned to disband 500 foot soldiers and several troops of horse.216 Accordingly, on 
11 July Parliament authorised the disbandment of the Shropshire forces except for 
400 foot and a 60-strong troop of horse (plus officers), a decision ratified by an 
ordinance passed on 13 August.217 On 19 February 1647 the standing county forces 
comprised the horse troop and the remaining garrison companies at Shrewsbury 
and Ludlow. Six days later, Parliament further approved the disbandment of the 
remaining foot, except for a 100-strong company based at Shrewsbury Castle as the 
county's sole garrison.218 This reduction of the infantry to a cadre appears to have 
been achieved, because early the following June the county committee for safety's 
hurried precautionary military response to the potentially destabilising news that 
King Charles had been taken into army custody involved just the county troop, the 
garrison of Shrewsbury Castle and a detachment at Ludlow. In addition, a rather 
apathetic town militia of four companies under local captains was raised at 
Shrewsbury that summer.219  
 How was demobilisation achieved? There were widespread mutinies in 
Parliament's provincial forces across England and Wales during 1646 and 1647 
engendered by soldiers' grievances about disbandment, especially over pay and also 
indemnity against civil prosecution for wartime acts.220 Concerted rank and file 
mutinies did occur in the Shropshire region. On 27 March 1647, Samuel Wood, 
steward of Sir John Trevor's estate at Trevalyn in east Denbighshire, reported how 
three companies of Colonel Pope's Foot had recently occupied nearby Wrexham. 
Demanding their pay and a share of the spoils from recent victories in North Wales, 
the soldiers had seized several officers including Major Sadler (who as a captain had 
left the committee's employ at Shrewsbury in November 1645) and had fired upon 
others, including Mytton himself.221 Similarly in Montgomeryshire, in early May 300 
soldiers gathered at Welshpool and forced the issue of their arrears by holding 
several local committeemen and a tax collector hostage until their demands were 
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met.222 Although it cannot be certain that disbandment in Shropshire proceeded 
without discontent, there appears no evidence of comparably mutinous action by 
the Shropshire forces.223 The prompt action taken by the county committee to 
commence disbandment before hostilities had ended may have forestalled the worst 
of the soldierly discontent experienced elsewhere. Making what appears to have 
been judicious use of revenue to provide acceptable remuneration, already by 
September 1646 the committee had disbanded many soldiers and settled their 
pay.224 Moreover, other soldiers found alternative employment. On 1 March 1647 
Major Anthony Hungerford agreed a contract with the Committee of Both 
Kingdoms to raise a regiment of foot for service in Ireland.225 Hungerford had 
served with distinction in Shropshire, as a captain in the Earl of Denbigh's Foot and 
successively as governor of two garrisons, and in autumn 1646 was appointed major 
of the four standing companies.226 With the county committee's support Hungerford 
soon recruited 600 men, mostly from the disbanding units and ex-soldiers of 
Shropshire, and his regiment crossed from Chester to Dublin in late April/early 
May, with a further company at least sailing in June.227 While Hungerford's 
regiment re-employed many foot soldiers, some of the Shropshire Horse may have 
enlisted in a new, 600-strong regular regiment commanded by Colonel Needham, 
formerly the governor of Leicester, and raised in April 1647 from the disbanding 
horsemen of Shropshire, Cheshire and several Midland counties.228 
 The renewed hostilities in 1648 saw a hurried partial expansion of the Shropshire 
forces, a necessary volte-face from the policy of disbandment of the previous two 
years. Although they were little more than a policing force, the county committee's 
soldiers managed to suppress the ill-coordinated Royalist insurrections attempted 
that summer. The hard-tasked County Troop saw most service, supported by a 
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second troop of around 120 horsemen raised hurriedly in July.229 Nonetheless, 
Colonel Humphrey Mackworth deployed just 80 troopers - 'all the horse of the 
county that could be got' - to disperse the most threatening Royalist gathering of the 
summer, attempted at Wattlesborough Heath on the night of 1/2 August. 
Mackworth had few foot soldiers and later sought Parliament's sanction and 
funding to expand his garrison at Shrewsbury to three regular companies.230 In 
attempting to reestablish the militia after the disintegration of the Royalist Trained 
Bands, in early June 1648 the county committee had ordered across Shropshire the 
compilation of rolls listing male householders and their sons and servants eligible 
for militia service, in order 'that the said county may be put speedily in a posture of 
defence of horse and foot'.231 But by mid-July the implementation of this previously 
long-delayed plan to raise 1,200 foot had faltered, hindered by public apathy and 
political infighting among the committee for the militia.232 The scanty evidence in 
constables' accounts of militia-related activity suggests that a patchy response in 
some parts of the shire may have accounted for those volunteers (the 'well affected 
of the county') who gathered at Wem under Colonel Andrew Lloyd's leadership at 
the height of the emergency in late July and early August 1648.233 Indeed, on 7 
August his fellow committeemen appointed Lloyd to raise and command a 
regiment of foot in Shropshire, thereby reviving the plan in hand to reconstitute the 
county militia.234 
Conclusions 
In Shropshire, as elsewhere in England and Wales during the Civil Wars, both sides 
recruited their forces in similar ways, by the enlistment of volunteers and 
conscripts, and by the interchange of prisoners of war and deserters. Many units 
that served in Shropshire from 1642 to 1648 have been named here, but others may 
remain to be identified. Regular soldiers predominated, but both sides also 
deployed irregular militias. Many of the opposing leaders among the county gentry 
raised units in Shropshire, although not all were of regimental size. These and units                                                         
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from elsewhere posted to the county recruited in Shropshire, activity that must have 
entailed the widespread militarisation of the county's male population. 
 Given the limitations of the known sources, the reconstruction of orders of battle 
and of overall numbers remains problematic. On the Parliamentarian side, however, 
it can be suggested that during 1644 the Shropshire forces, not counting auxiliaries, 
numbered 700-1,000 men, and (excluding Colonel Mytton's units) during 1645 and 
into 1646 increased to around 1,900. The largest of the small field armies to see 
action in Shropshire were Lord Capel's 3,000 Royalists engaged around Wem in 
October 1643, and the Earl of Denbigh's 3,500-4,000 Parliamentarians brought 
together briefly in early July 1644. Both armies included substantial reinforcements 
from further afield, and throughout the First Civil War in Shropshire outsider or 
auxiliary forces - often outnumbering the local units - played key supportive roles. 
Units of the Royalist regional armies of Lord Capel and later Prince Rupert were 
based in Shropshire and sustained the local war effort. On the other hand, local 
Royalist forces were somewhat diminished by the departure of officers and units 
serving elsewhere. This was not, however, a one-way process: the Prince of Wales's 
Lifeguard, for example, returned to Shropshire in autumn 1643 and remained there. 
Among the Parliamentarian auxiliaries, detachments from Sir William Brereton's 
army played a vital role in their repeated and often long-standing deployments to 
Shropshire. After what appears to have been the relative success of the county 
committee's policy of disbandment after the First Civil War, in 1648 the small 
Parliamentary county force and some volunteers were able to suppress piecemeal 
the local Royalist insurrections, largely because their opponents failed to coordinate 
and concentrate their manpower. 
 Having examined in detail the organisation of the armed forces in Shropshire, 
their funding will now be considered, as part of a wider analysis of the financial 
aspects of war effort. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
Financing the War Effort 
The English Civil Wars were fought at a time when the cost of waging war had 
increased exponentially during the previous 100 years, and would continue to rise 
for the remainder of the seventeenth century. With costs outstripping revenue, 
financing war effort could result in national indebtedness.1 In 1638, for example, the 
estimated cost of raising and maintaining a 40,000-strong English army for a one-
year campaign against the Scots was £900,000 - almost double Charles I's annual 
crown revenues.2 Ten years later, even if Parliament's monthly £60,000 assessment 
had been collected in full across England and Wales, it would have barely covered 
the ongoing costs of the 24,000-strong standing army and regional garrisons.3 The 
financial burden of civil war was immense because both sides exploited the same 
national economy. As an Essex churchman prophesied in a tract published in 1642: 
'civil war exhausts the exchequer, or brings the treasures or riches of the land into 
an hectic fever, being like a vessel tapped at both ends, which quickly runs out'.4 
Financing war effort, in Morrill's phrase, set the kingdom on a 'fiscal treadmill', as 
both sides sought sustainable alternatives to indiscriminately living off the land.5 
During 1642 the forces of King and Parliament were funded by more or less 
voluntary contributions. During 1643 more systematic means of securing revenue 
were put in place, including general taxation, excise and sequestration of enemy 
assets. Westminster led the way, by enacting a series of fiscal ordinances that 
created a legal framework (albeit of questionable constitutional validity) to finance 
the Parliamentarian war effort in the longer-term. 
 Money was required to finance vital aspects of war effort, including great 
expenditure on armaments bought from suppliers including local craftsmen and 
arms dealers. At Shrewsbury in February 1644, for instance, the local carpenter                                                         
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George Nicholls received £2 for working on gun carriages; meanwhile in London 
550 firearms and 500 swords purchased on the arms market for Sir Thomas 
Myddelton cost £640.6 Military wages were the largest and least sustainable charge, 
with few soldiers on either side being paid regularly or in full; a case in point being 
Sir Michael Ernle's complaint to Prince Rupert in October 1644, that despite the near 
mutinous discontent over pay of four Royalist regiments at Shrewsbury, he 'could 
get nothing settled nor paid for the subsistence of this garrison'.7 As examples of the 
wages of common foot soldiers, Royalists at Ludlow in 1643 were paid 6d daily, 
while in 1645-6 Parliamentarians based around Shrewsbury fared slightly better, 
receiving 4s per week.8 Parliamentarian captains of foot like John Brett expected 15s 
per day, but Brett actually received less than one third of his pay in 1644 and 1645 
while serving in Shropshire and later claimed arrears of £172.9 Like Brett, at the end 
of the First Civil War the generality of Parliament's soldiers were due large amounts 
of back pay, to the extent that by spring 1647 total army arrears may have amounted 
to £2,800,000.10 Senior officers were proportionately better off, but they too accrued 
large deficits. Despite Sir Francis Ottley's governorship of Royalist Shrewsbury 
commanding a weekly salary of £20, he received just £326, less than a quarter, 
during the 17 months from October 1642 to March 1644.11 
 Chapter one touched on the financial machinery of both sides, in terms of 
administrative bodies and personnel. The present chapter more fully examines the 
financing of war effort in Shropshire, and the various expedient and more 
systematic methods of gathering revenue. Looting and the taking of 'free quarters' 
(whereby soldiers were compulsorily billeted with civilians) served to subsidise the 
combatants, and these practices are given due attention here in a separate section. 
Due to the lack of extant financial records, more will be said of the methods used to 
acquire money than of the overall sums demanded, raised and disbursed. 
The Royalists 
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The Royalist cause in Shropshire during the First Civil War is unlikely to have 
received direct financial support from the exchequer at Oxford. According to one of 
his officers, when Lord Capel took command at Shrewsbury in March 1643 he did 
so without bringing any money from the Royalist capital.12 Prince Maurice similarly 
arrived at Worcester in January 1645 without a war chest, and so immediately 
demanded a monthly £100 subscription for subsistence from Shropshire and the 
other counties of his new command.13 On the other hand, Shropshire probably 
made few significant payments to the Royalist centre after early 1643.14 Instead, 
funds gathered by the Royalist administration sustained an agreed number of 
soldiers based there and paid for the fortification of their garrisons. Greater 
numbers of troops, however, magnified the financial strain. As Sir Michael Ernle 
found in early January 1645, the enlarged military establishment that he considered 
essential was to 'the gentlemen of the county' a force 'they really say they will not 
maintain'.15 All that can be said about any funding for the short-lived Royalist 
insurgency in Shropshire during summer 1648 is that it came from the pockets of 
activists and from sympathisers proffering clandestine backing. 
 Concentrating on the First Civil War, then, and adopting a thematic approach, 
the main sources of Royalist revenues will be examined in turn, beginning with the 
recourse first made to donations and loans. 
Gifts, loans and subscriptions 
King Charles's three-week stay in Shropshire during September and October 1642 
allowed time and opportunity to finance an army. Denied money by Parliamentary 
means, the King relied on benefaction and also expediency, including the 
contrivance of summoning Catholics and other Recusants in Shropshire and 
Staffordshire to pay their annual fines two or three years in advance, thereby 
generating almost £5,000 within 12 days. Charles meanwhile received cash in 
exchange for honours awarded to his wealthy supporters in Shropshire, among 
them Sir Richard Newport, who paid £6,000 for his elevation to the peerage, and Sir 
Thomas Lister of Rowton Castle, who reputedly gave a purse of gold coin for his 
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knighthood on 1 October.16 Local supporters and those further afield were 
encouraged to gift or loan cash and silver plate. Individual subscriptions were 
requested of Shropshire's gentry, among them Humphrey Walcot who was 
summoned to lend £5,000. How much Walcot paid is unknown but on 9 October he 
gave a warhorse and arms to Prince Rupert, for donations of war matériel were as 
acceptable as cash.17 A bequest of plate arrived from the University of Oxford, and 
other public donations included cash and part of the corporation silver proffered by 
the aldermen of Ludlow, transported to Shrewsbury at a cost of 13s and dutifully 
presented to the King by Bailiff Colbatch.18 Meanwhile, after presenting the royal 
entourage with a shared gratuity of almost £20 upon their arrival in town, 
Shrewsbury's corporation set about levying public subscriptions for the King, 
although on 28 September the aldermen permitted a one-week extension, 'because 
of the weak estate of the town'.19 Shrewsbury Grammar School loaned £600 to the 
King on 11 October.20  
 As a result of warrants circulated on 22 September 1642 by High Sheriff John 
Weld to Shropshire's high constables, summoning them to encourage donations 
from among the gentry, clergy and freeholders, what became, in effect, a fund-
raising rally was held on the riverside meadows at Shrewsbury on the 28th.21 There, 
Charles I spoke of undertaking a financial commitment alongside his loyal subjects 
in order to combat the rebellion. After promising to expend his personal financial 
reserves, the King urged the gathering to 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 Clarendon, History, II, pp. 365-7; Owen and Blakeway, Shrewsbury, I, p. 423. 
17 J.R. Burton (ed.), ‘The Sequestration Papers of Humphrey Walcot’, TSANHS, 3rd Series, V  
(1905), pp. 314-15. 
18 Clarendon, History, II, p. 364; SA, LB8/1/162, f. 3; SA, LB/Fiche 4677. 
19 SA, 3365/586, f. 1; SA, 6001/290, f. 133. 
20 Anon, A History of Shrewsbury School (Shrewsbury and London, 1889), p. 105. 
21 SRO, P593/P8/1/4, warrant to the high constables of Bradford hundred. 
not suffer so good a cause to be lost, for want of supplying me with that which 
will be taken from you by those who pursue me with this violence. And whilst 
these ill men sacrifice their money, plate and utmost industry to destroy the 
commonwealth  be you no less liberal to preserve it  
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The means of obtaining the anticipated donations were deferred to the sheriff and 
commissioners of array, as perhaps their first task as wartime financial officials.22 
 One eyewitness to the events at the Gay Meadow commented 'there was no 
money or plate parted with that I did see', but on 18 October another correspondent 
noted the 'abundance' of plate arriving at Shrewsbury.23 By then a royal mint was 
operating there under the supervision of Sir Thomas Bushell, a wealthy 
entrepreneur and superintendent of the mint and of the royal mines in Wales, who 
had overseen the transfer of plant and tooling from Aberystwyth. Until it was 
relocated to Oxford in January 1643 the Shrewsbury mint converted plate into silver 
coinage at up to £1,000 per week, the first supply arriving with the army on 21 
October when the common soldiers each received a half crown (30d).24 Given the 
sums raised by these initiatives and seized from neutralists and Parliament's 
supporters, according to Clarendon at this time the Royalist field army usually 
received weekly pay and did not go unpaid beyond a fortnight.25 
 Loans and gifts remained the mainstay of Shropshire's financial contribution to 
the Royalist war effort into winter 1642-3, when Sir Vincent Corbet's Dragoon 
Regiment was at first funded by public subscription.26 Further demands for 
individual donations were made as the war intensified. In April 1643, Lord Capel 
ordered the identification of persons deemed able to fund the Royalist cause, and it 
was probably the sum of this initiative that in late June encouraged King Charles to 
write of his generously 'well-affected subjects of the gentry of Salop'.27 Further loans 
were demanded from Oxford in early 1644 in another attempt to exploit the King's 
supporters. A device agreed by the Royalist parliament to avert more widespread 
taxation, from mid-February standard letters demanding individual loans 
proportionate to wealth were sent under cover of the privy seal to Royalist gentry 
across England and Wales. Among Shropshire's recipients were one Mr Mitton of                                                         
22 Rushworth, Historical Collections, V, p. 23. 
23 Some Late Occurrences in Shropshire and Devonshire (1642), p. 4; The true copie of a letter 
importing divers passages of high and dangerous consequence. Written by one Master Tempest a 
grand recusant, to his brother master John Tempest, likewise a papist and an officer in the Kings army 
(1642), p. 5. 
24 Letter [...] by one Master Tempest, p. 5; R. Lloyd Kenyon, ‘History of the Shrewsbury Mint’, 
TSANHS, 2nd Series, X (1898), pp. 251-72. 
25 Clarendon, History, II, p. 373. 
26 'Ottley Papers' (1895), pp. 254-6. 
27 Ibid., p. 312; NLW, Llanfair-Brynodol Letters, 54. 
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Shipton, summoned to pay £30, and Humphrey Walcot, who by May had paid £150 
in instalments.28 The privy seal letter subscription was intended to raise £100,000 in 
coin and plate to finance the Oxford-based field army during the forthcoming 
campaigning season, but lobbying on his behalf ensured that instead Prince Rupert 
was allocated most of the money raised from Shropshire and the six counties of 
North Wales.29  Accordingly, in a petition to King Charles in later June 1644 the 
sheriff and certain Shropshire gentry requested the further retention of privy seal 
loan money in order to lessen the burden of military taxation.30 Committed 
Royalists also contributed what they could in other ways to finance the war effort. 
Among them was Captain Edward Lloyd, who claimed he spent £800 in raising and 
equipping a troop each of horse and dragoons.31  
Sequestration 
The next step from taking donations from supporters was to seize the assets of 
opponents and their sympathisers. Sequestered property could be sold or rented out 
to generate income, but King Charles was at first reluctant to sanction the 
appropriation of his adversaries' wealth without robust legal justification.32 In 
March 1643, however, Parliament forced the issue by enacting an ordinance 
regulating the sequestration of their antagonists, and the following June the King 
and his Council of War at Oxford agreed a similar policy that Royalists in the shires 
soon formally adopted.33  
 Hutton found that the scarcity of evidence left Royalist sequestration 'shadowy', 
and questions regarding its effectiveness 'unanswerable'.34 The evidence from 
Shropshire, although tending to those conclusions, does suggest, however, that 
Royalist finances benefitted by the systematic exploitation of enemy assets. It was 
not long after the King had departed Shropshire that in later 1642 the Royalist 
leadership at Shrewsbury sought his approval, to 'seize upon the goods and chattels                                                         
28 HMC, Tenth Report, Appendix Part IV, p. 407; Burton, 'Sequestration Papers of Humphrey 
Walcot’, pp. 315-16. 
29 Hutton, War Effort, pp. 92, 135; BRL, Additional Mss 18981, ff. 113-14, 204; Anon., 
'Correspondence of Archbishop Williams', Archaeologica Cambrensis, 4th Series, I (1870), pp. 
64-5.  
30 CSPD, 1644, pp. 282-3. 
31 NLW, Sweeney Hall Mss A4 (Vol. II), f. 93, Captain Lloyd's narrative. 
32 Hutton, War Effort, p. 89; Morrill, Revolt, p. 113. 
33 Engberg, 'Royalist Finances', pp. 92-3. 
34 Hutton, War Effort, p. 90. 
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of such persons his majesty hath deemed traitorous'.35 Consequently, Sir John 
Corbet was among several Parliamentarian MPs whose restitution was the subject 
of a Commons debate on 5 April 1643, 'for the losses they have sustained by the 
King's forces, by having their estates and goods violently taken from them'.36 By 
way of a proclamation printed at Shrewsbury, two days before Lord Capel had 
announced his approval of the sequestration of 'disaffected persons', provided that 
due process was followed.37 Accordingly, by July Capel was encouraging his 
subordinates to use sequestration as the preferred means of funding Royalist forces 
in the region.38 In Shropshire meanwhile the estates of enemy exiles were being 
sequestrated, while suspected Parliamentarian sympathisers were made to pay 
Royalist taxes.39   
 By later 1643 Royalist sequestration was better organised, a development of their 
fiscal apparatus seen in the example of Lord Capel’s orders concerning Thomas 
Mytton’s assets.40 That spring the Royalist military had seized Mytton's chattels 
including his livestock, an act indistinguishable from plundering. By November, 
however, a commission sitting at Shrewsbury was managing sequestration more 
systematically, including the collection of rental from Mytton’s estates. Samuel 
More, Mytton's fellow committeeman, later recollected that by early 1644 his 
family's lands in south Shropshire had been similarly appropriated by the 
Royalists.41 The orders given on 23 March 1644 by a Shrewsbury-based commission, 
instructing the receivers of sequestered wealth from across Shropshire to submit 
accounts for audit and directly to pay the proceeds to the commission, demonstrate 
the ongoing importance of Royalist sequestration and the extent of the 
administrative machinery.42 Sequestration remained of sufficient value to the 
Royalists in Shropshire and adjacent counties into early 1645 that it was proposed as 
a prime source of funding for the Marcher Association under the commissioners' 
                                                        
35 SA, 6000/13293. 
36 JHC, III, p. 31. 
37 Arthur Lord Capell Lieutenant Generall under the Prince His Highnesse of His Majesties forces, in 
the counties of Worcester, Salop, and Chester, and the six northern counties of Wales. To all 
commanders, officers, and souldiers, and to all other His Majesties subjects whatsoever (1643). 
38 NLW, Crosse of Shaw Hill Mss, 1123; WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 22. 
39 'Ottley Papers' (1895), pp. 298-9, 309, 353-4. 
40 NAM, 8812-63, ff. 1-2. 
41 HMC, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath, I, p. 36. 
42 SA, 3365/2711, f. 26. 
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control.43 At the local level, in May 1645 the Royalist leadership at Bridgnorth 
directed that further work on the town's fortifications should be funded from 
sequestration.44 
Taxation 
In Shropshire Royalist taxation assumed three forms. Firstly, regular payments and 
irregular impositions were levied in the fashion of the pre-war local rates. Secondly, 
monthly contribution was levied across the shire. The third instrument, excise duty, 
can briefly be dealt with first. County commissions to levy duty on certain 'wares 
and commodities' were appointed at Oxford from mid-April 1644. Accordingly, in 
early May Edward Baldwin of Diddlebury, James Lacon of West Coppice and 
Richard Studeley of Shrewsbury were appointed as the superintending 
commissioners for the excise in Shropshire.45 The reach of the Royalist excise 
nationally appears to have been patchy and its yield mediocre, but, as in Shropshire, 
there is little evidence upon which to base these conclusions.46 However, the levy in 
Shropshire was not wholly a dead letter; in early 1645 half of excise revenue was to 
be diverted to the Marcher Association, and the excise commission for Shropshire 
was reappointed that March.47 
 Local rates were levied for the wages and upkeep of soldiers in Royalist service. 
At Bridgnorth, the aldermen set lewns for the townsfolk to pay the local trained 
bandsmen on duty elsewhere. A lewn for £20 was laid on 26 December 1642, and 
another agreed on 25 March 1643.48 Ludlow's inhabitants claimed to have spent 
almost £367 on the town's militiamen during 1642/3.49 Because voluntary 
subscriptions proved insufficient to finance Sir Vincent Corbet's Dragoons - as one 
Royalist lamented to Sir Francis Ottley in January 1643, would-be contributors 
tended to 'say much and do nothing' - in addition each allotment was charged a 
proportionate allocation.50 Bridgnorth as one allotment had to provide nine 
dragoons, 'to be maintained at the general charge of the town', towards which the 
                                                        
43 Townsend, Diary, II, p. 193; BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [second part], f. 105. 
44 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
45 BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [second part], ff. 49, 59. 
46 Engberg, 'Royalist Finances', pp. 94-5; Hutton, War Effort, p. 93. 
47 BDL, Dugdale Mss 19 [second part], ff. 105, 110. 
48 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
49 SA, LB7/2105. 
50 'Ottley Papers' (1894), p. 64. 
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corporation laid a lewn for £20 on 25 January 1643.51 In a further example of ad-hoc 
taxation by allotments, in March 1643 a rate of 40s per allotment to pay for 
ammunition was levied in the southerly hundreds of Overs and Munslow.52  
 Ongoing levies to finance fortifications imposed long-term fiscal demands on the 
inhabitants of the Royalist garrison towns. As early as August 1642 the corporation 
of Bridgnorth had set a lewn for £20 to improve the town defences, and the 
following November Shrewsbury's corporation imposed a rate of £250 for similar 
measures.53 By late 1644, nearly £2,800 (at least) in public assessments had been 
raised to fund the fortification of the county town.54 Similarly at Ludlow, during 
June 1644 114 townsfolk contributed to an assessment ordered by Sir Michael 
Woodhouse to fund further strengthening of the town walls.55 Other 
supernumerary charges also had to be met. Sometime in later 1644 Ludlow's 
inhabitants complained of the costs of distributing military warrants and of 
providing coal and candles for the garrison.56 In a petition to the governor Sir 
Michael Ernle dated 12 October 1644, Shrewsbury's aldermen alike complained that 
after paying for fortifications, for the purchase of eight cannon and towards military 
taxes and privy seal loans, 'the whole revenue of the town would not pay the coals 
and candles of the sentries'.57 Previous levies at Shrewsbury had included rates that 
raised £550 for Lord Capel in 1643, and £100 as a gift welcoming Prince Rupert in 
February 1644.58   In addition to ad hoc imposts, from early 1643 systematic military taxation was 
enforced in Royalist-controlled areas as a sustainable means of financing war effort. 
Levied first on Oxfordshire from late December 1642 as a weekly loan arrangement 
to pay for regiments of the field army, henceforth a weekly or monthly rate of 
contribution, in the form of a sweeping tax agreed between the military and civilian 
authorities, was to be collected in each shire to fund a commensurate number of 
soldiers based there.59 Accordingly, in early 1643 a monthly rate had been set in the                                                         
51 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
52 SA, LB7/2235. 
53 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated; SA, 6001/290, f. 135. 
54 SA, 3365/587, f. 1; SA, 3365/588, f. 4; SA, 3365/591, f. 1.  
55 SA, LB7/2250; SA, LB8/1/164, f. 8. 
56 SA, LB7/2319, unfoliated. 
57 SA, 6001/290, f. 144. 
58 SA, 3365/587, f. 2; SA, 3365/588, f. 2. 
59 Engberg, 'Royalist Finances', pp. 89-90; Morrill, Revolt, pp. 112-13 
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neighbouring Royalist counties of Worcestershire and Herefordshire, in January and 
February respectively, before contribution was demanded from Shropshire in late 
March.60 The inception of the tax on Lord Capel's arrival seems coincidental, for 
already by early March the commissioners of array were planning a county levy. 
Accordingly, on the 25th the corporation of Bridgnorth set a lewn for £46, 'charged 
to the town toward £4,500 for the defence of the country [county]'.61 Other evidence 
- of the petty constable of Halesowen (then an enclave of Shropshire lying within 
Worcestershire) who by June had failed three previous payments 'concerning the 
£4,500', and the £112 to be paid by the town of Ludlow in November as 'part of the 
£4,500 contribution' - confirms that Shropshire's monthly target for contribution 
during 1643 was £4,500, apportioned between the 100 allotments very much in the 
fashion of the ship money levies of the 1630s.62  
 Writing on 23 June 1643 to the Royalist commissioners in Caernarvonshire, King 
Charles endorsed 'the good example of our good subjects of our county of Salop' in 
raising 'competent monthly contribution'. And it may well have been the efficacy of 
Royalist taxation at this time that had provoked ten days previously a counterblast 
in a London newsbook, describing Shropshire's inhabitants as 'much embittered 
against the Lord Capel, for his excessive and unreasonable taxes and impositions'.63 
Later evidence suggests, however, that popular discontent and administrative 
neglect caused the payment of contribution, and indeed Royalist finances in general, 
markedly to decline in Shropshire during the two-month hiatus in high command 
between Capel's return to Oxford in December 1643 and Prince Rupert's arrival in 
February 1644. In the meantime Capel's 300-strong cavalry regiment remaining in 
Shropshire was funded only with great difficulty, by emergency subscriptions from 
loyal gentry and latterly out of his own pocket by the high sheriff.64 From 
Shrewsbury on 2 February 1644 Sir John Mennes wrote to Prince Rupert that many 
Royalist soldiers were unpaid and mutinous. 'Money', Mennes declared, 'is a thing 
                                                        
60 For Worcestershire, Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 21 Jan. 1643, p. 7; for Herefordshire, A Perfect 
Diurnall of the passages in Parliament, 30 Jan.-6 Feb. 1643, unpaginated. 
61 'Ottley Papers' (1895), p. 269; SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
62 'Ottley Papers' (1895), p. 329; SA, LB7/1932. 
63 NLW, Llanfair-Brynodol Letters, 54; Certaine Informations from Several Parts of the Kingdom, 
12-19 June 1643, p. 170. 
64 BDL, Firth Mss C6, f. 80. 
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not spoken of', grumbling that during his eleven-month posting to Shropshire he 
had been paid just £20.65 
 On arriving in the county Prince Rupert immediately set about reforming the 
contribution. A warrant to Ludlow's bailiffs dated 24 February 1644 signalled a 
more equitable approach: 'The great inequalities heretofore used in the assessing 
and collecting the payments of this county coming to our notion and knowledge 
occassioneth us to endeavour the prevention of having any payments or money 
raised [...] in that unequal way'.66 The Prince's intent, however, was more to broaden 
the reach of the tax. Henceforth contribution would be levied as a monthly penny 
rate in the pound, 'out of all men's estates, in which there can be no partiality or 
excuse', as Rupert reiterated in early April to the Royalist commissioners of 
neighbouring Montgomeryshire.67 During 1644, a 6d in the pound rate was levied in 
Shropshire from March to May, 4d from June to September, 6d in October and 
November, and 7d in December and into January 1645.68 Further evidence for 1645 
comes from Colonel Devillier's garrison at Caus Castle, which received contribution 
at the rate of 4d in February and March, and 6d in May and June.69 However, the 
monthly target of the county levy remains obscure. In 1644, the amount for March 
was £6,000, while monthly sums of £4,400 and £4,700 are also documented.70 But it 
remains uncertain whether these were totals for contribution, or were monthly 
targets embracing all revenue, including privy seal loans and sequestration. 
 Rupert's reforms shifted the focus of assessment from the allotments to 
individual townships. This required a countywide programme of reassessment by 
an increased number of parochial assessors.71 By the end of March 1644 there were 
142 in the town and liberties of Shrewsbury alone, while during 1644 the parish of 
Stockton had five assessors.72 Assessors were entrusted under oath to 'take the true 
values of all the lands, messauges and tenements, tithes and ecclesiastical livings [...] 
                                                        
65 BRL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 25. 
66 SA, LB/8/3/75. 
67 Order cited in G. Sandford (ed.), ‘Incidents in Montgomeryshire during, and also before 
and after, the Civil War in the time of Charles I, and during the Commonwealth’, Collections 
Historical and Archaeological relating to Montgomeryshire and its Borders, XIV (1881), p. 299. 
68 SA, LB/8/3/75; Townsend, Diary, II, p. 82; SA, 3365/224, unfoliated; SA, 3365/589, f. 3. 
69 HRO, CF61/20, ff. 569, 571, 573. 
70 SA, LB/8/3/75; CSPD, 1644, pp. 282-3. 
71 SA, LB/8/3/75; SA, 3365/2711, f. 25. 
72 SA, 3365/2711, f. 23; SA, P270/B/1/1, ff. 55-6. 
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as the same were really and indifferently worth and valued by the year three years 
since'.73 In the example of Battlefield, three miles north of Shrewsbury, this 
retrospective valuation amounted to £101 10s based on the assessed worth of 15 
inhabitants. Accordingly, at the 4d rate the township paid £1 13s 10d monthly in 
summer 1644, most by Pelham Corbet, who, assessed at £70, was taxed £1 3s 4d. 
Meanwhile the evaluation of the small village of Acton Scott was £299. There, the 
hall and seat of the local squire was rated at £60 (so paying £1 per month at the 4d 
levy), and the parsonage £40, with the remainder of the assessment charged to 15 
villagers, six of whom were classed as freeholders.74 In March 1644 the combined 
valuation of almost 400 inhabitants of eight parishes in northerly parts of Purslow 
hundred was £5,205, which would have yielded £130 monthly at the 6d rate.75 
 Instead of land, in urban areas personal income was taxed. Accordingly, the 
inhabitants of High Street and Old Fish Street at the heart of Shrewsbury were 
assessed on the basis of 'poundage and personal estate'.76 Appeals to the authorities 
during 1644 by some of their fellow townsfolk, most of whom were tradesmen, 
complained mostly of unfair assessment of personal estate expressed in money - as 
cash or investments, in goods and stock, or even tied to 'good debts'.77 The 
shoemaker John Betton, for one, remonstrated to the commissioners not against his 
assessment, calculated on 'ability both for his house and shop and for his personal 
estate', but against vindictive neighbours who alleged he had failed to declare an 
investment - a 'by estate of some moneys at interest'.78 
 Because a regular supply of food for soldiers and horses was just as important to 
the Royalists as cash flow, since Prince Rupert's overhaul of the tax (if not before) up 
to half of contribution could be paid in kind, in provisions or provender, at a set 
cash-equivalent rate. Thus in June, July and August 1644 together the township of 
Harlescott paid £2 18s 11d in cash and gave £3 1d worth of provisions towards 
contribution for those months of £7 11s 6d.79 The proviso allowing payment in cash                                                         
73 Townsend, Diary, II, p. 164. 
74 WSL, 350/40/5, unfoliated, transcript of 'An account of the pound rate of the township of 
Acton Scott'. 
75 SA, 1079/Box 13, Item 14, 'The upper end of Purslow hundred valuation of lands by a 
warrant of Prince Rupert, ann. 1643'. 
76 SA, 3365/224, unfoliated. 
77 SA, 3365/2711, ff. 1-16, 21. 
78 Ibid., f. 16. 
79 SA, 3365/224, unfoliated. 
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or kind ensured that the contribution reached far down the socio-economic scale, so 
those who were cash-poor gave produce instead. Two individuals with very modest 
land holdings in Purslow hundred who nonetheless paid contribution were Thomas 
Watkis of Moreswood, assessed at £1, and Nathaniel Matthews of Acton, assessed at 
£1 10s, who paid 6d and 9d respectively at the 6d monthly rate.80 Both were 
probably small freeholders, but tenants were also taxed, either in their own right or 
towards their landlord's assessment. When, in the autumn of 1646, Charles Bright, 
bailiff of the manor of Lydham, audited his tenants' rent arrears for the first time 
since 1642 he generously allowed eight between them a rebate of £22 for 
contribution payments they had made.81  
 Prince Rupert succeeded in reforming the reach and partiality of the contribution 
in Shropshire, but it remained an inefficient tax because it was administratively 
burdensome and its yield depended on the accumulation of a profusion of small 
payments. Money dribbled in, in an unpredictable way. The fullest extant set of 
accounts, for contribution paid in cash in parts of Shrewsbury and in 52 outlying 
townships from late September 1644 until shortly before the fall of the county town 
in February 1645, record 370 separate payments.82 The collectors of the township of 
Astley, for example made 21 payments, seven of which in October amounted to just 
£1 11s 9d, while nearby Hadnall paid on 27 occasions. Payments were inconsistent 
and variable. In rounded figures, monies received at Shrewsbury (towards a now 
unknown monthly target) amounted to £164 in October and just £104 in November. 
Contribution for December 1644 and January 1645 received by February came to 
£193, which with arrears from October and November amounted to £209. In October 
45 places paid, 34 in November, but just 22 in February. While some places, such as 
Acton Reynald and Grinshill, paid regularly on a monthly basis, many others did so 
sporadically - Great Hanwood, for example, only in October and January. The 
townships of Edgebold and Blackbirches each made their sole recorded payments in 
January 1645.  
 Achieving a consistent yield of contribution became all the more difficult in the 
face of local non-cooperation or forceful dissent. In December 1644, for instance, it 
was reported that inhabitants of Newport and Much Wenlock had refused warrants                                                         
80 SA, 1079/Box 13, Item 14, unfoliated. 
81 Ibid., Item 12, Bright's account book, unfoliated. 
82 SA, 3365/589, ff. 1-3. 
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to levy contribution and had arrested four civilian collectors.83 This partisan account 
of concerted tax refusal at this time is substantiated by Sir Lewis Kirke's report to 
Prince Rupert from Bridgnorth dated 22 February 1645, that the garrison there had 
received 'no contribution from the county these three months, nor like to receive 
any'.84 Those constables of Chirbury hundred who, from autumn 1644 until mid-
1645, provided contribution to Colonel Devillier's garrisons at Leigh Hall and later 
Caus Castle seem to have followed a calculated policy of hindrance. They 
accumulated substantial arrears but made sufficient timely payments in cash and 
provisions to avert Devillier's threats of punitive action against their constablewicks. 
The perceived indolence of the petty constables of Stockton, a hamlet five miles 
south-west of Leigh Hall, provoked the high constable to write to them in 
exasperation on 23 January 1645, that if they did not settle their accounts and bring 
in arrears, he would 'burn all the books and make you pay all anew'.85 Nonetheless, 
Devillier's account with Stockton ran substantial cash arrears into March. 
 The constables of Stockton personally delivered contribution to Devillier's 
garrisons, and it generally seems to have been the case in Shropshire that the 
Royalist military was not routinely involved in tax collection. This contrasts with 
the situation in the East Midlands for example, where Royalist officers routinely 
served as tax collectors - albeit in a region generally more administratively unstable 
for the Royalists than Shropshire.86 The record of contribution from the Shrewsbury 
area in 1644 and into 1645 shows that civilian collectors paid into the mayor's office, 
from where money was allotted to the military's receiving officer on a hand to 
mouth basis.87 Similarly, during 1644 the petty constables of townships owing 
contribution to Bridgnorth delivered their payments to the garrison, among them 
the constables of Stockton parish who also made at least two journeys to 
Shrewsbury to pay contribution there.88 Meanwhile during 1644, the collector for 
the village of Buildwas sent contribution to garrisons at Madeley and Wellington, 
and paid October's money to a servant of Sir Francis Ottley.89                                                         
83 The Weekly Account, 25 Dec. 1644 -1 Jan. 1645, unpaginated. 
84 BRL, Additional Mss 18982, f. 36. 
85 HRO, CF61/20, f. 567. 
86 Bennett, ‘Contribution and Assessment', p. 4. 
87 SA, 3365/589, f. 2. 
88 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/53-4; SA, P270/B/1/1, ff. 55-6. 
89 'Ottley Papers' (1896), pp. 256-7. 
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 If the Royalists sought to avoid the direct involvement of soldiers in tax 
collection, how did the military respond to non-compliance, given the balance to be 
struck between ensuring the soldiery were paid and fed without engendering non-
cooperation or hostility amongst the populace? Colonel Devillier impatiently issued 
intimidating warrants threatening action for non-payment and arrears, such as that 
dated 26 November 1644 directed to the petty constables of Stockton and Walcot, 
that 'if any mischief befall you by my soldiers going forth you must blame 
yourselves for it'.90 Devillier also threatened to impose higher payments, but there 
appears no evidence that his men actually took retributive action. In a similarly 
measured response to non-payment, it was not until Shifnal had failed to pay 
contribution for several months that in August 1644 Sir Lewis Kirke finally sent 
soldiers to collect the village's arrears. In the event, the small detachment from the 
nearby garrison at Tong was set upon by the locals, disarmed and imprisoned for 
several hours.91  
 On the other hand, evidence of a more forceful military response to non-payment 
comes from Shrewsbury sometime during 1643, when dragoons were sent to arrest 
persons 'who refused cessments'.92 These individuals may well have then faced a 
period of incarceration, like others imprisoned for failing to pay personal arrears, 
such as the rector of Harley who in January 1646 was held at Ludlow, or else 
because as prominent local individuals they were scapegoats held accountable for 
the indebtedness of the community - the fate at some point in 1644 of the husband 
of one Eleanor Cound, who petitioned Lady Ottley to secure his release.93 Another 
means of enforcement was the distraint of an individual's chattels. Distraint was 
employed in the Ludlow area in November 1643, for example, but the sluggish local 
economy made it difficult for the bailiffs to resell goods and livestock seized from 
defaulters in lieu of their contribution payments.94 Among those subject to distraint 
during 1644 were Samuel France of Ludlow, whose shovel and horse tack were 
confiscated for failing to pay 4s contribution, and one Mrs Allenson of Sutton, who 
during October had possessions seized on four occasions to the value of £4.95 Civil                                                         
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officials were, however, often ill prepared to enforce distraint or were reluctant to 
do so, being fearful of retribution. Richard Baxter's father during 1644 collected 
Royalist taxes, 'but he would not forcibly distrain of them that refused to pay, as not 
knowing but they might hereafter recover it all from him'.96 While no firm 
conclusion can be drawn as to the extent or severity of the Royalist military's 
coercive role, these examples show, however, that threatened or actual punishment 
went hand-in-hand with taxation. 
 The Marcher Association movement encouraged administrative changes to the 
contribution in Shropshire in January 1645, when certain gentry proposed the 
replacement of the 'levy by poundage' with a reformed version of the 'old division 
of allotments', but nonetheless the pound rate remained in force.97 By later 1645, 
with just three Royalist bases in Shropshire the concomitant loss of territory led to 
an irrecoverable decline in revenue. By December this resulted in a situation where 
at Bridgnorth Sir Lewis Kirke reportedly found that he had to negotiate and 'entreat 
hard' with the locality in order to continue to receive reduced contribution, while at 
the same time the garrison at High Ercall had resorted to coercion and robbery, 
including waylaying the collectors of Parliamentary taxes.98 
The Parliamentarians 
Overview 
The first of Parliament's many legislative measures to finance military operations 
against Charles I was the ordinance of 9 June 1642, 'for bringing in plate, money and 
horses', the so-called Propositions. Thereby Parliament called upon its adherents 
voluntarily to contribute plate and cash, while promising reimbursement and 
interest.99 Accordingly, by 20 September 1642 Richard More, MP, had delivered 
£120-worth of silver plate to London's Guildhall.100 The Royalist response suggests 
that, like More, many of Parliament's supporters in Shropshire donated generously 
towards the Propositions. Having been detained on suspicion of using their 
mercantile connections to send plate to London, that October several leading 
Shrewsbury drapers were summonsed by the Royalist leadership to reveal the 
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extent of local donations to Parliament.101 Further, King Charles's proclamation at 
Bridgnorth on 14 October 1642 acknowledged that 'many of our subjects, 
inhabitants of this county', had contributed money and plate to aid the rebellion, 
'contrary to their duty and allegiance'.102 A correspondent had reported from 
Bridgnorth on 1 October how the high sheriff had seized there 'certain thousands of 
pounds', collected by Shropshire Parliamentarians and intended to be smuggled 
down the River Severn to Bristol.103 
 The Propositions were an important source of Parliamentarian revenue, and 
further individual contributions were exacted under a national ordinance of 7 May 
1643. Thereby, individuals with an annual income exceeding ten pounds or a 
personal estate valued greater than £100 who had not given to the Propositions 
were compelled to make a donation of up to one-fifth of their income and one-
twentieth the value of their estate.104 But fines and donations were insufficient to 
sustain war effort in the long term. Parliament responded during 1643 by enacting 
further national fiscal ordinances enabling its generals and the various London-
based and county committees to exact revenue more widely, by taxation and from 
enemy property. But the exiled leadership of Parliament's cause in Shropshire was 
ill placed to implement levies most effectively administered in areas sympathetic to 
Parliament or held under Parliamentarian military control. Established precariously 
in their foothold at Wem, in autumn 1643 the Parliamentarians faced the difficulty 
of raising income from largely enemy territory - a task that Sir Thomas Myddelton, 
in a dispatch written from Wem on 6 October, gloomily reported was then 
impossible.105 Parliament acknowledged in the preamble to the ordinance of 13 June 
1644 - 'For raising monies for maintenance of the forces in Shropshire' - that 'all 
other ordinances made this present Parliament for the advance of monies in the 
several counties of the kingdom [...] never could be put in execution in the county of 
Salop, in regard it hath been and is under the command of the King's forces'.106 
Subsequently, because both sides increasingly taxed Shropshire’s inhabitants, the 
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Parliamentarians had to contend with diminishing returns. In April 1645 and again 
the following August, the committee at Shrewsbury reported (albeit, perhaps, with 
a degree of special pleading) the chronic difficulty of imposing levies on an 
impoverished populace repeatedly taxed and otherwise exploited by the 
combatants.107   
 Regional Parliamentarians pressed Westminster to grant additional fiscal powers 
and allocate scarce funds, requests that were subject to protracted lobbying and 
committee-room debate. A joint appeal from Wem on 21 October 1643 by Sir 
Thomas Myddelton and Sir William Brereton soliciting the Commons for a grant of 
£3,000 resulted some five weeks later in the formation of a Parliamentary 
committee, including the Shropshire MPs, tasked with procuring £2,000 for 
Myddelton.108 Lobbying by this committee eventually secured additional financial 
powers for the major-general, by way of an ordinance enacted on 21 February 
1644.109 There was no guarantee, however, that funds granted at Westminster would 
be paid quickly or in full. Payment was referred to Parliament's executive 
committees, which raised money largely on credit and advanced it in installments, a 
protracted process necessitating lobbying on the recipients' behalf. As a case in 
point, after the report of the capture of Shrewsbury was read in the Commons on 27 
February 1645 a grateful House pledged £4,000 from excise receipts to the 
committee of Shropshire, but the onus of securing payment from the excise 
commissioners was firmly placed on three committeemen in London, Thomas 
Nicolls and the MPs Pierrepont and Corbet.110 But almost a year later half of the 
grant remained unpaid, so on 8 January 1646 an ordinance was passed directing the 
commissioners to release the remaining funds.111 
 The difficulties the Parliamentarians faced in funding war effort in Shropshire 
were therefore threefold: firstly, the county committee initially operated in exile and 
so was restricted in implementing Parliament's pecuniary levies; secondly, once 
established in Shropshire the Parliamentarians had to contest revenues with the 
Royalists; and thirdly, reliance could not be placed on subsidies from London.  
 The finances of Sir Thomas Myddelton, the Earl of Denbigh's West Midland                                                         
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Association and the committee of Shropshire will now be considered in turn. 
Parliament's cause in Shropshire was also partly funded by Sir William Brereton, 
who subsidised the Cheshire forces serving in the county and in later 1645 also 
funded the Shropshire forces operating around Chester.112 However, Brereton's 
finances are not considered here on the grounds of space, and also because his war 
effort was firmly focused on Cheshire. 
 
Sir Thomas Myddelton's finances 
Funding Sir Thomas Myddelton's objective of recovering the six counties of North 
Wales for Parliament would also assist the recovery of Shropshire. Therefore, two 
days after Parliament's authorisation of Myddelton's commission as major-general, 
on 14 June 1643 the Earl of Essex pressed the Committee of Safety to relieve 'the 
distressed and miserable condition of the county of Salop and parts adjacent' by 
hastening the despatch from London of forces led jointly by Myddelton and the 
Shropshire committeemen. Meanwhile, in order to help finance this expeditionary 
force the Earl ordered the sequestration of the timber yard at Hammersmith owned 
by the Royalist merchant and ship-owner Sir Nicholas Crisp.113 On 13 June 1644 
Myddelton's appointment to the enlarged sequestration committee for Shropshire 
gave him an executive say in financing the war there.114 Emboldened by this 
mandate and his leading role on 2 July in breaking the Royalist siege of Oswestry, in 
mid-July his supporters at Westminster sought a Commons vote to commit for the 
maintenance of Myddelton's forces for the duration of the war rental sequestered 
from the estates of Lord Newport and his son Sir Francis, the MP and Royalist 
officer who had been captured in the fighting for Oswestry. However, by 19 July 
this fiscal coup attempted on Myddelton's behalf had been blocked, by the Earl of 
Denbigh's supporters in Parliament and by Sir John Corbet acting to protect the 
interests of the county committee.115  
  The episode showed that competition for scarce financial resources could 
provoke conflicts of interest amongst the Parliamentarians in the Shropshire theatre 
of war. A year earlier, however, Sir Thomas Myddelton had embarked on his major-                                                        
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generalship with a degree of financial self-determination. Although his commission 
empowered him to tax Royalist-controlled North Wales it was clearly impossible to 
do so, or for Myddelton to gather revenue from his Denbighshire estates. However, 
the previous generation of the wider Myddelton family, being ambitious 
entrepreneurs, had established themselves as land-owning merchant adventurers, 
manufacturers and financiers in London and south-eastern England.116 This enabled 
Sir Thomas by drawing on credit via the Myddelton's mercantile and political 
connections topped up from his and the wider family's wealth soon to advance 
£5,000 towards his war effort, which the Commons pledged to underwrite from 
sequestration revenues.117 Myddelton used this money to recruit the few soldiers 
and to purchase the military supplies and artillery train with which he arrived at 
Nantwich in August 1643, and which sustained his participation in the campaign 
for Wem in September and October and in the abortive offensive in partnership 
with Sir William Brereton into north-east Wales in November.118 By early October, 
however, Myddelton's borrowings were spent. Moreover, he was no longer 
considered creditworthy because the Committee of Safety had failed to reimburse 
his lenders; as the Commons acknowledged in early January 1644, just £1,000 of 
Myddelton's £5,000 capital had been repaid.119 
 The ordinance of 21 February 1644 revived Myddelton's war effort by 
consolidating his fiscal powers with the objective of financing a fresh brigade for six 
months.120 It allowed the major-general to solicit for subscriptions and to appoint 
officials to implement the four main national imposts introduced by Parliament 
during 1643, namely the assessment, the sequestration ordinance, the fifth and 
twentieth part and the excise. But given Myddelton's strategic situation, these 
powers for the most part were effective only in writing. It was little more than 
Parliamentary bluster to demand, by way of the assessment re-enacted on 2 August 
1643, a weekly levy of £175 from North Wales.121 (This did, however, set a precedent 
for levying arrears in the future). However, Myddelton also gained practical 
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dispensations: he eventually received £1,500 from the New River Company, a 
venture his late uncle Sir Hugh had pioneered thirty years previously to supply 
London with fresh water; and the right to retain up to £3,000 from any unaccounted 
revenues from sequestration he could discover in and around the capital within a 
month of the ordinance.122 
 Sir Thomas Myddelton's accounts record receipts up to his relinquishment of the 
major-generalship in June 1645.123 These show that in addition to the first advance 
of £5,000 his war effort was financed to the total of £22,179. This seems mostly to 
have been the funding for the second brigade, from its raising in London in early 
1644, to its deployment, from May, into Staffordshire and Shropshire, and from 
September into Montgomeryshire. However, the overall cost of Myddelton's war 
effort was undoubtedly much higher, because his accounts omit monies volunteered 
or gathered by officers of his brigade. Captain Hercules Hannay, for one, who 
served under Myddelton during 1644, later certified the payment out of his own 
pocket of almost £325 towards the maintenance of his troop of horse.124 
 According to his accounts, Myddelton's war effort was funded mostly by 
sequestration and subscriptions. Sequestration provided most, generating almost 
£11,000, including £804 from the Caroline repair fund for St. Paul's Cathedral, 
allocated by the Commons on 30 September 1644, with the largest sum, eventually 
amounting to £2,000, from the estates of the recently deceased Lady Jane Shelley, 
heiress of the Catholic Shelley family of Sussex.125 Subscriptions generated the 
second largest amount, £7,425 in all, from monies volunteered under the original 
terms of the Propositions or otherwise coerced as fifth and twentieth part fines. 
Myddelton's agents gathered his subscriptions mostly from the Parliamentarian 
heartlands of London, the Home Counties and East Anglia. Furthermore, in 
February and again in June 1644, Myddelton benefitted from support at 
Westminster, when the Commons issued appeals to ministers across London to 
urge their congregations to volunteer subscriptions to fund Myddelton's recovery of 
North Wales.126                                                         
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A considerable army [of the Association] may upon any occasion be put into a 
body and maintained at the charge of those counties where the contributions 
being to be levied [...] it will be necessary to have some foundation to put such 
ordinances of Parliament in execution, as may conduce to the maintaining of 
the army  
 Sir Thomas also gained money from small Parliamentary grants and by 
individual loans, while ransom payments generated nearly £140. Several county 
committees between them gave £314, including £50 from Shropshire, but only two 
of the six Welsh counties of his command contributed directly to Myddelton's 
exchequer - £157 from the committee of Montgomeryshire and a paltry £6 from 
Merionethshire. Finally, there was £350-worth of 'fines and compositions', £300 of 
which came, it seems, from the townsfolk of Whitchurch in Shropshire. This was 
probably a one-off emergency communal contribution to forestall plundering, 
similar to that paid in June 1644 by the inhabitants of Oswestry who reportedly 
gave £500 to appease the Parliamentarian soldiers who had captured the town.127 
Financing the West Midland Association 
An undated memorandum emanating from Parliament around the time of the Earl 
of Denbigh's commission as general in June 1643 foresaw the need for his 
Association to be put on a sound financial footing.128 Detailing the support to be 
accorded him as was customary for a commander-in-chief, it noted: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 However, the Earl was unable adequately to fund a unified army and thereby 
strengthen Parliament's position in Shropshire. Indeed, Denbigh's inability to 
impose financial control over the West Midland Association was in stark contrast to 
the Earl of Manchester's Eastern Association during 1644, the exemplar of a fiscally 
well-organised Parliamentarian army. With the support of allies in both Houses, 
Manchester was, in Holmes's words, 'given the opportunity to create a centralised 
fiscal and military administration'.129 In accordance with an ordinance of 20 January 
1644, the counties of the Eastern Association relinquished their financial                                                         
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independence to a standing committee with a central treasury at Cambridge, which 
in turn was superintended by the Association's Parliamentary committee at 
Westminster and also by Manchester himself.130  
 Denbigh meanwhile had little fiscal authority over his Association other than the 
deference he might expect as general. As Holmes concluded: 'Denbigh strove to 
secure some measure of central control [...] but was unable to tap the financial 
resources of the area ostensibly subject to his command'.131 Denbigh's commission 
did not address fiscal matters, apart from vaguely pointing to his powers as lord 
lieutenant of Warwickshire.132 With its authority derived from the royal prerogative 
rather than Parliamentary statute, the lieutenancy was in any case an uncertain 
platform from which to finance war effort. Lacking licence to levy money on his 
own initiative or by Parliamentary ordinance, the Earl did seek financial powers. A 
draft ordinance to enable his execution of Parliament's main imposts within the 
West Midland Association was read in the Commons on 30 October 1643, and on 2 
November referred to a committee including Sir John Corbet and Richard More.133 
By December Denbigh sought to hasten the ordinance, writing to More on the 1st to 
press the Commons for 'the same honour and power which they have conferred 
upon others of my quality employed in matters of the same nature'.134 But over the 
following weeks debate instead revolved around Denbigh's acrimonious 
relationship with the county committee of Warwickshire, rather than his hoped-for 
empowering ordinance. As Hughes has shown, although in spring 1644 Denbigh 
once more pressed his allies at Westminster to secure powers for him like those of 
the Earl of Manchester, neither this nor another attempt by Denbigh that August 
came to fruition.135 
 While Denbigh lacked sustained support across both Houses, his Association 
was not militarily robust enough for Parliamentary taxation to be effectively 
implemented there. The Eastern Association, on the other hand, had benefited since 
its formation in December 1642 by remaining for the most part firmly under 
Parliamentarian control, allowing Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex and                                                         
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Hertfordshire consistently to provide revenue. Similarly, when a South-Eastern 
Association was re-enacted in November 1643, although, like Denbigh, its 
commander Sir William Waller lacked financial powers, tax-raising committees 
were at least assigned to his support, in Hampshire, Sussex, Surrey and Kent.136 
However, as has been seen, much of the West Midland Association was contested 
territory, so that by the end of 1643 Parliamentarian administrations were firmly 
established in only Staffordshire and Warwickshire 
 Denbigh understandably hoped to rely on the successful Parliamentarian 
organisation in Warwickshire. However, in early September 1643 the county 
committee saw their fiscal arrangements endangered by the arrival in Coventry 
from London of the nucleus of Denbigh's Association forces - several hundred foot, 
a few troops of horse and some gunners.137 Frustrated by the Earl's prolonged stay 
in London, within weeks the county committee tired of subsidising his men. 
Disregarding Denbigh's instructions to them to care for his soldiers until his arrival, 
the committee instead unilaterally ordered their disbandment.138 In a letter to the 
Earl dated 16 October they justified their action, describing Denbigh's men as 
'burthensome to our small treasury [...] the [established] diverse garrisons being as 
many as the county can well bear'.139 Localism shaped the Warwickshiremen's 
stance: 'nor did we believe your lordship meant them a sole charge to this county', 
they added, 'who we considered came down for the service of the Association'. The 
incident set the tone for the Earl's vitriolic relationship with the committee of 
Warwickshire, and he was undoubtedly right in thinking that they saw themselves 
as the reluctant 'purse bearers of the Association'.140 The committee continued - 
albeit because of their own necessity - to deny Denbigh the regular revenues from 
Warwickshire, which instead maintained the county forces. In May 1644 the Earl 
complained to the Committee of Both Kingdoms that this situation was the main 
cause of his financial plight and a justification for additional powers.141 Denbigh 
received some support from the county committee at Stafford, who in June 1644                                                         
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permitted him to levy £20 from each of Staffordshire's administrative divisions.142 
But by mid-July just £500 of the anticipated £2,000 had been collected, although 
faltering efforts to collect the arrears continued into winter 1644-5.143  
 The Earl's attempts to gather revenue elsewhere in his Association met with little 
success. Some money was raised from northerly Worcestershire, although in doing 
so Denbigh quarreled with his subordinate Colonel John Fox, who from his base at 
Edgbaston Hall near Birmingham was already taxing the same area.144 Turning to 
Shropshire, although Denbigh taxed the enclave of Halesowen there seems no 
evidence that he attempted to tax the county proper.145 Here, as elsewhere, the state 
of the relationship between commander-in-chief and county committee determined 
their financial cooperation. In July 1643, during the honeymoon period after 
Denbigh's appointment, six leading Shropshire committeemen had joined with him 
to underwrite £1,000 as surety for £2,000 loaned by a wealthy Parliamentarian 
supporter.146 On 20 February 1644 William Crowne, Denbigh's secretary and agent, 
serviced the loan, paying £40 to the lender as 'the interest of £1,000 for three months 
borrowed by his Lordship and the Shropshire gents'.147 That summer, however, the 
relationship between general and committee had soured. Consequently the 
committeemen made little or no attempt, despite the House having entrusted them 
with doing so, to fulfill the Commons' pledge of 28 June for £1,000, together with 
600 pistols, to be provided for Denbigh's soldiers as reward for their success at 
Oswestry.148 Although in the meantime and with some backing in the Lords 
William Crowne had lobbied on Denbigh's behalf, neither cash nor firearms had 
been supplied when the matter briefly resurfaced in the upper chamber in mid-
November.149 
 On 20 June 1643 the Commons had reported how the Earl of Denbigh had 
obtained 'credits and securities' to raise £6,000, which Parliament would underwrite 
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and repay from that December.150 This sum with funds gathered within the West 
Midland Association was expected to allow the Earl to raise horse and foot as the 
mainstay of a field army.151 However, two years later, on 2 July 1645, Denbigh 
submitted for audit personal accounts showing revenues amounting to just 
£5,328.152 Of this, £440 was obtained from small donations, forced loans and minor 
acts of sequestration. The remaining £4,888 had been raised on credit, of which the 
London-based Treasurers of Sequestration had reimbursed £2,478.153 The Earl later 
feared that as a result his estates and family jewellery would be 'either lost, or eat 
themselves out with interest'. The extent of Denbigh’s reliance on credit raised 
against his assets, although demonstrating a considerable personal commitment, 
revealed the underlying fiscal weakness of the West Midland Association as an 
organisation.154 Yet in early September 1644 a London newsbook had commended 
Denbigh's military achievements amid financial adversity: 'He hath never had pay 
for his soldiers, yet he hath done better service for nothing, than some others that 
have spent the country 100,000 pounds'.155 
The finances of the Committee of Shropshire 
Fiscal expediency, 1643-4 
Without the hold on Shropshire that from 1646 to 1648 enabled it to put Parliament's 
imposts more fully into effect, the county committee for at least the first two years of 
the conflict relied mostly on financial expediency and personal contributions. The 
leading committeemen collectively were not a conspicuously wealthy body, their 
financial circumstances varying considerably. Nonetheless, and despite their 
financial interests in Shropshire being threatened by Royalist sequestration, they 
managed to raise money on credit - as in the example of the joint loan with the Earl 
of Denbigh. In writing to William Lenthall, the Speaker of the Commons, in July 
1644 the committeemen acknowledged their dependence on loans.156 They may also 
have continued to receive clandestinely some revenue from their Shropshire lands,                                                         
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as suggested by a Royalist initiative in October 1643 to call to account the factors of 
Thomas Mytton's estates.157 Although it is unknowable to what extent the 
committeemen personally funded their war effort, the ordinance of 13 June 1644 
pointed out that they had raised forces 'at their own charges'.158 Mytton, for 
example, was in early 1646 still obliged to take out a personal loan of more than 
£400 to pay his garrison at Oswestry.159 Like the committeemen, other officers also 
contributed to the cause and provided for their soldiers. For example, in April 1645 
a gentleman preparing to serve in Shropshire as an officer under Myttton pledged 
£400 to the war effort.160 
 The committee of Shropshire also sought to obtain revenue from a broader body 
of contributors. Donations made by Salopians under the Propositions during 1642 
were absorbed into the wider nascent Parliamentarian war effort. However, eight 
days after the introduction of fifth and twentieth part fines, on 15 May 1643 a 
Commons committee including Sir Thomas Myddelton and the MPs More and 
Pierrepont was tasked with calling to account defaulters of subscriptions for 
Shropshire.161 The ordinance that embodied the committee of Shropshire that April 
had required the preparation of rolls, listing the 'names, and surnames and places of 
abode of every person charged', enabling the committee to solicit subscriptions from 
expatriate Salopians - those exiled by the conflict or otherwise residing elsewhere - 
and perhaps also from likely contributors remaining in the Royalist-controlled 
shire.162 In mid-1644 the county committee also received a windfall donation from 
the estate of Daniel Oxenbridge, a merchant who had willed £1,000 to Parliament. 
Accordingly, on 28 June the Commons directed Oxenbridge's executors to pay the 
first tranche of £500 to William Spurstowe, MP, on behalf of the committee.163 
 The committee of Shropshire's other main source of revenue during 1643 and 
1644 was sequestration, mostly by seizing cash and portable assets. This varied from 
small sums, like the £50 taken from a Catholic Royalist officer that the Commons on 
14 April 1643 ordered to be paid to Sir John Corbet for the purchase of arms, to the                                                         
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probably much larger amount generated as a result of the Commons on 1 March 
1644 permitting the London-based committeemen to sell by public auction 
appropriated goods belonging to the Herefordshire Royalist James, Viscount 
Scudamore.164 Furthermore, in a dispensation similar to that granted to Sir Thomas 
Myddelton in February 1644, the ordinance of 13 June enabled the committee for 
four months to sequester hitherto undiscovered enemy assets found in and around 
London to the value of £3,000.165  
 Other financial expedients embraced by Shropshire's committeemen included a 
proposal in May 1643 to secure credit against revenue from the Welsh cloth trade, 
and an initiative that October to revive the powers of the Coquet Office – the 
customs house of the port of London. Merchants who supported this proposal were 
prepared to pay an administrative levy of 2s per transaction to obtain the Office's 
seal as verification of legal trading and the payment of appropriate duties.166 
The Assessment 
Levied in each county as a widespread military tax, the weekly or monthly 
assessment became a long-standing Parliamentary impost, and eventually the 
largest single source of funding for Parliamentarian and the later Commonwealth 
armies.167 Since its introduction in February 1643, Shropshire's weekly share of the 
assessment had been set at £375.168 But then and later this was an impossible target 
and more a commitment of Parliament's intent. Towards that year's end, two 
committeemen wrote from Wem that 'the country refuse to pay any money', 
expressing the impracticability of administering Parliamentary taxation at that time 
in the county war.169 Although Parliament had designed the assessment to be paid 
into the central treasury at London's Guildhall, instead the proceeds mostly 
remained in the shires, where the committees used what they collected as a regular 
source of funding for local forces.170 This was the case in Shropshire during 1644 
and into 1646, where the weekly assessment was levied upon allotments assigned to 
a particular Parliamentarian garrison or unit, as the following examples suggest. By                                                         
164 JHC, III, pp. 44, 412. 
165 JHL, VI, p. 586. 
166 JHC, III, p. 86, 15 May 1643; JHC, III, p. 278, 17 Oct. 1643. 
167 Wheeler, in World Power, pp. 173-91, considers the assessment in some detail. 
168 A&O, I, p. 87. 
169 WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 37. 
170 Wheeler, World Power, pp. 176, 180; Pennington and Roots, Committee at Stafford, p. xxxi. 
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autumn 1644 the allotment of Stoke, lying within north Bradford hundred, was 
allocated to the garrison of the fortified manor house at Stoke upon Tern.171 
Similarly, from April to November 1645 Captain King's was one of five companies 
of foot paid out of the assessment of the allotments comprising the town and 
liberties of Shrewsbury.172 The garrison of Oswestry meanwhile levied the 
assessment from allotments within the hundreds of Oswestry and Pimhill.173 
 The account books of captains of foot King and Farrington provide insight into 
the working of the assessment in Shropshire. Some comparisons with the Royalist 
contribution can also be drawn from the three-monthly interim accounts, for July to 
September 1644, surviving from a handful of townships in Shrewsbury liberties 
which were later assigned to King's and Farrington's companies. The 
Parliamentarians also taxed each township at a monthly rate in the pound according 
to land and property ownership. Thus the evaluation of Astley - a township four 
miles north-east of Shrewsbury assigned to Farrington from mid-November 1645 to 
February 1646 - would have been £181 10s, derived from rating 25 wealthier 
inhabitants who between them paid the monthly sixpenny rate of £4 11s 8d.174 The 
wealthiest area assigned to King during summer 1645 was Stoneward, the southerly 
ward of Shrewsbury. Here, 172 townsfolk contributed to a monthly levy of £29 8s 3d 
at the sixpenny rate, hence Stoneward's assessment can be calculated as £1,176 
10s.175 Both captains calculated their assessment on a monthly basis, although King's 
collectors had leeway to collect the 'several sums [...] charged and assessed monthly, 
weekly or otherwise'.176  
 
Townships 
 
 
 
Royalist 
valuation, 
summer 1644 
 
Royalist 
percentage 
collected,  
4d rate 
Parliamentary 
valuation,  
June1645- 
February 1646 
Parliamentary 
valuation,  
April-June 
1646 
Parliamentary 
percentage 
collected,  
6d rate 
Acton 
Reynald £209 77% £216 £151 95% 
Albright 
Hussey & 
Battlefield 
£101  Unknowable £100 £100 95% 
                                                        
171 TNA, SP28/242 Part 2, f. 300, Capt. Hungerford's accounts. 
172 TNA, SP28/242 Part 2, King's account book. 
173 BDL Tanner Mss 60, f. 461. 
174 SP28/174 Part 1, Farrington's account book, f. 1. 
175 SP28/242 Part 2, King's account book, ff. 1-3. 
176 Ibid., unfoliated. 
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Betton, 
Sutton, 
Alkmere & 
Longner  
£477 Unknowable £477 Unknown 22% 
Great 
Berwick £151 Unknowable Unknown £147 65% 
Harlescott £151  78% Unknown £136 67% 
Haston £86 100% £90 £51 75% 
Smethcott £115 79% £75 £54 88% 
 
Table 7: Analysis of contribution and assessment paid by townships within the liberties of 
Shrewsbury, 1644-6.177 Calculations rounded to the nearest £. 
 
 
 Table 7 suggests that the Parliamentarian assessment at first tended to adopt the 
same valuations that the Royalists had calculated to levy contribution. Reevaluation, 
however, was the most likely reason for the reduction of the levy in 1646 on three of 
the five townships for which there is comparative data. In June 1645 the assessment 
was being revised in the Shrewsbury area at least, and by the end of the year the 
county committee was overseeing a countywide reevaluation.178 Table 7 also implies 
that given a favourable military situation both sides could achieve respectable 
collection rates. Captain King gathered 63% of the £575 assigned to him for June to 
November 1645, while Captain Farrington collected 72% of the £520 allotted to his 
company from mid-November 1645 until June 1646. Furthermore, both captains also 
received subsidies from the county committee's treasury. From the date of his 
commission, 2 April 1645, until 2 July following when he began to levy the 
assessment, King was allocated £6 weekly for his and his officers' pay, of which he 
received just over half.  Farrington fared better, receiving £206 in several cash 
payments, and the committee paid his company in full for February/March 1646. 
Overall, Farrington's accounts show that his company received much of their pay. 
This may reflect an improvement in the county committee's finances from late 1645 
and into 1646, resulting from a more pragmatic approach to taxation (widespread 
reassessment providing a realistic appraisal of what the county could deliver), and                                                         
177 Sources: TNA, SP28/242 Part 2, King's accounts; SP28/174 Part 1, Farrington's accounts; 
SA, 3365/224, unfoliated. 
178 SA, P250/Fiche 326, Churchwardens' accounts of the parish of the Holy Cross, 1645/6; 
LBWB, II, pp. 420-1. 
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greater opportunity for collection and enforcement as the Parliamentarians gained 
control over much of Shropshire.  
 Indeed, the Parliamentarian military - in contrast to the Royalists - appears to 
have been directly involved in tax administration and collection. Captains King and 
Farrington were responsible for gathering and accounting their allotted assessment. 
King's five collectors were authorised to enforce distraint, and at least three of them 
were officers in his militia company.179 In November 1645 the committee at 
Shrewsbury acknowledged their reliance on military enforcement to gather the 
assessment, when complaining to Sir William Brereton about the protracted 
deployment of many of the Shropshire Horse around Chester: 'The want of our men 
is extremely prejudicial to our own country', the committeemen admitted, 'which 
hinders us of that contribution that otherwise would have been fore-gotten [i.e. 
collected previously]'.180 Once a unit was allocated the assessment from a particular 
allotment it regarded the territory as its fiefdom, and would be mindful of the 
revenue accordingly. Hence, in October 1645 the Shropshire Horse complained that 
because of their prolonged absence on campaign receipts of money from the 
districts allotted to them were diminishing.181 The quarrel between Colonel Mytton 
and the committee at Shrewsbury over soldiers' pay and allocation of assessment 
revenue flared up in February 1646 as a territorial dispute, when rival troops of 
horse from Oswestry and Shrewsbury collecting the assessment in the same parts of 
northerly Shropshire confronted each other in an armed standoff at Ellesmere.182 
The continued active involvement of the Parliamentarian military in the collection 
of the assessment during 1647 and 1648 is suggested by the example of the 
experience of Worfield, a parish centred on the village three and a half miles north-
east of Bridgnorth. Here, on several occasions, the parishioners had to provide food 
and lodging for soldiers come to collect the assessment before it was due.183 
 In June 1647 Parliament re-enacted the monthly assessment, intending to reclaim 
the tax as a national levy to finance the New Model Army and the war in Ireland. 
However, the ongoing political and fiscal crisis over army pay and soldiers' arrears                                                         
179 TNA, SP28/242 Part 2, King's accounts, unfoliated. 
180 BRL, Additional Mss 11332, f. 94. 
181 LBWB, II, pp. 184-5. 
182 BDL, Tanner Mss 60, ff. 444, 461; CSPD, 1645-1646, p. 359; The Scottish Dove, 26 Feb.-4 Mar. 
1646, pp. 582-3. 
183 SA, P314/M/1, ff. 40-1. 
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led to two national ordinances being passed on 24 December 1647 which gave tacit 
approval for assessment revenue to be allocated to the disbandment of the 
remaining supernumerary county forces and to the pay of regional garrisons.184 To 
retain some control over the tax and prevent its dissipation at local level, Parliament 
the previous day had appointed audit commissioners for each shire, those for 
Shropshire being the recruiter MPs Colonel Robert Clive, Sir Humphrey Briggs and 
Esau Thomas. The Westminster-based Committee of the Army, acting on behalf of 
the Treasurers at War, also appointed regional superintendents including one 
Robert Baddeley, the committee's agent for bringing in the assessment in Shropshire 
and Montgomeryshire during 1648.185  
 During 1647 and 1648 Shropshire's monthly assessment was £554, 
proportionately 37 per cent of the sum demanded by the weekly assessment in 1643. 
The levy was apportioned to the county's 100 allotments, including the town of 
Ludlow, assessed to pay £5 13s monthly as one allotment.186 Papers of the 
Committee of the Army provide a probably incomplete record of how Shropshire's 
assessment was disbursed during 1648, payments reflecting the changing priorities 
Parliament confronted that year, from back pay and disbandment, to sustaining 
forces during the Second Civil War. During the political turmoil of 1647 much of the 
assessment nationally went unpaid, although a forceful final demand for Ludlow to 
pay arrears by 10 August suggests that Shropshire's commissioners collected the tax 
with some vigour.187 By February 1648 the commissioners were able to authorise 
payment of £2,000 from Shropshire's assessment towards the disbandment of two 
regiments in Herefordshire.188 Furthermore, from March 1648 to February 1649 
Shropshire contributed at least £2,100 to the pay of Colonel Robert Duckenfield's 
Cheshire-based Regiment of Foot. Upwards of £400 was also paid to the standing 
garrisons in Wales, at the Red Castle, Denbigh, Conway and Caernarvon.189 In 
addition, in July 1648 the county committee imposed an ad-hoc levy across 
Shropshire to fund the additional troop of horse raised to counter the Royalist                                                         
184 Wheeler, World Power, pp. 189-91; A&O, I, pp. 1048-9, 1053-4. 
185 TNA, SP28/50 Part 3, f. 467, Papers of the Committee of the Army. 
186 A&O, I, pp. 959, 1109; SA, LB7/1946. 
187 Wheeler, World Power, pp. 113, 189; SA, LB7/1946. 
188 TNA, SP28/50 Part 1, f. 81, Part 3, ff. 309-10, Papers of the Committee of the Army. 
189 C. Firth, The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army, (Cranbury, 2006), p. xxiv; Papers of the 
Committee of the Army: SP28/52 Part 1, f. 21; SP28/55 Part 1, ff. 15, 17, 21, 23, 39, Part 2, ff. 
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insurgency. At £10 10s, each allotment was charged double the monthly army 
assessment. Alternatively, an allotment could make payment in kind by providing a 
horse, with tack and arms, and one month's pay for a trooper.  The levy was 
extended into August and re-enacted in November to raise additional disbandment 
money.190 It is unclear whether at this time the monthly army assessment was 
suspended or was appropriated for the county's use.  
 Finally in this examination of Parliamentarian assessments, Shropshire seems to 
have remained exempted from the ordinances enacted from 1644 to provide for 
Lord Leven's Scots army while it served in England allied to Parliament. However, 
Shropshire did contribute to national assessment ordinances in 1644 and 1648 to 
fund Parliamentary forces campaigning in Ireland. The ordinance of 18 October 
1644 demanded £62 10s per week from the county for 12 months for the 'British 
Army in Ireland'. When it was re-enacted on 17 February 1648, Shropshire had to 
pay almost £185 monthly for six months towards a national monthly total of 
£20,000.191 Wheeler concluded that during 1644 and 1645 this tax was collected very 
irregularly, and this appears to have been so in Shropshire, for in February 1646 the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms instructed the county committee to make greater 
effort in collecting arrears.192 The 1648 assessment for the Irish war was being 
enforced in Shropshire by April when rates were being calculated in the 
Shrewsbury area, while on the 10th the county committee demanded that Ludlow 
pay the current levy and also imposed arrears from 1645 and 1646, when the town 
was Royalist controlled.193 
Sequestration and Compounding 
Sequestration varied in both form and degree. In 1643 and 1644 the committee of 
Shropshire benefited from windfalls and chance seizures of enemy property and 
cash. Systematic Parliamentarian sequestration embraced the financial management 
of businesses and landed estates, entailing the collection of rental income and the 
leasing and sub-letting of assets to third parties.194 Sequestration was part of a wider 
regime of financial punishment imposed on Parliament's enemies that embraced 
appropriation, loans forced under the Propositions or the fifth and twentieth part                                                         
190 SA, LB7/1936-7, 1943-4. 
191 A&O, I, pp. 553, 1074. 
192 Wheeler, World Power, p. 181; CSPD, 1645-1647, p. 360. 
193 SA, P250/Fiche 328; SA, LB7/1933. 
194 Morrill, Revolt, p. 111. 
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and composition fines. By August 1644 the Parliamentarians were applying these 
penalties to levy income from the north Shropshire estates around Wem of the 
Royalist exile Robert Howard, Earl of Arundel. His tenants' rents were sequestrated 
under the pretext of the Earl's obligations under the fifth and twentieth part, and his 
woodland was felled and the timber sold for profit.195 This appears to be the earliest 
evidence of methodical Parliamentarian sequestration in Shropshire, supporting 
Humphrey Mackworth's contention in 1649 to the London-based Committee of 
Compounding, that it was not until mid-1644 that the county committee had been 
able to impose sequestration to any significant effect.196 Even so, the 
Parliamentarians' reach was then limited to northerly Shropshire and to suspected 
Royalists like Sir Arthur Mainwaring, who in November 1644 was assessed to pay 
£400, his manor at Ightfield lying discomfortingly close to the Parliamentarian 
garrisons at Wem and Stoke upon Tern.197  
 Victories during 1645 and 1646 resulted in the consolidation of Parliament's 
authority over previously contested territory, enabling a concomitant increase in the 
imposition of fines and sequestrations. Shropshire reflected the prevailing national 
situation. Valuations for sequestrations in the Shrewsbury area were being prepared 
during August 1645, with the result that in 1646 Captain Farrington's monthly 
assessment included rents and tithes sequestered by the county committee from the 
estates of Royalist gentry.198 By June 1645 the properties of Sir Basil Brooke, a 
Royalist activist and notable Catholic, were within reach of sequestration by the 
Parliamentarian garrison at Benthall Hall near the absent Brooke's estates at 
Madeley, where lay his coalmines and iron works. On 9 June - the day after the 
Parliamentarian victory near Stokesay in south Shropshire - the Benthall garrison 
seized the works and more than £600-worth of stock. Acting under the direction of 
the committee at Shrewsbury, two captains of the Benthall garrison managed the 
iron works until the end of the year, when it was handed over to the Staffordshire 
ironmaster Richard Foley. Brooke's coalmines were also sequestrated, and for the 
next four years let on one-year leases and exploited for short-term profit.199 
Accordingly, in 1650 one local master collier despondently related how the pits,                                                         
195 HMC, Sixth Report, Part I, p. 25. 
196 CPCC, I, p. 157. 
197 CPCM, I, p. 486. 
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denied investment, had fallen into disrepair: 'Much wrong was done to the said 
works since they came into Parliament's possession [...] to gain from what they can 
out of the said works for their satisfaction, though to the destruction of the same'.200  
 Other Shropshire Royalists suffered similar punitive measures, among them Sir 
William Whitmore. Between December 1646 and October 1647 sequestration agents 
made at least five inspections of Whitmore's estate at Apley in order to compile the 
detailed inventories that in early 1648 allowed the sale of £583-worth of goods, from 
which £116 was deducted as Whitmore's payment of the fifth part. The 
sequestrators also sub-let his land and received the rental. At this time the county 
committee for safety seems to have employed a permanent staff of three agent-
collectors in each hundred. It seems likely, therefore, that John Llewellyn, Richard 
Hawkshead and Thomas Achelley, who administered Whitmore's sequestration, 
were the agents for Brimstree hundred.201 The Newport family alone contributed a 
substantial proportion of the revenue the county committee received from local 
Royalists. On 18 October 1645 Parliament allotted Sir Francis Newport's fines to the 
committee, and on 24 July 1646 instructed the Committee of Compounding to 
advance £3,500 towards the disbandment of the Shropshire forces against the surety 
of revenue from Sir Francis's fines. By spring 1649 the county committee appears to 
have received more than £8,000 from penalties imposed on Sir Francis and his father 
in exile Sir Richard.202 
 The Newports paid much of their fines by composition, and were among the 130 
or more Shropshire Royalists who eventually compounded for their involvement in 
both Civil Wars.203 A Royalist could seek financial settlement with Parliament by 
applying to compound for a one-off fine rated according to the degree of his 
militancy: whether he was considered a less significant 'delinquent', or else a more 
committed, hard-line 'malignant'. Paying the resultant fine would lift or prevent 
sequestration.  On 12 August 1645 the Commons agreed that a composition fine 
should be calculated retrospectively, according to the pre-war worth over two years                                                         
200 SP23/105, f. 227. 
201 Fletcher, 'Sequestration [...] of Sir Thomas Whitmore', pp. 308-14; Wanklyn, 'Landed 
Society & Allegiance', p. 266; CPCC, pp. 266-7. 
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of the applicant's estate.204 Sir Thomas Eyton, for example, who compounded in 
February 1647 was the following 18 March fined £818 as one-tenth of his estate, 
reduced to £500 two months later.205 Towards the end of the First Civil War the 
county committee had agreed temporary compositions with a growing number of 
local Royalists, among them Richard Oakeley, who paid £250 by December 1645, 
and Sir Thomas Whitmore, who had paid the committee £500 by September 1646 
when he formally applied to compound.206 Other Royalists negotiated a local 
financial settlement with the county committee by paying subscriptions, either 
under the pretext of the Propositions - towards which John Pierce of Westbury paid 
£55 in January 1646 - or the fifth and twentieth part, for which Humphrey Walcot 
paid £300 two months later.207  
 Such fines for the most part went into the coffer of the committee at Shrewsbury. 
However, the Committee for Compounding sitting at London's Goldsmith's Hall 
was the central agency entrusted with administering compositions and receiving the 
resultant fines. The revenue a county committee received from composition would 
thus diminish without gaining dispensations, like that allowing the committee of 
Shropshire to receive the Newports' fines. This awkward arrangement between local 
and central authority led to dispute in 1647 over Sir Richard Leveson's composition. 
Having paid £50 of his £400 fine in Shropshire, Leveson went to London to pay the 
rest. On 19 June, however, the committee at Shrewsbury demanded the fine in full, 
and when it went unpaid, retaliated in September by sequestrating Leveson's 
Shropshire estates, despite vociferous objections from the authorities in London.208 
Similarly, the coalmines jointly-owned by Lawrence Benthall and James Lacon that 
the county committee had seized in 1646 remained sequestered and leased to third 
parties while both undertook the protracted process of compounding during 1647 
and 1648.209 In order to enforce fines sequestration was often an inextricable part of 
the process of compounding, as in the case of Sir Richard Prince of Shrewsbury. 
Having in May 1645 paid £200 to the county committee for his fifth and twentieth 
part, Prince in December 1646 applied to compound and on 11 May 1647 was fined                                                         
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£800, but five months later his sequestration was ordered for non-payment.210 
Plunder and free quarter 
Looting and compulsory billeting were universal practices of the Civil Wars that 
subsidised war effort. According to Gentles, a 'massive resort to free quarter and 
plunder' typified the conflict.211 Unauthorised plundering was condemned, but 
booty could be resold, or else provided the soldiery with basic essentials, such as 
clothing and bedding, which otherwise had to be purchased and were often in short 
supply. By lodging soldiers amongst civilians the burden of providing food and 
shelter for them was placed upon the householder. Plunder and free quarter 
compensated for inadequate logistical support and for shortfalls in pay. Indeed, in 
April 1645 one would-be Parliamentarian officer promised Colonel Mytton that he 
with 30 recruits would at first 'do duty [at Oswestry] for free quarter (requiring no 
pay)'.212 Morrill's assertion that these 'incidental costs of war [nationally] exceeded 
the formal fiscal burdens' is supported by the local example of Astley, near 
Shrewsbury. Here, if we take their claims at face value, the near £27 that 10 
inhabitants between them accrued in debts for billeting Royalist soldiers during 
1643 can be compared to the village's total recorded cash contribution payments 
from October 1644 to February 1645 of only £4 18s.213 
Plunder 
Military appropriation carried varying degrees of legality, but the effect was much 
the same on those who experienced requisitioning by warrant, commandeering or 
outright looting. Such was the lot of those Ludlow townsfolk who in 1644 
relinquished bedding to furnish the quarters of Royalist soldiers garrisoning the 
castle. Although they may well have been served official warrants beforehand, these 
people doubtless felt violated, among them a householder who reported the loss of 
a bed and linen, 'taken out of my house by musketeers by violent means'.214 
 Plundering was feared in England as a destructive vice imported from 
contemporary Continental warfare. There, because the ostensibly more legitimate 
means of military finance and supply often proved inadequate and unsustainable,                                                         
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as one appraisal of seventeenth-century logistics has put it, often 'more or less well-
organised plunder was the rule rather than the exception'.215  
 The understandable tendency of victims to overstate losses and the often 
propagandist intent of reporting makes it impossible to determine the extent of 
plundering in Shropshire. What seems clear, however, is that from the beginning of 
the conflict looting was a chronic underlying problem for the civilian population. 
Richard Baxter described how his father and Godly neighbours in Shropshire 'that 
were noted for praying and hearing sermons, were plundered by the King's soldiers 
so that some of them had almost nothing but lumber left in their houses'.216 Baxter 
may not have over exaggerated the worst effects of looting.  A household near 
Shrewsbury apparently ransacked by Royalists around Easter 1643 sustained 
damages amounting to almost £50, including stolen silver, brass and pewter ware, 
bed linen, clothing, books, and provisions, and broken furniture and fixtures.217 
Countermeasures adopted by the corporation of Bishop's Castle at the beginning 
and towards the end of the First Civil War show that plundering by both sides was 
a persistent threat. On 6 December 1642 the townsmen were ordered to attend an 
armed night watch, to guard against the 'eminent dangers [...] by reason of divers 
soldiers now remaining within this county'. In April 1646 the watch was 
reappointed on the 14th, because of fear of 'a continued concourse of soldiers at all 
times'.218 In March 1645 Sir Thomas Myddelton found that the central Marches 
generally had been despoiled by both sides to such an extent, that 'the licentiousness 
of the soldiers in plundering and wasting the country make most people that have 
no relation to arms to hate the very name of a soldier'.219 
 Partisan reports of the fighting often contained accusations of looting. According 
to the Royalist organ Mercurius Aulicus, a Parliamentarian force operating out of 
Wem in mid-March 1644 had intended to 'plunder the country', but the booty they 
later abandoned in their retreat was by the King's men 'safely returned to the honest 
owners'. In early February 1646 a London newsbook similarly reported how Sir 
William Vaughan's horsemen had recently 'plundered very much' around Bishop's 
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Castle.220 Both reports were probably substantially true, because the combatants 
sporadically harried ostensibly enemy territory. During April 1643, for instance, 
Royalist patrols operating from Lord Capel's field headquarters at Whitchurch 
seized livestock and goods from several Cheshire villages. But on 30 May Sir 
William Brereton struck back by storming Whitchurch itself.221 The 
Parliamentarians seized Royalist military supplies and looted the town, and a week 
later Brereton's men returned to take back to Nantwich what remained, although 
(according to the Parliamentarian Thomas Malbon) seizing 'no man's goods but only 
the Cavaliers'.222 Cattle were among the commodities most frequently taken, either 
to provide meat on the hoof or for resale. Because of the notoriety of his troops in 
this respect, by June 1643 the capital's press had dubbed Lord Capel 'that great cow 
stealer'. A year later, however, a London newsbook was pleased to report how 
Parliamentarian soldiers had rustled livestock in the hill country near Oswestry and 
sold them for 'good pennyworths'.223 
 Notwithstanding their acceptance of officially sanctioned acts of plunder, both 
sides acknowledged the damaging effect on popular support of unauthorised 
pillage and extortion by their own soldiers. On the Royalist side, the notorious 
depredations of Colonel Johan Van Geyrish's troopers in south-west Shropshire 
during autumn 1644 caused many country people to withhold contribution. 
Consequently, as the de facto area commander, an exasperated Sir Michael 
Woodhouse wrote from Ludlow on 5 October complaining to Prince Rupert, that 
Van Geyrish was 'quartered to destroy and not advance the service'.224 Although 
billeting bills show that part or all of the regiment was withdrawn into Ludlow, the 
hostility that Van Geyrish's men engendered against the Royalist military triggered 
the clubman activity in south Shropshire during winter 1644-5.225 With similar 
detriment to the Parliamentarian cause for the short time that they campaigned in 
Shropshire, the Earl of Denbigh's Horse, in summer 1644, and detachments of the                                                         
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Yorkshire Horse, during April 1645, were notorious freebooters whose behaviour 
alienated many from Parliament's cause. The latter unit's especially violent conduct 
caused the Shropshire committeemen to demand that Sir William Brereton 
withdraw and replace them, with 'such as will not plunder otherwise the country 
will rise against them'.226  
 It was generally assumed that the cooperation they gave one side or the other 
allowed civilians a certain degree of protection from extortion by the enemy, as Sir 
Michael Ernle acknowledged in later October 1644. Having dispersed the Royalist 
cavalry to garrisons across Shropshire, Ernle was unable entirely to safeguard the 
hinterland of Shrewsbury, and so some locals, 'for want of protection', began 'to 
forsake their dwellings and seek shelter amongst the enemies'.227 The 
Parliamentarian committeemen voiced similar concerns to Sir William Brereton in 
November 1645: 'We suffer much in the opinions of the best for leaving our country 
so naked' they declared, being unable to prevent plundering forays by the Royalist 
garrison at High Ercall because most of the Shropshire Horse were in Cheshire.228  
 Marauding was condemned as a capital offence in the published articles of war 
regulating the armies of both sides, and also in particular standing orders. On 21 
September 1642 High Sheriff John Weld circulated to Shropshire's civil authorities 
Charles I's reassuring declaration of his 'especial care' of the county, against 'the 
adverse army or by such straggling and disorderly soldiers of our own'. The King 
pledged to impose martial discipline, and restitution for 'damage or plunder'.229 In a 
later initiative endorsed by Charles and his parliament at Oxford, the pamphlet of 
Orders published in spring 1644 to regulate the conduct of Royalist forces in dealing 
with civilians sanctioned the prosecution under the common law of soldiers accused 
of theft or robbery, an important dispensation seized upon by the townsfolk of 
Ludlow in their petition that year, for protection against 'the rapine and plunder of 
soldiers and other mutinies'.230  
 The orders given on 21 February 1645 to the Parliamentarian task force preparing 
to assault Shrewsbury were intended to forestall plundering. The soldiers were                                                         
226 HMC, Sixth Report, Part I, p. 20; BRL, Additional Mss 11331, f. 4. 
227 BRL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 299. 
228 BRL, Additional Mss 11332, f. 94. 
229 SA, LB7/2318. 
230 Orders Presented to His Majesty By advice of the Lords & Commons of Parliament Assembled at 
Oxford (1644), p. 8; SA, LB7/2139. 
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promised a share of a bounty worth up to £4,000, but anyone caught looting would 
'not only lose his present reward but be proceeded against for trial of his life 
according to the martial law'.231 Incentive and threat notwithstanding, on the 
following day, in the largest single act of plunder in Shropshire during the Civil 
War, the soldiers instead set to ransack the town before it was fully secured. The 
acting commander-in-chief Colonel Reinking recollected how 'both horse and foot 
for most part contemning both order and command, fell to plunder all before them', 
some disciplined soldiers having to be deployed to protect leading Royalists and 
their property.232 On the 23rd the committeemen could do little other than exercise 
forbearance whilst the looting and disorder continued, admitting the following day 
that Shrewsbury had been 'exceedingly plundered' - the soldiers (unsurprisingly) 
having rejected their offer of a reduced bounty. Order was not fully restored until 
the 25th, with the arrival of Sir William Brereton accompanied by some disciplined 
Cheshire Foot.233 By then, Brereton reckoned, Shrewsbury had been 'damnified to 
the value of £4,000'.234 Repairs to the damaged mayor's chambers were still being 
made seven months later.235 Learning by this unfortunate lesson, in April 1646 the 
committee of Shropshire delivered on a modest pledge to pay just £1 (a bonus of 
around a month's pay for an infantryman) to each soldier undertaking the assault 
on Bridgnorth. As a result the soldiery mostly exercised restraint, and, as the 
committeemen thankfully reported, 'the town was generally saved from plunder'.236 
Billeting and free quarter 
While the garrisoned castles, manor houses and other strong points provided some 
accommodation, soldiers otherwise were dispersed to lodge amongst civilians, in 
churches, inns, or private houses and outbuildings. With the King's army in town, 
in early October 1642 a Shrewsbury resident reported 'the multitude of soldiers 
daily billeted upon us', adding disconsolately, 'I have had of these guests all this 
week and expect little better next week'.237 Although published as anti-Royalist 
propaganda, this statement captures the resentment forced billeting engendered as                                                         
231 NLW, Sweeney Hall Mss A1, f. 24. 
232 Relation [...] by [...] William Reinking, p. 6. 
233 LBWB, I, pp. 38-9, 45-6, 49-50. 
234 Tibbutt, Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke, p. 465. 
235 SA, 3365/591, f. 18. 
236 BDL, Tanner Mss 59, f. 10. 
237 Occurrences in Shropshire and Devonshire, p. 4. 
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an intrusion into private life. It was always a most unpopular practice - probably 
even among civilians who otherwise favoured the soldiers' cause - and especially so 
when soldiers were disorderly. In January 1646 householders at Bridgnorth 
complained to the Royalist commissioners about the ill-disciplined soldiers living 
amongst them. The minutes of the meeting of the town corporation on the 15th 
noted that, 'the towns men implored to those gentlemen their grievances of great 
spoil and detriment they say is sustained by the soldiers unruliness and distress in 
their houses'.238 
 Such behaviour exacerbated civilian fears of the arrival of numbers of soldiers 
requiring food and accommodation. In November 1648, one of the county 
committee's officials for the assessment played on these apprehensions, urging the 
bailiffs of Ludlow to hasten the collection of arrears to avert the billeting of the 
county troopers in their town: 'I pray you if you want to save the horse from 
quartering on you, that you would cause the petty constables to be very careful to 
gather that assessed'.239 On the other hand, communities sometimes banded 
together in a hostile stance against unwarranted billeting. In August 1644, the 
townsfolk of Much Wenlock and then Bridgnorth opposed the arrival of Colonel 
Van Geyrish's Regiment by turning on the troopers and forcing them to seek 
accommodation elsewhere.240 Van Geyrish's Horse had been posted to Shropshire 
on Prince Rupert's orders, and it was the unexpected arrival of outsiders and the 
unanticipated burden they placed on local resources that provoked most hostility. 
In December 1645 the county committeemen cautioned Sir William Brereton against 
sending auxiliaries from Lancashire into Shropshire: 'for should any strange force be 
quartered upon our county it would be imputed to our disregard of the welfare 
thereof'. The committeemen feared the effect on popular support of 'bringing others 
upon them to devour and eat them up'.241   
  Billeting had, quite literally, a consuming effect because householders often bore 
the full financial burden of providing for military lodgers. The soldiery was 
supposed to pay its way, but the military's perennial problems with cash flow 
encouraged the widespread practice of free quarter. Thereby soldiers received board 
                                                        
238 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
239 SA, LB7/1944. 
240 BRL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 216. 
241 BRL, Additional Mss 11332, f. 24. 
 144 
and accommodation on credit at the expense of their host, who was promised 
reimbursement at some later date. Because bills often remained unpaid and it was 
imposed in addition to taxes and other levies, free quarter has been singled out by 
historians as 'the most widespread grievance of all' during the Civil Wars, and as a 
system 'universally detested among the civilian population'.242  
 The record of Royalist billeting in Shropshire survives in the form of bills and 
petitions for arrears, so that little is known of what the military did pay. Documents 
from Ludlow and Shrewsbury show that as regional commanders during 1642 and 
1643 the Marquis of Hertford and Lord Capel set tariffs for billeting against which 
civilians were to be reimbursed.243 Similarly, the regulations issued by the Oxford 
parliament in spring 1644 published a tariff for weekly board and lodging that 
allowed 3s 6d for a common foot soldier, for example. Richard Brasier of Ludlow 
claimed this rate for providing for one garrison soldier for a fortnight, another for 
six weeks and a third for 20 weeks.244 There were, however, periods when soldiers 
paid their way or were provided for by other means. In March 1644 Prince Rupert 
rescinded free quarter in Shropshire, and Royalist soldiers instead were given 
modest but sustainable pay and weekly rations. At Bridgnorth the garrison disliked 
the new regime and complained of poor victuals and remuneration, but the 
governor Sir Lewis Kirke acknowledged that the town was then too impoverished 
to sustain free quarter.245 From the opposing side, there is evidence that in spring 
1645 Parliamentarian garrison soldiers at Shrewsbury paid billeting charges out of 
their wages, probably by deduction.246 The bills of several Royalist units billeted at 
Ludlow in 1642 and 1643 were paid in part, among them the local dragoons 
commanded by Captain Edward Baldwyn, who 'paid for all the billets until that 26 
of May [1643]'. Nevertheless, local officials calculated that the town's arrears for 
billeting to the end of June 1643 still amounted to £370.247 Communities and 
individuals elsewhere also accrued large debts in providing free quarter for Royalist 
soldiers, much of which probably went unpaid. Nine companies of the King's army, 
for example, between them left debts of £117 when they marched from Shrewsbury                                                         
242 Pennington, 'War and the People', p. 117; Hutton, War Effort, p. 30. 
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in October 1642, while Roger Ambler, a local baker, reckoned he was owed £1 14s 
for having provided for officers' servants as well as soldiers.248 On 6 December 1642 
Bailiff Farr of Bridgnorth journeyed to Shrewsbury seeking remittance for his town's 
cumulative arrears for billeting amounting to almost £407.249  
 In order to ease the problems of billeting, the Orders of the Oxford parliament in 
spring 1644 prohibited Royalist soldiers from taking free quarter where contribution 
was also paid. Consequently, in their petition that year Ludlow's townsfolk 
concluded it would be lawful 'to deduct out of their monthly contribution all such 
sums of money which shall be due for quartering either horse or foot'.250 This intent 
notwithstanding, surviving records from Ludlow, dating from later 1644 and into 
January 1645, present a litany of grievances relating to free quarter. These suggest 
that even in a long-standing garrison town irregular payment and long-standing 
arrears often prevailed (although we lack a corresponding record of settled 
accounts). Typically, William Bagley received just 3s 6d for providing food and 
lodgings for a garrison soldier for nine weeks, leaving him £1 18s in arrears. His 
fellow townsman Richard Soloman declared that he had provided for one soldier 
for a month, another for six weeks and a third for three months, all without 
recompense.251 At Shrewsbury in the meantime, by later 1644 free quarter had been 
reintroduced without the exemption for paying contribution.252 
 The burden of free quarter eased, but did not end with the First Civil War. In 
addition to Parliament's standing county force and the soldiers awaiting 
disbandment, detachments of the New Model Army were posted to Shropshire, as 
in May 1647 when five companies of Colonel John Okey's Regiment of Dragoons 
were based there.253 A case study of the burden and local response to billeting and 
free quarter at this time is provided by the two-year accounts from September 1647 
of the constables of Worfield parish.254 There the parishioners often provided 
individual soldiers and small detachments with accommodation of one or two 
nights' duration. On one occasion it cost the parish 8s to provide a party of horse                                                         
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with free quarter for a night. Furthermore, Constable William Billinglsey 
reimbursed himself from parochial funds the 3s 4d it cost him to provide overnight 
accommodation for five soldiers, and other householders received compensation 
from the parish for similar losses in providing free quarter.  
 More troubling for Worfield was the arrival on 21 November 1647 of troopers led 
by one Captain Young, a detachment of Colonel John Birch's old regiment that had 
served in and around Herefordshire since December 1645. These cavalrymen and 
Birch's foot soldiers had mutinously opposed disbandment, and communities across 
Herefordshire and neighbouring Radnorshire had been disrupted and intimidated 
by their lingering presence during 1647.255 That autumn, some of Birch's horsemen 
were also billeted at Bridgnorth.256 In late September one of the town chamberlains 
journeyed the 13 miles to Diddlebury to seek out their commanding officer, Major 
Hopton, to facilitate the removal of his men from Bridgnorth. The townsmen also 
solicited the help of the local high constable, but in November they succumbed to 
paying Captain Young a bribe of £21 to take his troopers elsewhere.257 This probably 
resulted in their arrival at Worfield, where the parishioners sought to remove them 
by making representations to the authorities at Bridgnorth and Shrewsbury in 
December, and in January 1648 sending another delegation to Shrewsbury to lobby 
Major Hopton. The parish later sought restitution by submitting to the local justices 
of peace accounts of their losses sustained during the troopers' unwarranted stay. 
Conclusions 
In financing war effort in Shropshire, unsurprisingly the combatants adopted 
similar methods, some of which, such as taxation at parish and county level, 
followed pre-war precedent. Other measures, such as sequestration, took root in 
expediency but became important and sustained sources of revenue. Both sides at 
first took recourse to the wealth of their confirmed or supposed supporters, given as 
donations or proffered hopefully as loans; as the Royalist leadership at Shrewsbury 
optimistically noted in their planning sometime in late 1642, 'this is but advance 
monies and when things are settled his majesty will repay'.258 Many activists, army 
officers especially, continued to make donations in a voluntary way, but payments                                                         
255 Parker, Radnorshire, pp. 131-2. 
256 In January 1648 the regiment had at least four troops. TNA, SP28/50, Part 1, f. 81. 
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were also coerced from wealthier individuals using devices such as the privy seal 
loans and the fifth and twentieth part. Sequestration and composition fines were the 
punitive culmination of attempts to acquire the wealth of the better off.  
 Both sides increasingly turned to general taxation. Royalist and Parliamentarian 
taxation of property and income, in the form of the contribution and assessment 
respectively, used similar methods to engage large numbers of taxpayers. At certain 
stages of the conflict both sides achieved reasonably successful rates of collection, 
but administrative difficulties and the increasing reluctance or inability of an over-
exploited and war-weary populace to continue to pay meant that taxation never 
produced the anticipated returns. Consequently, soldiers were usually in arrears of 
their pay or went unpaid, and this encouraged the prevalence of free quarter and 
looting, practices that were probably as widespread in Shropshire as elsewhere in 
England during the First Civil War. 
 The Royalists were placed to exploit Shropshire's financial resources and they 
succeeded in establishing mechanisms for doing so, while being able to effect 
necessary financial reform. Although sequestration remains a shadowy facet of 
Royalist finance, this study has suggested its effectiveness. However, as the 
Royalists lost both territory and support, including those gentry who sought 
financial settlement with the Parliamentarians, opportunities to gather revenue 
withered alongside the administrative structure for doing so. This increased the 
incidence of plunder and other coercive acts by Royalist soldiers as the First Civil 
War drew to an end. 
 Denied the territory that sustained the Royalist war effort, the Parliamentarians 
first drew resourcefully on expedient fiscal measures enacted away from 
Shropshire, largely in and around London. Although they lacked collective financial 
organisation - and the Earl of Denbigh's inability to impose financial control over 
the West Midland Association was more typical of Parliamentarian attempts at 
regional financial organisation than was the success of the Eastern Association - by 
tacit cooperation the committee of Shropshire and Sir Thomas Myddelton, backed at 
times by Denbigh and Sir William Brereton, financed war effort from scratch 
without much of a territorial base to draw on. Despite the limitations of their 
financial resources - the £27,000 or so that directly funded Sir Thomas Myddelton's 
brigade for the best part of two years seems insignificant against the near £34,000 
per month required in 1644 to finance the (greatly larger) army of the Eastern 
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Association259 - the Parliamentarians maintained forces in the field until being more 
able to implement taxation and to extract revenue from their disheartened or 
defeated opponents. The county committee in particular achieved considerable 
success as a money-raising body, although it lacked very wealthy members and for 
much of the conflict could only obtain limited revenues from Shropshire.  
 Apart from soldiers' wages, money was otherwise mostly spent in purchasing 
military supplies and funding logistical activity, actions of war effort that are the 
subject of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
Military Supplies and Logistics  
Logistics was the vital connective activity underpinning the overall war effort, 
encompassing the acquisition, transportation and distribution of supplies and war 
matériel of all kinds. Accordingly, this chapter examines the ways in which both 
sides provided for their forces in Shropshire. Addressed in turn are the methods 
used to procure arms and munitions, equipment, provisions, horses and provender, 
and the movement of military supplies around the theatre of war.  
Arms and munitions procurement 
Obtaining armaments was of course a pre-eminent activity of war effort. The 
majority of regular Civil War soldiers were equipped with firearms. It was the norm 
for two thirds and sometimes more of the foot to be musketeers. Dragoons, as 
mounted infantry, also carried muskets. The horse were armed with pistols, some 
also with carbines. The remaining foot soldiers and their officers carried staff 
weapons, mainly pikes, and most soldiers, mounted or on foot, wore a sword. The 
ordnance, in a range of calibres, comprised cannons and a smaller number of 
mortars, which all required an array of ancillary equipment. Match, a slow-burning 
cord, as a fuse was the means of ignition for the predominant type of infantry 
firearm, the matchlock musket, and also for artillery. Gunpowder was the 
propellant for ammunition, in the form of lead bullets for firearms, and cast-iron 
solid round shot and hollow grenades for cannon and mortars respectively.1  
 Apart from the equipment kept by individuals or in town or parish armouries for 
the trained militia, in Shropshire on the eve of civil war arms were also held in 
private ownership. In July 1635, three of his deputy lieutenants in Shropshire had 
reported to the Earl of Bridgewater their efforts to determine the weaponry 
available to equip the county's able men in the event of a wider call to arms:2                                                         
1 Among the plethora of publications dealing with general and particular aspects of the 
arming (and also the equipping and clothing) of English Civil War armies the most 
informative, especially for their illustrations, include: K. Roberts, Soldiers of the English Civil 
War (1): Infantry (London, 1989), and the companion volume, J. Tincey, Soldiers of the English 
Civil War (2): Cavalry (London, 1990); Haythornthwaite's English Civil War; and D. 
Blackmore, Arms & Armour of the English Civil Wars (London, 1990). For the artillery, see S. 
Bull, 'The Furie of the Ordnance', Artillery in the English Civil Wars (Woodbridge, 2008). 
2 HHL, Ellesmere Mss 7639, 7671, quotation from the latter. 
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We [...] have spoken to those of the better sort to provide themselves of arms 
for their particular uses and divers gents have some arms besides those for the 
use of the trained bands, but what the number of them is we know not, nor of 
 th   i  di  f  i  f t i d  
 
 
 
 
Whilst practicably unquantifiable, then, arms in private ownership were fairly 
widespread, although probate inventories compiled before the Civil War indicate 
the limited military usefulness of these weapons. Husbandmen and yeomen, 
gentlemen and lesser gentry owned bladed and staff weapons such as swords, 
daggers, bills and halberds. Those with firearms owned fowling pieces more than 
muskets, while some still had longbows and arrows.3 The spare equipment stored in 
parish armouries was probably often obsolescent. At Shrewsbury in 1637, for 
example, the arms of the parish of the Holy Cross included a sword and two old 
helmets as well as the well-maintained modern equipment for two trained 
bandsmen.4 Small supplies of munitions for exercising the Trained Bands were kept 
by town and parish officers, like the petty constables of Stockton who spent £2 on 
match and gunpowder to be used in training during 1640.5  
 On 13 January 1642 Parliament instructed the shires to take precautionary 
measures for security and defence.6 Accordingly, four days later a quorum of 
Shropshire's justices of peace, the high sheriff and the mayor of Shrewsbury met 
there in response. Their resultant directives suggest the state of the county's military 
preparedness.7 The county magazine at Shrewsbury then held 30 barrels of 
gunpowder and proportionate supplies of bullets and match. Orders were given for 
all arms kept on the county's behalf to be returned to Shrewsbury, other than the 
personal weapons of the trained bandsmen. The individual subscribers, parishes 
and town authorities who maintained the Trained Bands were commanded to 
provide the musketeers with ammunition, while wealthier gentry were instructed to 
'provide a convenient quantity of arms, powder and munition in their house for the 
defence of themselves and the county according to their several abilities'.  
The Royalists                                                         
3 SA, ‘Wem Probate Inventories, 1535-1650’, 2 vols. (undated); SA, 'Whitchurch Probate 
Inventories, 1535-1650', 2 vols. (undated). 
4 SA, P250/Fiche 321-2. 
5 SA, P270/B/1/1, ff. 46-7. 
6 JHC, II, pp. 377-8. 
7 SA, LB7/2315. 
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Local sources and manufactures 
The demands of civil war on Shropshire's arms-holdings began in earnest with the 
arrival of the King's army in the third week of September 1642. In other counties 
weapons had been taken from the militia to equip the army's recruits, but 
Shropshire's Royalist gentry lobbied to ensure that the shire's Trained Bands kept 
their equipment.8 Therefore arms had to be found elsewhere, so on 21 September 
High Sheriff John Weld issued warrants calling for public donations of weaponry to 
the magazine at Shrewsbury.9 This and similar appeals for the contents of private 
armouries resulted, according to Clarendon, in the accumulation of arms that were 
often 'very mean', the sort of obsolescent weaponry and elderly equipment like the 
four sets of pikeman's armour, four swords, a halberd and a pair of daggers taken 
from the town hall at Bridgnorth by officers of Colonel Pennyman's Regiment on 29 
September.10 Although the King's army commandeered a quantity of local 
weaponry, after its departure in mid-October much probably still remained. 
Shropshire's Royalist leadership therefore made intermittent appeals for arms in 
private hands. In March 1643, men from south Shropshire summoned for militia 
service were to bring whatever weaponry they owned, from which assemblage the 
useful arms would be allocated to the chosen recruits.11 Responding to Lord Capel's 
demand for horses and arms the following June, one William Young explained that 
he could donate only a fowling piece, having already armed a trooper and a 
dragoon.12 
 Arms given up by individuals were a diminishing resource, so the Royalist 
leadership in Shropshire soon sought alternative supplies. In October 1642 they 
ordered all gunsmiths in the county to work at Shrewsbury, 'so that we may have 
no muskets forged but what shall be for the King'.13 By January 1643 firearms were 
being manufactured (and probably also reconditioned) there, although not in 
sufficient quantity to provide a surplus to supply demand from Oxford.14 Output 
was superintended by Sir Francis Ottley, who in early April 1643 was entrusted by                                                         
8 Clarendon, History, II, p. 373. 
9 SA, LB7/2317. 
10 Clarendon, History, II, p. 373; SA, BB/C/8/1/7. 
11 SA, LB7/2235. 
12 'Ottley Papers' (1895), p. 338. 
13 SA, 6000/13292. 
14 'Ottley Papers' (1894), pp. 57, 59, 71-2. 
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Lord Capel with overseeing all supplies of arms in Shropshire.15 The production of 
small arms continued at Shrewsbury into 1644, in which a local joiner was engaged 
making musket stocks from stockpiled seasoned timber.16 
 Ottley's remit extended to the manufacture of bullets, and volume production 
was underway by April 1643 when Capel ordered the casting of a further half-ton of 
musket ball.17 Soldiers often cast their own shot, but plumbers had the necessary 
lead-working skills and the equipment to manufacture larger batches of ball to 
order. Thus bullets were made at Bridgnorth in 1642 by the plumber Richard 
Broadfield, and during a production run at Ludlow in 1643 two hundredweight of 
ball was cast by a local plumber in the vestry of St. Leonard's church.18  
 Metal and wood workers at Shrewsbury also adapted their skills to warlike 
production, including the manufacture and refurbishment of swords. In early 1643 a 
consignment of 43 new swords was made for 6s apiece, while the charge to fit a new 
hilt and guard to a reconditioned blade was 1s.19 From 1642 into 1644 the wooden 
and iron components for gun carriages and trails were made and assembled, along 
with gunnery tools including rammers, linstocks, sponges, budge barrels and 
gunpowder horns.20 Gunpowder cartridges for the cannon were made from hempen 
cloth produced locally.21  
 The Royalists also developed local production of match and gunpowder. The 
cultivation, processing and spinning of hemp and flax to make cord, rope and 
coarse cloth was a widespread productive cottage industry in Shropshire.22 
Recognising the county's potential as a source of raw material for the production of 
match for the wider Royalist war effort, in April 1643 King Charles instructed Sir 
Francis Ottley to send regular supplies to Worcester.23 That match was also 
manufactured in Shropshire is suggested by a request in May 1644 by Sir John 
Watts, governor of Chirk Castle, to Sir Abraham Shipman, then governor of                                                         
15 'Ottley Papers' (1895), p. 304. 
16 SA, P250/325. 
17 'Ottley Papers' (1895), p. 304. 
18 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/52; SA, LB8/1/163, f. 4. 
19 SA, 6000/13281. 
20 For example, SA, 3365/587, ff. 19, 34, 58; SA, 3365/588, ff. 45, 95. 
21 SA, 3365/587, f. 19. 
22 P. Edwards, 'Shropshire Agriculture 1540-1750' in A History of Shropshire Volume IV, 
Agriculture, (ed.) G.C. Baugh (Oxford, 1989), p. 147. 
23 'Ottley Papers' (1895), p. 316. 
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Oswestry, for his help in obtaining a supply of match from the magazine at 
Shrewsbury. Watts promised by way of exchange a fresh supply of raw material - 
'as much, or much more good flax'.24  
 The large-scale production of gunpowder was an industrialised operation 
requiring water-driven mills. Local processing was dependant on the availability of 
gunpowder's three ingredients - charcoal, sulphur and saltpetre (potassium nitrate). 
Charcoal was readily made in Shropshire, but sulphur (brimstone) could be 
obtained only as an import from the Mediterranean region. Saltpetre as the main 
constituent of gunpowder was also imported, but could be made locally in a lengthy 
process involving the extraction, distillation and crystalisation of the nitrogen-
enriched soil dug from latrines, stables, barns, dovecotes and middens.25 Evidence 
for the wartime extraction of raw material for saltpetre production at Shrewsbury 
appears in the accounts of the churchwardens of St. Mary's parish, who in 1646 paid 
6s for transporting 'earth to repair after the saltpetre men'.26 While production of 
gunpowder or its ingredients was underway at Shrewsbury by December 1642, by 
April 1643 the mills built at Shrewsbury and Chester that Lord Capel expected 
would supply the region were nearing completion.27 The Shrewsbury 'powder 
work' incurred operational costs of £177 between October 1643 and April 1644, 
when on the 13th there were eight barrels in stock.28 Output was locally and 
regionally important but limited by the availability of raw materials, especially 
sulphur, delivered to Shropshire via lengthy and vulnerable supply lines. By 
autumn 1644 gunpowder production at Shrewsbury was becoming unsustainable, 
as Sir Michael Ernle despondently reported, 'for the want of brimstone and other 
materials'.29 
 These local initiatives to manufacture war matériel had varying success, but the 
most significant contribution Shropshire industry made to the wider Royalist war 
effort was the production of ordnance and shot, and also bar iron and steel. In 1611 
John Speed wrote that Shropshire had iron and abundant woodland, 'which two [...] 
continue not long in league together', an allusion to the by then well-established                                                         
24 WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 106. 
25 Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 107-8. 
26 SA, P257/B/3/2, unfoliated. 
27 'Ottley Papers' (1894), p. 49; NLW, Crosse of Shaw Hill Mss, 1097. 
28 SA, 3365/588, f. 18. 
29 BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 253. 
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county iron industry in which local and imported ore was smelted, cast and worked 
in charcoal-fired blast furnaces and forges.30 During the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries a scattering of upwards of 40 foundries, forges and slitting 
mills operated along Shropshire's river valleys under the auspices of some of the 
county's entrepreneurial landed families. Shropshire's iron industry was of growing 
national importance at the outbreak of civil war, although output was modest 
compared to England's main iron-production region, the Weald.31 
 Any warlike production in Shropshire before 1642 remains unknown, but the 
local iron masters quickly adapted to the demands of the Royalist war effort, 
including mastering the technically exacting process of gun founding. In this 
transition the enigmatic Mathias Gervase played an important, if now unknown, 
supervisory role. Gervase may have been a foreign expert who brought Continental 
expertise to the Shropshire industry. By March 1643 he was superintending the 
foundry at Leighton, nine miles south-east of Shrewsbury beside the River Severn, 
where cannon shot and grenades - both mortar shells and hand grenades - were 
being cast by the ton for the Royalists at Chester, Oxford and in Staffordshire.32 
 During 1643-4 Gervase held authority from King Charles's Council of War at 
Oxford to regulate the production of foundries in Shropshire and Staffordshire.33 
The furnace at Leighton meanwhile continued to specialise in casting shot and 
shells, and during April 1644 increased production to meet demand from Oxford for 
the forthcoming campaigning season.34 Shot was also cast at the foundry operated 
by Francis Walker at Bouldon, in the lee of the iron ore-bearing Clee Hills north-east 
of Ludlow. Walker had pre-war operational experience of the county iron industry 
and successfully introduced gun founding at Bouldon, and also to the blast furnace 
he had operated under lease in the 1620s at Bringewood, on the 
Shropshire/Herefordshire border.35 During 1643, at least 43 medium and heavy iron 
cannon in three calibres were cast at Bouldon for Royalist garrisons as far afield as                                                         
30 Speed, Great Britaine, p. 71.  
31 R. Hayman, 'The Shropshire Wrought-Iron Industry, c. 1600-1900' (PhD thesis, University 
of Birmingham, 2003), pp. 28-31; W.H.B. Court, The Rise of the Midland Industries, 1600-1838 
(London, 1965), p. 82; B. Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire (Chichester, 2000),    
p. 20. 
32 'Ottley Papers' (1895), pp. 287-92. 
33 BL, Harley Mss 6804, f. 226. 
34 BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 130. 
35 Hayman, 'Iron Industry', p. 28. 
 149 
Shrewsbury, Worcester, Oxford and South Wales, for which Walker charged £965.36 
Four pieces were sent to equip a Royalist warship fitted out at Chester.37 
Meanwhile, ordnance for the defence of Ludlow and Shrewsbury was also cast at 
Bringewood.38 During 1644 Walker fulfilled further orders for cannon and 
munitions for Royalist garrisons in Worcestershire - at Hartlebury, Evesham and 
Worcester - and Sudeley Castle in Gloucestershire.39 But production had probably 
ceased at Bouldon before June 1645 when enemy garrisons were established nearby. 
 In July 1645 Walker was paid for supplying bar iron to make fittings for the 
drawbridges defending Ludlow.40 Probably one of Walker's last orders, it provides 
evidence of the production of finished raw material by Shropshire's iron industry. 
This supplied manufactories of armaments for the Royalist war effort at Worcester 
and Oxford, and in what later became the industrialised Black Country of southern 
Staffordshire and northern Worcestershire, particularly the forges clustered along 
the Stour valley on Shropshire's south-eastern border.41 Three tons of bar iron and 
nine tons of shot delivered at Oxford from Worcester on 18 May 1644, for example, 
were most likely cast in Bouldon's foundry.42 The forge on the River Roden near 
Moreton Corbet also produced bar iron, for during a raid on the area in May 1644 
the Parliamentarians reportedly captured ‘six loads of iron’.43 Little is known of the 
wartime production of Sir Basil Brooke's ironworks at Madeley, but the haul of 
finished iron and steel, including nine tons of annealed plate, taken when the 
Parliamentarians seized the works in June 1645 had probably been intended for the 
Royalist war effort.44 
Other sources of supply 
Because local producers could provide only some of the armaments they required, 
the Royalists in Shropshire relied on supplies from further afield - especially from 
Oxford, Worcester and Bristol. Oxford, the Royalist wartime capital, became a 
centre for the manufacture and distribution of armaments. Arms and munitions                                                         
36 CSPD, 1641-1644, p. 488; CSPD, 1644, p. 22. 
37 NLW, Llanfair-Brynodol Letters, 58. 
38 CPCC, II, p. 1484; SA, 3365/587, f. 14. 
39 BL, Harley Mss 6802, ff. 72, 113, 218; CSPD, 1644, p. 22; Townsend, Diary, II, p. 257. 
40 SA, LB8/1/165, f. 1. 
41 Hayman, 'Iron Industry', p. 23; ROP, I, pp. 35-6 
42 ROP, I, p. 134. 
43 Malbon, Memorials, p. 131; Hayman, 'Iron Industry', p. 31. 
44 TNA, SP23/105, f. 201. 
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supplied from Oxford for Lord Capel's forces in Shropshire included the 150 
muskets, 20 barrels of gunpowder, and match and bullets delivered to Shrewsbury 
in November 1643.45 Similarly, the 21 firkins of gunpowder and 20 bundles of match 
received at Shrewsbury on 10 April 1644 were among the deliveries from Oxford for 
Prince Rupert's command.46 Worcester was an entrepôt for consignments from 
Oxford and for the output of regional arms manufacturers. When Prince Rupert was 
briefly based at Ludlow in March 1645 he intended to equip his infantry with pikes 
fitted with the points stockpiled at Worcester forged in Worcestershire and 
Staffordshire.47 Bristol, second only to London as the kingdom's most important 
seaport, after the Royalists captured it in July 1643 became a major arms 
manufacturing centre and a vital point of entry for imported armaments.48  
 In fact imports played a major part in sustaining the Royalist war effort 
nationally.49 Much of the arms and munitions passing through Oxford and 
Worcester to Shropshire would have originated on the Continent. Prince Rupert 
took command of the region in early 1644 with the intention of supplying his forces 
in Shropshire with imported armaments arriving at Bristol and Royalist-held ports 
in south-western England. At Chester, his deputy Lord Byron anticipated receiving 
a proportion of the 2,000 muskets Rupert hoped to receive, but in practice optimistic 
expectations were confounded by shortages caused by irregular shipments and 
demand from strategic imperatives elsewhere.50 In January 1644, Bristol's stock of 
gunpowder was diminished and awaited replenishment from a 500-barrel 
consignment from the Netherlands recently landed at Exeter. Accordingly, on 13 
February one of his aides wrote from Bristol to temper Rupert's expectations for 
munitions from there: 'I am afraid you will find yourself very much mistaken in the 
quantity which you believe here, and more in the care which should provide 
them'.51 Delays in sending from Bristol to Shrewsbury by mid-March just 200 
muskets and 100 barrels of gunpowder - considerably less than half the 
consignment that had seemed deliverable a month before - caused much apologetic                                                         
45 TNA, WO55/459/Part 3, f. 481; ROP, II, p. 305. 
46 TNA, WO55/459/Part 1, f. 53. 
47 Warburton, Prince Rupert, III, p. 68. 
48 Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 79, 90, 205. 
49 Ibid., pp. 210-11. 
50 BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 60. 
51 Ibid., ff. 11, 36. 
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back-peddling at Oxford by Lord Percy, the Master-General of Ordnance, and by 
the influential courtier Henry Jermyn.52 Priority had been given instead to 
equipping the Oxford army and Lord Hopton's western army, which between them 
during March had received the bulk of 3,000 new muskets.53  
 However, Prince Rupert's resounding victory at Newark on 21 March 1644 
provided a twofold solution to his armaments shortage. Firstly, the victory 
reconfirmed Rupert's military and political standing at Oxford, so that by the 28th 
he had been allocated 140 barrels of gunpowder at Bristol and supplies of sulphur 
there and at Oxford.54 Secondly, the Prince's field army could be equipped from the 
arms and munitions surrendered by the defeated Parliamentarians. On 28 March, 
from Leicester the Earl of Denbigh reported the imminent departure from the East 
Midlands of the Royalists for Shropshire, with the armaments taken at Newark 
loaded onto requisitioned carts, a haul estimated by a Royalist officer at Shrewsbury 
as including 40 barrels of gunpowder and 5,000 weapons.55 As the war continued 
Royalist stocks of arms and munitions in Shropshire were also supplemented by 
local captures, like the 22 pairs of new pistols reportedly taken by Sir William 
Vaughan's Horse in December 1644 in a cavalry skirmish near Welshpool.56 
The Parliamentarians 
It remains uncertain to what extent local manufacture contributed to the 
Parliamentarian war effort. The production of grenades, at least, ceased when the 
Royalists lost control of the foundries, for by December 1645 the Parliamentarians in 
Shropshire could not obtain mortar shells.57 Parliament's forces campaigning in and 
around the county were equipped instead mostly from London. Purchases were 
made on the arms market, while under the direction of Parliament and its executive 
committees supplies were issued from central magazines operated by the 
Committee of Safety and the Ordnance Office. These arsenals were replenished in 
turn by home manufactures and by Continental imports.58 
 Lobbying was a prerequisite to obtaining Parliament's centrally kept supplies.                                                         
52 Warburton, Prince Rupert, I, pp. 503, 508, II, p. 380; BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 92; Day, 
Pythouse Papers, pp. 58-9, 60-2. 
53 Day, Pythouse Papers, pp. 60-1; Warburton, Prince Rupert, II, p. 388. 
54 BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 113. 
55 CSPD, 1644, pp. 75-6; Lewis, Fire and Sword, p. 71. 
56 Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 5 Jan. 1645, p. 1325. 
57 LBWB, II, p. 349. 
58 Blackmore, Arms & Armour, pp. 5-6; Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 199-200. 
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Responding to an appeal from the committee of Shropshire in February 1644, on the 
26th the newly formed Committee of Both Kingdoms recommended to Parliament 
the provision of 20 barrels of gunpowder and one ton of match for Colonel 
Mytton.59 The Commons concurred on 1 March, ordering the release of powder and 
match from the Committee of Safety's magazine. The Commons the same day also 
allotted arms and munitions to Sir Thomas Myddelton, including 40 barrels of 
gunpowder and a half-ton of match from the Committee of Safety's magazine, and 
petards (demolition charges) from the Ordnance Office's stores in the Tower of 
London.60 In a further example of this procedure, a warrant from the Committee of 
Both Kingdoms allowed Sir John Corbet on 2 April 1645 to take delivery for the 
Shropshire forces of 30 barrels of gunpowder from the Ordnance Office stores and 
quantities of match and bullets soon after.61 However, these central supplies were 
not always forthcoming. On 8 December 1645 the Committee of Both Kingdoms 
directed the Ordnance Office to provide Corbet with a demi-cannon and a mortar, 
together with 20 barrels of gunpowder, match and bullets.62 But due to oversight, 
carelessness or shortage, the Committee had to re-submit the warrant on 10 March 
1646. A further warrant from the Committee of the Army was required for Corbet to 
receive the mortar piece on 10 April, along with some match. But it was not until 4 
May that Corbet finally took delivery of the brass demi-cannon.63 The siege gun 
came from the Ordnance Office stores, and because armaments from the central 
arsenals were often charged for, it cost the committee of Shropshire £76. During 
summer 1643, munitions provided for the Earl of Denbigh from the Committee of 
Safety's magazine had similarly been charged to his account.64 
 However, the central magazines were an unpredictable source of supply because 
of administrative delays, shortages and competition from other Parliamentary 
armies. Therefore the Parliamentarian war effort in Shropshire was sustained also 
by purchases made on the open market, from producers or their intermediaries and 
from arms merchants and dealers. Armaments were bought from leading 
manufacturers supplying Parliament's wider war effort. In August 1643, for                                                         
59 CSPD, 1644, p. 26. 
60 JHC, III, p. 412. 
61 WSL, SMS 463, unfoliated; CSPD, 1644-1645, p. 404. 
62 CSPD, 1645-1646, p. 252. 
63 WSL, SMS 463, unfoliated. 
64 TNA, SP28/34 Part 2, f. 291. 
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instance, the Earl of Denbigh purchased bullet moulds and 16 hundredweight of 
ball from John Montgomery, one of the capital's most productive shot casters.65 Sir 
Thomas Myddelton meanwhile bought pole-arms from Anthony Webster, the 
prominent London pike maker who later supplied the New Model Army. The cutler 
Stephen Heard, another long-term contractor to Parliamentary forces, delivered 400 
swords at 6s apiece to Myddelton's London storehouse in early April 1644.66 That 
month Myddelton's agents also purchased grenades from the London agent of John 
Browne, the pre-eminent gun founder with works in the Weald who before the Civil 
War held the royal monopoly to supply shot and iron ordnance.67 The London 
market also provided artillery and associated equipment. In 1643, as well as 
ordnance received from the Tower armoury the Earl of Denbigh purchased six small 
cannon, known as drakes, at £22 per pair.68 A light cannon supplied to Sir Thomas 
Myddelton's brigade in April 1644 cost almost £6.69 Meanwhile John Arundel, 
Myddelton's master gunner, purchased the tools of his trade, including fuses, 
artillery tools and nine hundredweight of round shot.70 The capital was also the 
main source of firearms; by the end of August 1643 the Earl of Denbigh had 
acquired around 1,000 small arms there. Arms shipments from London to Coventry 
under Denbigh's direction were ongoing, including a consignment of 80 new 
muskets delivered in January 1644.71 Firearms purchased for Sir Thomas 
Myddelton's brigade during 1644 included a batch of 250 new matchlock muskets at 
15s 6d apiece, and 121 reconditioned muskets costing £27 11s.72 From September 
1644 to January 1645 Myddelton's brigade received in all 1,150 matchlock and 
flintlock muskets.73  
 In May 1645 the committee at Shrewsbury awaited the arrival by way of 
Coventry of 400 muskets from London, and also expected a consignment of firearms 
imported via the Parliamentarian port of Hull - an example that armaments were 
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obtained elsewhere than the capital.74 By April 1645 the committee was also buying 
gunpowder and match from the Manchester-based dealer William Sunderland. An 
order for 50 barrels of gunpowder at £6 each was then in hand, although 
Sunderland's price for match was an expensive £50 per ton.75 Another example of a 
provincial supplier was Robert Porter, a cutler from West Bromwich near 
Birmingham who made swords for the West Midland Association. On 6 May 1644 
Porter delivered a consignment of 200 swords with belts, at 7s 1d apiece.76 That 
April one of Denbigh's commissary officers at Coventry had received 31 new 
firearms from another local manufacturer, the gunsmith John Launder.77  
 The bulk purchases of arms by Parliamentarian commanders were supplemented 
by the private purchases made by junior officers to equip their own troops or 
companies. Lieutenant Thomas Perkins, for example, on joining the major's troop of 
the Earl of Denbigh's Horse in March 1644 bought 27 pairs of wheel lock pistols 
with holsters, costing £53 6s 6d.78 The Parliamentarians also benefited from the 
reuse of captured arms. While serving in Shropshire Captain Anthony Hungerford 
armed his company in part by buying weapons captured by his own men or other 
soldiers, paying a bounty of 5s for a flintlock musket, 2s for a matchlock and 1s per 
pike.79 
Clothing and equipment 
In addition to clothing and footwear, standard items of soldiers' personal 
equipment included sword belts, knapsacks, body armour, helmets and the 
bandoliers worn by musketeers. As with armaments, local producers in Shropshire 
provided the Royalists with much of what they needed. At Ludlow, during 1643 
tradespeople supplied soldiers' clothing, stockings, boots, shoes and other items of 
personal equipment, while in 1644 the tailor Owen Jones clothed Colonel Van 
Geyrish's horsemen.80 Also during 1643 Shrewsbury leather workers and other 
craftspeople had supplied the garrison with scabbards, and also bandoliers at 2s 
apiece. Armour and helmets were refurbished and there was also some small-scale                                                         
74 LBWB, I, p. 343. 
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production of armour, because in May a local blacksmith supplied a cavalry officer 
with a new breast and backplate.81  
 From Shrewsbury in early February 1644 Sir John Mennes reported that shoes 
and stockings for 1,700 Royalist foot soldiers could be made locally, while 500 
finished suits of clothes (probably comprising caps, coats, breeches and shirts, 
together with stockings and shoes) were already in store.82 Before the Civil War 
Shrewsbury, and Oswestry to a lesser extent, were regional centres for finishing and 
marketing cloth produced in Mid and North Wales. A directory of mercantile trade 
published in 1638 had noted that Shrewsbury was 'much enriched by their trade for 
cottons and friezes, with their neighbours the Welsh'.83 Notwithstanding the 
disruptive and depressing effect of the war on trade, the Royalist war effort 
provided an alternative market for the wares of Welsh cloth producers, made into 
military clothing at Shrewsbury and elsewhere. In early August 1644, coats and caps 
in uniform colours made in and around Welshpool in Montgomeryshire for two of 
Prince Rupert's infantry regiments were stored in the nearby Royalist garrison at the 
Red Castle, along with a batch of red cloth for clothing the Prince's Regiment of 
Horse.84 However, the loss of Oswestry and later Shrewsbury and the inroads into 
Wales made by Myddelton's brigade from autumn 1644 denied the Royalists 
sources of cloth and centres for manufacture. Consequently, when Prince Rupert 
was at Ludlow in March 1645 attending to logistical matters he ordered soldiers' 
clothing from Oxford and Bristol.85 
 The Parliamentarians also made use of Welsh cloth. A consignment they 
captured at Oswestry in June 1644 intended for Price Rupert's army instead clothed 
the Shropshire forces and the Earl of Denbigh's Regiment of Foot.86 However, the 
capital remained the main source of equipment for Parliamentarian forces 
campaigning in and around Shropshire. Coats for Sir Thomas Myddelton's foot 
soldiers were made in London in October 1644, and among the other purchases 
there during 1644 for Myddelton's brigade were 300 bandoliers at 14d each, and the 
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300 knapsacks bought off James Gough, a leading supplier of leather ware to 
Parliamentary forces.87 Equipment acquired by the Earl of Denbigh in London 
during summer 1643 included 83 sets of cavalryman's armour - enough, perhaps, to 
equip fully half of the four troops then being raised - and 300 'Swedish feathers', a 
defensive stake used by musketeers.88 Meanwhile, the Greenwich-based master 
armourer Thomas Stevens made Denbigh’s own amour.89 An example of the use of 
regional suppliers was the purchase by the Shropshire committeeman Thomas Hunt 
of 74 pairs of soldiers' shoes at Nantwich on 1 December 1644.90 
The supply of provisions  
An adequate and reliable supply of food was of course essential to military 
operations, to maintain the effectiveness, wellbeing and loyalty of the soldiery. 
Hunger lowered morale and induced desertion, as Sir John Mennes found in early 
February 1644 when he reported that Royalist cavalry at Shrewsbury were 'ready to 
disband for want of victuals'.91 Civil War armies obtained most of their foodstuffs 
locally, so Shropshire agriculture had to sustain this vital function of war effort. 
 The occasional dearth caused by poor harvests notwithstanding, farming in 
Shropshire in the mid-seventeenth century was productive and well developed. 
Commentators noted the county's agrarian prosperity. In 1611 John Speed described 
Shropshire as a near-idyllic land, 'very fruitful for life'; the air was 'wholesome', and 
the climate 'delectable and good, yielding the spring and the autumn, seed time and 
harvest, in a temperate condition'. Cornfields and woodland flourished on the fertile 
soil of a 'fruitful' land.92 Sixty years later Richard Blome, another geographer, more 
prosaically echoed Speed's assessment of Shropshire: 'It is a fertile soil, both for 
tillage and pasturage, abounding in wheat and barley, is well clothed with wood, 
feedeth store of cattle'.93  
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 Cattle were indeed the mainstay of Shropshire's farming economy.94 Pastoralism 
predominated on the central and northern lowlands and there were strong ties to 
the Welsh cattle-rearing trade. Traditionally cattle had been kept for beef, but 
during the seventeenth century the north Shropshire plain became a notable 
dairying region. Sheep were of secondary importance, and large flocks were kept on 
the county's uplands and heath land. Shropshire wool was noted for its fineness, 
and there was growth in mutton production. Pig keeping was being developed on a 
commercial scale, often in association with dairying. 
 Early modern Shropshire has been characterised as 'a good example of a cattle 
rearing, meat-producing county'.95 But notwithstanding the primacy of livestock 
keeping, by the 1640s arable farming was expanding in an increasingly mixed 
agriculture. At the close of the seventeenth century Richard Gough found his own 
parish, in a predominantly pastoral area, yielding corn as good as the notably 
productive fields on the plain above the River Severn near Wroxeter, which together 
with the valley of the Tern and easterly parts of the county were important arable 
districts.96 Enclosure and the improvement of marginal land encouraged more 
widespread development of arable. In 1649, a proponent of agricultural betterment 
cited Shropshire as noteworthy for the 'improvements made upon coarse lands', to 
the extent that it was one of several agriculturally improved shires become 'as 
gallant corn countries as be in England'.97 Wheat was grown for flour, but in 
Shropshire bread was more often made from barley and rye. Barley was also grown 
for malt, while oats and peas were often cultivated as fodder crops. 
 Notwithstanding a developing inter-regional trade in livestock and produce, 
most transactions in animals, corn and provisions were made at the seasonal fairs 
and weekly markets held at Shropshire's 18 market towns and larger villages.98 On                                                         
94 The following summary of Shropshire's agricultural economy at this time draws on 
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Thursdays at Wem, for example, there was a large market for cattle and produce, 
while the Wednesday market at Market Drayton specialised in horses and cattle.99 
Shrewsbury's six annual fairs and the livestock markets held regularly at Ellesmere, 
Oswestry, Bridgnorth and Ludlow were important for animal husbandry. During 
the Civil Wars markets and fairs were vulnerable to military action. Trade was 
threatened by unlicensed plundering, and events were sometimes targeted to deny 
provisions to the enemy and as calculated acts of retribution. This happened on 1 
August 1644, when Colonel Mytton led a party of Parliamentary horse to disrupt 
the Lammas, or harvest, fair at the county town, beforehand having 'charged the 
country not to carry provisions to the enemy into Shrewsbury, which many 
malignants did'. In a cross-country sweep to the south of the town Mytton's troopers 
reportedly 'drove away to a great number of horse, cows and sheep and did much 
hinder the fair'.100  
 Sometimes food was forcibly taken from civilians as well as livestock. Thomas 
Crosse of Ludlow, for one, complained of Royalist soldiers 'throwing open my 
larder and spoiling all that was in it'.101 However, soldiers were usually fed by more 
legitimate ways, taking board in their billets from civilian hosts, or issued rations by 
the commissariat on campaign or in garrison. Accordingly, during 1643 and 1644 
Shrewsbury and Ludlow householders claimed a daily allowance of six pence for 
providing two meals and drink for each Royalist infantryman lodging with them.102 
The Royalist force that besieged Oswestry from 29 June 1644 carried with it a supply 
of provisions, much of which was abandoned in their retreat on 2 July. 
Consequently Sir Thomas Myddelton reported the capture of several vehicles 
'loaded with provisions, [such] as beer, bread and other necessaries'.103 From 
November 1644 to January 1645 Colonel Devillier's Royalist garrison at Leigh Hall 
regularly received victuals from the surrounding countryside, including quarters of 
beef, and sides of mutton and bacon, cheese, butter and poultry.104 Bread does not 
appear to have featured among these supplies, but the garrison received deliveries 
of rye and so baked its own. Elsewhere local bakers provided this staple of the                                                         
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military diet, and sometime in 1644 the parish of Stockton supplied the Royalist 
garrison at Tong Castle with 220 lbs of bread.105 
 
 
Township 
(17 in total) 
 
Sorts of Provision 
By weight or volume/number of consignments 
 
Cheese 
lbs 
Butter 
lbs 
Bacon 
lbs 
Wheat 
strikes 
Barley 
strikes 
Rye 
strikes 
 
Cash 
Equivalent 
Sum 
Alkmond Parva [Park] 283/3 - - - - - £2 7s  
Allbright Lee - - - - - 15/1 £1 13s  
Astley 72/2 - - - - - 12s  
Battlefield 96/2 5/1 - 1/1 - - £1 3s  
Clive 327/4 12/1 - - - - £2 7s 
Coton - - - - 5/1 26 ½/3 £10 12s  
Great Berwick 183/1 - - - - - £1 11s  
Great Hanwood 108/1 25/1 - 3/1 - - £1 10s  
Hadnall 240/5 - - 1/1 - - £2 4s  
Harlescott 343/7 4/1 - - - 2/1 £3 5s  
Hencott 300/7 21/1 26/1 1/1 - 13 ½/2 £5 4s 
Little Berwick 264/3 25½/2 - - - - £2 13s 
Newton and Edgebold 478/12 8½/1 6/1 - - - £4 6s  
Newton on the Heath 77/4 - - - - 2/1 £1 
Nobold 346/2 8/2 - 5/1 - - £3 11s  
Stone Bridge 50/2 - - - - 2/1 15s  
Wollascott - 7/1 - - - 3/1 10s  
 
Totals 
 
3,167/55 116/11 32/2 11/5 5/1 64/10 £45 3s 
 
Table 8: List of sorts, quantities and cash-equivalent values of provisions supplied as 
contribution from the Shrewsbury area, 1644.106 Sums rounded to the nearest shilling. 
 
 
 The provisions the local constablewicks provided for Devillier's men were given 
in part payment of contribution taxes. As already noted, by 1644 up to half of 
contributions could be made with food or provender. In Shropshire the equivalent 
cash value per pound weight for cheese was 2d, for butter 4d and bacon 3d. Wheat, 
at 4s per strike, was the most expensive bread corn, with barley the cheapest at 2s 2d 
per strike.107  
 Table 8 lists produce given in lieu of cash as contribution delivered into the                                                         
105 SA, P270/B/1/1, f. 55. 
106 Source: SA, 3365/2572, ff. 1-3. 
107 Townsend, Diary, II, p. 164; SA, 3365/2572, ff. 1-3. 
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Royalist garrison at Shrewsbury, from one town ward and 16 rural townships 
within a seven-mile northerly radius. The table is compiled from the loose folios of 
an incomplete and undated ledger. Its association with other documents relating to 
contributions in the Shrewsbury area indicates that the surviving entries represent a 
three-month accounting period over high summer 1644. These records are 
dominated by deliveries of what amounted to more than 28 hundredweight of 
cheese, which together with bread was a staple in the diet of the Civil War soldier. 
Evidence elsewhere suggests that Shropshire's productive dairying economy was 
able to meet the military's demand for this important commodity. In July 1644, for 
example, one ton of Shropshire cheese was sent to Bridgnorth and on to Worcester 
in order to supply the Oxford army. Furthermore, the following September farmers 
in the Buildwas area sent 12-hundredweight of cheese to Shrewsbury in part-
payment of contribution at the usual twopenny rate per pound.108 Table 8 also lists 
smaller quantities of butter and bacon, characteristic products of local dairying. The 
predominance of rye among cereal crops in Shropshire is also apparent.  
 Grain or milled flour and other preserved foodstuffs such as cheese and bacon 
could be kept in magazines to provide a reserve of provisions. By March 1646 the 
Royalists besieged in High Ercall Hall depended on their store of powdered meat 
and made bread from their stored grain.109 Prince Rupert in particular recognised 
the importance of securing food supplies, whether to sustain field operations or to 
endure a prolonged siege. Although on 2 February 1644 Sir Richard Newport had 
written forewarning him that Shrewsbury was 'altogether un-provided of a 
magazine of victuals', after the Prince arrived in Shropshire provisions were 
amassed at the main Royalist garrisons.110 During March, warrants were sent into 
the countryside around Bridgnorth to deliver provisions there, and on the 30th 
Rupert's Commissary General Sir William Bellenden optimistically reported that at 
Shrewsbury, 'there comes in great store of provisions, so that we do promise your 
highness a full magazine of corn at your return'.111 Foodstuffs contributed from the 
easterly hundreds of Stottesdon and Brimstree went to Bridgnorth, while Ludlow 
received supplies from southerly Overs hundred.112                                                         
108 'Ottley Papers' (1896), pp. 247, 253. 
109 A Copy of the Summons [...] Also the taking of High-Arkall, p. 2. 
110 BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 24. 
111 Ibid., f. 117. 
112 SA, 3365/2711, f. 22, order of Prince Rupert's commissioners at Shrewsbury, 2 May 1644. 
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 Shropshire farming fed soldiers there and also supplied military operations 
further afield. Before the Civil War the county had met its obligation for purveyance 
by paying cash in lieu of produce. In March 1643, however, food rather than money 
was demanded, when a Royalist commissary officer arrived at Shrewsbury from 
Oxford bearing a royal warrant, to 'bring thence divers provisions for our 
household and army'.113 In early June 1644 provisions were sent from Bridgnorth 
downriver to Bewdley in Worcestershire to supply a division of the Oxford army 
led by King Charles then operating in the region.114 That month Sir Michael 
Woodhouse agreed regularly to send provisions from Ludlow to Royalist 
Worcester, giving orders on the 17th for a 'good store of victuals, bakers' goods, 
quantities of butter, cheese, bacon and malts to be provided and sent forthwith'.115 
The Parliamentarians in turn could eventually spare supplies to support operations 
elsewhere, so in November 1645 provisions from Shropshire were sent to Sir 
William Brereton's army besieging Chester.116 
 It remains to consider the war effort's impact on the Shropshire cattle trade, and 
here again the evidence is of Royalist activity. The herds appropriated by the 
military provided a ready supply of fresh meat. In 1644, for example, around 60 
head of cattle kept by the garrison at Ludlow were grazed at the expense of the 
townsfolk's pastureland.117 The Royalists sought to control the cattle trade but 
found it difficult to regulate, as an anonymous memorandum to Prince Rupert, 
undated but probably written in later 1644, makes clear.118 It disclosed a widespread 
clandestine trade, in which oxen, steers and dairy cows driven from Wales into 
south Shropshire were exchanged in deals struck surreptitiously away from the 
established livestock markets. The cattle were then herded from Shropshire into 
south Staffordshire in small numbers so as to avert suspicion, and (with the alleged 
connivance of Royalist garrisons nearby) driven through Warwickshire to 
Parliamentarian Coventry or onward to London. The report named two chief 
middlemen from south Staffordshire - who had recently been 'to Bridgnorth [...] and 
went up and down the county and bought many cattle and have many agents for                                                         
113 BL, Harley Mss 6851, f. 143. 
114 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/54. 
115 SA, LB7/2251. 
116 LBWB, II, pp. 206-7, 222. 
117 SA, LB7/2125. 
118 WSL, SMS 5513. 
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them' - and stressed the strategic importance of controlling trade: 'If those cattle 
were brought to Worcester there happily they might be better fed at the spring and 
so conveyed to Oxford unto the King's friends'. The memorandum concluded by 
recommending to Prince Rupert that unauthorised trading should be suppressed 
and the cattle seized. It is therefore likely that in March 1645 Sir Lewis Kirk acted 
with the Prince's authority when obstructing the spring droves heading for 
Staffordshire passing within reach of his garrison at Bridgnorth. In south Shropshire 
meanwhile Sir Michael Woodhouse also adopted a characteristically ruthless policy 
of containment. This prompted the Archbishop of York, from his fastness at 
Conway in north-west Wales, to protest in January 1645 to Prince Rupert against 
Woodhouse's 'oppression' of the Welsh cattle droves, which he described as 'the 
Spanish fleet of North Wales which brings hither the little gold and silver we 
have'.119  
Obtaining horses and provender 
Like most pre-mechanised armies, those of the Civil Wars depended on horses for 
their mobility in combat and on the march. Cavalry and dragoons took their place in 
the line of battle, and undertook more routine duties such as reconnaissance, 
convoy escort and raids upon enemy outposts. Consequently a large proportion of 
the opposing armies were horse soldiers, in comparison to the usually more 
numerous and cheaper to equip foot. At the battle of Edgehill in 1642 the ratio of 
horse to foot was probably around one to two point five, while by 1645 the balance 
in the field armies on both sides was nearer one to one.120 Sometimes substantial 
numbers of horsemen were deployed in Shropshire, as in July 1645, when, on the 
4th, in an all-mounted engagement in Corvedale around 400 Royalist horse defeated 
seven Parliamentarian troops. The fighting around High Ercall the next day may 
have involved around 1,500 horsemen.121 In addition to mounting the cavalry and 
dragoons, horses were used as draught animals in the artillery, baggage and supply 
trains of the armies, and also for other ancillary tasks. In October 1644, for example, 
Shrewsbury's corporation hired mounts locally for Prince Rupert's tax collectors.122 
 Large numbers of suitable animals were essential to military operations, so horse                                                         
119 Warburton, Prince Rupert, I, p. 503, II, p. 386, quotation from III, p. 56. 
120 Foard, Naseby, p. 207. 
121 BL, Harley Mss 6852, f. 274. 
122 SA, 3365/588, f. 45. 
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procurement became a vital activity of war effort. In this respect the outbreak of war 
in 1642 was propitious, for by then, as Edwards has demonstrated, 'the warring 
parties could draw upon a reasonable stock of horses'.123 During the 100 years 
preceding the Civil Wars there had been significant improvement in both the 
number and quality of horses across England and Wales, in what was of course an 
era of popular horse-ownership for riding and for haulage.124 The increase in the 
national horse stock was reflected in Shropshire, where during the early Stuart 
period horse breeding was widespread but usually undertaken on a small scale, 
mostly by yeomen farmers.125 However, wealthier individuals also bred and kept 
larger numbers of horses. For example, when Sir Andrew Corbet (father of Royalist 
colonel Sir Vincent) died in 1637, he owned 28 horses including two stallions and 
ten colts.126   
 The military preparations that the Privy Council required the shires of Caroline 
England to make for the defence of the kingdom involved horses. While ensuring 
that the county horse troop was mounted adequately, a lord lieutenant and his 
deputies were also entrusted to maintain muster rolls of vehicles and teams, and 
also of 'nags to mount shot on' - a reserve of horses to mount musketeers as a corps 
of dragoons.127 Accordingly, in summer 1635 Shropshire's deputy lieutenants 
dutifully sent the Earl of Bridgewater rolls of draught and riding horses, while a 
muster of the County Troop was planned for 10 September.128 Furthermore, in 1640 
Shropshire had to provide 40 draught horses for the Royal army during the Second 
Bishops' War.129 
 Civil War armies obtained horses in five ways: via more or less voluntary 
donation; via requisitioning; via outright theft; via purchase; and via the enemy. 
Early in the war the Royalists exploited Shropshire's equine population to mount 
locally raised units and also to provide remounts for horse soldiers posted to the 
county, like Sir Henry Crowe's Dragoons who during summer 1643 received horses                                                         
123 P. Edwards, 'The Supply of Horses to the Parliamentarian and Royalist Armies in the 
English Civil War, Historical Research, 68 (1995), p. 56. 
124 Ibid., pp. 53-6; Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 155-7. 
125 Edwards, 'Shropshire Agriculture', p. 160. 
126 SA, 322/4/5, Corbet's probate inventory. 
127 HHL, Ellesmere Mss 7639: Bridgewater's instructions of 9 May 1635 to Shropshire's 
deputy lieutenants, referring to the Privy Council's standing orders from July 1626. 
128 HHL, Ellesmere Mss 7639, 7671, 7673. 
129 SA, 1831/1/5/8, order to the Drapers' Company of Shrewsbury, Apr. 1640. 
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obtained by Sir Francis Ottley.130 Later of course the Parliamentarians found it 
commensurably more difficult to obtain horses in Shropshire, hence in October 1643 
Sir Thomas Myddelton could see no possibility of obtaining horseflesh in the 
vicinity of Wem.131 Therefore the capital and the Home Counties became important 
sources of horses for the Parliamentarians campaigning in and around Shropshire. 
However, local horseflesh was a finite resource only slowly replenished: a colt born 
in 1642 would not achieve maturity to serve as a cavalry horse until later 1646.132 As 
a result of local shortages, by April 1644 Prince Rupert was seeking riding and 
draught horses for his Shropshire-based forces from as far afield as his fellow-
general Sir Henry Hastings's command in the East Midlands.133 
 Both sides at first looked to voluntary donations from the gentry, the horse-
owning class with the most suitable animals. Along with the horse, donors were 
often expected to provide tack, horseman's weapons and sometimes the rider. An 
individual's response was also seen as a mark of loyalty. On 5 December 1642, in 
repeating an earlier warrant the Royalist leadership at Shrewsbury ordered 
gentlemen in the Ludlow area to send horses with tack and weaponry to be enlisted 
at Shrewsbury on the 15th. Previous donors were thanked, but the recalcitrant were 
threatened with their names being 'informed to his majesty as ill affected'.134 In 
another forced appeal for donations in June 1643 Lord Capel requested horses, arms 
and riders for enlistment, while threatening to deny military protection to those 
failing to cooperate. Among the expected donors was Sir Richard Leveson, who, 
although he had previously given two horses, was required to send two more, 
together with tack and arms, to the muster at Shrewsbury on the 19th.135  
 Parliament also expected its supporters to donate horses. The Propositions of 
June 1642 called for the contribution of horses, arms, and horsemen, besides plate 
and cash.136 Given the early predominance of the Royalists in Shropshire 
Parliament's forces probably received few horses from there, but in 1643 
Parliamentarian commanders raising units in London for service in the region                                                         
130 'Ottley Papers' (1895), pp. 345-6. 
131 HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix Part I, pp. 134-5. 
132 Edwards, Dealing in Death, p. 155. 
133 WSL, SMS 550/17, SMS 550/20. 
134 SA, LB7/2234. 
135 SRO, D868/2/45.  
136 JHL V, pp. 121-2, 9 June 1642.  
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benefitted from revised legislation. Parliament's ordinance of 10 May - 'to redress 
the abuses in taking horses for the supply of the army' - empowered the deputy 
lieutenants and committee for the Propositions in each county to regulate the 
collection of horses. An amendment on 29 May sanctioned the levying of horses by 
county quota.137 Thereby, in June 1643 the Earl of Denbigh was authorised to obtain 
horses in London and Middlesex, while Sir Thomas Myddelton gained 100 horses 
from Surrey and Sussex.138 This helped several troops of horse to be raised for 
service in Shropshire and the West Midlands, which departed the capital for 
Coventry in late August.139 During 1644, Myddelton's London agents continued to 
receive horses by way of the Propositions: eight were brought in on 18 August by a 
gentleman of Maidstone, Kent, for example.140 The Earl of Denbigh also recruited 
some horses and horsemen by voluntary parish quotas and contributions in his 
home county of Warwickshire.141 In spring 1644 Denbigh benefitted from quotas 
enforced in Staffordshire, when the county committee ordered four horses from 
each of the shire's divisions to be sent to the Earl's stable at Stafford.142  
 During winter 1642-3 the Shropshire Royalists in addition to voluntary 
subscriptions used a quota system to raise dragoons, certain allotments having to 
provide a number of horses and armed riders. The allotments of the southerly 
hundreds of Clun and Purslow, for example, were each to contribute eight horses 
and horsemen.143 Meanwhile eight Bridgnorth townsmen between them provided 
nine horses under contract to the town corporation, which undertook to pay 12d for 
the daily hire of the horses on active service and also compensation for loss or 
injury.144 Accordingly, in December 1643 the corporation duly paid Thomas Glover, 
who had supplied two horses with tack, the modest sum of £4, 'towards his losses in 
horses, bridles and saddles'.145 During the Second Civil War, in July 1648 a similar 
quota system by allotments was introduced to mount the additional troop of horse                                                         
137 JHL, VI, pp. 39-40, 10 May 1643; JHL, VI, pp. 68-9, 29 May 1643. 
138 WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 9; CSPD, 1641-1643, p. 467.  
139 A Perfect Diurnall of some passages in Parliament, 28 Aug.-4 Sept. 1643, p. 54; TNA SP28/34 
Part 2, ff. 291-2. 
140 TNA, SP28/139 Part 20, Captain Sontley's accounts, unfoliated. 
141 WRO, CR2017/C9, f. 18. 
142 Pennington and Roots, Committee at Stafford, pp. 60, 77, 93. 
143 BCHRC, First Minute Book, f. 203 
144 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
145 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/53. 
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raised by the county committee.146 
 Horses were also requisitioned by warrants subscribed and executed by the civil 
and military authorities; in this way a mare belonging to Thomas Heath of Ludlow 
was taken from him by a town constable accompanied by four Royalist soldiers.147 
Because Civil War armies did not retain large numbers of draught horses they 
requisitioned additional animals as and when required.148 This exploited the pool of 
working horses owned by common people, like John Aston of Bridgnorth. 
Described as 'a poor man and not able to brave the loss', Aston was compensated by 
the corporation in October 1645 for the horse he lost by Royalist impressment.149 
The requisitioning of their animals was an ongoing grievance of Ludlow's 
townsfolk, who in their petition of 1644 declared 'that no horse or teams may be 
gone after presses but that payment may be first made'.150 
 Unpaid requisitioning was, in effect, legitimised theft, but soldiers also arbitrarily 
stole horses for their own use or resale. Horse thieving was widespread and 
recurrent. In July 1643, for instance, Sir Thomas Wolrych, as governor of Bridgnorth, 
was informed that Royalist troopers had taken 'by violence' four horses from a loyal 
local farmer.151 On the evening of 4 December 1644, on leaving Stanton Lacy near 
Ludlow Royalist troopers broke into a stable and took two mares, and on their 
march north also stole a horse from Richard Burnell of Acton Scott parish. Burnell 
enterprisingly tracked the thieves to their destination, the garrison at High Ercall.152 
Both sides officially condemned and sometimes severely punished horse thieving - 
Edward Preece, a Royalist soldier from Myddle, was hanged for it - and 
occasionally there was restitution. In January 1644 the county committee at Stafford 
ordered that a horse stolen by a trooper from Wem and sold to a Parliamentarian 
captain should be returned to its rightful owner.153 Horses were branded to counter 
theft, as in May 1644 when one John Salisbury received 14s for 'marking' horses of 
Sir Thomas Myddelton's brigade, while at Shrewsbury Royalist mounts were seen 
                                                        
146 SA, LB7/1936-7. 
147 SA/ LB7/2130. 
148 Edwards, Dealing in Death, p. 161. 
149 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
150 SA, LB7/2319, unfoliated. 
151 'Ottley Papers' (1895), pp. 347-8. 
152 SA/LB7/2136. 
153 Gough, Myddle, p. 71; Pennington and Roots, Committee at Stafford, p. 42.  
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branded with a stylised royal crest - described as 'CR and the print of a wheel'.154 
 Many animals were obtained legitimately through the established channels of 
horse-trading. Cavalry officers made occasional purchases while on campaign, like 
Lieutenant Tayler, a Warwickshire horseman who served in Humphrey 
Mackworth's troop in Shropshire in 1643-4, who spent a small allowance of £13 on 
horses.155 But horseflesh was also purchased in larger numbers. Mounts for Sir 
Thomas Myddelton's brigade were bought at Smithfield, London's main livestock 
market, from leading dealers such as Harvey Conway.156 On 4 April 1644 Conway 
was contracted for £150 to deliver 20 'able and serviceable' troop horses to one of 
Myddelton's captains.157 Early the following May, Benjamin Ash, another prominent 
dealer, was paid almost £132 for the purchase and livery charges of 20 horses (Plate 
4).158 London's saddlers meanwhile supplied tack for Myddelton's horses. 
Parliament's armies generally relied on the manufacturing capacity of the London 
industry for the bulk of their saddlery ware, and between January and May 1644 
Myddelton's officers and agents purchased more than 480 sets of tack from the 
leading producers Ellis Parry, Benjamin Potter and William Pease.159 There is little 
extant evidence of the Civil War horse trade in Shropshire, although Royalist 
soldiers bought mounts at the annual livestock fairs held around 22 July at 
Bridgnorth in 1644 and in 1645. They included a dragoon who acquired a 'grey nag' 
in a part-exchange deal with a gentleman from Herefordshire at the fair in 1645.160  
 
                                                        
154 TNA, SP28/346 Part 1, f. 50; SA, 3365/2566, unfoliated. 
155 WRO/CR0285, f. 172. 
156 Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 161-2. 
157 TNA, SP28/346 Part 1, f. 51. 
158 Ibid., unfoliated. 
159 Edwards, Dealing in Death, pp. 169-70; TNA, SP28/346 Part 1, irregular foliation. 
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Plate 4: Bill presented by the Smithfield horse dealer Benjamin Ash for purchasing horses 
and for livery services, authorised for payment by Sir Thomas Myddelton on 6 May 1644.  
 The opposing army was a lucrative source of horses. Captured horses were 
habituated to military service and might be taken with tack and other equipment, 
while their loss weakened the enemy's mobility and offensive capability. Horses 
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were usually part of the victor's spoils after every action, as in June 1645 when those 
surrendered by the Royalist garrison of Caus Castle were reportedly 'delivered up 
to the [county] committee for the public service'.161 A characteristic action of the 
Civil Wars in which taking horses was an objective was the so-called 'beating up of 
quarters' - a raid on the enemy's camp.162 An example of this kind of operation, to 
which a unit of horse at rest was especially vulnerable, was the raid on 5 August 
1644 by Myddelton’s and Mytton’s forces upon Prince Rupert's Regiment of Horse 
recuperating at Welshpool. With his men dispersed to billets in the town and 
surrounding countryside, and most of their horses unsaddled and put to grass 
during daytime, Major Dallison on 4 August wrote fearing a sudden 'blow' against 
his scattered command.163 His fears were realised before dawn the next morning, 
when the Parliamentarians attacked. Offering little resistance Dallison and most of 
his men escaped, but the enemy reportedly captured around 200 of their horses.164 
Back in March the Royalists had achieved similar success at Market Drayton, when 
Prince Rupert's men gained 100 horses after routing the Parliamentarian Shropshire 
and Yorkshire Horse.165 Horses were also vulnerable to enemy raids when put to 
grass outside a garrison's protective perimeter because nearby pasture had been 
denuded by over grazing or stripped of turf for building earthwork defences. In 
August 1644 a patrol led by Colonel Mytton reportedly seized upon by chance some 
Royalist cavalry horses grazing on the Monkmoor beyond the easterly defences of 
Shrewsbury, and in July 1645 Parliamentarian cavalry similarly attempted to rustle 
horses kept outside town by the Royalists at Bridgnorth.166  
 Feeding and caring for horses to keep them fit and serviceable had a significant 
logistical and financial impact on the war effort. Horses were routinely shod and 
when unwell treated by army farriers, like the Royalist John Bromley at Bridgnorth 
in 1644, while civilian tradesmen also provided services for the upkeep of army 
horses. In summer 1644, for example, Sir Thomas Myddelton's wagon master paid 
for the shoeing and for running repairs to the harnesses of draught horses on                                                         
161 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 25 June-2 July 1645, p. 844. 
162 Young and Embleton, Cavalier Army, p. 111. 
163 Dallison's dispatch to Prince Rupert was captured and later published in The True 
Informer, 10-17 Aug. 1644, pp. 319-20. 
164 CSPD, 1644, p. 405. 
165 Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 9 Mar. 1644, pp. 870-1. 
166 The Perfect Occurrences of Parliament And Chief Collections of Letters, 9-16 Aug. 1644, 
unpaginated; The Moderate Intelligencer, 10-17 July 1645, p. 156.  
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convoy work between Stafford, Wem and Oswestry.167 Because working horses 
need a nourishing diet, including cereals and pulses as well as grass or hay, Civil 
War armies had regularly to gather and purchase large supplies of provender. 
Livery bills for horses in garrison or awaiting deployment soon accumulated. John 
Ward, a London ostler, was owed £145 and fell into debt after stabling horses for the 
Earl of Denbigh during his recruiting drive in the capital in 1643.168 Meanwhile, Sir 
Richard Prince found over two months that providing stabling and grazing on his 
paddocks outside Shrewsbury for nearly 100 Royalist cavalry horses had cost him 
£32.169 Householders providing free quarters for horse-soldiers also had to supply 
provender, like the Shrewsbury leather worker Thomas Betton who for six days in 
March 1643 fed four Royalist troopers and bought oats and hay for their horses.170 
 Fodder was stockpiled in the magazines of the garrisons by commissaries like 
John Duckett, who later recollected his employment by the county committee 'to get 
in oats and such like provisions'.171 Similarly responding to warrants issued by the 
Royalist garrison at Bridgnorth during 1644 and 1645, Stockton's parish constables 
delivered hay and oats there by the cartload, and sometime in 1645 also sent oats 
and peas to nearby Worfield where Royalist horsemen from Lichfield were 
billeted.172 The Royalists also accumulated provender given as contribution in lieu 
of cash payments. During 1644 the cash equivalent for hay was 1s 8d per 
hundredweight and 1s 4d pence per strike for oats and peas.173 In late summer 1644 
townships in the liberties of Shrewsbury fulfilled their contributions in this way. 
Hencott, for example, supplied seven hundredweight of hay, and Coton six strikes 
of peas, while Hadnall and Great Berwick between them provided seven strikes of 
oats.174 Individual landowners also contributed fodder, such as Francis Burton of 
Longner Hall near Atcham, who in early February 1645 received a warrant from the 
Royalists at Shrewsbury to provide up to 50 loads of hay.175  
 The opposing garrisons coveted supplies of provender, especially in mid-winter                                                         
167 SA, BB/C/6/1/1-6, unfoliated; TNA, SP28/346 Part 1, f. 79. 
168 WRO, CR2017/C10, f. 75. 
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175 Warburton, Prince Rupert, III, p. 58. 
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when stocks were limited. In January 1645, a London newsbook reporting how 
Parliamentarian Oswestry was endangered by the equidistant Royalist strongholds 
at Shrawardine and Chirk described how: 'neither is there any hay left there, save 
what is as much under the power of the enemy, as under the command of Colonel 
Mytton'.176 Foraging expeditions were mounted to secure supplies, such as in 
February 1644 when soon after arriving in Shropshire Prince Rupert sent a strong 
detachment of horse and foot from Shrewsbury into the countryside around Wem, 
which returned with 30 cartloads of hay.177 In harvest-time 1645 a party of 
Parliamentarian horse reportedly captured 22 cartloads of hay and corn by 
intercepting a similar sortie by Royalists from High Ercall and Lilleshall.178 
 The relentless and apparently insatiable demand for provender made great 
demands on local supplies. In 1644, Ludlow's townsfolk called for the removal of 
'the troops of horse [...] in regard of the scarceness of hay and provender for their 
accommodation', while after that year's harvest officials of Shrewsbury's corn 
market reported how demand by the Royalist military for local yields of corn, 
especially oats taken for fodder, had caused toll revenues to collapse.179 Such 
problems were exacerbated when the military disrupted farming and caused 
damage to crops. In July 1643 Lord Capel had reportedly infuriated Oswestry's 
husbandmen, by putting 'all his horse into their meadows, which hath eaten and 
spoiled all their grass'.180 During 1644 Thomas Tipton of Frankwell, Shrewsbury, 
also complained of the damaging loss of pasture, cut from his tenants' land as 
forage for Royalist cavalry.181 
Transportation and distribution 
Once war matériel had been procured it had to be transported to and around the 
theatre of operations. The key entrepôts and distribution centres for armaments 
during the First Civil War were Oxford and Bristol for the Royalists, and London for 
the Parliamentarians. However, because Shropshire was far from these centres long-
distance supply lines were established. Military supplies brought to Shropshire or                                                         
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obtained locally were distributed between the various magazines, while units took 
with them on campaign reserve stocks of munitions and provisions. All of this 
activity - involving riverine and road transport and the procurement of vehicles and 
draught animals, and requiring the services of large numbers of personnel, 
including military commissary officers and civilian carters, porters and boatmen - 
was shaped by the pre-existing routes of trade and communication. 
The Severn navigation 
The River Severn was the single most important means of transportation for 
finished goods and raw materials into and out of Shropshire during the seventeenth 
century. A usually toll-free arterial trade route of great regional importance 
connecting the county to the major ports of Gloucester and Bristol, the Severn was 
commercially navigable throughout its course in Shropshire by sailing barges and 
other, larger, shallow-draught trading vessels called Trows. Hence, both 
Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth were locally important inland ports.182 In February 
1634 Bridgnorth's aldermen, in declaring their opposition to a scheme to improve 
the navigability of the Warwickshire Avon, described the Severn's vital economic 
importance to Shropshire, to 'common commerce and traffic which we have with 
other countries [counties]'; by 'carrying away coals and other fuels, and butter and 
cheese which is the life and chief supportation of the same'.183  
 King Charles's army used the Severn as a military highway from autumn 1642, 
when towards the end of September six cannon were shipped from Shrewsbury for 
the defence of Bridgnorth.184 Foot soldiers and supplies took the same passage in 
October, when Bridgnorth was the main mustering point for the army in its advance 
out of Shropshire. Accordingly, boatmen and their vessels were hired or 
commandeered, including Abram Gyles, a Shrewsbury bargeman, who on or 
around 12 October shipped a Captain Boles's company to Bridgnorth.185 In March 
1644 Prince Rupert also used the Severn for troop deployment, when 1,100 
commanded musketeers were lifted downriver from Shrewsbury to rendezvous                                                         
182 Court, Midland Industries, pp. 6-9; T.S. Willan, 'The River Navigation and Trade of the 
Severn Valley, 1600-1750', The Economic History Review, 8 (1937), pp. 68-9, 77-8; Trinder, 
Industrial Revolution, pp. 7, 10. 
183 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated; Court, Midland Industries, p. 10. 
184 The Latest Remarkable Truths From Worcester, Chester, Salop, Warwick, Stafford, Somerset, 
Devon, Yorke and Lincoln Counties (1642), p. 8. 
185 SA, 6000/13285-6, 13298. 
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with the Prince at Bridgnorth on the 15th, thence embarking on the campaign to 
relieve Newark.186 
 However, Parliamentarian strongholds limited the use that the Royalists could 
make of the River Severn as a supply route into and out of Shropshire. Bristol was 
under Parliamentarian control by December 1642, when a Royalist there wrote 
advising Sir Francis Ottley that enemy riverine patrols prevented arms being 
smuggled from the port.187 Although Bristol fell to the Royalists seven months later, 
they were denied access to the lower Severn because Gloucester remained a vital 
Parliamentarian garrison throughout the First Civil War. The middle Severn from 
Shrewsbury to Worcester, however, was useful to the Royalists for transporting the 
armaments made in Shropshire, because ordnance and shot were more easily 
carried by water than by road. In April 1644, for instance, river craft were used in 
preference to a wagon convoy to carry from Bridgnorth to Worcester cannon shot 
and grenades urgently needed at Oxford. Offloaded at Worcester, the munitions 
then went overland to the Royalist capital.188 This ammunition had been made at 
Leighton, where the foundry's location beside the Severn allowed output to be 
directly shipped downstream to Bridgnorth and Worcester, or upstream to 
Shrewsbury, where on 8 June 1643 a boatman delivered 900 round shot.189 The 
Royalists also hired a Severn barge for several days in September 1643 to transport 
turves cut from surrounding fields into Shrewsbury, to be used as revetments in the 
town's earthwork fortifications.190  
 The important pre-war trade in transporting coal from the east Shropshire 
coalfield to Shrewsbury and Worcester also continued despite the fighting. 
However, by December 1645 the combatants were engaging in mutually damaging 
economic warfare by blockading, as reported, the riverine 'free trade in coals' from 
the pits close by the Severn at Benthall, Broseley, Dawley and Madeley.191 The 
Parliamentarian garrison at Benthall disrupted downstream deliveries heading for 
Bridgnorth and Worcester, while roving Royalist patrols from High Ercall and 
Bridgnorth attempted to obstruct the passage to Shrewsbury by intimidating or                                                         
186 Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 23 Mar. 1644, p. 894. 
187 'Ottley Papers' (1894), p. 54. 
188 BL, Additional Mss 18981, ff. 130, 153.  
189 SA, 6000/13314. 
190 SA, 3365/588, f. 4. 
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seizing the boatmen.192 
Local overland routes and carriers 
While the River Severn as a supply route was of some importance to the Royalists in 
Shropshire, most war matériel for both sides was transported overland.  
 John Ogilby's Britannia, an atlas of the kingdom's main roads published in 1675 
and an important development in cartography, identified the 'principal roads' 
traversing seventeenth-century Shropshire.193 (The wider regional main road 
network identified by Ogilby is reconstructed in Map 6, p. 174). The main north-
south route through Shropshire was the Chester to Bristol road, through 
Whitchurch and Shrewsbury and on to Ludlow, with a north-westerly spur heading 
via Ellesmere into Flintshire. The southerly of the two other 'principal' roads, 
crossing Shropshire 18 or so miles apart on an approximately parallel south-easterly 
to westerly course, was the London to Montgomery road, via Worcester and 
Tenbury, which entered Shropshire south of Ludlow and traversed the southerly 
hill country. The second cross-county route, to Shrewsbury, led from Bridgnorth, 
where a spur of the London to Holyhead road crossing northern Warwickshire and 
southern Staffordshire, and another southerly London route via Oxfordshire both 
converged. From the county town this London to Shrewsbury road continued 
westerly to the Welsh border. Beyond these and other thoroughfares lay a network 
of lesser roads and trackways, following often-ancient courses determined by the 
interconnection of market places and the movement of livestock. Drove roads from 
Wales crossed Shropshire, and livestock was driven locally to common grazing 
along driftways and straker routes.194 Richard Gough in describing some of the 
lesser ways crossing Myddle parish left an impression of seventeenth-century 
Shropshire's mazelike network of local routes: 'the Linch Lane, the lane that leads 
from Haston to Balderton, the Sling Lane, Bald Meadow Lane, Whitrish Lane ...'.195  
 The condition of Shropshire's thoroughfares was probably as variable as the 
differing ways that historians have interpreted the state of the roads of Stuart 
England. Crofts considered that roads were often 'thought of as a strip of land' not 
to be farmed or quarried, rather than treated as permanent structures.  On the other                                                         
192 Ibid.; LBWB, II, pp. 206-7. 
193 J. Ogilby, Britannia, or an Illustration of the Kingdom of England and Dominion of Wales by a 
Geographical and Historical Description of the Principal Roads thereof (1675). 
194 T. Rowley, The Shropshire Landscape (London, 1972), pp. 241-2. 
195 Gough, Myddle, pp. 68-9.  
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hand, Chartres pictured an expansive seventeenth-century road network supporting 
widespread carrying services.196 Ogilby's laconic itineraries provided a vague 
impression of the state of Shropshire's principal routes: the London road from 
Oxfordshire approaching Bridgnorth was good, 'a well accommodated and 
frequented road', while the London to Montgomery road was 'to Ludlow 
indifferent, but better to Bishop's Castle', the latter stretch being 'much up hill and 
down dale'.197 Ogilby depicted Shropshire's main roads as unenclosed along much 
of their course, allowing them to broaden into driftways across open fields or heath: 
'so that', as Crofts considered elsewhere, 'the line of the road evaporated into an 
abstract right of way'.198 The stretches of roadway near to bridges and market towns 
were most likely to benefit from the statutory obligation upon each parish to 
provide highway maintenance. In February 1641, for example, Bridgnorth's 
corporation authorised repairs for a mile or so from the town to a westerly stretch of 
the London to Shrewsbury road.199 But the national road network deteriorated 
during the First Civil War because only militarily essential repairs were made. For 
that reason, in late 1645 the Chester road through Coton, Shrewsbury's northerly 
suburb, was reported by a local petty constable to be 'very much out of order'.200   
 Despite uncertain maintenance and variable construction, frequently worsened 
by the weather, roads and trackways became military supply lines. Civil War armies 
for road transport relied mostly on civilian hauliers and carriers, conscripted or 
hired on a more or less makeshift basis. Accordingly, by 8 October 1642 horses and 
vehicles commandeered as transport for the King's army for the forthcoming 
campaign were being gathered at Shrewsbury, including the two carts provided by 
distant Stockton parish.201 When the army moved into the Bridgnorth area, on 13 
October further warrants were circulated for the surrounding areas to provide 
additional transport.202 However, the limitations of relying on coerced civilian 
drivers reluctant to leave their locality were becoming apparent, so that day King                                                         
196 J. Crofts, Packhorse, Waggon and Post: Land Carriage and Communications Under the Tudors 
and Stuarts (London, 1967), p. 14; J.A. Chartres, 'Road Carrying in England in the 
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Charles instructed his Lieutenant-General of Ordnance, Sir John Heyden, to order 
that 'no carts, wains, horses taken up for the use of the artillery shall depart the 
service upon pain of death'.203  
 However, civilian hauliers also entered into paid contractual arrangements, like 
Edward Colbatch of Ludlow and John Lewis of Bridgnorth who were both paid for 
transporting ammunition, respectively 13s during 1642-3, and 10s in February 
1645.204 Indeed, the regulatory orders published by the Royalist parliament at 
Oxford stipulated the rates for mileage - at 2d for a horse, and 1½d for an ox, per 
mile - that the army should pay for civilian transport.205 The tariff for oxen was 
particularly relevant to Shropshire, where they were used for haulage and often 
preferred by farmers instead of horses for plough work. Oxen, then, were also used 
for military transport work, and so Sir Richard Prince sent two drivers, with a team 
of four oxen, and one of two horses, to Lord Capel's army for five days in 1643.206 
William Jordan of Acton Scott parish was an occasional carter whose petition, 
complaining of being unpaid by the Royalist military for most of his work during 
1644, provides insight into the workload of civilian hauliers. With his wain and 
team Jordan ferried ammunition from Ludlow to Church Stretton, transported 
timber to the garrison at Stokesay Castle, and in March delivered provisions to the 
besiegers of Hopton Castle.207  
 In Shropshire at this time the vehicles used to carry freight hauled by oxen or 
horse teams were carts and tumbrils and the heavier load-bearing wains and 
wagons, all generally two rather than four-wheeled types.208 While Civil War armies 
relied on such requisitioned civilian vehicles, they also kept small permanent 
transport parks, particularly for the artillery trains.209 Hence several wagons and 
carriages with draught harnesses were purchased in London in March 1644 for Sir 
Thomas Myddelton's brigade, while wagons from the artillery park of the Oxford 
army carried munitions to Shropshire for Prince Rupert's forces.210                                                           
203 ROP, I, p. 152. 
204 SA, LB8/1/163, f. 3; SA, BB/D/1/2/1/55. 
205 Orders [...] of Parliament Assembled at Oxford, p. 8. 
206 Crofts, Packhorse, Waggon and Post, pp. 133-4; SA, 3365/2566, unfoliated. 
207 SA, LB7/2144. 
208 Edwards, 'Shropshire Agriculture', pp. 149-50. 
209 Edwards, Dealing in Death, p. 228. 
210 TNA, SP28/346 Part 1, f. 45; SP28/346 Part 2, f. 50; SA, LB7/2249; BL, Additional Mss 
18981, f. 60; ROP, I, p. 342 
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 Vehicles seem to have been the predominant means of military transport, but 
packhorses had excellent mobility over rough ways and hill country and had been 
important to Shropshire's pre-war economy, especially the ponies indigenous to 
Wales and the Marches used as pack animals in the cross-border cloth trade.211 
Evidence of Royalist military packhorse traffic during 1644 is found in the petitions 
of three Ludlow townsmen: Walter Lea, whose horse, with 'a [pack?] saddle and a 
collar', was lost during the Montgomery campaign; Samuel France, who had a horse 
commandeered that died in carrying ammunition to Chester; and William Bagley, 
who provided fodder for a packhorse convoy - described as 'twelve horses with 
munition to carry to Shrewsbury'.212 
Long-distance supply lines 
Beyond these local transportation arrangements, the bulk of the war matériel upon 
which both sides depended arrived in Shropshire via long-distance supply lines. 
These routes of communication are reconstructed in Map 6. 
 The Parliamentarians' main supply line led firstly from London to Coventry, 
Parliament's stronghold in the central Midlands since the city had barred it gates to 
King Charles in August 1642. Soldiers and supplies took the London to Holyhead 
road, described by Ogilby as following Watling Street from St. Albans to Towcester, 
and thence, via Daventry or Northampton, to Coventry - thereby skirting Royalist 
Oxfordshire and Worcestershire.213 London-based carriers and waggoners delivered 
supplies to Coventry for the West Midland Association and for Sir Thomas 
Myddelton’s brigade. In February 1644, for example, three carriers employed by the 
Earl of Denbigh between them delivered two and a half tons of gunpowder, 
charging 8s per hundredweight. In April, another carrier transported three and a 
half tons of ammunition for Myddelton.214 From Coventry, supplies were 
transferred to Parliamentarian Stafford via Meriden, Tamworth and Rugeley, the
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 Map 6: Main supply lines into Shropshire as they may have operated during summer 1644. 
 
 
route taken by Denbigh's army in May 1644.215 In January 1646, armaments 
stockpiled at Coventry for Thomas Mytton's campaign into North Wales were also 
convoyed along this route to Stafford.216 In its final stretch through Staffordshire the 
route from Stafford to Wem passed the Parliamentarian garrison at Eccleshall 
Castle. Here, in 1644 the nearby village of Yarnfield provided teams and carters to 
relay Sir Thomas Myddelton's supplies en route to Wem.217 Crossing into                                                         
215 Newes from Prince Rupert [...] The Earl with his forces marched against them, pp. 1-5. 
216 CSPD, 1645-1647, p. 297. 
217 Pennington and Roots, Committee at Stafford, p. 281. 
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Shropshire, at Market Drayton convoys were routed northward to Sir William 
Brereton's Cheshire stronghold at Nantwich or on to Wem.218  
 The Royalists could threaten this London to Shropshire route along much of its 
course. Accordingly, in October 1643 the committee of Warwickshire warned the 
Earl of Denbigh against sending artillery from London to Coventry because of 
enemy activity.219 However, the threat from Royalist garrisons in Staffordshire 
lessened after Denbigh captured Rushall Hall, near Walsall, in May 1644.220 A 
London newsbook reported the Earl's success: 'this will appear a very considerable 
service, and of great benefit to the country [Staffordshire] in opening the passage to 
Coventry and London'.221 But the way to Wem was often endangered by Royalist 
blockade. In the third week of December 1643 his colleagues there wrote instructing 
Humphrey Mackworth to suspend the movement of supplies from Coventry, 
because the 'passages are now so stopped'.222 
 Two long-distance Royalist supply lines led to Shropshire. Along the first 
supplies were conveyed from Oxford. The organisation and route of one such 
convoy, bringing munitions to Shropshire in early October 1643 escorted by the 
returning infantry regiments of Sir Michael Woodhouse and Richard Herbert, can 
be reconstructed from the papers of the Oxford-based Royalist Office of 
Ordnance.223 Leaving the city on 29 September, two conductors (Ordnance Office 
transport officers) led the convoy, of one wagon and two carts drawn by horses 
from the Oxford artillery train, via Woodstock to Enstone, 14 miles north-west of 
Oxford on the Worcester road. With fresh teams provided at Enstone, the convoy 
resumed the 35-mile journey to Worcester on the London to Montgomery road, 
crossing the northern Cotswolds and continuing via Evesham. Arriving at 
Worcester on 2 October, the convoy was met by carts and fresh teams from 
Shropshire sent by Colonel Robert Ellice, fortuitously so, it seems, because at 
Worcester Sir Michael Woodhouse found 'much confusion to get a horse'.224 With 
the loads transferred, supervised by one of the Oxford conductors the convoy                                                         
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continued to Ludlow, arriving on 12 October. After crossing the Severn at Worcester 
this convoy would have followed the London to Montgomery road along the valley 
of the River Teme, via Tenbury, to Ludlow, the route taken in mid-February 1644 by 
a four-wagon ammunition convoy from Oxford. Upon arriving at Worcester, the 
conductor in charge sent orders ahead for the authorities at Ludlow to requisition 
two carts and eight horse teams to allow the convoy's ongoing journey to 
Shrewsbury.225 Convoys to Bridgnorth from Worcester could travel either side of 
the Severn valley, on the east bank along the London road via Kidderminster and 
Quatt, or by the bridge at Bewdley taking a lesser road on the west bank; in April 
1644 several unescorted wagons went by this latter route from Bridgnorth to 
Worcester.226 
 In 1644 supplies from Bristol for Prince Rupert's command were first routed via 
Oxford and Worcester. A consignment of munitions reported on 16 March as being 
delayed in departing Bristol had arrived at Worcester by the 28th, where 
preparations were made for its journey onward to Shrewsbury.227 But stores from 
Bristol also went by an alternative route, through the Welsh Marches along the 
Royalists' second main supply line. This followed the Bristol to Chester road 
described by Ogilby. From Bristol, supplies were carried north nine miles to the 
Severn crossing at St. Aust and ferried across the estuary to Beachley Head near 
Chepstow. From there, the route traversed Monmouthshire and Herefordshire, to 
Ludlow and Shrewsbury, and on to Chester. Around 20 June 1644 a Chester-bound 
convoy from Bristol taking this route narrowly avoided interception by 
Parliamentarian forces near Oswestry. The Royalists after losing Oswestry diverted 
their convoys further westward into Wales, along the northerly stretch of Ogilby's 
Cardiff to Chester road.228 A Chester-bound munitions convoy from Bristol 
captured at Newtown in Montgomeryshire on 4 September by Myddelton's brigade 
had been diverted at Ludlow to follow this supposedly safer but more laborious 
passage, via Llanfyllin to the key Royalist garrison and staging post at Chirk 
Castle.229  
 From autumn 1644 this overextended line of communication along the Welsh                                                         
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Marches became increasingly vulnerable to enemy action and other disruption. In 
September, the Gloucester garrison followed up a raid on the Severn landing at 
Beachley Head by capturing Royalist Monmouth on the 26th, which remained in 
Parliamentarian hands for the next two months.230 By mid-October Royalist 
communications were further obstructed by Myddelton's garrisons in 
Montgomeryshire, so that on the 13th one of Prince Rupert's aides wrote despairing 
for the safety of any supplies sent from Bristol into the Marches.231 In early March 
1645, ammunition sent from Bristol for Prince Rupert at Ludlow was stranded at 
Chepstow because the locals would not provide transport; meanwhile an uprising 
of clubmen against the Royalist military in Herefordshire had endangered supply 
lines there.232 
 Delays and shortages and especially the loss or capture of supplies could 
significantly affect the military situation. Therefore considerable effort was made to 
protect or intercept convoys, as in the example of two such actions in Shropshire. 
Although the Royalist ammunition convoy sent from Shrewsbury in early January 
1644 to Lord Byron's army besieging Nantwich had a strong escort of 400 cavalry, 
nevertheless when halted at Ellesmere on the night of the 12th/13th the convoy was 
surprised and captured by a smaller Parliamentarian force from Wem.233 The 
following August a mounted Royalist party operating out of nearby Whittington 
attacked a Parliamentarian munitions convoy from Wem bound for Oswestry, but 
the Royalists were beaten off by the escort and mounted reinforcements from 
Oswestry's garrison.234 
Magazines 
Convoys delivered to the magazines that served as storage and distribution centres 
for military supplies. Even small strong points kept a magazine, for example 
Longford House near Newport. When the Parliamentarian garrison surrendered to 
Prince Rupert on 3 April 1644 it yielded provisions, four barrels of gunpowder, 
supplies of match and bullets, some hand grenades, 40 pikes and 100 muskets.235                                                          
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231 Carte, Ormond, VI, p. 206. 
232 BL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 83. 
233 Ibid., f. 2; Carte, Original Letters, I, p. 40. 
234 The Perfect Occurrences of Parliament And Chief Collections of Letters, 6-13 Sept. 1644, 
unpaginated. 
235 Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 6 Apr. 1644, p. 921. 
 182 
 The pre-war county magazine had been located at Shrewsbury and the Royalists 
kept their main regional depot there. The Parliamentarians found the garrison well 
supplied when they took the town in February 1645, and reported the capture of 
nearly 2,000 weapons and 14 cannon, along with 100 barrels of gunpowder.236 The 
repair and refurbishment of Shrewsbury Castle as an arsenal had been completed 
soon after Prince Rupert's arrival in February 1644. On 25 January Rupert had 
written forewarning Sir Francis Ottley, demanding 'the covering of the castle of 
Shrewsbury, and the dividing and disposing thereof into rooms capable and fitting 
to receive the stores'. Ottley responded by hastening building work there and 
arranging temporary storage facilities.237 After Shrewsbury fell, Bridgnorth and 
Ludlow remained as Royalist supply depots. Provisions and ammunition were 
received at Bridgnorth in May 1645 during the northerly advance of the main 
Royalist field army, for example.238 Prince Rupert had gathered military supplies at 
Ludlow in early March 1645, and when the castle was surrendered in 1646 the 
Parliamentarians found it still well provisioned and holding a number of pieces of 
ordnance and 37 barrels of gunpowder.239  
 After the First Civil War the county magazine remained at Shrewsbury Castle, 
with a subsidiary depot at Ludlow. On 5 June 1647, the day after King Charles had 
been taken into army custody, the county committee took the precaution of 
ordering the transfer of the Ludlow magazine to Shrewsbury, and the confiscation 
and delivery into the castle of all arms in private ownership. That August, the 
arsenal at Shrewsbury Castle was well enough supplied to allow the equipping of 
the town militia with 400 muskets and pikes and 20 barrels of gunpowder.240 
 During the First Civil War the Parliamentarians had kept regional magazines at 
Nantwich and Stafford. By May 1644 the magazine of the West Midland Association 
had been established at Stafford, and a large consignment of armaments delivered 
there on the 16th included 682 matchlock muskets with 740 bandoliers, and 59 
barrels of gunpowder.241 Stafford in turn supplied the magazine kept at Wem jointly 
by the committee of Shropshire and Sir Thomas Myddelton. Deliveries into Wem                                                         
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from late June to mid-July 1644 included 200 muskets, three hundredweight of 
match, 20 barrels of gunpowder, 2 petards, and three cannon with 200 rounds of 
ammunition.242 Immediately after the fighting for Oswestry, on 2 July six barrels of 
gunpowder, six hundredweight of match and a thousand-weight of bullets were 
transferred there from Myddelton's stores at Wem. By mid-October arsenals had 
also been established at Myddelton's Montgomeryshire garrisons. On the 10th and 
12th, the magazines at Montgomery Castle and the Red Castle between them 
received 22 barrels of gunpowder and nine hundredweight of match.243 
 Both sides also used temporary storehouses, including private residences. In 
London in summer 1643 the Earl of Denbigh rented a 'chamber and warehouse for 
the ammunition', where he employed a staff of waggoners, porters and watchmen 
to deliver, handle, pack and oversee military supplies.244 From there armaments 
were delivered to Denbigh's town house at Coventry. Sometimes during 1644 
Humphrey Mackworth's house at Coventry also provided temporary 
accommodation for military supplies delivered from London.245 At Shrewsbury, in 
March 1644 a Royalist commissary officer delivered gunpowder and match to Sir 
Richard Leveson's town house, where it was re-packaged and transferred to 
Leveson's garrison at Lilleshall.246  
 Magazines were supervised by commissary officers and their deputies, who 
managed the procurement and also the delivery and distribution of supplies. One 
David Maurice was chief commissary to Sir Thomas Myddelton's brigade 
throughout 1644 and into 1645, and in later 1644 John Taylor was Maurice's sub-
commissary officer at the Red Castle.247 The ex-Royalist quartermaster John Visgate 
later claimed to have been commissary of the ammunition magazine at Shrewsbury 
under Sir Francis Ottley's governorship.248 
Conclusions 
Because of the widespread support for King Charles in Shropshire and the region, 
from the onset of civil war the Royalists exploited the military resources available to                                                         
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them. They used existing industries to produce armaments and equipment, of 
which Shropshire's iron industry was of most importance to the wider Royalist war 
effort. However, because residual stocks and local and regional manufactures could 
not supply all their needs, increasingly the Royalists drew supplies from much 
further afield. The Parliamentarians were denied local resources for most of the First 
Civil War and so obtained military supplies mostly in London, by purchase and also 
by grants from central stores. As the war progressed they established a wider 
supply network, involving importers and regional producers. Both sides made 
extensive use of captured armaments. 
 Shropshire's agrarian economy was harnessed to warlike production and 
consumption. The county's food producers came under increasing strain by a 
militarised command economy linked to taxation, but seem to have managed to 
provide sufficient provisions for the day-to-day consumption of the garrisons and 
for their reserve magazines. By supplying animals and feed the county economy 
also enabled the combatants to maintain their essential stocks of horses. During the 
First Civil War the Royalists were the more successful in exploiting local reserves of 
horseflesh, forcing the Parliamentarians to obtain most of their mounts from much 
further afield.  
 Military supplies were moved around a network of routes that, despite some use 
being made of the navigable River Severn, depended on the vagaries of the local 
and national road network. Both sides obtained much of their war matériel far from 
Shropshire, so that military success or failure often depended on the timely arrival 
of supplies shifted along long and vulnerable lines of communication. Tactical 
operations were undertaken to protect or harass supply convoys, to acquire 
resources and to deny them to the enemy.  
 Logistical activity therefore fuelled the intermittent skirmishing that 
characterised garrison warfare. This aspect of the fighting in Shropshire is the 
subject of part of the following chapter, which also deals more widely with 
operational aspects of war effort. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
Operational Aspects of the War Effort 
While the preceding chapters have examined war effort in terms of organisation, 
manpower and resources, chapter five addresses the operational conduct of the 
Civil War in Shropshire. After an overview of the larger field engagements and of 
the nature of the fighting, the following sections address garrisons and methods of 
fortification, siege-craft, intelligence gathering and medical services.   
The nature of warfare in Shropshire 
The major battles of the Civil Wars were not fought in Shropshire, although the 
regionally important battle of Montgomery - the largest battle in Wales during the 
First Civil War - was in 1644 fought within yards of the county border. Seven larger 
field engagements in Shropshire can be identified, fought over more or less open 
country and involving over 1,000 combatants, all during the First Civil War. These 
occurred at Loppington on or around 28 September 1643; at Market Drayton on 5 
March 1644; in the Longford/Lilleshall area on 25 March following; near Oswestry 
on 2 July 1644; to the west of Shrewsbury two days later; near Stokesay on 8 June 
1645; and at High Ercall on 5 July following.  
 The fighting for Wem on 17-18 October 1643 was not an open field engagement. 
However, because the Royalist assault on the fortified Parliamentarian-occupied 
town was the climax of a six-day campaign of manoeuvre, and was a key action and 
a turning point in the war in Shropshire, it merits description at some length here.  
 The Wem campaign aside, for which a narrative reconstruction can be attempted 
using several sources, the field engagements in Shropshire are not well 
documented. Because the written accounts are brief, lacking in detail and are often 
partisan, there is insufficient balanced reporting from both sides. 
 These were actions that fall into the awkward to define scope of military combat 
that includes large skirmishes and small-scale battles. None followed the formula of 
a set-piece battle of the period - fought over an area of generally open country 
between opposing armies carefully deployed in linear battle formation, with 
infantry in the centre, interspersed with any available artillery, and the cavalry on 
the wings. Instead, the actions in Shropshire were less coordinated encounters.  
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 This was the case in autumn 1643 when Lord Capel's Royalist army, numbering 
around 2,000 men, intending to assault nearby Wem instead became bogged down 
in first attacking Loppington, the village having been occupied by two or three 
companies of Parliamentary dragoons. The fighting centred on the church, which 
the dragoons defended as a strong point, but a vigorous counter attack by a 
relieving force of 500 or more Parliamentarian horse and foot hastily sent from Wem 
may have taken the numerically superior Royalists by surprise, causing them to 
withdraw under cover of nightfall and, for the time being, to abandon the attempt 
on Wem.1 
 Capel spent two weeks in reorganising and reinforcing his army, and on 13-14 
October 1643 led from around Shrewsbury upwards of 3,000 men into the mere and 
heath land country of north-west Shropshire. Expecting Wem to be Capel's 
objective, in order to slow his advance on Saturday 14th the Parliamentarians 
deployed a body of cavalry near the ford over the River Roden at Blackhurst, five 
miles north-west of Wem. This did not result in an engagement, however, because, 
as the Parliamentarians reported, the Royalists 'came not as we expected';2 Capel's 
army instead resumed its march in a north-easterly direction, and after crossing the 
open expanse of Fens Moss entered Whitchurch on Sunday. By advancing to 
Whitchurch Capel's strategy had been to interpose his army between Wem and 
Parliamentarian Nantwich, threatening both garrisons while drawing enemy forces 
away from Wem. On Sunday evening Capel's plan remained opportunistic: from 
Whitchurch he wrote to Sir Abraham Shipman, left in command at Chester, that 'I 
am come to Whitchurch, my design as for tomorrow's march somewhat depending 
on intelligence'. However, he ordered Shipman with most of the garrison to make a 
diversionary march from Chester towards Nantwich early on Monday morning.3  
 Meanwhile, leaving a small garrison at Wem, Sir William Brereton and Sir 
Thomas Myddelton with the rest of the Parliamentarian forces in the area, forming a 
field army of perhaps 2,000 men (the sources are silent in this respect), had marched 
north from Wem, and by daybreak on Monday were deploying in battle order on 
Prees Heath, two miles south of Whitchurch. The Royalists, however, had left 
Whitchurch well before sunrise, and entering Cheshire, marched the 11 miles to                                                         
1 Williams, 'Notebook of William Maurice', p. 35; WRO, CR2017/C10, f. 60; Shropshires misery 
and mercie, Manifested, pp. 2-3; Malbon, Memorials, pp. 76-7. 
2 HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix Part I, p. 141. 
3 WRO, CR2017/C9 f. 32. 
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Nantwich before mid-day. It is uncertain whether Capel intended to make a serious 
assault on Nantwich - whether the skirmishes with the Parliamentary garrison to 
the west of the town on Monday afternoon were meant to test the defences, or were 
just a feint. With his army having suffered around 40 casualties, in the evening 
Capel disengaged and about turned to Whitchurch. In the meantime, the 
Parliamentarians who that morning had been left flat-footed outside Whitchurch, 
instead of pursuing Capel had cautiously withdrawn 12 miles to the south-east to 
Market Drayton, where they rested Monday night. 
 Having rested his own men for a few hours at Whitchurch, on the morning of 
Tuesday 17 October Capel made a forced 11-mile march south to Wem. Advance 
units of the Royalist army began to arrive near the fortified town after mid-day. 
With some limited artillery support, from mid-afternoon the Royalist vanguard 
attempted to take Wem by storm, launching attacks against the northern and 
eastern defences where the ground was more suitable. However, because the 
Parliamentarian garrison effectively concentrated its firepower, which included 
several small cannon, against the two points of their attack, the Royalists were 
unable to gain the earthworks and the assault petered out at nightfall. Furthermore, 
the Royalist effort may have become increasingly uncoordinated, as units arriving 
late from the line of march from Whitchurch were drawn piecemeal into the assault. 
The Royalists mounted further attacks on the morning of Wednesday 18th, but 
Capel broke off the action around mid-day without success. His assault parties had 
sustained heavy lossess - a Parliamentarian estimate that the enemy suffered more 
than 200 casualties may not have been too inflated - and the killing or wounding of 
several senior officers depressed morale among the Royalist rank and file.   
 The Parliamentarian field army, meanwhile, had marched from Market Drayton 
early on Tuesday to relieve Nantwich. However, upon news that Nantwich was no 
longer threatened the soldiers, to the point of mutiny, demanded a period of rest, 
and so the Parliamentarians spent the remainder of Tuesday billeted between 
Nantwich and Market Drayton. With reinforcements from Nantwich, the 
Parliamentarian army mustered on Wednesday morning and marched to the relief 
of Wem. In the afternoon Capel received intelligence of their advance, and to avoid 
a disadvantageous field engagement ordered his blooded and weary army to 
withdraw. With their immediate line of retreat towards Shrewsbury blocked by the 
River Roden, in order to preserve their artillery and supply and baggage train the 
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Royalists made a circuitous march of about five miles to the bridge over the Roden 
at Lee Brockhurst, south-east of Wem.  In late afternoon Parliamentary units caught 
up and skirmished with them, but the Royalist rear guard effectively covered the 
withdrawal over Lee bridge, and with nightfall most of Capel's army made good its 
retreat towards Shrewsbury.4  
 Turning to the engagements in 1644, an attack on Parliamentarian quarters by a 
fast-moving Royalist force took place at Market Drayton on 5 March. Although 
some Parliamentarian horse were deployed on heath land to the south of the town 
to oppose Prince Rupert's rapid approach march, the Royalist horse and foot soon 
drove them through Market Drayton onto another body of Parliamentarian horse 
formed to the east of the town, until under renewed Royalist attack they all broke 
and scattered to the north-east.5 Another encounter engagement was fought near 
Longford on the 25 March. This developed when around 650 Royalists advanced 
against a larger Parliamentarian force, of perhaps 850, mustered at their garrison at 
Longford in preparing to attack the Royalist garrison at nearby Lilleshall. Unable to 
draw the Parliamentarians from their defensive position, the Royalists withdrew in 
disorder followed at a distance by the Parliamentarians. The Royalists rallied on a 
large open field near Lilleshall and then attacked and broke the Parliamentarians, 
who in turn had become disordered in advancing over enclosed ground.6 
 As a result of the Royalists laying siege to Oswestry on 29 June 1644, the fighting 
beyond the town on 2 July 1644 began precipitately in the afternoon, when a 
reconnaissance by cavalry from the Royalist siege lines developed into unsupported 
attacks by the entire Royalist horse upon Sir Thomas Myddelton's approaching 
relief force. With substantial close infantry support the fewer Parliamentarian 
cavalry routed the Royalist horse, but Royalist infantry defending enclosures and 
narrow lanes near the town obstructed their pursuit. This enabled the Royalist main 
body to withdraw with the siege artillery protected by a screen of rallied horse, 
although with considerable loss in casualties, prisoners and abandoned supplies. 
The engagements to the west of Shrewsbury two days later were a series of                                                         4 This reconstruction of the Wem campaign was based on: HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix 
Part I, pp. 141-3, 157; HMC, Twelfth Report, Appendix Part IX, p. 41; Malbon, Memorials, pp. 
75-84; WRO, CR2017/C10, f. 60.  
5 Lewis, Fire and Sword, p. 70; Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 9 Mar. 1644, pp. 870-1. 
6 Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 30 Mar. 1644, pp. 908-9; BDL, Firth Mss C6, f. 353. 
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skirmishes. After capturing the bridge at Montford during the afternoon of 4 July 
units of the Earl of Denbigh's army renewed their advance across heath land until 
they engaged Royalist horse, dragoons and foot defending more enclosed ground 
near the town. By evening the Parliamentarians had advanced so far as to engage 
the defences of Shrewsbury's westerly suburb at Frankwell, exchanging musket fire 
with Royalists defending the earthworks before withdrawing at nightfall.7   
 The fighting for Parliamentarian-occupied Stokesay Castle on 8 June 1645 
similarly extended over a wide area and (including the garrison) involved perhaps 
3,000 combatants. It may have begun when the Parliamentarian brigade deployed 
two miles to the north around Wistanstow advanced against a vanguard of Royalist 
horse, forcing their retreat onto a screen of musketeers posted among hedgerows. 
These in turn the Parliamentarians drove onto the Royalist main body covering the 
castle, and a more general, perhaps hour-long, engagement developed in the 
Stokesay/Newton area (modern Craven Arms) until the Royalists broke.  Disputed 
leadership and poor coordination between the Royalist commanders contributed to 
this regionally significant Parliamentarian victory.8 However, it was to some extent 
offset by Sir William Vaughan's success in relieving High Ercall Hall early on 5 July 
following, in what was the final larger field engagement in Shropshire. Here, 
because the Parliamentarian besiegers failed to act on intelligence of the enemy 
advance, the Royalists kept the advantage of surprise and their attack was wholly 
successful; the Parliamentarian encampment was overwhelmed by Vaughan's 
horsemen with the loss of substantial military supplies and more than 500 casualties 
and prisoners of war. Colonel Wilhelm Reinking, the Parliamentarian commander, 
was among the captured.9  
 Notwithstanding the importance of these larger actions, the common currency of 
the fighting in Shropshire was the skirmishing between garrisons and the attack and 
defence of fortified paces. Indeed, apart from the action at Market Drayton the main 
field engagements resulted from the defence, attempted capture or relief of a 
stronghold. The proliferation of places occupied and defended more or less 
                                                        
7 Rushworth, Historical Collections, V, p. 745; A Letter sent From Sir Tho. Middleton, pp. 4-5; 
CSPD, 1644, pp. 332, 337-8; Great Victories Obtained by the Earle of Denbigh at Shrewsbury, 
Chulmely, and other parts in Cheshire (1644), unpaginated; BRL, Harley Mss 6802, f. 248. 
8 Three Great Victories, pp. 2-3; Walker, Discourses, p. 129. 
9 BL, Harley Mss 6852, f. 274; Perfect Passages of Each Dayes Proceedings in Parliament, 9-16 July 
1645, pp. 300-1. 
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permanently by bodies of troops was a distinctive feature of the wider Civil Wars 
that to a great extent determined the course of the fighting. As Hutton and Reeves 
have pointed out: 'The characteristic military action of the British and Irish Civil 
Wars was an attack upon a fortified strongpoint'.10 The war in Shropshire was no 
different from this trend, and indeed several historians since the Webbs, who listed 
30 strongholds here during the First Civil War, have commented on the large 
number of garrisons in Shropshire.11 Parts of the shire were heavily garrisoned and 
this study has identified 37 places held by the military for sufficient length of time 
to have been recorded as garrisons, although clearly not all were occupied 
simultaneously (Map 7). Accordingly, warfare in Shropshire during the First Civil 
War was characterised by small engagements between garrisons; the intermittent 
skirmishes and raids conducted to suppress enemy activity, to control territory and 
the local resources of war effort. Garrison warfare provoked many such clashes 
across Shropshire, examples of which have featured in the preceding chapters. The 
often larger and more sustained military operations undertaken to subjugate 
strongholds are examined in this chapter.   
 
                                                        
10 R. Hutton and W. Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications' in The Civil Wars A Military History, 
(eds.) Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, p. 195. 
11 J. Webb and J.T. Webb, Civil War [...] as it affected Herefordshire, II, p. 131; Pennington, 'War 
and the People', p. 123; Carlton, Going to The Wars, p. 151; Atkin, Worcestershire Under Arms, 
p. 61. 
 187 
 
Map 7: Shropshire garrisons during the First Civil War, also showing the larger 
 field engagements.12 
                                                         
12 References to these garrisons are found within this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, 
with two exceptions. Firstly, Wroxeter (probably St. Andrew's church) was listed as one of 
20 Royalist garrisons 'taken (by the Shropshire Committee and their forces) from the King 
since they took the field', in Perfect Occurrences of Parliament And Chief Collections of Letters, 
22-29 Aug. 1645, unpaginated; secondly, 'Shifnal House' (most likely Shifnal Manor, a house 
of the Earl of Shrewsbury) was noted as a Royalist garrison in Mercurius Aulicus, w/e 23 
Mar. 1644, p. 891. 
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 The spread of garrisons was 'an unavoidable liability' which created problems for 
the opposing war efforts.13 For example, garrison duty unprofitably withheld many 
soldiers from offensive operations, who by consuming local resources often over-
exploited civilians, triggering disputes among fellow commanders. As Sir Michael 
Ernle reported in autumn 1644, the outlying Royalist garrisons 'upon the skirts' of 
Shropshire were absorbing the contribution to the detriment of his main garrison at 
Shrewsbury.14 The attack and defence of garrisons also tended to prolong local 
conflicts as an undercurrent to the wider war. This was recognised by a newsbook 
reporting the fighting around Wellington in later March 1644, which saw the 
Royalists occupy, lose, and then regain Apley Castle and the local church: 'Thus our 
present wars are likely to be prolonged, by this vicissitude and gaining and losing', 
the editorial concluded.15  
 Garrisons were, however, established for sound operational and local strategic 
reasons: to hold ground; to control routes of communication and as staging posts; to 
harass the enemy and to hinder his movements. The latter were the reasons for 
locating those Royalist garrisons mentioned above by Sir Michael Ernle as recently 
established or reinforced in west Shropshire. The outposts at Caus Castle, Leigh 
Hall and Lea Castle would obstruct an advance from Montgomeryshire by Sir 
Thomas Myddelton's brigade. Garrisons were also sited to secure taxes and sources 
of supplies whilst denying them to the enemy. Accordingly, part of the role of the 
Parliamentarian garrison planted at Benthall Hall in spring 1645 was to conduct 
economic warfare, by denying resources to the Royalists at Bridgnorth less than 
seven miles away. In this it seems to have succeeded: 'This garrison doth much 
annoy the enemy', said one partisan report, preventing 'the enemy from gathering 
contributions in their country' and stopping 'coals from coming thither'.16 Outlying 
satellite garrisons guarded the major strongholds as a screen against enemy 
incursion while controlling a wider territory. The loss of these outposts, however, 
had the reverse effect, a corollary acknowledged by Colonel Mytton in early March 
1644. The Parliamentarians' recent abandonment of their outer garrisons at Acton 
                                                        
13 Hutton and Reeves, 'Sieges and Fortifications', p. 199. 
14 BRL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 299. 
15 The Military Scribe, 26 Mar.-2 Apr. 1644, irregular pagination. 
16 The Weekly Account, 10-17 Dec. 1645, unpaginated. 
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Reynald and Moreton Corbet, the result of a planned retrenchment, had, as Mytton 
put it, 'besieged us already [at Wem] having given the enemy the command of the 
country close to our walls'.17 
 
Garrisons and fortification 
The prevalence of garrison warfare resulted in many places in Shropshire being 
occupied and fortified, of which towns will be considered first. As economic and 
political centres of their localities and hubs for trade and communications, towns 
were highly prized militarily throughout the wider Civil Wars. Defensible towns 
especially assumed strategic importance. Oswestry, for example, in Sir Thomas 
Myddelton's opinion was 'a very strong town, and if once fortified, of great 
concernment, and the key that lets us into Wales'. Arguably the local turning point 
in the First Civil War in Shropshire was the capture of Shrewsbury by the 
Parliamentarians in February 1645, which, as Clarendon concluded, 'was a great 
blow to the King, and straightened his quarters exceedingly, and broke the secure 
line of communication with Chester, and exposed all North Wales, Hereford and 
Worcester to the daily inroads of the enemy'.18 The course of the First Civil War in 
Shropshire was determined largely by the occupation and contestation of four other 
towns - Ludlow, Bridgnorth, Oswestry and Wem. Apart from Whitchurch and 
Market Drayton, which were garrisoned and fortified by the Royalists in early 1643 
but later abandoned, no other Shropshire towns were held as long-term garrisons. 
Towns were, nonetheless, often and repeatedly used as billets, and sometimes held 
under short-term occupation. By the third week in August 1645, for example, a 
party of Parliamentarian horse was posted 'to lye constantly to secure Bishop's 
Castle (a well affected town but no garrison, which with parts adjacent have 
appeared well for the Parliament)'.19 
 During September 1642 King Charles's cause became firmly rooted in Shropshire 
by the Royalism of Shrewsbury, Bridgnorth and Ludlow. These towns once 
garrisoned were usefully situated to allow jurisdiction over much of the shire. 
Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth also controlled strategically important bridged 
crossings of the River Severn. All three as medieval walled towns had developed                                                         
17 WSL, SMS 558. 
18 A Letter sent From Sir Tho. Middleton, p. 5; Clarendon, History, III, p. 512. 
19 Heads of Some Notes of The Citie Scout, 2 Sept. 1645, pp. 3-4. 
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alongside castles sited on naturally defensible positions, on high ground bounded in 
part and thus defended by rivers. In the seventeenth century these remained 
tactically advantageous sites, especially because each town was still circuited by 
medieval walls and its castle could serve as a citadel. Although in 1642 these ageing 
defences were not in an immediately defensible state of repair, once strengthened 
and improved they made effective fortifications. The extensive renovations to 
Shrewsbury Castle, for example, included new accommodation and ancillary 
buildings for the garrison, and a loop-holed, stone-built barbican with a drawbridge 
built to fortify the main gate.20 At Ludlow, in 1643 the town gates were loop-holed 
for musketry and there were phases of extensive repair or enhancement to the walls 
and gates from July to August 1644, and in May to July 1645.21 As an additional 
defensive measure, by October 1644 all but three of Ludlow's seven gateways had 
been blocked.22 Turnpikes (a spiked portable barrier, or Cheval de frise) and chains 
were used as temporary barricades to span and so obstruct entranceways and 
thoroughfares. Turnpikes were deployed at Shrewsbury by mid-1643, while chains 
were installed around the town by local smiths such as Clermont Owen, who in 
December 1644 fitted ten 'great hooks to hang the chains upon at the end of the 
streets and gates'.23 New earthen fortifications, of ditches fronting ramparts studded 
with timber palisades, were built according to prevailing military doctrine as 
emplacements for artillery and to strengthen weak points so creating a more 
defensible perimeter. At Bridgnorth, improvements to the town defences were set in 
train in December 1643, and on 1 May 1645 the Royalist leadership ordered further 
enhancement to the 'works [fortifications] about the town'.24 The extent of these 
defences remains uncertain but the town ditch was re-cut, and the raising of 
earthworks around the North Gate and the adjacent churchyard of St. Leonard's 
entailed the destruction of gardens and the demolition of a school house.25 
Accordingly, when the Parliamentarians stormed the town in March 1646 they 
found that 'the North Gate fort stood some dispute'.26 New fortifications at                                                         
20 Evidence of this building work is found in SA, 3365/587, ff. 38, 87, 90, and SA, 3365/588, 
ff. 90, 99, 107. 
21 SA, LB8/1/163, f. 4; SA, LB8/1/164, f. 9; SA, LB8/1/165, f. 6. 
22 SA, LB8/1/164, f. 5. 
23 SA, 3365/587, ff. 20, 24, 26, 114; SA, 3365/591, f. 42. 
24 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated. 
25 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/53. 
26 The Weekly Account, 1-8 Apr. 1646, unpaginated. 
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Shrewsbury included a detached earthen artillery fort, or sconce, built on high 
ground above the westerly suburb of Frankwell. When the Parliamentarians 
captured Shrewsbury this sconce was surrendered last and on separate terms, 
thereby suggesting its importance.27 Oswestry still had enclosing medieval walls, 
but in May 1644 the Royalist leadership at Shrewsbury considered the town 
remained vulnerable to attack and gave orders for a programme of refortification. 
That September, however, Oswestry's defences remained incomplete under 
Parliamentarian control.28  
 Wem made an unprepossessing location for the main Parliamentarian garrison, 
as the town lacked medieval defences and a naturally strong position. Sited above 
the River Roden, Wem could, however, command a field of fire across the 
surrounding lowlands (and the Parliamentarians cleared outlying buildings to 
facilitate this), and was protected to the south by the river and adjacent water 
meadows. Furthermore, the Parliamentarians appear to have engineered the Roden 
to flood the pastureland and fill the defensive ditches. Wem was eventually fortified 
by an enclosing complex of earthworks, incorporating ditches from four to nine 
yards wide, ramparts and palisades, although when first built in autumn 1643 the 
defences were somewhat rudimentary, one contemporary report noting 'there had 
been no time to make sconces [small forts or redoubts]'.29 In early April 1644 Lord 
Byron found Wem 'well fortified and advantageously seated', although vulnerable 
to fire, 'the houses being all thatch and standing very near the works'.30 Until 
summer 1644 Wem was sometimes kept under more or less tight Royalist blockade, 
in mid-April that year for instance it was reported that 'The enemy hath not laid 
close siege against it [...] but quarter near about it'.31 However, the Royalists seem to 
have been deterred by the strength of the fortifications from mounting any 
concerted attack against Wem after Lord Capel's failed assault in October 1643, 
although on the night of 20/21 May 1645 an aborted raid was attempted upon the                                                         
27 Gough, Myddle, p. 267; Relation [...] by [...] William Reinking, p. 6. 
28 CSPD, 1625-1649, pp. 600-1; CSPD, 1644, p. 514. 
29 HMC, Thirteenth Report, Appendix Part I, pp. 170-1; S. Garbet, The History of Wem (Wem, 
1818), pp. 217-18; M. Charles and L. Jones, Land Off Aston Street, Wem, Shropshire, 
Archaeological Excavations 2007 & 2008 (Birmingham, undated), pp. 2-3, 14-15; A True Relation 
of a Great Victory Obtained by the Parliaments Forces Against the Cavaliers neere Chester (1643), 
unpaginated. 
30 BRL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 118. 
31 A Continuation of Certain Special and Remarkable Passages Informed to the Parliament, 18-25 
Apr. 1644. 
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150-strong garrison by a detachment led by Sir Marmaduke Langdale from the main 
Royalist field army, then halted 14 miles away at Market Drayton.32 
 Earlier that May the committee at Shrewsbury had confidently reported that 
'Wem is re-fortified and made far more strong than before', improvements they 
attributed to Colonel Reinking's expertise in military engineering.33 An engineer 
skilled in fortification was a valuable asset, and the Royalists in Shropshire 
benefited from the services of Captain Francis Sandford, a local man and Lord 
Capel's appointee in March 1643 as his chief engineer. Sandford was empowered to 
inspect 'castles, forts & works', and 'them to amend & repair, & such other new 
works to contrive & direct'. His long-term project was overseeing the fortification of 
Shrewsbury, for which service in 1644 the town corporation paid him a gratuity of 
£10 - 'for designing the making of fortifications'.34 
 In building fortifications engineers like Sandford directed a mixed local 
workforce of skilled artisans and conscript labourers. At Ludlow in mid-1645, for 
example, the local mason John Coffin and his workmen were paid for 14 days' work 
on the town walls, although one William Brill, a townsman-cum-labourer, had 
earlier complained of being unpaid after 'constantly working in the castle ditch'.35 
Meanwhile, sometime in 1645 a working party of men from the parish of Stockton 
supervised by a local petty constable spent 12 days labouring on the fortifications at 
Bridgnorth.36 There, the townsmen had been expected to work at the defences in 
person or send substitutes in their stead, while Bridgnorth's wealthier inhabitants 
were assessed to find a quota of labourers or else pay the wages of others in lieu, at 
a day rate of 6d, or 11d in the winter. A similar weekly subscription to pay 
workmen was enforced on the better-off at Shrewsbury during 1644 and into 1645, 
paid to 'the collectors for the labourers at the works'.37 
 As often the largest stone-built buildings in a locality, churches frequently served 
as Civil War strongholds. Church towers made advantageous observation posts and 
firing positions, whilst the rest of the building provided secure accommodation for 
soldiers and even stabling for their horses. An advance force could establish itself in                                                         
32 Symonds, Diary, p. 175. 
33 The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 6-13 May 1645, p. 796. 
34 SA, 465/697, Sandford's commission; SA, 2265/588, f.2. 
35 SA, LB8/1/165, f. 6; SA, LB/2147. 
36 SA, P270/B/1/1, ff. 57-8. 
37 SA, BB/C/1/1/1, unfoliated; SRO, D593/R/1/3/2, unfoliated. 
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unoccupied or hitherto enemy territory by holding a church, as in April 1645 when 
a Parliamentarian detachment garrisoned St. Michael's, Madeley.38 Oswestry's 
parish church, St. Oswald's, being sited outside the town walls became a strong 
point during the fighting in summer 1644. On 22 June Parliamentarian infantry 
stormed the place and pursued the Royalist defenders into the steeple. When the 
Royalists in turn laid siege to the town a week later they recaptured St. Oswald's, it 
being, as Sir Thomas Myddelton noted, 'the strongest hold about the town'.39 A 
church near a garrisoned manor house would be incorporated into the defences, or 
else rendered indefensible if it stood too far beyond the perimeter. At High Ercall 
Hall, St. Michael's was linked to the defences because its tower provided the 
Royalists with a defensible vantage point. The consequential damage the church 
sustained in the several sieges was estimated in 1655 to cost £800 to repair. Standing 
within yards of much-contested Moreton Corbet Castle, St. Bartholomew's was left 
similarly badly damaged until repairs estimated at £500 began in 1662.40 Sir Richard 
Leveson's garrison at Lilleshall Abbey was established in what had been the 
ecclesiastical buildings. After the Dissolution the Augustinian house had been 
purchased and converted to secular use by the Leveson family, and by the Civil War 
the buildings remained in good repair. After a short investment towards the end of 
August 1645 Leveson's stronghold fell to the Parliamentarians, who in turn 
garrisoned Lilleshall Abbey into 1646.41 
 St. Eata's church by the bridge at Atcham, within four miles of Shrewsbury, 
accommodated the Royalist garrison guarding this important crossing of the River 
Severn, a detachment numbering 32 officers and men in May 1644.42 The 
Parliamentarians also recognised the local strategic significance of Atcham and 
garrisoned it in March 1645, probably once the Royalists had abandoned the place 
after Shrewsbury fell.43 The Royalists had also garrisoned the other bridged 
crossings of the Severn. At Shrewsbury, towers and drawbridges defended both 
bridges as part of the town's originally medieval defensive circuit. Meanwhile, five 
miles upriver at Montford the bridge was broken, fitted with a draw section and                                                         
38 SA, P180/Fiche 1. 
39 Two Great Victories, unpaginated; A Copy of A Letter sent From Sir Tho. Middleton, p. 5. 
40 Lloyd Kenyon, Sessions, I, pp. 19, 78. 
41 Malbon, Memorials, p. 180; Symonds, Diary, p. 249; LBWB, II, pp. 327, 388-9. 
42 CSPD, 1625-1649, p. 283.  
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guarded by a small garrison that in May 1644 numbered 43 foot. Although 
reinforced by some horse, the following 4 July this detachment could not prevent 
the Earl of Denbigh's army from storming the bridge, and later in retreating from 
Shrewsbury the Parliamentarians destroyed the drawbridge.44 Downriver towards 
Bridgnorth, the bridge at Buildwas was barricaded with turnpikes and defended by 
a sentry house.45 At Bridgnorth the Royalist garrison controlled the Severn crossing 
at the Low Town, and chains had been fitted across the bridge since 1642. In May 
1643 orders were given also to fortify the fords in the district.46 
 The places most often fortified and converted to garrisons were the country 
houses of the gentry, which for the military purpose of controlling territory were 
conveniently scattered across Shropshire. These buildings provided a garrison with 
accommodation for men, horses and supplies, and protection against attack. Despite 
residential modernisation some medieval castles retained much of their former 
character as formidable strongholds. These included the originally thirteenth-
century masonry castles at Caus and Shrawardine, owned by the Royalists Sir 
Henry Thyne and Henry Bromley respectively. Both castles had probably been 
garrisoned before autumn 1644 when they were occupied by Sir William Vaughan's 
Regiment.47 Fourteenth-century Broncroft Castle was more a fortified manor house, 
home during the Civil War of the Catholic Luttley family. Although in May 1645 a 
Parliamentarian detachment found that Broncroft Castle had been left 'much 
demolished' by Royalists, nonetheless they repaired and fortified the place to 
command Corvedale, 'a rich and fertile part of the county'.48  
 Protected by enclosing water-filled ditches, late medieval moated manor houses 
also remained defensible. Those known to have been garrisoned were Apley Castle, 
Dawley Castle, High Ercall Hall, Leigh Hall, the castle at Stoke upon Tern, the house 
at Albright Hussey, and also Ightfield Hall, a Parliamentarian garrison by early 1644 
described as a 'brick house and moated'.49 Dawley Castle had been fortified around 
1316 under a licence to crenellate, and the Compton family owned the 1640s manor 
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house. Abandoned by the Royalists towards the end of August 1645 (reportedly 
after having burnt it), Dawley Castle became a Parliamentarian garrison under the 
governorship of Captain Fowke.50 Several Elizabethan mansions lacking moats also 
proved defensible, including Sir Basil Brooke's court at Madeley, a Royalist garrison 
by September 1644 which they abandoned soon after Shrewsbury fell;51 the Smythe 
family's house at Morville, under Royalist occupation by April 1645;52 and, 
apparently, Longner Hall near Atcham, home of the Burton family and another 
Royalist garrison.53 The Earl of Shrewsbury's house at Longford, a Parliamentarian 
outpost by early 1644, was described in May 1645 by Symonds as 'a large brick 
house [...] spoiled and abused', although it still housed a Royalist garrison.54  
 Like the towns, garrisoned houses were often strengthened by new earthen 
fortifications. At Moreton Corbet the thirteenth-century masonry castle stood in 
awkward juxtaposition to the Corbets' Elizabethan mansion, so the defences were 
consolidated by re-cutting and expanding the outer ditch and by building ramparts 
incorporating projecting bastions known as 'flankers'.55 The stone-built late 
sixteenth-century Hall at Benthall was not otherwise readily defensible. 
Accordingly, when the Parliamentarians planted a garrison there in mid-April 1645 
they quickly fortified the place with enclosing earthworks, which within a month 
were reported as 'perfected [...] against any sudden assault'.56 Archaeological survey 
has indicated that ramparts incorporating angled bastions were built at 
Shrawardine Castle, while excavations at High Ercall Hall have revealed evidence 
of the deepening and widening of the enclosing moat during the Civil War, and of 
an accompanying formidable earthen bulwark built over the former boundary 
wall.57                                                         
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 Throughout the Civil Wars it was common practice of garrisons to dismantle or 
demolish buildings within the vicinity of their defences. This was done in order to 
allow the construction of outer fortifications, to clear a field of fire, and to deny 
cover and shelter to an attacking force.58 Natural obstacles in the landscape were 
also removed: at Ludlow, for example, an apple orchard was felled during the 
clearance and re-cutting of the town ditch.59 The most telling examples from 
Shropshire are of precautionary defensive destruction wrought by Royalist 
garrisons under threat of attack during 1645 and 1646. In 1645 the garrison at 
Shrawardine levelled the castle's outbuildings, had the nearby parish church pulled 
down in two stages (after the fall of Shrewsbury, on 24 February, and in early June), 
and shortly before they were besieged, around mid-summer's day torched the 
village.60 At Ludlow, the Royalist garrison hurriedly and partially burnt the suburbs 
before withdrawing into the town around 24 April 1646, although much property 
had already been destroyed by 10 April when the corporation ordered the 
compilation of a rent roll of demolished houses.61 Suburban properties outside the 
town gates were cleared, and by early November 1645 destruction had been so 
thorough along the street leading from the northerly Corve Gate that the town 
surveyors positioned marker stones to delineate where the buildings and plots had 
stood. The granting of a lease in December 1647 for one Francis Phillips to build on 
a plot where had stood a 'house burnt down to the ground by the wicked command 
of Sir Michael Woodhouse' is evidence of the clearance of property in Ludlow's 
westerly suburb beyond the Galdeford Gate.62  
 In 1644 there had been widespread clearance of property at Bridgnorth. The 
income lost by property owners, 'from the several rents for houses, shops, dwellings 
which are now demolished and pulled down in this time of war', was 
acknowledged by the town corporation, which detailed its own losses in rental from 
buildings and plots of land, in and around the castle and the town wall and ditch, 
cleared or given over to fortifications.63 Further precautionary defensive demolition 
                                                        
58 S. Porter, Destruction In The Civil Wars (Stroud, 1994), pp. 18-24. 
59 SA, LB7/2147. 
60 SA, P248/A/1/1, unfoliated. 
61 Carr and Atherton, Civil War in Staffordshire, p. 175; Perfect Occurrences of Both Houses of 
Parliament and Martiall Affairs, w/e 8 May 1646, unpaginated; SA, LB/Fiche 4679. 
62 SA, LB/Fiche 4679-80. 
63 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/54.  
 197 
took place at Bridgnorth during 1645. In March, on the command of the governor 
Sir Lewis Kirke the tower of St. Leonard's church was reduced in height; in May, the 
old town hall was taken apart and the new town hall in July, and the timbers from 
both stockpiled in St. Leonard's along with those from other dismantled buildings; 
in September the town cross was pulled down. This was done so that in the event of 
the capture of the town the enemy would be denied cover and observational or 
firing positions that might threaten the castle itself. Furthermore, in November all 
remaining buildings beyond the North Gate defences were ordered demolished to 
clear a field of fire.64 
Siege-craft 
The capture of a stronghold could be attempted in various ways, the outcome 
determined as much by the belligerents' resolve as their resources. To force a 
conclusion attackers could use negotiation (conducted as a sporadic or ongoing 
dialogue, in accordance with the customary rules of war); direct assault, or storm 
(often preceded by the breaching of the defences by bombardment or undermining); 
blockade and enforced privation; or these methods in combination during a 
protracted siege. From 26 February to 13 March 1644 Royalists employed the full 
modus operandi of siege-craft against the small Parliamentarian garrison holding 
Hopton Castle in south Shropshire.65 They launched three assaults, set afire most of 
the buildings, made breaches using hand tools, deployed a battery of heavy cannon, 
and eventually forced the surrender of Captain Samuel More and the 29 surviving 
members of his garrison by preparing to detonate a gunpowder mine under their 
refuge in the castle keep (Plate 5, p. 201). The Royalists had also blockaded the 
garrison for much of the intermittent siege, by setting outposts near to the castle and 
billeting their main body in nearby villages. Captain More in the meantime rejected 
four opportunities to negotiate terms for surrender, each time lessening his chance 
of gaining a favourable outcome. When More finally relented, because of his 
obstinate resistance (the Parliamentarians had had no realistic hope of relief) the 
Royalist commander Sir Michael Woodhouse would only grant 'mercy', leaving the 
garrison's fate to his discretion. In the event, apart from More all were summarily 
put to death, in the circumstances an act permissible under the laws of war.66                                                         
64 SA, BB/D/1/2/1/55; The Weekly Account, 10-17 Dec. 1645, unpaginated. 
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 Elsewhere, recourse to military protocol before a garrison was in extremis could 
avert loss of life. Towards the end of April 1644 the important Parliamentarian 
garrison at Tong surrendered with precipitate haste. They held the church of St 
Mary and St. Bartholomew, its adjacent collegiate building and the nearby castle, 
then largely a brick-built mansion. Arriving at Tong on 25 April, once the Royalist 
commander Colonel Henry Tiller had realised that the church complex and mansion 
were 'so far asunder that they cannot relieve one another', he promptly ordered the 
church to be stormed and its defenders retreated into the college. Thus isolated from 
their comrades in the castle, they next day agreed to Tillier's summons to surrender 
and marched away with their arms. The Parliamentarians remaining in the castle 
rejected Tillier's first call to surrender, but after a further parley on the morning of 
the 27th they also capitulated on favourable terms.67 By a peculiar custom of war the 
bells from the churches of a captured place were granted to the besieging artillery 
commander, traditionally so that they could be recast to make ordnance. 
Accordingly, Tong's churchwardens found that by paying 6s 'to the cannoneer for 
the redeeming of the little bell' they could reclaim from the Royalists this symbol of 
victory.68 In later May 1645 the Royalist garrison of Stokesay Castle offered no more 
than token resistance to the Parliamentarian brigade that advanced into the district. 
The governor, Captain Danet, rejected the Parliamentarians' first summons to 
surrender, but when they prepared to storm the place he quickly capitulated on 
favourable terms.69  
 The course of the investment of Ludlow in 1646 was also determined more by 
negotiation than by force. On 24 April Colonel John Birch arrived from Hereford 
with reinforcements to assume overall command of the Parliamentarian forces that 
for the previous fortnight or so had occupied positions near to Ludlow. Birch had 
around 1,000 men, mostly his own contingent from Hereford together with 
detachments from the county forces of Montgomeryshire, Radnorshire and 
Shropshire. After some skirmishing in the outskirts Sir Michael Woodhouse's 
garrison withdrew behind Ludlow's town walls, leaving Birch, by taking 'up 
quarters [...] at places most convenient for straightening of them', to deploy his 
forces to blockade both town and castle. An attack upon the Parliamentarian leaguer                                                         
67 BRL, Additional Mss 18981, f. 165. 
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on 29 April by a Royalist force of detachments from Raglan, Goodrich and 
Worcestershire was repulsed, and Woodhouse's horsemen were equally 
unsuccessful in their attempts to break out.70 Birch summonsed Woodhouse to 
surrender, pointedly reminding him that as governor of the sole Royalist garrison in 
Shropshire and one of the few remaining in England, there was 'neither any visible 
force in the field, nor any garrison unbesieged which can yield you the least hopes 
of relief'. Appealing to Woodhouse to emulate honourable capitulations elsewhere, 
Birch added: 'I need not tell you of [...] sundry other places of strength, maintained 
by men of honour, who have conceived it prudent [...] to make their places happy 
by terms of honour'. On 2 May Woodhouse replied rejecting the summons: 'I cannot 
assent unto it, neither with my allegiance, or honour of a soldier, in the condition I 
am in now to resist you'. He did, however, request - and receive - Birch's permission 
to send two gentlemen to seek direction from the King.71  
 While the emissaries were away Birch returned to Hereford, leaving the siege to 
be conducted by the committee of Shropshire who could redeploy to Ludlow their 
troops previously engaged at Bridgnorth after the castle was surrendered on 27 
April. Meanwhile, an order from mid-April by the Committee of Both Kingdoms for 
siege guns at Gloucester to be sent to Birch at Ludlow was rescinded, either in 
expectation of a negotiated surrender or because the Shropshire forces could deploy 
their own ordnance.72 Woodhouse's emissaries returned from Oxford on 12 May, 
and the news that King Charles had given himself up to the Scots army outside 
Newark hastened negotiations at Ludlow. Birch had returned to the leaguer and by 
the 15th brokered a deal between Woodhouse and the Shropshire committeemen for 
the surrender of the town. The committee's soldiers entered Ludlow around 20 May, 
by which time Birch and Woodhouse had agreed articles for the surrender of the 
castle on the 31st. Birch again returned to his headquarters at Hereford, leaving the 
local committeemen, annoyed with the leniency of his terms, to complain about the 
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'diversity of commands'.73 His surety of Woodhouse's personal safety appears to 
have clinched the capitulation - the governor reportedly 'refused to perform the 
same to any other' - but with Birch's departure the agreement broke down; the 
Royalists sallied out of the castle into the town, killing several Parliamentarians.74 
Birch was hurriedly recalled to patch up the agreement and Ludlow Castle was 
surrendered on 1 June, albeit on less honourable terms. Whereas the articles at first 
had allowed for Woodhouse's men to march away with their horses, colours and 
arms to 'garrisons unbesieged' (effectively, therefore, to disband and disperse with 
due punctilio), in the event just the senior officers kept their horses and side arms 
while all other ranks were unceremoniously disarmed.75 
 Negotiation, pragmatism and mutual observance of the customary rules of war 
brought about the Royalist capitulation at Ludlow. On other occasions the 
fluctuating military balance caused the hasty abandonment of strongholds. For 
example, the loss of Shrewsbury in February 1645 caused the Royalists in panic to 
abandon several garrisons. Rowton Castle, nine miles west of Shrewsbury, had been 
deserted and burnt within a day or so of the town's fall, as was Leigh Hall 13 miles 
to the south-west. Further afield meanwhile the Royalists torched and abandoned 
Tong Castle and deserted Madeley Court.76   
 When defenders were less obliged to give up the assailants might use a ruse, 
although the veracity of reports of such stratagems must remain questionable, given 
that they stressed the cleverness of their own side at the expense of the gullible 
enemy. For instance, on the night of 18 February 1644 Captain More's detachment 
reportedly gained Hopton Castle after tricking a Royalist sentry into believing that 
the Parliamentarians were a party of the King's men.77 A similarly partisan account 
described how, also under cover of darkness, on the following 8 September the 
Parliamentarians attacking Moreton Corbet Castle by scattered musketry fire, drum 
calls and orders shouted to imaginary units attempted to demoralise the Royalist 
garrison and trick them into believing they faced a larger force.78                                                         
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 The same report continued to describe how the Parliamentarians were soon 
engaged in close-quarter fighting, using hand grenades to dislodge Royalists firing 
from windows and loopholes. A direct attack, or storm, of this kind was often 
launched against a stronghold when attackers held the advantage of surprise or 
numerical superiority, or when there was neither time nor resources to mount a 
protracted siege. Thus the Parliamentarians reportedly stormed Morville Hall on 14 
June 1645 after 'a short dispute', whereas on the following 19 December St. Peter's 
church at Wrockwardine was successfully defended by its small Parliamentarian 
garrison against hasty Royalist assaults.79 In March 1646 the Parliamentarians 
similarly intended to take Bridgnorth by surprise attack on the night of the 27th, but 
the assault force was delayed and left fatigued by the overlong approach march and 
so the operation was postponed. The Royalist governor Sir Robert Howard rejected 
a summons to surrender, and so on 30 March the Parliamentarians stormed and 
captured the town by simultaneously attacking the defences at three places, forcing 
the defenders to take refuge in the castle.80  
 A besieging force could employ several tactics to increase their chances of a 
successful assault. Ladders to scale walls were used by Royalists at Hopton Castle in 
1644 and by Parliamentarians against Shrewsbury in 1645, while at Moreton Corbet 
the previous September the Parliamentarians had negotiated the castle's outer ditch 
using ladders.81 Against Wem in October 1643 Royalist soldiers made faggots of 
brushwood and straw to use as fascines to infill the town ditch, carrying them in 
their advance as protection against the defenders' fusillade.82 Setting buildings or 
defensive fixtures afire was another tactical option. After capturing Oswestry town 
on 22 June 1644, the Earl of Denbigh's council of war agreed that an attempt should 
be made the following morning to breach the still Royalist-held castle by setting the 
gates alight using pitch. But in the event there was no need for this rather desperate 
expedient, because the garrison's womenfolk soon persuaded them to surrender.83 
At Loppington, on 28 September 1643 Royalists attacking the Parliamentarian 
outpost of Wem at St. Michael's church burned the door and the shingle roof, an act                                                         
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of arson in which Lord Capel was reportedly 'the busiest of his soldiers in carrying 
faggots to the porch'.84  
 An assault would be spearheaded by a vanguard of picked soldiers known as the 
'forlorn hope', such as the 80 dismounted Royalist cavalrymen leading the attack 
against Wem on 17 October 1643. Armed with swords and short-range firearms 
(pistols and carbines) the troopers were considered well equipped for close-quarter 
fighting.85 The Parliamentarian forlorn hope against Shrewsbury on 22 February 
1645 comprised 30-40 dismounted troopers and a similar number of musketeers 
armed with firelocks. Their flintlock-operated firearms did not use smouldering 
match cord, the glow from which in the darkness might have revealed their 
position.86 Indeed, Colonel Mytton later criticised Colonel Reinking as commander 
of this night-time operation for failing to maintain discipline amongst the main 
body of matchlock-equipped musketeers: 'I came in unto them: and whereas he 
[Reinking] sayeth that he had only two lit matches, I caused them to put out thirty 
and above, asking them if they would surprise the town with lit matches'.87  
 Notwithstanding this sort of difficulty in maintaining operational control at 
night, attackers valued the advantage of surprise that the hours of darkness gave 
them. Indeed, a week before the Parliamentarians had attempted a nocturnal assault 
against Shrewsbury. However, the expedition was abandoned short of the town 
before sunrise because, as Colonel Mytton reported, their approach march had been 
slowed by 'the night being exceeding dark and the ways extremely wet'.88  
 Although surprise attacks were often successful, the deployment of artillery was 
usually the decisive factor in the subjugation of a stronghold. After the failure of the 
second Royalist assault against Hopton Castle (launched before dawn on 2 March 
1644), Sir Michael Woodhouse acknowledged that the place could only be taken 
with the use of cannon.89 Artillery support gave an attacking force a significant and 
often overwhelming advantage. A single heavy cannon could render a lesser 
stronghold indefensible and demoralise its defenders. When the Royalists attacked                                                         
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Parliamentarian Apley Castle in March 1644 the matter was decided by a culverin 
brought from Shrewsbury, its short bombardment reportedly 'played the rebels so 
close with shot' that the place fell by storm within two hours.90  Meanwhile Lord 
Byron, as he reported, had led an expeditionary force 'with a great piece of battery, 
into that part of Flintshire which lieth between Bangor [-on-Dee] and Wem [...] in 
regard of the many petty garrisons possessed there by the rebels'. 'Upon the sight of 
our great gun two of them yielded upon quarter and the other two were quitted 
before I could come to them', Byron wrote from Ellesmere on 30 March to Prince 
Rupert, reporting with satisfaction the capitulation of the Parliamentarian 
outposts.91 At Oswestry, on 22 June following the Parliamentarians deployed a pair 
of field pieces to break one of the town gates. The bombardment had a demoralising 
effect on the Royalist garrison, who retreated into the castle after a cannon ball 
disembowelled a townswoman and injured a couple of defenders. Later, however, 
the Parliamentarian gunners found that shot from the heavier of their two cannon 
caused inconsiderable damage to the castle.92 The incident demonstrated that 
medieval walls remained a formidable defence against all but the heaviest guns or 
most sustained of bombardments. At Hopton Castle, Captain Samuel More 
recorded (albeit with unlikely precision) that the Royalists' three heavy cannon took 
some seven hours and 96 shots to breach the outer wall.93 Against Wem in October 
1643 the Royalists unluckily lost half of their firepower - three cannon and a mortar  
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Plate 5: The tower house 
(or keep) of Hopton Castle, 
the final refuge of Captain 
Samuel More's garrison in 
1644. The garderobe outlet 
entered by Royalist pioneers 
in order to place a 
gunpowder mine is at the 
base of the nearest (south-
west) wall. 
 
 
  
Plate 6: View from the 
medieval castle earthworks 
on Panpudding Hill 
(foreground), across the 
intervening valley towards 
the leaning shattered keep of 
Bridgnorth Castle (centre 
left).  
Parliamentarian artillery 
positioned here during the 
siege of April 1646 would 
have been within effective 
range of the Royalist 
stronghold. 
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- when the mortar broke after firing its second bomb, and a cannon was dismounted 
by a chance shot from one of the defenders' guns.94  
 At Bridgnorth, during April 1646 the Parliamentarians deployed artillery in 
laying siege to the castle. The destruction of nearby buildings in a two-day long 
conflagration on 31 March and 1 April that devastated much of the High Town, 
caused by incendiary fire from the Royalist garrison's artillery, appears 
inadvertently to have enabled the besiegers to site some approaches, or 
entrenchments, close to the castle.95 By 10 April the Parliamentarian ordnance - 
which included at least one mortar - was reported as emplaced and 'ready to play'.96 
Because the twelfth-century earthen ringwork and bailey on nearby Panpudding 
Hill occupies an advantageous hilltop position separated from Bridgnorth Castle by 
an intervening valley, it is most likely that during the siege the Parliamentarians 
adapted it as an artillery emplacement (Plate 6).97  
 Whether they deployed artillery or not, advantage did not always lie with the 
attackers, however, for defenders could employ various countermeasures. Given 
time and opportunity they could improve their fortifications. At Hopton Castle, 
after beating off the first Royalist assault More's garrison 'were as industrious as 
men could be' in constructing earthworks and adapting the buildings for defence. 
They later piled earth and timber to block the breach made by the Royalist cannon.98 
At Shrawardine in June 1645, the Royalist garrison at first appears to have 
conducted an effective forward defence from the cover of the ruins of the church 
and village before withdrawing into the castle.99 Defending marksmen firing from 
overlooking vantage points could harass besiegers, by picking off at long-range key 
personnel such as officers and gunners. The snipers' weapon of choice was the 
fowling piece, used for game shooting and often rifled for greater range and 
accuracy. The NCO commanding the eight-man Royalist detachment occupying 
Albright Hussey House, for example, deterred an attack by wounding the 
Parliamentarian leader and shooting his horse from under him using a fowling 
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piece. In defending High Ercall Hall the Royalists were reported to have used 
'divers long fowling pieces that kill a great way; which have done them great 
service'.100 Artillery also enabled a garrison to conduct a long-range defence. The 
firepower of their emplaced cannon seems to have been the key factor in the 
Parliamentarians' successful defence of Wem in October 1643, one report 
acknowledging 'the mighty execution which our cannons did upon the enemies'.101 
The reported killing there of 50 Royalist soldiers in a salvo by two small cannon, or 
drakes, was probably an exaggerated relation of the devastating anti-personnel 
effect of canister shot.102 In mid-April 1644 the artillery emplaced defending Wem 
was reported as 'two sakers [medium cannon] and some other pieces of 
ordnance'.103 
 Lord Newport's residence at High Ercall Hall proved to be the most strongly and 
resolutely defended of Shropshire's Civil War strongholds. Enclosed by a broad wet 
moat and substantial defensive earthworks, the Royalist stronghold was, as events 
proved, aptly described as 'a place of great strength and well fortified [...] not 
thought feasible to be taken by storm'.104 The intermittent attempts by the 
Parliamentarians to blockade and besiege High Ercall Hall over the course of a year 
therefore make an informative case study in contemporary siege-craft.  
 Recognising the threat from the Royalist garrison just seven miles away, in 
March 1645 the Parliamentarians recently established in Shrewsbury moved 
quickly, besieging the Hall by the end of the month once mobile Royalist forces led 
by Princes Rupert and Maurice had left Shropshire or dispersed to their garrisons. 
The Parliamentarians hastily erected siege-works, and by 3 April their artillery had 
already damaged the drawbridge and gatehouse. Sappers meanwhile worked to 
drain the moat and to dig approaches near to the Hall in preparation for an assault, 
and a night attack was probably attempted on 10/11 April.105 However, on the 
evening of 15 April the Parliamentarians abruptly abandoned the siege and 
retreated to Shrewsbury, blaming their withdrawal on what turned out to be false                                                         
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intelligence of a Royalist relief force approaching the area. For their part the 
Royalists' Mercurius Aulicus related how the garrison had withstood a 17-day siege 
by artillery, mining and assault. It seems likely that an aggressive sally by the 
garrison in which the Parliamentarians suffered a number of casualties hastened 
their withdrawal.106  
 An apparently favourable military situation encouraged the Parliamentarians to 
return in force to High Ercall on 1 July, only for them to be beaten and driven away 
four days later by Sir William Vaughan's relief force. The Parliamentarians appear 
also to have abandoned a third siege in mid-August, but a month later the Hall was 
again besieged or under blockade.107 During December the Parliamentarians scaled 
down a blockading operation involving mounted patrols and three of four small 
encircling garrisons planted in nearby churches, and so were unable to prevent the 
Royalists being reinforced by some horse and resupplied by Sir William Vaughan 
around the 20th, while bad weather into the New Year prevented their building an 
earthwork fort near to the Hall.108 In early March 1646, however, the 
Parliamentarians succeeded in entrenching themselves nearby, by completing a 
strong sconce which, together with a string of four smaller redoubts, enabled the 
600-strong besieging force effectively to blockade the Hall by the middle of the 
month. At least six pieces of ordnance brought from Shrewsbury were emplaced, 
and a damaging bombardment by heavy cannon and mortar fire on 25 March forced 
the garrison to seek terms. The Royalists surrendered High Ercall Hall on the 27th, 
somewhat to the besiegers' relief; they had found it 'a most difficult thing to take the 
place by storm, and their provision within so great that there was little hope in 
many months to prevail by famine'.109  
 As the fighting in England drew to a close, Parliamentarian attention turned to 
their remaining garrisons and to those abandoned strongholds that might provide 
defensible rallying points for further resistance. In early April 1646 the committee of 
Shropshire received general and particular instructions from London with regard to 
rendering indefensible - or slighting - the county's fortifications. In line with                                                         
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national policy, on the 4th the House of Commons entrusted the committee with 
deciding which places should be kept as garrisons, or else be demolished. Two days 
later, the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered that while the fortifications about 
High Ercall should be levelled and the moat drained, the Hall itself should be left 
intact; otherwise, they declared, 'there would then be too many sad marks left of the 
calamity of this war'.110 On 11 July following the Commons further directed that 
with the exception of Shrewsbury and Ludlow Castle, all fortifications in Shropshire 
should be slighted.111  
 How thoroughly this policy was executed is difficult to ascertain, given that 
some places had already been rendered indefensible by fighting or precautionary 
slighting. For example, in May 1645 the Parliamentarians found that damage by 
Royalists had rendered Holdgate Castle in Corvedale unfit for use as a garrison.112 
The following July the Parliamentarians burnt Shrawardine Castle and then 
quarried its walls for stone used in the defences of Shrewsbury.113 The near 
complete destruction of Bridgnorth Castle by demolition began under 
Parliamentarian direction in February 1647, but elsewhere potential strongholds 
were left more or less intact, for during the renewed hostilities in July 1648 
Parliament issued emergency orders for the castles at Dawley and Broncroft to be 
rendered 'untenable'.114 
Military intelligence and communications 
In the 1644 edition of his treatise on the cavalry, the military writer John Cruso 
characterised the exemplary 'good commander', a paragon who, among other 
martial virtues, formulated strategy not only on the basis of the capability of his 
own forces, but also with 'the assurance of the condition of the estate of the enemy, 
his commodities, and necessaries, his councils and designs'.115 Thereby Cruso 
pointed to the value of intelligence - meaning all sorts of information, especially 
news of the enemy's condition, which can inform military planning. Although its 
importance has previously tended to be overlooked by historians of the Civil Wars, 
recent scholarship has shown that military intelligence played a vital role in the                                                         
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conflict. Accordingly, intelligence-gathering operations of varying sophistication 
became an integral part of war effort.116  
 In Shropshire's theatre of operations there is good evidence of the widespread 
collection of intelligence and of commanders acting upon it. Indeed, in a civil war 
fought between a largely monolingual people by soldiers who lived amongst 
civilians of sometimes uncertain loyalty, and when the opposing forces often 
operated in close proximity, the main difficulty that commanders faced was not 
obtaining intelligence, but determining its reliability and preventing the leakage of 
disinformation which might be detrimental to morale. In late July 1643, in letters 
from Shrewsbury Lord Capel rebuked his deputy at Chester for allowing fallacious 
and uncorroborated intelligence reports to damage Royalist morale. Capel's 
warnings to Sir Abraham Shipman could have served as a caution to commanders 
on both sides: 'Let there be an especial notice taken of those that bring intelligence 
and news', he ordered, 'and if [...] they bring false intelligence severe course be 
taken with them'; furthermore, 'be assured of the condition of the person, and the 
probabilities of the relation, before you give too much credit'.117 
 In 1642 the King's party in Shropshire were engaged in gathering intelligence. In 
late August Bridgnorth's aldermen, fearful that Parliament's army 'would come 
against this town', sent a townsman, one Richard Adams, on a scouting mission 
towards Coventry to ascertain the whereabouts of the forces of Lord Brooke and the 
Earl of Essex.118 By mid-September the mayor of Shrewsbury was acquiring 
intelligence from letters intercepted at the town gates, and in November it was 
reported that 'the high sheriff [...] and the mayor of Shrewsbury have commission 
from the King to open all letters before they be either carried out or brought into 
that county'. By the year's end bargemen plied the River Severn bound under oath 
to disclose to the mayor's office any correspondence they carried.119  
 These early intelligence operations by civic authorities were intended more to 
safeguard life and property in their locality than to further Charles I's cause 
militarily. However, as the war intensified networks of scouts, spies and informants                                                         
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were integrated into the war effort on both sides. Three examples of 
Parliamentarian operations illustrate well the importance of intelligence in military 
planning. In the vicinity of Oswestry, around 20 June 1644 Colonel Mytton 
employed 'diverse ways to have intelligence' (messengers, spies and prisoners of 
war), enabling him to monitor the progress of an enemy munitions convoy and later 
to ambush another detachment. Furthermore, the weakened state of the town's 
Royalist garrison was identified, so that Oswestry was stormed and captured two 
days later.120 In February 1645, the surprise assault on Shrewsbury was made 
against a weak point in the riverside fortifications identified to the Parliamentarians 
by two defectors from the garrison.121 In late July 1648 a clandestine plot, co-
coordinated by Lord Byron's agents, for local Royalists to seize the county town was 
disclosed by an informer to Shrewsbury's governor, Humphrey Mackworth. This 
caused the arrest of several would-be insurgents, and the confessions two of them 
made under interrogation enabled the committee's troopers on the night of 1/2 
August to surprise the Royalist gathering at Wattlesborough Heath.122 
 An army's reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering effort was directed by its 
scoutmaster, a role George Davis later claimed to have performed for Lord Capel in 
Shropshire and Cheshire, while one Theodore Jennings was the Earl of Denbigh's 
scoutmaster-general.123 Both sides retained small numbers of mounted scouts as 
specialists in surveillance to supplement the regular cavalry's intelligence gathering. 
In May 1643 Lord Capel ordered Sir Francis Ottley to deploy scouts from 
Shrewsbury widely across the county and its border, 'lest some might fail'.124 
Colonel Thomas Hunt's regiment of Parliamentarian horse similarly included a 
number of scouts.125 Parties of horse undertook reconnaissance work during their 
routine patrols, such as the opposing eight-man detachments from the garrisons at 
Royalist Shrawardine and Parliamentarian Moreton Corbet who skirmished in the 
village of Myddle sometime in late 1644.126 Myddle was seven miles equidistant to 
both castles, and the range of a garrison's reconnaissance effort was effectively a                                                         
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half-day's ride by its horsemen.  
 News and hearsay filtered into garrisons from the surrounding countryside and 
both sides coveted local intelligence. In May 1645 High Sheriff Sir Francis Ottley 
ordered parish constables in west Shropshire to report to Royalist garrisons any 
movement of Parliamentarian forces.127 Similarly, in February 1646 Parliamentary 
officers at Stokesay Castle pledged their garrison's protection to the townsfolk of 
Bishop's Castle if they cooperated, in giving 'us at all times what intelligence you 
can of the motion and approaches of the enemy'.128 But the flow of intelligence was 
subject to fluctuating popular support, as the Royalists found to their cost after the 
battle of Montgomery, a blow to Royalist arms in the region that disheartened the 
King's supporters and encouraged his opponents. Consequently, in October 1644, a 
month after the battle, Sir Michael Ernle reported of Shropshire that 'the country 
being now surrounded by the enemy's forces [...] is [...] apt to run in unto and 
serveth the rebels with all manner of things especially intelligence'.129  
 Garrisons were hubs for intelligence gathering. By the close of 1645, news of 
activity in the three Royalist strongholds remaining in Shropshire was being relayed 
from nearby Parliamentarian garrisons to Sir William Brereton and to the 
committeemen at Shrewsbury.130 Moreover, the wide-reaching regional intelligence 
network fostered by Brereton informed Parliamentarian operations generally in 
Shropshire during 1645. This meant that the Royalist task force Sir William Vaughan 
led from south Shropshire towards Chester in later October 1645 as it advanced 
through the northern Marches was closely monitored from Parliamentarian 
garrisons. Timely and accurate intelligence reports enabled Brereton and his fellow 
regional commanders to concentrate their forces and intercept and defeat Vaughan 
outside Denbigh on 1 November.131  
 Garrison commanders could gain useful intelligence from deserters and 
prisoners of war, whose testimony, although given under duress or to appease their 
captors, nonetheless might provide valuable insight into the enemy's condition and 
morale. In late February 1644 the Royalists found that statements by 
Parliamentarian deserters from Wem, reporting the garrison as weakened and                                                         
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demoralised, were corroborated by a spy in the town employed by Sir Vincent 
Corbet, then governor of Moreton Corbet Castle.132 Prisoner-taking raids were 
conducted to acquire intelligence of this kind. For example, on 24 October 1645 five 
of Sir William Vaughan's soldiers were questioned after being seized from their 
bivouac near Bishop's Castle by a detachment from Stokesay garrison. But common 
soldiers were usually ill informed about strategy, and on this occasion all Major 
Hungerford could glean by interrogating his captives was that 'they are designed to 
raise a siege but where they know not'.133 
 Both sides also made widespread use of 'intelligencers' - the contemporary term 
for civilian spies and informers.134 Because intelligencers could operate more freely 
in enemy-controlled territory, especially in garrisoned towns, their news was an 
invaluable supplement to the reports of the military's own horse and scouts. To this 
end, by December 1645 Captain Lord Colvill, governor of Parliament's garrison at 
Broncroft Castle, had 'an honest friend for intelligence' within Bridgnorth, and also 
employed an informant in the Royalist-held city of Worcester.135 In order to 
undertake their hazardous clandestine work, intelligencers had to be highly 
motivated, either out of loyalty to their adopted cause or by attractive remuneration. 
The contemporary military theoretician John Vernon was in no doubt that 
trustworthy and quick-witted spies should be well rewarded: 'which will cause 
them to expose themselves unto all hazards and dangers to give intelligence'.136 Sir 
Thomas Myddelton accordingly paid his intelligencers well for their missions into 
Royalist-controlled Wales, including Piers David, given almost £21 for spying in 
Montgomeryshire. Espionage was not, however, a male preserve and Myddelton 
also paid one Jane Evan £5 for intelligence.137 In early December 1645 one of Sir 
William Brereton's female informers - who was probably a professional spy and 
perhaps also a femme fatale - on her return from Royalist Worcester visited Sir 
William Vaughan in his quarters at Bridgnorth. Later the next day she related her 
meeting with the Royalist general and other news to the Parliamentarian 
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committeemen at Shrewsbury.138 Judging by the tone of his report, Royalism rather 
than remuneration inspired an intelligencer dwelling in a township near Wem to 
send Sir Francis Ottley in early 1644 an estimation of Parliament's forces in the 
county, based on his own observations and local hearsay. The anonymous informer 
nervously entrusted Ottley to 'keep this letter very close or else burn it as soon as 
you have read it'.139 Potentially the most useful intelligencer was an informer of 
seniority within the enemy's camp, like the 'one that is a commissioner of array and 
frequently in Ludlow, yet in affection our friend' who by December 1645 was 
notifying the committee at Shrewsbury about Royalist activity in south 
Shropshire.140  
 Given this sort of infiltration by informants and the uncertainties of local 
allegiance, attempts to maintain military secrecy were often ineffectual and the 
enemy soon knew about deployments. Moreover, news could be communicated 
quickly along active intelligence networks. For example, from Wem on the morning 
of 19 February 1644 Colonel Mytton was able to write with the benefit of 
corroboration by several local sources to inform Sir Thomas Fairfax of Prince 
Rupert's arrival at Shrewsbury the previous evening.141 With similar rapidity, news 
of the Royalist defeat near Stokesay on 8 June 1645 was being communicated the 
next day by the Parliamentarian Colonel John Fox from his base at Edgbaston Hall 
near Birmingham, almost 40 miles from the battlefield in south Shropshire.142  
 Messengers were employed when distance and fear of disclosure made it 
hazardous to impart intelligence in person. One such was Richard Clarke, a youth 
who cleverly adopted the guise of a simpleton beggar and secreted messages in a 
hollow staff when travelling between the Parliamentarians at Wem and their 
informants in Royalist garrisons.143 Richard Waker was a less cunning messenger 
arrested by the Royalist authorities at Ludlow in May 1643 on suspicion of carrying 
letters to and from Brampton Bryan Castle, the Parliamentarian stronghold in 
northern Herefordshire.144                                                          
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 Mounted couriers maintained long-distance communications between 
commanders, including the exchange of intelligence reports. Accordingly, during 
1644 and 1645 the constables of Stockton parish had to requisition horses for the 
Royalist courier service operating out of Bridgnorth.145 Trusted and well-paid 
civilians were frequently employed as dispatch riders instead of soldiers, as in 
February 1645 when the anxious Sir Richard Cave intended 'instantly to hire 
messengers at any price' to carry from Ludlow the news of the fall of Shrewsbury to 
Prince Maurice at Chester.146 Bailiffs' accounts show that in 1645-6 civilian couriers 
often delivered Royalist dispatches overnight from Ludlow and were well 
remunerated for doing so; one rider received 5s for delivering a letter to Sir William 
Vaughan, for example.147 Messages of this sort if intercepted were a most valuable 
source of intelligence to the enemy. Therefore, in order to mitigate the dangers of 
capture and disclosure critical information could be omitted from the written report 
and instead given verbally by the messenger, or else disguised by encipherment. 
But this was a precaution field commanders often found impracticable. 'For want of 
a cipher or skill how to use', concluded Lord Capel in a dispatch to King Charles's 
secretary, Lord Falkland, from Bridgnorth on 26 March 1643, 'I dare not advertise 
more upon the chance of messengers'.148 In his hasty situation report to Prince 
Rupert mentioned above, Sir Richard Cave concluded, 'I have not time to write in 
cipher, if I had I should say more'.149  
 Given that messengers had to contend with ill-made roads, variable terrain, and 
unpredictable weather, whilst avoiding interception by the enemy, communications 
and the exchange of intelligence was often maintained effectively. On 22 March 
1643, for instance, three Royalist couriers relayed a packet of letters the 20-odd miles 
from Chester into north Shropshire in just five hours.150 Perhaps more typical was 
the 40-mile passage of an intelligence report from Sir Henry Hastings - addressed 
'for his Highness Prince Rupert at Shrewsbury, post-haste, post-haste' - sent from 
Tutbury Castle in north-east Staffordshire at four pm on 12 April 1644 that arrived 
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at Bridgnorth at nine pm on the 13th.151 Such communications were slowed, 
hampered and endangered by the proximity of enemy garrisons. After the 
Parliamentarians captured Oswestry, for example, the Royalists were forced to 
divert across the Shropshire border into the Welsh hill country their line of 
communication with Chester. Consequently, at the end of June 1644 one of Prince 
Rupert's agents ruefully contemplated his southerly journey by this alternative 
route: 'The Parliament men from Wem surprised Oswestry, which sends me to 
make a passage to Worcester through more unhallowed countries than the Alps'.152 
Medical services 
In comparison to the plentiful evidence for intelligence gathering, there are fewer 
references to the care of the sick and wounded in the Shropshire theatre of war. 
Analysis of the medical services of the opposing forces is therefore problematical; 
what treatment and nursing care was received by soldiers like John Mould, for 
example, a Parliamentarian trooper from the parish of Myddle who, according to 
Richard Gough, after being shot in the thigh remained 'very crooked as long as he 
lived'? Thomas Ash, a Royalist soldier from the same district, similarly returned 
home with 'a crazy body and many scars, the symptoms of the dangerous service 
which he had performed'. Both were fortunate to have survived their wounding and 
return home from the Wars, for Gough calculated that of the soldiers' 18 fellow 
parishioners who enlisted for King or Parliament, 13 were killed in battle, or else 
died of wounds or disease, or otherwise remained missing, a statistic cited by 
historians as an exemplar of the sometimes high rates of mortality consequential to 
Civil War soldiering.153 
 The combatants were under obligation to provide charitable care for their own 
and enemy sick and wounded, in accordance with military custom and the religious 
and moral standards of mid-seventeenth-century society.154 Contemporary military 
theoreticians also acknowledged that medical practice was a necessary ancillary arm 
of the military. Cruso recommended that army headquarters should include a six-                                                        
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man medical team, in addition to the surgeons and their assistants of the individual 
regiments, while Henry Hexham thought that each infantry company should have a 
'good barber surgeon', to tend the wounded in the regimental surgeon's absence.155  
However, in reality care for the sick and wounded was often limited by shortages of 
skilled practitioners and the scarcity of medical supplies. The fullest study of 
military welfare during the Civil Wars has concluded that while the medical corps 
of the armies of both sides were at first unprepared and inadequately equipped and 
staffed, by 1645 Parliament had overseen the development of a reasonably well-
resourced and administered medical service. The Royalist army, on the other hand, 
to the end failed to give the same priority to caring for its casualties.156 These 
conclusions were, however, based mainly on the practices of the King's Oxford-
based army and of Parliament in south-east and eastern England, while less is 
known of the medical services of the regional armies and local forces elsewhere.157 
 After the departure of the King's army, in mid-October 1642 Shropshire's 
Royalist leadership agreed to appoint an experienced surgeon to oversee medical 
care.158 Nonetheless, local Royalist soldiers lacked medical support when engaged 
in cross-border skirmishes with Sir William Brereton's Cheshire Parliamentarians in 
early 1643. Sir Vincent Corbet's Dragoons were part of the Royalist force routed by 
Brereton at Nantwich on 28 January. The following day Corbet wrote in desperation 
to Sir Francis Ottley at Shrewsbury, demanding 'all the surgeons you can possibly 
provide for we are in great want of them'.159 But any help Corbet's men received 
was inadequate or transitory, because in mid-April he again appealed for a surgeon 
('with all his implements and necessaries') to be sent to treat the wounded at his 
field headquarters at Malpas.160 Notwithstanding such shortages of competent 
practitioners, it seems that eventually Royalist forces more often included medical 
staff. A surgeon and a physician were among the prisoners of the Royalist army                                                         
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defeated near Stokesay in June 1645, for example, and in April 1646 there were 
surgeons among the garrison at Bridgnorth Castle.161  
 On 13 April 1643 Sir Vincent Corbet had specifically requested the services of 
John Shelvock, a barber-surgeon from Shrewsbury.162 In exchange for his expertise 
Shelvock was promised 'remuneration to his content', and it is likely that sporadic 
care provided by civilian practitioners - hired or otherwise called upon by the 
military - was the norm. Among the military's medical staff officers was William 
Thorpe, chief surgeon to the Earl of Denbigh. With his wagonload of medical 
supplies, Thorpe accompanied the army of the West Midland Association on 
campaign in Staffordshire and Shropshire from May to July 1644, thereby 
demonstrating a commitment to medical care even in Denbigh's cash-strapped 
organisation.163  
 Other aspects of the management of care for the wounded in and around 
Shropshire can be reconstructed. The casualties of a larger engagement might 
receive primary surgical treatment at a field hospital, like that set up by the 
Parliamentarians after the battle of Montgomery. There, however, the surgeons and 
their mates were noteworthy for their avarice rather than medical skill, the 
Parliamentarian general Sir John Meldrum reportedly threatening several that he 
would 'deal with them as with enemies' unless they handed over jewellery removed 
from the fatally wounded Sir William Fairfax.164 More often casualties were 
evacuated further afield to receive treatment (or indeed, to be taken for burial). The 
Parliamentarians reported after Sir William Vaughan's abortive attack on their 
garrison at Wrockwardine in December 1645 that the Royalists carried away their 
dead and wounded in ten commandeered farm carts.165 In their retreat (or rout, 
according to the solely Parliamentarian reports of the action) the Royalist force 
defeated outside Bishop's Castle on 30 August 1645 abandoned sixty wounded, but 
in a humanitarian act of quid pro quo an agreement was made for their exchange 
with a like number of Parliamentarian captives. It was reported: 'the officers have 
procured their carrying to Ludlow, to be looked after by their own surgeons, and                                                         
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engaged that so many prisoners of war should (at their coming hither) be 
exchanged for them'.166 Numbers of wounded were sent to Shrewsbury, which, as 
the county town and principal Royalist and later Parliamentarian garrison, could 
provide carers and accommodation. In mid-September 1644 Royalist casualties from 
the siege of Montgomery Castle were carted the 20 or so miles to Shrewsbury to 
receive medical attention.167 Similarly, after their defeat at nearby High Ercall on 5 
July 1645 around 100 wounded Parliamentarian soldiers may have straggled into 
the county town.168 St. Mary's Church at Shrewsbury appears to have served as an 
infirmary or temporary hospital during October 1644 at least, when Lady Leveson 
made a charitable donation for the care of wounded soldiers accommodated 
there.169 
 Local men made casualties might be fortunate enough to be tended by their 
families, but in the general absence of hospital facilities it was common practice for 
wounded and sick soldiers to be dispersed to inns or households to be nursed by 
ordinary civilians. This was done by the imposition of billeting and free quarter, or 
else more amenable arrangements for paid care might be entered into with the 
authorities.170 The latter may have applied to William Shepherd, a householder from 
Onibury, who during 1644 claimed payment for taking in Royalist soldiers 
wounded at the siege of Hopton Castle, and again after the battle of Montgomery.171 
In July 1644 an officer at Wem complained that wounded Parliamentarian soldiers 
went unpaid, but this may have been because their wages had been stopped to pay 
instead their civilian attendants.172 Another example of a householder providing 
medical care was the unknown Shrewsbury resident who from mid-September 1643 
provided quarters for the Royalist Captain Holmes and his servant. The Captain 
was sometime wounded or fell sick, and so received care at his lodgings until his 
death on 15 November, during which time - as the householder emphasised when 
submitting his bill - he received 'all things convenient for him'.173 But as a result of                                                         
166 Heads of some Notes of the Citie Scout, 9 Sept. 1645, p. 4. 
167 CSPD, 1644, p. 533. 
168 BRL, Harley Mss 6852, f. 274. 
169 Carlton, Going to the Wars, p. 228; Donagan, 'Casualties of War', pp. 122-3; SRO, 
D593/R/1/3/2, unfoliated. 
170 Donagan, 'Casualties of War', pp. 123-5. 
171 SA, LB7/2098. 
172 WRO, CR2017/C10, f. 19. 
173 SA, 3365/2566, unfoliated. 
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their actions many soldiers were not accorded careful treatment. The Royalist 
cavalry officer Cornet Collins had led repeated forays to plunder the parish of 
Myddle. As a result of his notoriety, when wounded there in a skirmish Collins was 
left by the villagers to bleed to death on a mattress he had sought to take from a 
household the day before.174 However, because the cornet had been shot in the 
stomach there was in any case little that seventeenth-century medicine could have 
done to help save him. 
Conclusions 
Shropshire was noteworthy for the numerous garrisons established by both sides 
during the First Civil War. Although there were several field engagements, all with 
important local outcomes, the resources of war effort were employed mostly in the 
defence and subjugation of strongholds. Shrewsbury, Oswestry, Wem, Bridgnorth 
and Ludlow as fortified garrison towns were of pivotal importance, while many 
other defensible places, including churches, castles and manor houses, became 
strongholds. These were often strengthened by earthen fortifications, the physical 
and documentary traces of which are now mostly fragmentary or lost. The 
prevailing techniques and tactics of mid-seventeenth-century siege-craft deployed 
in Shropshire ranged from subterfuge to concerted siege operations. The 
deployment of small numbers of artillery pieces by both sides often proved 
particularly effective. Notwithstanding the measures and counter-measures of 
attack and defence, the subjugation of a stronghold was often settled by 
negotiations conducted in accordance with military custom.  
 Intelligence work and medical care were important ancillary aspects of war effort 
that at the regional and local level of the Civil Wars have received little scholarly 
attention. This chapter has shown how gathering and communicating military 
intelligence in and around Shropshire was an essential activity for both sides. 
Commanders received a scatter of information, gleaned from patrolling troopers 
and scouts, prisoners, deserters, spies and gossiping townsmen and country-folk. 
The evidence - particularly that of Sir William Brereton's regional intelligence 
network - is slanted to the conclusion that the Parliamentarians more effectively 
gathered and acted on intelligence. Among Royalist commanders, however, Lord 
Capel for one sought to imbue his subordinates with an appreciation of the                                                         
174 Gough, Myddle, p. 41. 
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importance of accurate intelligence. Both sides provided medical care for the sick 
and wounded on a more or less ad-hoc basis, with most reliance placed on civilian 
practitioners and lay nurses. From the limited evidence no conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the efficacy of the opposing medical services in the Shropshire 
theatre of war, but clearly neither side wholly neglected this benevolent task of the 
war effort. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis has for the first time made a very thorough analysis of the military 
history of the county of Shropshire during the English Civil Wars of 1642 to 1646 
and in 1648. Shropshire's experience of the First Civil War in particular was 
remarkable. It was here in 1642 that King Charles I was first able to organise an 
effective army to uphold his cause by force of arms, and in 1646 where some of his 
most ardent supporters made their last stand. The war in Shropshire for most of the 
intervening years was more prolonged and intense than in many other English and 
Welsh counties. What had become a Royalist county was invaded, contested and 
gradually gained by Parliamentarian forces that, lacking access to local military 
resources, operated as an expeditionary force. Shropshire also experienced armed 
conflict in 1648 during the Second Civil War, albeit on a smaller scale and of less 
importance. 
 Shropshire has accordingly proved to be an excellent subject for the study of 
contemporary war effort, to consider as a whole the means by which Royalists and 
Parliamentarians directed, organised and sustained military operations. A more 
balanced study of the war effort of both sides has been achieved here than in similar 
county-centred studies, where the view of military activity has often been less 
detailed, and, because of the volume of extant source material, where most attention 
has been paid to the Parliamentarians. The number of surviving documents 
recording Royalist action in Shropshire, on the other hand, has been found to be 
exceptionally high in comparison to other English counties, and this has enabled 
more informed comparisons to be made of the war effort on both sides.  
 Having examined in detail the nature of military enterprise, this thesis has 
provided a much clearer picture of Civil War Shropshire. By this likely 
reconstruction of events and activity, it is now more fully understood how the 
combatants were led, how the armed forces they were able to field were organised, 
how those forces were funded, equipped, provisioned and supplied, and, by having 
looked closely at operational matters, how the county war was actually fought. This 
assessment of war effort in Shropshire has been informed by the study and 
evaluation of a very widespread selection of contemporary written and printed 
sources.  
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 In addition to undertaking a fresh military study of an English county during the 
Civil Wars, the secondary purpose of this thesis was, by taking a regional 
perspective, to inform wider interpretations of warfare in England at this time. 
Accordingly, the second important contribution this thesis has made to the 
historiographical knowledge of military activity during the period has been to show 
how organised war effort at county and regional level came into being and how it 
was sustained.  
 At county level, war effort for both sides was directed by relatively small 
numbers of leading local activists headed by a few outstanding and highly 
committed individuals, some of them serving as military leaders. However, a much 
larger body was involved in administering the war effort, individually acting with 
varying authority as civilian officials, or else serving in the military. Given the 
involvement also of farmers providing provisions and fodder, of artisans engaged 
in warlike production, of laymen and women proffering intelligence or providing 
medical care, and of a populace paying military taxes, Shropshire demonstrates well 
the widespread militarisation experienced by county communities deeply 
enmeshed in the war effort. In addition, the officials and structures of traditional 
county administration assumed wartime roles and responsibilities, alongside the 
new militarised leaderships of the commission of array and its sub-commissions 
and the county committee and its offshoots. At the level of regional military 
organisation, although Shropshire for much of the war formed part of a reasonably 
cohesive bloc of Royalist territory, allowing the regional commanders Lord Capel 
and Prince Rupert to enjoy considerable success in organising the war effort there, 
the county displayed the difficulties of forming successful regional commands 
where and when widespread and recurrent fighting hampered administration and 
prevented local forces from being deployed further afield.   
 Turning to material aspects of war effort, the means both sides nationally used to 
finance the war, by donations, subscriptions, fines, seizure and taxation, were also 
imposed in Shropshire to varying effect. War effort in Shropshire also reflected the 
national situation in that while most provisions were obtained locally, indigenous 
warlike production had to be heavily supplemented by imported military supplies. 
However, the findings from Shropshire have pointed to the extent and organisation 
of regional production, and to the versatility of local suppliers in fulfilling wartime 
requirements. The overriding importance to the national Parliamentarian cause of 
 218 
London, with its manpower and economic and financial resources, is demonstrated 
well by the example of Shropshire, a distant theatre of operations that was 
nonetheless substantially resourced from the capital. 
 The composition and role of the armed forces in Shropshire tend to support 
wider conclusions about English Civil War military organisation as expressed by 
Donagan, in that local forces were 'frequently small, heterogeneous and inadequate', 
and also that the armies, being mobile and widely distributed, were only rarely 
'heavily concentrated for major battles'.1 The war in Shropshire was to a certain 
extent insular, fought mostly by the opposing county forces heavily supported by 
auxiliaries detached or posted there, rather than being influenced by the 
intervention of the major field armies; neither the Royalist Oxford army, apart from 
skirting easterly Shropshire in May 1645 at the outset of the Naseby campaign, nor 
Parliament's main armies under the Earl of Essex, the Earl of Manchester, Sir 
William Waller, or, indeed, the New Model Army, campaigned in Shropshire. This 
tends to emphasise the achievement of local Parliamentarian arms, for the 
Shropshire forces - albeit with considerable auxiliary support - eventually regained 
the county without the benefit of intervention by an allied army to clear their way 
(other than the Earl of Denbigh's brief intervention in summer 1644). However, 
apart from the absence of the large field armies and consequently of pitched battles, 
warfare in Shropshire from 1642 to 1646 very much typified that elsewhere in 
England, being characterised by minor skirmishes and a few more significant small 
field engagements, and in particular by the attack and defence of garrisoned and 
fortified places, strong points being particularly widespread in Shropshire. Methods 
of fortification familiar elsewhere were employed in Shropshire, entailing the 
refurbishment of medieval works and the construction of earthworks of modern 
pattern. A good example from Shropshire of the frequently makeshift nature of 
Civil War fortification is Morton Corbet Castle, where the buildings of the medieval 
castle and the Tudor mansion, together with the nearby parish church, were made 
defensible alongside new earthen defences. 
 It is regarding Royalist activity during the First Civil War that Shropshire 
provides the most distinct findings to inform national interpretations of the conflict. 
These tend to refute determinist conclusions to the outcome of the war - that the 
overriding inadequacies of the Royalist war effort made the military defeat of King                                                         
1 Donagan, War in England, p. 218. 
 219 
Charles inevitable. Inherent administrative and logistical failings have been 
attributed to the Royalists by Hughes and Gentles, by Morrill, who saw 'financial 
thrombosis' destroying Royalist capability, and pointed to most volubly in a chapter 
by Holmes. He considered that King Charles’s response to organising leadership 
and mobilising resources was confused; that the Royalists' approach was 
conservative and too slow to adopt punitive wartime measures, such as 
conscription and sequestration; that local Royalist administration was divided and 
argumentative; and, overall, that the Royalists 'never developed as efficient a system 
for mobilising resources' as their opponents.2 
 The extant records have usually made it much easier for historians to 
demonstrate the superiority of Parliamentarian organisation than to prove the 
administrative and fiscal competence of their opponents. However, the rather fuller 
picture of Royalist activity in Shropshire is one of a considerable level of 
organisation and, as a result, of effective mobilisation of war effort, including 
taxation, recruitment, munitions production and logistical provision. Furthermore, 
it has been argued here that instead of being unduly hesitant to impose harsh 
wartime measures, regardless of King Charles's early sensitivity, the Royalists 
adopted exactions such as widespread taxation, sequestration and impressment 
before or around the same time as the Parliamentarians. Taking general military 
taxation as a barometer of administrative effectiveness, in terms of systematic 
organisation and the involvement as assessors and collectors of large numbers of 
parochial and higher officials, the Royalist contribution, especially during 1644, 
seems to have been as more or less viable a money-raising instrument as the 
Parliamentarian assessments from 1645 to 1648. The failings in contribution can be 
attributed more to military instability, war weariness and the inherent practical and 
bureaucratic difficulties of implementing widespread taxation of any sort in the 
seventeenth century, than to systemic failings in Royalist organisation. Overall, 
Royalist forces in Shropshire do not seem to have been any less well resourced or 
equipped than their Parliamentarian opponents, although clearly both sides 
experienced shortages and the difficulties of relying on long-distance lines of                                                         
2 Reference to Hughes's determinist view has been made on pp. 14-15 of this thesis; Gentles, 
in English Revolution, p. 127, concluded that 'Financially and logistically the Royalists were 
less well organised than Parliament'; Morrill, Revolt, p. 155; C. Holmes, Why Was Charles I 
Executed? (London, 2006), chapter four, ‘Why Did Parliament Win the Civil War?’, pp 71-92, 
quotation from p. 90. 
 220 
communication with their main depots. To help overcome these difficulties the 
Royalists attempted to develop local resources, and the adaptation of the Shropshire 
iron industry to warlike manufacture is a noteworthy example of successful 
regional production under Royalist direction.  
 Were the Royalists more prone to infighting? It is the case that in their 
correspondence the senior Royalist officers posted to Shropshire often expressed 
distrust and disrespect for the local commissioners and for the local 'amateur' 
soldiers. However, historians pre-occupied with the carping of outsiders to their 
patron Prince Rupert have perhaps overlooked positive evidence of 
interdependence and collaborative action, resulting from divisions overcome or 
patched over: of taxes gathered, resources secured, forces kept in the field and 
engagements won. By their ad hoc nature, Civil War command structures - of 
commissions and committees of civilians and soldiers, of regional commanders 
supported by few permanent headquarters staff, of locals and outsiders, of military 
professionals and amateurs - with their often blurred lines of demarcation of duties 
tended to foster cross purposes and generate rivalry and conflicts of interest. This 
study has also presented examples of Parliamentarian disharmony, like the officer 
on the Earl of Denbigh's staff who believed that the purpose of the county 
committees was only to provide the soldiers with resources and not to be involved 
in fighting the war.3  
 Unique failings in the Royalist war effort, then, cannot be proven in Shropshire's 
theatre of war during the First Civil War, although in 1648, if a Royalist 'war effort' 
of sorts can be discerned, it was disorganised and so easily broken by the county 
Parliamentarians.  
 Of course, the outcome of both Civil Wars in Shropshire was not determined 
there, but by military events elsewhere in 1645-6 and during 1648. Nonetheless, a 
protracted war within a war was fought for Shropshire from 1643 to 1646, so what 
were some of the strengths and weaknesses of the combatants? 
 The Shropshire Royalists benefitted by being part of a more cohesive regional 
command than the Parliamentarians were able to achieve by way of the West 
Midland Association, although it can be argued that the Shropshire 
Parliamentarians proportionally benefitted as much by their unofficial cooperative  
'association' with Sir William Brereton's Cheshire war effort and with Sir Thomas                                                         3 CSPD, 1649-1650, pp. 444-5. 
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Myddelton's campaigns into Wales. Brereton, for example, by assuming, de facto, 
the role of regional commander during winter 1644-5, brought reinforcements from 
Cheshire and also from Staffordshire and Yorkshire to Shropshire in early 1645. The 
Royalist regional commanders, Lord Capel, Prince Rupert, Prince Maurice and Lord 
Astley, and the deputy commanders, Lord Byron and Sir William Vaughan, 
collectively were among the most committed, and militarily and administratively 
able of King Charles's followers, with Rupert being the outstanding leading figure. 
However, their benefit to the local Royalists in Shropshire in the longer-term was 
patchy. Rupert, for example, attracted considerable forces to Shropshire and 
achieved military success there, but he, like the other commanders-in-chief, often 
campaigned further afield or was otherwise preoccupied with organisational 
matters elsewhere. The objectives of their Parliamentarian opponents, however, 
were tightly regionally focussed, so that they with their forces and military 
resources tended to remain in theatre; neither Brereton's well-organised Cheshire 
army, nor the smaller forces of Myddelton and the Shropshire Parliamentarians 
were obliged to fight elsewhere until 1646, when the war was already decided. The 
Shropshire Parliamentarians, although their forces were small and often 
outnumbered, achieved success because they were wholly committed to recovering 
their county, while Royalist attention and resources were often distracted 
elsewhere. Until early 1645, on the whole the Royalists had held military advantage 
in Shropshire, in terms of territorial control and in size of forces, and by successes in 
the field and in taking strong points. However, in the long term the 
Parliamentarians gained the three most important victories of the county war: by 
occupying and successfully defending Wem in autumn 1643; by capturing and 
holding Oswestry in summer 1644; and by taking Shrewsbury in early 1645. For 
whatever reason, the Royalists' inability to capture Wem, which had they done so at 
pivotal points in the county war would have stifled local enemy resistance and 
heavily damaged the regional Parliamentarian war effort, was their signal military 
failure in Shropshire. 
 Although this thesis has illuminated military affairs in Civil War Shropshire, 
there remain avenues of research which space has precluded discussion of here. 
This study has been concerned with examining the personnel and material aspects 
of war effort, but popular allegiance of course plays a vital part in determining the 
direction and outcome of any conflict, and the nature of this in Shropshire merits 
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further scrutiny. Apart from a good deal of support from among the gentry, what 
wider level of support determined Shropshire's Royalism? And what level of 
support did the Shropshire Parliamentarians enjoy, in, in effect, invading their 
home county? This thesis has tended to suggest that the Shropshire forces were 
heavily officered by outsiders, but can a local Parliamentarian officer corps of lower 
commissioned ranks be identified? Another topic meriting further research is the 
Civil War 'battlefields' of Shropshire, none of which, at the time of writing, has 
conclusively been located on the ground. 
 Returning to the earliest study of Civil War Shropshire, Farrow contended that 
the national conflict of 1642 to 1646 in particular could be reflected 'in miniature' in 
the county war. This thesis has perhaps proved that to be the case, the longevity and 
variability of Shropshire's war and the evidence of it having informed this 
comprehensive view of English Civil War war effort. Moreover, although historians 
have often and rightly stressed the extent of Civil War neutralism and the variability 
of active participation, the case study of Shropshire has on the other hand 
demonstrated the very well organised belligerency of the combatants. In local terms 
it has certainly countered the judgment of one county historian, who concluded that 
Shropshire ‘proved itself so unmilitaristic in the Civil War’.4  
  
  
  
                                                        
4 B. Trinder, A History of Shropshire (Chichester, 1998), p. 67. 
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